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Nitzsch, Carl Immanuel, 178
-1868.

System of Christian doctrin



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SYSTEM
OF
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE:

BY
DR CARL IMMANUEL NITZSCH.

TRANSLATED FROM THE
FIFTH REVISED AND ENLARGED GERMAN EDITION,

BY THE
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EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.
LONDON: HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.; DUBLIN: JAMES M'GLASHAN.

MDCCCXLIX.

EDINBURGH:
ANDREW JACK, PRINTER,
NIDDRY STREET.

NOTICE BY THE TRANSLATORS.

THE Translators avail themselves of the brief space usually allotted for notices to the reader, to state distinctly, that in offering a translation of Nitzsch's "SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE," they do not hold themselves responsible for, or identify themselves with, any peculiarities of opinion contained in the work.

Upon the whole, as regards its general spirit and tendency, the work stands high in the estimation of all competent judges, both in this country and on the Continent. As a concise, profound, and vigorous digest of thought and learning, it has been long known to every German student of divinity in Europe,—a work wherein Christian faith and Christian life combine in most perfect harmony, and not more remarkable for its profound learning than for its candour and truthfulness.

With respect to the translation, the Translators have experienced more than the usual difficulties. The work is intensely German in *manner*—that is, it is dry, often extremely obscure and repulsive, and cast throughout in a mode of thought so totally different from our own, as to bid defiance to any attempts to render it, in this respect, different from what it is in the original. Indeed the author himself, in the preface to a volume of his Sermons, candidly admits the almost invincible obscurity and hardness of his style. If the original, then, be obscure, how much more must even the best translation partake of this blemish.

To the mere general reader, and to those unacquainted with the style, phraseology, and mode of thought prevailing among German writers, this translation will often appear uncouth and inelegant; but that is a censure to which every translation of works like the present is liable: for the difficulty of rendering abstract truths by equivalent terms in English, is one that is often altogether insurmountable. A German has no difficulty in conveying the meaning he attaches to any philosophical idea by appropriate epithets, which, for the most part, can only be rendered into English by paraphrase or cumbrous circumlocution: a German scholar indeed, may MENTALLY translate with facility, and understand tolerably well, the meaning of a difficult author like Nitzsch; but that is a very different thing from translating for the press, and conveying in precise and definite terms, without comment, the ideas of an author, and unfolding, in perspicuous and intelligible expression, the involved sentences and intractable phraseology of the German school.

The Translators are painfully conscious of the many imperfections of their labours, nor can they flatter themselves that they have always been successful in penetrating into the entire meaning of their author; but they have conscientiously done their best to give an honest translation, and have never sacrificed for mere verbal display the MATTER of the original. With a view to its usefulness as a work of reference, they have taken every pains to secure the utmost accuracy of the numerous references to Scripture, according to the English version; and, in the main, they trust that the work may be consulted with confidence.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

ON the repeated publication of a manual by means of which I first entered into closer connection with a wider circle of the Theological public, I have felt a double duty, *first*, Wherever it was possible, to preserve the original character of the work, whilst farther expanding it, and, *secondly*, To the best of my ability, to bestow on it those corrections and improvements, which either the progress of my own mind or the experience derived from scientific intercourse may have suggested, since the last edition. It is hoped that those principles of faith and science, on which the work was originally grounded, and which no subsequent experience has tempted me to renounce, will be clearly recognised in the additional developments accompanying this edition. Why I have allowed the system, as such, not only in its ground-work, but also in its essential structure, to remain as before, notwithstanding the many objections that have been raised by some, and the attempts that have since been made by others, well deserving consideration, the work itself will show. In so far as I have felt a call for systematic theology, it has ever been my aim, above all things, to comprehend with increasing depth and fulness, the material for Christian doctrine in its original purity, and hence it has resulted that my work has necessarily assumed an exegetical character with a retrospective bearing on Biblical Theology. Having found the unity of Christian representations in Soteriology, that is, in the view of the Divine and human, as determined by the existence and ministry of Christ, I recognised the central point of all doctrines, not in the

gnostic element, but in the historical and practical one associated with it, and consequently only in the Redeemer himself. Accordingly, I have endeavoured to recognise and represent theoretical and practical Christianity in its original unity and reciprocal action, and I have adopted no doctrinal material which may not relate to the confirmation, the nourishment and excitement of Christian consciousness, and co-operate towards the regeneration of a true church system. Thus the idea which is rooted in a vital and biblical representation, and which endeavours to unite itself with science, in other words, the Christian determination of the general idea of religion, so far as I was able, and so far as this scientific unity of the consciousness possessed by the church at the present day required and admitted, has been fully developed. In this way, and with such an object, I have pursued speculative doctrine, which, even in our day, as often as it consciously or involuntarily retreats upon this standing-point, confers a true benefit on theology. Opposed to absolute Theo-Logic, I would gladly occupy the lower stage of reflection and maintain a dialectic contrast.

It has been my constant endeavour to supply any deficiencies occurring throughout the work. Hence, in this edition, the doctrine on the Holy Scripture and its interpretation has been more amply developed, partly in the text and partly in the notes, so far as space permitted, and with reference to the article on the same subject, wherein I have criticised Strauss's *Doctrine of Faith*. The consideration of the festival of Sunday, which is a fact of the Apostolical Church, and the idea of the Sabbath in the New Testament, were omitted in former editions; on the present occasion, (§ 194) I have united the doctrine of the Lord's day with the idea of congregational prayer. For many reasons I have deemed it necessary to consider the subject of the prohibition of images in the manner it has been handled at page 320. The connection of the church doctrine of faith with the apostolical standing-point, which has hitherto been referred to the notes, I

have more fully enlarged upon in the articles on the Person of Christ, Preaching, and Baptism; but what has been added is frequently nothing more than literary and historical notices. In general, I have sought to continue the dogmatic tendency of the work which I have felt advisable to maintain since its last appearance in 1839; an attempt, which, apart from the leisure and ability of the author, has been restricted by its own limits. This work is not and ought not to be regarded as dogmatic in the full sense of the term. Those authors with whom I differ in the main I have endeavoured on every occasion to treat with courtesy; but I have not entered on the tendencies of the age which appear absolutely foreign to the subject, as regards faith or science, because this would only have been to anticipate questions belonging to a region purely philosophical. Those attacks only which have been directed against Christian theism are repelled in their proper places; more especially when treating on the evidence of the existence and attributes of the Deity, on miracles, &c. On this subject, perhaps I may venture to refer to my critical reviews of Strauss' doctrine which have appeared in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, and to an academical sermon, *Christianity and Freedom*, in the fifth selection of my sermons. I have taken no notice of numerous writings, which, although they start more or less from a theistical standing-point, degrade the facts and positive doctrines of Christianity to a mere transient symbol of religious truth, and my reason is, that the entire tendency of my work opposes such views. Schelling's professed Realism, indeed, I might have so far appropriated, inasmuch as he, in contrast with all modern speculation, fully recognises the distinction and relation of the two great directions of religio-historical development, Ethnicism and Revelation, which my manual has from the first indicated as the history of passive and active religious consciousness. I have not, however, made any quotations, since I was not in possession of authentic communications. I am desirous, even within the limits of the present work, of connecting myself with that absolute Biblical realism,

such as for the most part is fairly represented in Germany by Beck and Stier; for this tendency is venerable and dear to me, because it discovers such a multitude of Biblical facts, connection, and unity, for which exegetical proof is actually possible, and which in others is wanting; and by means of such discoveries how does all confidence in Scripture and all love for its study increase, and how is the shallowness of so many a learned tradition abashed and subdued! We can acknowledge this, be thankful for it, and profit by it, and yet not be in a condition to abridge the history of religious science to the extent required, in order to commence anew at the very letter of revelation; and this especially when such procedure relates to physical, empirical, and cosmical questions, in a manner altogether different from ethical and metaphysical ones. To me the relation of faith to natural science is a matter of indifference, for the blessing of revelation, as the renewer and sanctifier of self-consciousness, is independent thereof. Undoubtedly the *idea* of religion receives its determinations, realizations, and immunities from religion as a fact; it indicates itself primarily through this realization, but as an organ of science and appropriation it does not lose thereby the right of its own independency. Science, however, is not without its history.

The present work has not escaped the charge, from many quarters, of eclecticism. Eclecticism, in the sense of indiscriminate selection, deserves, beyond a doubt, to be condemned on the part of science; but when we behold an example before us, that in one and the same criticism of Christianity Böhme, Spinoza, Edelmann, Reimarus, Wegscheider, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, have organically grown up together into one body, and thus accomplished their analytical process: well indeed, upon the conservative and restorative side, ought an Eclecticism, comprehending many elements which have appeared in succession and in contrast, accomplish that which is appropriate to its character.

BONN, 24th April, 1844.




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
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INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. GENERAL VIEW.

AN Introduction to a System of Christian Doctrine comprehends within its scope the following fourfold design :—

1. It assigns to the system its appropriate place in the circle of theological study, by means of which the IDEA of this science is at the same time determined.

2. It has to define the object of a scientific representation, or the GENERAL IDEA of Christianity.

3. It undertakes to give an account of the laws by which a knowledge of Christianity is acquired.

4. And, finally, it unfolds the history of the Christian system, and exhibits it in its purest form.

I. THE IDEA AND OBJECT OF A SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

§ 2. RELATION TO THE CATECHISM.

Christian doctrine, regarded as theological science, is a species of systematic theology. As such, it is to be distinguished not only from homiletical and catechetical exposition addressed to the congregation,¹ for which it should rather provide preparatory instruction relative to a knowledge of the object and idea of the Christian system ; but it also differs from a catechism of Christian doctrine ; for it cannot be considered,

like the catechism, as a text of the public doctrine and public confession, such as church communion recognizes, nor can it be viewed as forming the basis of a general knowledge of Christianity. Christian doctrine belongs rather to the province of the theologian who co-operates in expanding the catechism,² and promoting its use, in so far as that object depends upon the systematic skill of the theologian. Christian doctrine, or religious doctrine, is, in one point of view, a more perfect, and in another, a more imperfect species of systematic theology; and how far this is the case will subsequently appear.

¹ Twesten's observation, in his admirable Lectures, (*Vorless. üb. d. Dogm. &c.*, i. p. 89 seq.), which have exhausted the subject, on the relation of dogma to the doctrinal exposition of the clergy addressed to the congregation, is equally applicable to Christian doctrine, or to the scientific union between the doctrine of faith and morals. Both, namely systematic doctrine and homily, are serviceable to the church, and both treat of Christianity. Still, however, the standing point and aim of the former, the source of the latter, and the matter and form of both, are somewhat different. Compare Schleiermacher's *Glaubensl.* 2d edit. i. p. 123.

² In a second or third stage of catechetical instruction, we may venture to recognise Christian doctrine in the unity and totality of its organic connection. The Palatinate Catechism will ever remain a model. See Theobl. Græber, on a New General Catechism in Nitzsch and Sack's *Monatschrift f. d. Ev. Kirche*, 1843, p. 329. But upon the basis of even Luther's Small Catechism, a doctrinal system may be raised, and this by receiving all the other principal points into the chief head of the three articles of the Christian faith, which has been attempted by Seiler, Dinter, Hebel, and Schmieder. This, however, can only be done according to methods which are based upon a knowledge of the system of Christian doctrine.

REMARK 1. The use of the term DOCTRINE, as signifying a scientific system of cognitions of any kind, is justified by usage. Doctrine of Christianity, Christian doctrine, Christian religious doctrine, are all possible designations of theological discipline.

We prefer the more definite term, system of Christian doctrine, or system of Christianity.

REMARK 2. We shall not discuss the subject of popular dogma or ethics, nor of the material for pulpit doctrine, which has been improperly termed, practical theology; such cannot be regarded as valid kinds of systematic theology. See Schleiermacher's *Glaubensl.* 2d edit. i. p. 172. But we shall endeavour here to follow the plan advanced by Bretschneider, *Handb. der Dogmatik.* 3d edit. i. § 5, under the title of Christian Theology, and afterwards accomplished, in his own way, under the title of *Religiöse Glaubenslehre*, &c. 1843, and which Hyperius has often termed *Methodum Universæ Theologiæ*.

§ 3. RELATION TO DOGMA AND ETHICS.

The science of Christian doctrine undoubtedly possesses something in common with the catechism, and still more with ecclesiastical religious doctrine immediately applied to congregational purposes; that is to say, the religion of Christians in the inseparability of perception and action, or in the unity of Christian life (*Χριστιανισμός, ὁδὸς κυρίου, Θεοσεβεία χριστιανῶν*), serves for the subject-matter of ecclesiastical doctrine, not of course meaning thereby to deny the distinctions naturally existing between these two elements. But the attempt to unite them, by which our science recedes from dogma and ethics, and approximates to the most perfect form of systematic theology, is at all times both possible and necessary. It is possible,¹ because Christian life remains a unity, and between perception and action, a mutual dependency exists, similar to that dependency which reciprocates between individual parts of perception and action themselves; and it is eminently necessary, because sometimes ethics forget their dependence upon *doctrinal faith*, and sometimes dogma forgets its relation to moral *doctrine*; and still more is it so, since the knowledge of what constitutes the very foundation and extent of Christianity has been disputed and rendered insecure.

¹ The preliminary proof of this possibility lies in the general

admission of the fact, that there are points in dogma from whence the theologian will have to look forward to ethics; and, in like manner, there are points in ethics whence he will necessarily have to look back upon the doctrine of faith; and, further, in the universal admission that there are doctrines common to both. Compare Schleiermacher, i. § 26.

REMARK. We take for granted that the separate treatment of dogma and ethics is by no means filled up or supplanted by the development of a system of Christian doctrine. Compare Steudel. *Glaubensl.* p. 88. Kling *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1834, iv. p. 4.

§ 4. RELATION TO BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.

Christian doctrine, developed within these limits, and in this systematic point of view, declines the regulating interposition of symbolic writings, and withdraws itself from all immediate dependence on the formal system of the church, and more especially is this the case, because it is the express office of Christian doctrine to assist and guide the examination, confirmation, and expansion of the former. Still, Christian doctrine has this in common with Biblical theology, that they are both deficient in historical completeness; and, on that very account, is a more imperfect species of systematic theology. Christian doctrine differs, however, from Biblical theology, in that it does not prominently recognise the expansive progression of the successive stages of revelation, from Abraham to the apostles; nor does it especially take cognizance of the unity and multiformity of the various Scripture doctrines, belonging to one and the same stage; but rather, it apprehends the period of completed revelation, and of Christian faith and life, in its finished form, just as it was under apostolic instruction, and in apostolic communion originally and typically, for all times.

REMARK 1. Biblical theology has experienced a defective treatment, in so much as, instead of being almost exclusively

cultivated in its genetic character, it ought rather to have furnished, before everything else, a new system of Christian doctrine. De Wette's and Von Cöllen's labours approximate very closely to our view in relation to form, although, from the double state of Hebrewism and Judaism in the Old Testament, we construct a three-fold one, and embody the element of morality in a still greater proportion. Baumgarten-Crusius also does the same, although he endeavours to pursue the internal genesis of the Bible, in relation to each particular leading Christian doctrine of faith, and entirely excludes the doctrine of morals.

REMARK 2. Just as the History of Dogma is related to the Dogmatic, and the History of Moral Doctrine to Ethics, so Biblical theology is related to the system of Christian doctrine. See Baumgarten-Crusius' *Grundzüge der Bibl. Theol.* Jena 1828, p. 3. "Biblical theology introduces Dogmatic history, as they are, in spirit, kindred disciplines."

II. ON THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.

§ 5. RELIGION AND REVELATION.

What Christianity really is, can only be scientifically understood, when in part, its specific resemblances¹ to, and in part its differences from, other forms of man's spiritual life, are duly apprehended. To the former appertains the idea of religion; to the latter, the idea of revelation.² Now, there is no contradiction in the fact, that revealed religion, as such, is opposed to all others, and yet is incorporated into the unity of the idea and history of religion. The inward operation of the idea manifested in all religions, are different from their absolute realizations; from which again, indeed, the pure conscious idea is derived; and yet the negative and positive preparatives of this realization in part maintain a common relation to it, and in part also, the real and unreal phenomena of the idea maintain a common relation to the idea itself.

The untrue, the false, are, as such, opposed to the idea.

The half-true and erroneous are plainly opposed to the absolute reality of truth; as, however, the untrue and the false are really nothing in themselves, they have simply to be reduced back again to their relation unto truth; and thus these two kinds of consideration are complete.

¹ See my *Treatise on the Religious Idea of the Ancients*, in *den Studien und Kritiken*, &c. Published by Ullman and Umbreit, vol. i. part iii. p. 527-32. Schleiermacher's dogma (*Glaubensl.* p. 17), "In order to ascertain, in what the essence of Christian piety consists, we must pass beyond Christianity, and take our stand above it, in order to compare it with other kinds of faith," is, if there be any philosophical theology at all, an absolutely necessary one. It is apparent in various ways, from Acts x. 35, xvii. 23; John viii. 47, &c., that Christianity, even in its immediate life, applies to a piety which precedes it, and exists without it.

² A doctrine of religion adapted to Christian theology necessarily conducts, by means of religious history, to the idea of revelation.

A. Of Religion.

§ 6. IDEA.

Christianity is a determinate mode of man's life: it hath this in common with many other, or all other modes of human life, namely, it is religious;¹ that is, it is a mode of life determined by its relation to, or conscious dependence upon God.² That a religious destiny appertains to human life as such, and to man's existence in every grade,³ and that it does not exclusively appropriate to itself either knowledge, conception, action, or the will, but conditionates the entire functions and circle of life, whether existing in a spiritual condition, or capable of doing so,—are truths not to be disputed.

¹ The word Religion, if we merely consider its derivation from the Latin, may be as correctly derived from *religare* as from

religere; for in the first place, the third conjugation lies at the root of many verbs of the first, second, and fourth conjugations, so that the third might be correctly termed the first, or the other three alternate with it; for example, the verb *optere* preludes *optare*, whence *optio*; *jurgere* (ob) *jurgare* (*jure agere*), whence *jurgium*; *postulere*, *postulare*, whence *postulio*; *bellere* *bellare*, whence *rebellio*, &c. And it would seem that in certain aspects the word *ligere*, to bind, is more primitive than *ligare*, and this view I concede to licentiate Müller (*Study of Theology*, 1835, p. 156), and to Dr Hahn (*De rel. et superstit. nat. et ratione*, Veratisl. 1834) in preference to that adduced in my *Treatise on the Religious Idea of the Ancients*. But that the word nevertheless is only derived from *religere*, *religare*, to read again, to observe, &c. appears to philologists incontrovertible, (apart from other facts of the custom of language adduced by Müller,) from the old adage, “*religentem esse oportet, religiosum nefas.*” The objection of Müller and Hahn, that the derivation of the ancients cannot generally be confided in, is inadmissible; for derivations which are made with design or at a venture, artificial, individualised, and manifestly impossible is one thing, and quite another are those involuntary ones which spring out of the intercommunion of conception and language, in the form of proverbs, and before the period, correctly speaking, of etymological acumen, and, which, moreover, are in themselves both possible and even probable. Thus the idea fundamentally associated with the term *religio*, is not obligation, or bond; but *respectus*, *observantia*, respect, observation. Müller ascribes to the word *religere* its original signification,—reflection, thought; and associates this signification with the fundamental idea of religion as awe, fear, scrupulosity. This opinion might be harmonised with the rest, but space will not admit of it here. Since Dietrich has proved (*Theo. Stud. und Krit.* 1847, i. 152), that the word PFLICHT (duty) is not derived from *flecten* (to plait), but from *pflegen* (to cherish), it cannot any longer be used analogously for *religio*,—obligation.

² Religion is not a mode of perceiving and venerating God, but rather a form of perception, thought, action, and feeling, which has the Divine for its object, basis, and aim. The usual, but not the ancient, abstract definition could only suffice for that theological period from which the philosophy of religion was as yet estranged. Such definition explains nothing fundamentally, but it intimates that there is a manifoldness in the revelation of

God, or in the developments of the original religious predisposition. Its only commendation consists in combining knowledge and action,—a commendation which Strauss, while he assumes it as a starting-point, at once entirely mars by directly sacrificing the other element *colere*,—on the other hand, its most essential defect consists in neglecting to reduce both elements into one, and overlooking its generic characteristic. The latter is correctly added by Baumgarten-Crusius (*Introduction to the Study of Dogma*, p. 3), who defines religion to be a certain quality, a relation of the whole life, &c. The unity of religious action, condition, or conduct, is preserved by *cultus, agnitio numinis*, as stated by Henke and the ancients; or by *modus colendi Deum*, according to Heilmann and Döderlein; for as *agnoscere* includes the practical, so on the other hand *colere* does not exclude the theoretical. Still more accurately expressed by Ammon, “the sacred bond of consciousness, &c.,” and by Schwartz, “The scrupulous consciousness of our own and the world’s dependence on God;” and by Steudel, “resignation unto God.” But whoever considers the statement of the objective, namely, “dependence upon God,” too precise, will either (according to the preceding argument,) apply Cicero’s *Superior Natura quam divinam vocant*, also *numen divinum*, το θεῖον, (God in general according to a more modern mode of expression,) or else substitute with Schleiermacher the objective for the subjective, “consciousness of absolute dependence.” The element of required *re-union* and *re-connection* with God, or the supposition of the fall of man, does not lie in the previous and general idea of religion, although Sack in his *Apology*, first ed., Hahn in his *Compendium of Christian Faith*, Leonhard Clemens Schmitt in his *Construction of Theological Evidence*, and others, are of opinion it does so. The idea of religion excludes as well as includes in itself the existence of sin; it is prospective in regard to the mere possibility of sin, even as it is retrospective in reference to actual sin about to be removed. But in no case ought we to adopt the views of those who have recently declared the subjectivity of religious conception to be partial. See Leonh. Clem. Schmitt’s *Construction of Theological Evidence*, Bamberg, 1836, p. 15. For God is in no sense religious; the creating, revealing, and redeeming activity of God is not an act of religion. Although it be true that the Christian supplicates God in and through God, and approaches God through God; yet that

God adores God is in nowise religion, unless indeed it be the *θεὸς ἐν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ* of the Arians; nor does God's annunciation of himself to man constitute religion; but in each element of religion a difference subsists between the object, who is God, and the subject, which is relative and capable of relation. So that even in the union of the Christian with Christ in the Holy Spirit, the divine Spirit, already subjective, becomes again objective, and thus still less is the objectivity of the Father and the Son dissolved. Those theologians who desire to represent and to conceive religion as a kind of Divine activity, or as a mutually reciprocating activity, should remember that either no logic, or the logic of speculative pantheism lies at the bottom of their treatment of the subject.

According to Hegel and Vatke, religion is a process of the mind, in which case it can easily be understood, that subjectivity can only be an evanishing of the idea under discussion.

He only who teaches this identity of the subjective and objective, will presume to confound the process of revelation, which is a Divine action, with the process of religion; for as to such identity, though it be acknowledged to exist in the essence of God, it is not recognised in religion,—for to perceive it in religion would be equivalent to seeing religious dissolution. If religion were a relationship, or, as some call it, an interchange of relation (as Klee) between God and man, it would either not be possible to understand it as a function, or else only as a two-fold one; and as these two activities could not be on an equality, but, of necessity, in the order of subjection, as the modified and modifying, or the influenced and influencing, so it would only be possible to recognise them as divine cause and effect. Religion is rather a reference and relationship of finite consciousness to the Creator, Sustainer, and Governor, therefore it is man's communion with God and his adoration of God.

³ The spirit, the personal being, the rational creature, as such, is religious, and atheism is only an attempt not to be so.

§ 7. CAUSE OR ORIGIN.

Religion by no means fills up the circle of human life in such a manner, as if it emanated, in the first instance, from a cen-

tre, upon every incidental occasion; that is to say, it does not arise so much from experience and sensation, or from reflection added to the sum-total of experience and sensation, as it does from an original self-consciousness; on the contrary, the latter (self-consciousness) is alone the constant cause and ground of religion. And although we may venture to assert that man, by the mutual action and reaction of the external and internal, and also through experience, revelation, education, and tradition, may be raised up to a knowledge of God, and that religion everywhere possesses and promotes a process of improvement, yet if education were not already preceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operative predisposition,¹ there would be nothing for education and culture to operate upon.

In this dogma all religious philosophers since Kant² to a certain extent concur, however they may in other respects differ. Moreover, it is in harmony with all the true philosophy of antiquity,³ as well as that of the middle ages; so that now it is a comparatively easy problem either to annul or to adjust the empirical deductions of religion; for the most modern speculative school assumes, indeed, in its latest development of religion (in form and substance) its duration and constancy:—otherwise a perfected idea would justify the cutting asunder the vital cord of religion itself. But indisputably, this speculative school concedes to religion, in the process of human consciousness, this necessity of origination, this indwelling in the spirit, this origin.

REMARK 1. The process of religious life undoubtedly exhibits to us, not merely actions from an internal cause tending to without, but also reactions tending to within; and the latter are always originally modified by the former. Religious association wields a definite influence over individual life, but this only occurs after it has itself sprung from the expressive impulse of original and universal consciousness of God. Pious feeling is awakened in man by the contemplations of nature and art; (see Seneca *Ep.* 51) but the inducing cause these contemplations supply to religion is not an efficient one, and the admonitory power which the external world exercises is not originally an instruc-

tive one. The same argument applies to reflection. If spiritual development, on its part, may even be modified by contact with the external world; yet certain kinds of external experience or certain qualities of collective experience do not so conditionate development as to render it religious.

REMARK 2. If we derive religion from immediate and original consciousness, and therefore from facts, and consequently from experience, it is nevertheless obvious that we do not thereby assign to it either a temporal or an empirical origin, correctly speaking; for both kinds of experience agree with each other merely in this—the exclusion of an origin purely from reflection.

REMARK 3. The phenomenon of religion may be illustrated empirically by deducing it—

a. From certain impressions received from the sensible world, that is to say, from natural phenomena, exciting dread, or exhibiting benevolence, which leads man, by means of his imagination, or reflection, beyond the field of sensible observation.

b. From the contemplation of nature in general.

c. From the useful inventions of a Numa, Lycurgus, &c.

d. From original external revelation, to which reason is related as a purely passive organ, and heathenism as a feeble relic.

These derivations, in so far as they do not consist in direct evasion, which infidelity pursues, are however all deficient in philosophical seriousness, and are either merely the rudiments of the true derivation, or else admit in some degree of being vindicated by their partial relations to the RELIGIONES. And in like manner we may reason concerning the third or irreligious derivation. For otherwise the latter would create far more obscurity than clearness, and would resemble what Thrasymachus says in Plato *v. Republic*. 1, concerning *δίκαιον*, namely, that it is nothing more than the interest of him who is in authority.

Lucretius does not represent *fear* as the cause of thankfulness towards God, but as the origin of a futile veneration for Deity, which a contemplation of nature is calculated to destroy; in other respects he would have been as correct had he placed fear at the head of passive religious excitations, as to represent reverential awe as the first of the active ones. For in this twofold point of view *δεισιδαιμονία*, *φοβεῖσθαι τὸ θεῖον*, *σεβέσθαι*, &c., were applied to religion in general. As to the question whether *fear* or *love* be the earlier element in religion, we refer to

Köppen's *Philosophy of Christianity*, 2d edit. vol. i. p. 20. Schleiermacher, too, (in his *Discourses on Religion*, 3d edit. p. 109) has shown how untenable a religion, regarded as merely originating from the dread of a Being who darts his lightning or wields his thunder, would have proved. The feeling of dependence, in its durability, universality, and inexhaustible depth, is so much the less capable of being explained by the power of sensible impressions of an agreeable or disagreeable kind, since either one impression obliterates another, or all are deprived of their absolute force by experience, habit, or reflection. If these impressions retain this force, then must the latter originate from some other source, namely, from a permanent excitability of the original God-feeling through a mediating world-consciousness. A like argument applies to *b*. For it is one thing to grant a physico-theological or cosmological demonstration; and quite another to deduce from thence the ground or cause of religion. The former has its value, indeed it is said in the *Book of Wisdom* xiii. 1, *Μάταιοι μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει, οἷς παρῆν Θεοῦ ἀγνοσία*, and *οὐκ ἴσχυσαν εἰδέναι τὸν ὄντα*; but notwithstanding, in v. 8, *Πάλιν δὲ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ συγγωστοί*; also in Romans i. 20, *ἀναπολόγητοι*. Now if Paul, as well as the pseudo-Solomon, appear to require from them only a cosmological or physico-theological inference, still this acknowledgment of such a requirement is founded upon the hypothesis, that the spirit may possess an innate capacity and destiny for receiving and following the motives of its consciousness of God. Besides, other passages must be compared; as Acts of the Apostles xvii. 27, 28; Romans ii. 15, with Romans i. 19. In whatever sense we may interpret *τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ* and *ἐν αὐτοῖς*, Paul maintains categorically, v. 21, *διότι γινόντες τὸν Θεὸν οὐχ ὡς Θεὸν ἐδοξασαν*, and Melancthon remarks on v. 20, *quamquam enim mens ratiocinatur aliquid de Deo ex consideratione mirabilium ejus operum in universa rerum natura, tamen hunc syllogismum ratio non haberet, nisi, etiam Deus aliquam notitiam κατὰ πρόληψιν indidisset mentibus nostris: et alia mirabilia spectacula rerum πρόληψιν excitant*. If experience and the contemplation of nature begets religion, whence springs unbelief? All men have experience and testimonies of the works of God. And among these are many who are not Scythians, but richly endowed with understanding, and yet deny man's dependence upon God, as for example Democritus and Epicurus. Now if the guilt of this denial

lies as deep, as Paul in Romans i. 18 assures us it does, then, it follows, that mere experience apprehended by the understanding would just as much impede as advance the recovery of religion; accordingly as the mind had previously been true to itself or not.

The fourth derivation is alike unsatisfactory; for, in a Christian sense, Revelation always assumes religion to be in a state of decay; in another and more extended sense, however, religion must ever be regarded as addressing itself, in its manifestations or inspirations, to a spirit; now to this spirit, as such, belongs not a nude and isolated self-consciousness, but an internal revelation of God, of which, clouded though it be, it cannot be deprived without ceasing to exist.

¹ Köppen, in his *Philosophy of Christianity*, vol. i. p. 22, has the following remark: "We have no knowledge of a dynamic influence, spiritual or physical, without a dynamic reaction; in this case, man was not merely reared in the knowledge of God, but already possessed a perception of Deity, and became conscious of his doing so by means of a special preparation."

² Jacobi, Schleiermacher, Fries, and Clodius, have undoubtedly contributed more than any others, and each in his own peculiar way, towards the support of this opinion, so that the immediate existence of religion in man's self-consciousness, and a higher and deeper origin of it than either empiricism or reflection could offer, has again come to be generally recognised; and it might seem that Kant had as yet no share in this retrogression or progression of the age; nor Hegel, since he treated the doctrine with contempt. By the former, however, philosophy has been, for the first time, introduced into the realms of immediate consciousness, after a long period of dry neglect; albeit such philosophy was principally merely that of morals. And the latter, although he advocates a mediating process and a change of direct consciousness, in order that the true nature of the *objective* should reach the conscience, naturally does justice to mere experience or reflection (in the form of faith, of feeling, &c.), as opposed to immediate knowledge. (See *Encyclopædia of Philosophical Science*, 2d edit. p. 64, where he thus expresses himself): "It can scarcely occur to Philosophy that she should contradict those tenets of immediate knowledge; she ought rather to congratulate herself, perhaps, that these her ancient tenets, which express the whole of her general substance, had become

in so unphilosophical a manner, certain general prejudices of our age—Tenets—namely, that that which is held to be true is inherent in the Spirit, and that truth is for the Spirit.” In like manner do the successors of Hegel reason; only that one class of them have resolved more and more upon a philosophical celebration of a second annihilation of religion; and, in accordance with such views, the immediate origin of religion in human self-consciousness indicates and demonstrates, rather, the untruth of religious conceptions, than their certainty and truth. Frauenstadt maintains that Faith and Thought, Religion and Science, are absolutely irreconcilable contradictions. According to Feuerbach, religion is a dream of the human mind; a personal God, the creation of the fancy and of the mind (of the desire) nothing objectively real; if not the true essence of man, the objectively true man himself in the dreaminess of faith. Strauss, correcting both, says, that religion is the imagined and felt perception of the relation between the finite and the absolute, *i. e.*, the preliminary and more imperfect stage of rational perception. On the other hand, Vatke asserts, (*Human Freedom*, 1841, p. 20, &c.) that not the eternal essence of religion, but a certain phenomenal appearance, is subdued by the incursions of free thought.—Irreligion can only be an opinion, which religion as such endeavours to annihilate. Such a view the rational character must ever utterly condemn. It is the opinion of the abstract understanding, which speculation is justified in protesting against.

³ According to Plato, (in his *Phaedon*,) and to Menon, the knowledge of the beautiful, the good, the just, and the holy, is as much the reminiscence of a pre-existing state of the soul, as the knowledge of equals, the greater and the less. On which point Boethius aptly says (*de Consolatione Philos.* 3 Met. iv.):

Hæret profecto semen introrsum veri,
 Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.
 Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis,
 Ni mersus alto viveret fomes corde?
 Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur.

In Cicero *de Natura Deorum*, D. i. Velleius boasts, Solus Epicurus vidit primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem

quandam Deorum, quam appellat *πρόληψιν*, Epicurus, *i.e.*, antceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quicquam nec quæri nec disputari potest. Joann. Damasc. *Exp. Fid.* i. 3, ἡ γνώσις τοῦ εἶναι θεὸν φυσικῶς ἡμῶν ἐγκατέσπαρται.—Innate ideas or notions. It is evident how very much the acknowledgment of the origin of religion from immediate consciousness must, at all times, have been serviceable to the apologists of Christianity and of Christian belief in revelation. But the anonymous author of the question addressed to me, (*Theol. St. u. Krit.*, 1841, 4, compare 1843, 3, “The harmony of immediate and certain self-consciousness with the contents of Holy Scriptures,”) has applied the doctrine of immediate self-consciousness in a manner calculated rather to destroy than to establish the Christian doctrine of faith: Immediate, determinate self-consciousness constitutes our finiteness and God’s existence; all knowledge of the existing state of God is merely an apparent knowledge; Christ is revelation, once for all, because, whilst He impersonated the highest *Norm* of faith and life, He has nowhere communicated information concerning the Essence of God such as would include a truth incomprehensible to finite minds. The Trinity, Original Sin, Reconciliation, &c., are transferred, according to this mode of reasoning, to an assumed Perception, which is grounded upon no authority, or is merely speculative. Just as if the who, which, what? (he is uncertain on the point) could have any meaning; and just as if immediate self-consciousness should be incapable of development by means of thought and experience. Whereas, let the source of Christian dogmas in the Apostolic consciousness, be only compared with Scripture, and the resemblance of this genesis with that of religion in general will be apparent, and will constitute a preliminary defence against various questions of a sceptical tendency.

§ 8. ORIGINAL FORM.

Subordinate to the admitted dogmas of modern philosophy, although not unimportant, is the question, what really does constitute this original consciousness in reference to religion? Which question, again, resolves itself into another, namely,

does religion, according to its fundamental, and as it were legislative form in the conscience, possess in itself a pure and absolutely simple immediateness, or a certain modification of the same?—a question which again may be thus expressed—whether does a determinating precedence in matters of religion appertain unto *faith* or to *knowledge*? Those who uphold the theory of a simple and absolute immediateness, are wont to designate the original form of religion, sometimes Intuition, sometimes Perception and thought,—*reason*, in contradistinction to *understanding* or feeling; or they appeal to the totality and fundamental unity of consciousness, or to a nameless something,—an X, which they place before perception, feeling, and will.¹

REMARK 1. How far from being indifferent to the theologian, in the present state of science, are these extremely controverted and difficult questions, will hereafter be apparent from our doctrine on the formal defects of religion. In order to acquire historical information on the very different ideas which the leading thinkers of our age, particularly since Kant and Jacobi, have entertained of faith, sensation, intuition, thought, and idea, and in order to avoid rash conclusions from traditional definitions, the student may consult the following works:—Bouterwek, *Rel. der Vernunft—Religion of Reason*, Gott. 1824, First Treatise, p. 3, 54; Baumgarten-Crusius' *Introduction to the Study of Dogma*, p. 54-76; and C. Hase *de Fide* lib. ii. Tüb. 1825. Unless we are acquainted with those changes Schleiermacher and Hegel introduced in the psychological usage of language and thought (because they were necessary for the period), we are incompetent to discuss those theological questions of the age which have (for the most part) a progressive and productive character. There are at the present day two kinds of scientific language, which occasion much confusion, when they either accord or disagree. The modern dialect always understands the ancient, because the latter has nothing either novel or difficult to express. Sometimes, however, it is unwilling to understand it. The ancient dialect can only understand itself; but cannot comprehend the modern.

REMARK 2. In certain respects, the terms, consciousness, mind,

&c., are admissible; but only as temporary expedients for avoiding controversy; for, the inquiry *concerning relations*, which in this way are still left undeveloped, must not be entirely shunned. In consciousness, a condition, an object, and in part an activity are distinguishable, by means of which the subject is related to the object; and in part an action can be observed by which the subject obtains its determinations from the object. Now, there arise two questions, in reference to religious consciousness, which, as original and immediate, we have opposed to reflection and experience, so soon as religion is traced back from the mediate life of doctrine, and mode of action, to consciousness. (1st.) Whether religious certainty and truth depend most upon my disposition of mind; how I am touched or excited (upon sensation, subjective consciousness); or upon what I perceive, observe (on objective consciousness), and in what way the one is modified or perfected by the other; and (2d.), Whether the perfection of religious consciousness consists more in the free activity of thought and apprehension, as the mediating principles of the subjective and imparted; or more in susceptibility for revelation and internal experience?

In the inquiry above alluded to (*Theol. St. u. Kritik* 1841-4), the author represents the substance of this remark as indifferent, and the progress of the question contained in the text as erroneous. As soon as an immediate religious self-consciousness has been admitted, the question, according to that writer, has only to be put,—What is the nature of this self-consciousness?—in order directly to decide, what perceptions are to be regarded as authentic, and what are not; or what historical and speculative dogmas are there in Christian tradition, for example, that ought to be removed as being destitute of authority. Besides, he objects to the expression *mind*, used here in a particular sense, and will not even recognise in the discussion, sensation and perception, object and subject, &c.; but it is impossible to argue with a writer who entirely overlooks psychology.

We have proceeded upon the supposition of the *Immanence* of religion, in order, beforehand, to render it as independent of mere empiricism as of the contingencies of reflexion and speculation. The *process* is merely secured and grounded, but by no means cleared. The above author, however, reaches no definite point, but applies himself directly to the subject-definition,—God is. Now, if nothing else be immediately certain, how much

more ought the phenomenological form in which this single certainty enters the conscience be determined; and thus we have asked, for the author's own sake, as Schleiermacher and others have also done, for the original form of religion. We do not deny, indeed, that what at first appears in the form of immediateness, may become, by the intervention of thought, authentic truth, any more than we deny that we have to assume an act of religion; and that both functions,—thought and action, belong to it, if the immediate act shall maintain and manifest its energy, while the immediate subject-matter at the same time shall acquire and preserve its purity and clearness. Cognitions, merely as such, are always authoritative. The author has even censured this position, in as much as he rejects all psychological questions. The mere proposition of direct self-consciousness, as applied to religion, does not by any means preclude the truth and validity of historical or speculative dogmas, but merely includes a regulative influence in their explanation, derivation, reduction, and criticism.

REMARK 3. The most comprehensive and universal indication of religious consciousness is faith. It is the unity of sensation and perception, of susceptibility and spontaneity in matters of religion. It is through Christianity alone that the notion of faith has so pervaded science and general culture, as to be regarded as the fundamental character and essential function of religious life; wherefore faith in its general or philosophical meaning can only be apprehended according to the analogy of its strictly Christian meaning. A trace of the correct generalization is to be found in Hebrews xi. 1. Yet not as though *ὑπόστασις* and *ἔλεγχος* were merely the energies of reflection and intellectual syllogising. The usual explanation, that faith consists in maintaining as true the super-sensual derived from subjective yet conclusive grounds, does not reach its essence. Thus we simply perceive, that faith in some way differs from opinion inadequately grounded, and from knowledge; but we do not perceive that it is an original, yet at the same time a free act of the subjective spirit, nor that it is a believing with the heart,—*Καρδία γὰρ πιστεύεται*, κ. λ. Romans x. 10; nor that *νόησις διὰ πίστεως*, or *πιστεῖ νοεῖν*, Heb. xi. 3, is the earlier or more immediate fact which precedes and lies at the foundation of dialectic and demonstration; and in this relation the nature of faith has been strikingly treated by Dr David Schultz, in his “Christian Doctrine of Faith,” &c. Breslau, 1834. (A New Treatment of the

question, What is Faith, and who are Unbelievers?) Faith is neither a contemplative nor a knowing perception, but a sensuous one; and yet it is not inferior in certainty and satisfaction to knowledge or contemplation; because, in reference to its objects, it is much more able to render all knowledge and observation dependent on itself. Therefore Clemens of Alexandria, however defective as an etymologist, justly remarks, in his *Stromatum* iv. 22, § 145, Εἰ γ' οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐτυμολογεῖν χρῆ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως τὴν, ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῆς, ληπτέον· ὅτι ἴσθησιν ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄλλοτε ἄλλως πρότερον φερομένην. ὡσαύτως καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐτυμολογητέον τὴν περὶ τὸ ὄν στάσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν. More important expositions are given by the same writer, (*Stromatum*, ii. 2–6.), touching the relation of πίστις to γνῶσις, to προαίρεσις, to ὑπόληψις, &c. Faith is the primary and true knowledge of God, and the Divine; πίστις πρόληψις γνώσεως, συντομος γνῶσις, πιστὴ τοίνυν ἢ γνῶσις. It is not disputed that faith endeavours, by means of thought γνωστὴ δὲ ἢ πίστις, to attain to a knowledge which, as yet, it neither is nor has. Moreover, Clemens firmly maintained the believing character of religious knowledge, in opposition to the Valentinians, who ascribed faith to the vulgar, and knowledge to themselves; and at the same time he insisted upon the scientific nature of faith, in opposition to those who regarded it as unscientific. Still something more is required for faith; for it has not cognition (*cognoscere Deum*, in the sense in which Abelard even, esteems it above *intelligere*), and just as little does it disregard *understanding* and *conception*; but strives to attain them; and this not for the purpose of exalting them to its own essential *principle*, but rather that it may, through them, in part, communicate with the rest of life, and in part protect itself against a mixture of foreign elements. Accordingly, the exhortations of Clemens, Augustin, Anselm, &c., to *intelligere*, and their appreciation of γνῶσις, can be understood. Those who elevate conception to the essential *principle* of religious cognition, are unsupported by the above writers, although it is to a certain extent defended by Abelard.

In proportion as faith has become understanding and conception, is conviction at hand. Little faith may coexist with much understanding and conception; and the reverse is true. There are yet two elements of the notion of faith, which Clemens defended against the followers of Basilides. The latter termed faith a *φύσιον*, which any one by choice might adopt, (an opinion

which in itself involves a contradiction). On the other hand, he defended the τὸ προαιρετικόν of faith. Faith is a cognition, combined with and derived from recognition, and is ever attended with love; and does not merely permit and empower, but also inclines and obligates man to believe; and in this point of view it is more easy to understand how an obedience of faith exists in Christianity.

Now, although the school of Basilides atoned for that defect, by terming faith the assent of the soul to the supersensual, (Clemens i. 1), ἀφανοῦς πράγματος ἐνωτικὴν συγκατάθεσιν, still it neglected the other element, which Augustin expresses by the terms, *creditur testi*; namely, that faith is the reception of a testimony and a susceptibility for an object, which declares itself, and at the same time attests and guarantees itself to the conscience. *Fides credit aliquid credendo alicui, i. e. Deo testi.* The believer, says Clemens, is ἀπαράβιατος τηρητικὸς τῶν ἐγχειρισθέντων. Hence it may be maintained, that the Christian representation of Being and Becoming, is not only in a special, but in a more complete sense, Faith. First, because Christian perception resting especially on the evidence of the Divine Word and acts, is it a faith in revelation; and, secondly, is it so, because the essential purport of this revelation is redemption, which, as such, corresponds only to a confidence full of requirements. But if we desire, as we ought, to reduce the notion, which is in itself Christian, into an *idea*, or to extend it to an ideal universality; in that case it is necessary to define religious faith to be especially a—feeling, practical knowledge, which includes a trust in God, as testifying Himself to the conscience, and a confidence in His kingdom. Man, in his conscious distinction from the world, and in his union with it, is a witness to himself that God is. This certainty, as contrasted with mere sensuous self-consciousness, is confidence. And in this point of view, the same may also be asserted of faith in the idea, *i. e.* of faith in God in the idea, in consciousness.—See Dähne's *Development of the Paulin Doctrine of Faith.* Halle, 1835, p. 107.

¹ Here we particularly refer to Jacobi and the religious philosophers, who concur with and have extensively illustrated his views.—Weiss *on the Living God*, 1812. Bouterwek, already referred to, and Hase de Fede, p. 33, who approximates to the same view. *Hicce vero modus Deum animadvertendi intuitus intellectualis haberi nequit, fit enim neque intuendo, neque*

cognoscendo, nec sentiendo, neque agendo, sed aliquo x, quod scientiam, sensum et voluntatem amplectitur, ipsis tamen amplius, majusque est, cujus intimam persuasionem, siquidem singularum facultatum persuasionem fidem vocamus, fidem quoque sensu eminenti appellare licet. And Fischer's *Introduction to the Dogmas of the Evangelical Protestant Church*, Tübingen, 1828, p. 18. "The true form of the original manifestation of religion only exists, when it stands forth in harmony with human entireness, and when it permeates knowledge and desire in the same proportion as feeling does." In like manner, Steudel, *Doctrine of Faith, &c.*, Tub. 1834, p. 9, and Leonh. Schmitt, in the work already referred to, p. 35. But in other respects origination has only been discussed, when at the same time derivation ought also to have been considered. In what then does derivation consist, if the sum total of activities be required in order to represent origination? A psychology which derives from knowledge, desire, and feeling, three co-ordinate forms of consciousness, precludes all possibility of explanation in the matter.

§ 9. SUBJECT CONTINUED.

By means of an independent psychology, and conformably to it, the primary manifestation of religion has been illustrated in this point of view, with greater precision, by Schleiermacher.¹ Twisten and Elwert concur in the same view, the latter being its expounder and defender. Fries² also adopts this view, and has been followed by De Wette and Henry Schmid. But Schleiermacher and Fries, although they both admit sensation, or at least a determinate mode of sensation, to be the original form of religion, yet differ in the following respects: Schleiermacher supposes that to acquire a *conception* of religion, nothing *precedes sensation*; whilst, on the contrary, Fries conceives *religious ideas* to be necessary for that purpose; which ideas assume a living power in this finite existence through the anticipation and sensitive perception of the Eternal. In opposition to all this the Intellectualists,³ in their anxiety lest the prepon-

derance of the subjective in religion might prejudice the claims of objective revelation, education, and dogmatic authority, resolutely maintain that piety is at first a mode of perception or cognition; whilst others, (the disciples of Kant) although they base religion, the necessary hypothesis of the existence of God, of freedom and immortality, upon the direct thesis of moral consciousness, yet, notwithstanding, reject the doctrine of *sensation*. But the theory of *sensation* is chiefly opposed by the Speculatists,⁴ with whose views it originally approximated so closely; as indeed it did with so many other of their developments; for sensation, faith, or whatever other name immediate consciousness of God may be designated by, is regarded by the Speculatists as a mere formless elementary material of religion, which may, to be sure, constitute its intrinsic substance, but yet must first be moulded into a *conception*, as the alone adequate and absolute form of religion, by an exciting dialectic.

¹ Discourses on Religion and the Doctrine of Faith, § 8. "Piety in itself is neither knowledge nor action, but an inclination and determinateness of feeling." N.B. The question here discussed is neither that of an attendant sensation, nor of one which would array itself against thought and will, but of an original sensation. See Twisten's *Lectures on Dogma, &c.*, p. 2—20, where he treats on the nature of religion, and p. 20 *et seq.* on the relation of cognition to religion (faith, knowledge, science). The opinions for and against Schleiermacher's idea of religion have been fully and skilfully analysed by Elwert, in his paper on the *Nature of Religion, &c.*, published in the *Tübingen Journal of Theology*, 1835, 3d part.

² *New Critic of Reason*, ii. p. 267, 274, compare also, his *Knowledge, Faith, and Presentiment*, Jena, 1805, and De Wette's *Biblical Dogma*, 2d edit. § 3—33, also his *Religion and Theology*, 2d edit., and Heinrich Schmid on Schleiermacher's *Doctrine of Faith*, with reference to his Discourses on religion. Leipsig, 1835.

³ Steudel's *Doctrine of Faith*, p. 9. Leonh. Schmitt in the work referred to above, p. 30.

⁴ Hegel, Hinrichs, Daub, Rosenkranz.

§ 10. CONCLUSION.

As the question concerning the relative order of cognition and sensation, feeling and will; or concerning what is termed the uniform interpenetration of the perceiving, feeling, and willing spirit by religion, could only arise among those who explain nothing, or desire to render every thing inexplicable; so, in the actual state of religious science, the fundamental question simply and chiefly comes to this: how are the two theories of religious consciousness to be rendered intelligible; of which, one is termed the philosophy of sensation, the other, the philosophy of idea? Both concur in admitting that the *Divine* rather excites sensation than reflection, and that it is internally experienced, rather than externally perceived; or, at least they allow, that the process of religious life can in no wise be conceived, if it have not initially and fundamentally, something directly belonging to the subjective spirit. Moreover, both theories admit, that the felt (sensation) may be thought and acted, discovering itself to cognition, in order to be reduced to knowledge and practice. There are also many other points of agreement, which more especially appertain to the formative process of the religion of communities; but which do not require to be here discussed. But according to the doctrine of *sensation*, the *felt* is not only the first religious sense, but also the ruling, abiding, and perfect form of the religious spirit; so that whatever is known and acted, and aspires to have a claim upon religiousness, must maintain its ground and principle in sensation, to which it tends for its development; and the sum total of the forces constituting religious life, simply because it is life, is based upon immediate self-consciousness. On the other hand, the philosophy of *idea*, whilst it recognises religion in general to be a process of the spirit, but is unacquainted with any other spiritual process, as a logical one, allows sensation to be only a preliminary form,

and indeed, in so far as it develops conceptions, the most imperfect form of the religious spirit. Dialectic, commencing in sensation, nay even producing and modifying it, may first, indeed, vary and transform (by means of mutation, aggregation, negation, and affirmation), the substance of religious sensation, as presented to the mind of sense, into an absolute notion, as the perfect consummation of all the forces in which the idea of religion attains development. The former theory appears to sacrifice science to life, and the latter, life to science. With reference to the first it may be said, that its advocate hath educated and elaborated more materials for religious thought than any other of his contemporaries; and it seems too, as if this theory only required to be sufficiently explained and developed, to vindicate its claim of superiority over that of thought and activity. If, in reply to this, the philosophy of idea asserts that *sensation* is merely the *subjective*, the contingent, or even the animal state; such an assertion is equivalent to being unwilling to understand Schleiermacher's doctrine. For his doctrine has shown in all cases, the possibility and the necessity of religious consciousness proceeding out of the subjective into the objective, and by this means reaching its objective condition; and has pointed out its purifying operation and confirmation, in the spirit's collected life.¹ Nevertheless, his theory has not yet sufficiently accomplished this object, in certain respects; for by merely showing that distinct pious emotions are called forth by the ideas belonging to each, and then advance to thoughts and impulses, still the possibility and necessity of self-improvement, and a self-adjustment of religious consciousness has not yet been sufficiently and fully pointed out.² This first occurs when a process discovers itself in immediate spiritual life, by means of which, the substance of the original divine feeling becomes permanently objective, and in this permanent state reacts, by a process of division and purification, upon the varying and blended life of sensation and perception. The original God-feeling, in its combination with sensitive consciousness, has also an original power

to make itself objective, speculatively and transcendently in the idea or as idea; and just as the image of this God-feeling corresponds to, or is excited by, variable sensation, in like manner its idea is affected towards permanent sensation. Sensation has reason, and is reason. The sensible and felt God-consciousness generates out of itself fundamental cognitions, in which it realises itself as true and certain, and by the power of which it is enabled to rule and to qualify, independently of all scientific mediation, the whole realm of images; just as distinct Christian consciousness entertains in itself a distinct Christian idea, namely the Divine word, to which, and with which, it is directed and regulated. The vivacity of this process depends partly upon experience, and partly on the will; and this leads us to the practical side of religious consciousness, where a similar relation appears. For not only do isolated moral impulses, mingled with sensitive ones, proceed from religious sensation; but there is also a conscience by which the whole realm of impulses is conditioned. Thus, the original feeling of religion is the unity of reason and conscience; and the living energy of the one function influences the vivacity of the other. It is solely within the confines of these movements that all the essential changes and perfections of religious life take place. From hence, indeed, religious science receives *matter* and *motive*; but then it must also react upon its source in conjunction with that experience and communion in which religious culture is concerned; if what they effect and perform shall complete the character of a religious state. Within these limitations, according to which there is everywhere in the original action of the religious spirit a causal reaction; or according to which, in part, the difference of stable and unstable religion, and in part the opposite of passive and active religion, is acknowledged,—the doctrine of *sensation* can maintain the position it has assumed in Theology. On the other hand, the logical doctrine has not yet shown that it esteems faith and piety, or the essence even of religion itself, for anything more than a mere channel of spiritual and Divine development; and thus re-

ligion vanishes at the very moment when it ought to have reached its climax. The idea of religion in its original form ought to be commensurate with the idea of life. All the functions of life proceed from sentient being, and return into it again. Thought constitutes a distinct part of the common spirit-life, and action not less so. By themselves, neither can attain being and blessedness; and, on the other hand, they are only competent to maintain themselves in this being, by means of a sentient spirit, a believing and experiencing *immanence*. A valid theory of religion must at any rate recognise, that faith does, and how it does, lead to blessedness—a faith, the possession of which, apart from love, constitutes no blissful knowledge of God; and we must not be left in doubt as to whether a lauding Seraph occupies a higher or a lower stand than a speculative devil.

¹ See Elwert on the *Essence of Religion*, above referred to, p. 61–73, where Hegel's arguments against Schleiermacher are examined and refuted.

² See my review of Twisten's Lectures on Dogmatic Theology, in *Theol. Stud. und Krit.*, 1828, 1st part, p. 205–8, and Christ. Frid. Schmid.: *quatenus ex eccl. evangelicæ principiis existere possit doctrinæ Christianæ scientia*. Tübingen, 1831, p. 42, sqq. We were desirous of being persuaded, with Elwert (p. 92), that the theory we advocate concerning the Doctrine of Sensation had been hitherto peculiar to it. We have our doubts, however, on this point, because this doctrine, in the field of dogmatism, has neglected the idea of the Divine Word.

§ 11. ELEMENT.

That which constitutes the specific matter of religious feeling, expressed in the simplest terms, is either consciousness of God, or the relation of individual-self and life to God,—or dependence upon God,—or absolute dependence. None of these statements require to be directly defended; still each of them needs farther development. For inasmuch as there ought

always to be added to the real idea of God-consciousness those determinations which that consciousness obtains through its connection with consciousness of self and the world; so, in like manner, is it requisite that the idea of absolute dependence be not considered for itself alone, but as combined with the personality of man, or in conjunction with his independence of the world; or, in other words, that although God may have been substituted for the dependent instead of the absolute, at the same time the Divine Being may be recognised in his distinction from the world. This idea of the nature of religious feeling, since Schleiermacher adduced it, has often been assailed in a very erroneous manner;¹ but it has not only been fully vindicated in its genetic connection, but may be considered, because derived from the inmost centre of the matter, the most satisfactory view of the subject.²

¹ See, for example, Hase *de Fide*, p. 27. “Sed vicissim agere, qui absolute patitur quomodo potest?” F. Delbrück’s *Examination of some of the Leading Subjects in Dr Fr. Schleiermacher’s Christian Doctrine of Faith*, 1827, Section 2. For an attempt to remove these misapprehensions, see *Study and Critic of Theology, &c.*, 1828, 3d part, p. 662, *et seq.*, and with these compare my Review of Rosenkranz’s *Kritik der Sch. Glaubensl.*, in the same work, for 1837, p. 444. There is not any relation of created personal being to God which includes a complete antagonism to God. Religion is, in free consciousness, nothing else than consciousness, free through God and in God, that is to say, being dependent upon Him. By means of the feeling of not being constrained by God, and, perhaps, of being able to contend against Him, or actually to contend against Him, must, (the more it continues and becomes intensively perfect in itself,) a yet stronger feeling of dependence be generated, whether it be in the form of gratitude or repentance.

² The author, in his 2d edition, i. § 4, has again most carefully illustrated the subject with reference to prevailing errors. See also Elwert, in the work referred to above, p. 75–78, where in part, the objection to the doctrine of Identity of Religion as absolute freedom, and, in part, the replies of a more or less Pelagian character, are refuted.

§ 12. CONCLUSION.

That self-consciousness only is more than world-consciousness, which, (in so far as it exhibits itself as perception,) in part opposes the infinite and the finite, (God and the world); in part conditionates the worldly through Divinity; and in so far as it exhibits itself in action, conducts to the opposite of right and wrong.¹ All thought and will (whilst they retain their own real character,) are based upon the assumptions of an unconditional cause and object; upon an ἐξ οὗ and εἰς ὃν τὰ πάντα; consequently they are founded upon religiousness in direct self-consciousness. Out of the necessary fundamental thoughts of the human mind, of the eternal, of the good, and the free, (which are all equal in dignity,) the entire subject-matter is developed in all its relations and bearings, by a kind of presumed consciousness of God, self, and the world; and where this is not the case, still each religious subject-matter must be judged in accordance with these assumptions. Together with the consciousness of God, the idea of God is supposed, and consequently the idea of religion in man; and in accordance with this principle, absolute religion and reverence for God is also inferred. But it does not by any means follow from this, that the re-action process of truth and righteousness, (which is never entirely absent even in a mind unswayed by religious feelings,) should everywhere penetrate as such, into the conscience, or that the Idea of religion should be developed up to an *Ideal*; or, however scientifically and artistically constructed, be practically and vitally realized.

¹ Henke, *Lineamenta Instit. Fidei Chr.* 1793, § 1. Supponitur itaque omnes, quibus unquam aliqua religio tribui potuit, cognovisse a. incertas, inconstantes et mutabiles esse res humanas b. earum conditionem pendere a nutu aliquo superiori s. a voluntate et cura potentioris cujusdam animæ; c. neque perinde esse, quid sentias, agas, speres, d. sed propter hanc eandem potestatem reatricem, cui subes, alia esse observanda alia fugi-

enda.—And more precisely still by Twisten, p. 3, where the following remarks especially deserve our attention: “Wherever that antagonism, God and the World, is held up, whether it be through a renunciation of the one or an identification of both terms, then the applicability of the religious idea ceases; for Pantheism is only so far compatible with religion, as it also admits that an opposition exists between God and the world.” And again: “the essence of religion, therefore, materially regarded, consists in the recognition of a higher Being, distinguishable from the world, and of the dependence of the world on the same. Thus, that which might otherwise be regarded as religion, is reduced back to its proper form. Thus, for example, belief in freedom and immortality partakes only so far of a religious nature as it refers to that distinction, and to the relation between God and the world; namely, as it expresses the acknowledgment of a true reality of finite existence, and of a timeless relation to the Eternal. Were this relation not recognised, the view of the soul’s immortality would no more concern religion, than does, for example, the admission that matter throughout all its mutable accidents remains identical.

§ 13. RELATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS.

In order to comprehend how there can exist, notwithstanding the source and primal element of religion being thus constituted, a multiformity and diversity of religion, among mankind, the distinction between subjective and objective religion must be taken into account, and thus the contrasted and reciprocal action of the constant and inconstant in religious life becomes apparent. Each religious feeling is to be approved or disapproved, according to its conformity to those necessary and fundamental perceptions and determinations of the human spirit; and indeed, so far, the distinction between true and false religion is to be firmly maintained; on the one hand, against certain doctrines of intuition; and on the other, against certain doctrines of the possible occurrence of an exclusive process of development of the collective religion of mankind.

But if we wish (which is, at all events desirable) to form a general judgment concerning the origin of all that is defective in religion; in that case, the distinction between passive and active piety, must not, as has too commonly been the case, be disregarded.

REMARK 1. The difference between intellectual and actual religion, (*intellectualis et actualis*) has hitherto been universally admitted. Both originate from the same source, and reciprocally influence each other. Notwithstanding this, however, the consideration of action, and the consciousness of being and of cause, preceding the striving after an object, must be considered. See Clemens of Alex. *Stromatum*, iv. p. m. 275. Τὸ μαθεῖν τοῦ πράξαι πρεσβύτερόν ἐστιν· φύσει γὰρ ὁ πράσσων τοῦτο, ὁ πράξαι βούλεται, μανθάνει πρότερον.—'Αρχὴ καὶ δημιουργὸς πάσης λογικῆς πράξεως ἡ γνῶσις εἰη ἄν." Ωστ' αὐτὸ ἐκὼς ταύτη μόνη χαρακτηρίζεται ἡ τῆς λογικῆς ιδιότης ψυχῆς.

REMARK 2. The relation of subjective and objective religion to the opposite of mind and idea, or to the opposite of the internal and external, or of the individual and common, is erroneous. However, there is some good foundation for this usual distinction. For in the *first* place, a certain totality of religious conceptions and modes of contemplation is formed in every religious person, which in part, is itself conditioned by the progressive life, and in part as it operates, opposes the latter. Here we have primarily an objectivity and subjectivity in religion. In the *second* place, that totality of conceptions and maxims resulting from life, becomes subjective as soon as we oppose it to absolute and constant religion, or to the fundamental thoughts and relations which are identical in all subjects. In this case, the utmost extent of the distinction between the peculiar and the general becomes apparent. For a more exact account of this classification we refer to the work of Baumgarten-Crusius, quoted above, p. 5.

REMARK 3. Undoubtedly the antithesis, truth and falsehood, admits of being applied to religion, provided the original sensation from whence religion proceeds, on the one hand fosters representations, and on the other, induces a knowledge of its import, and that not accidentally, but in accordance with a necessary mode. Indeed, we do not groundlessly imagine that religion in its subjective manifestation, is never absolutely false, and

never positively true. Even the impure or bloody worship of Mylitta or Moloch involves elements of truth; nevertheless, universal heathenism is false in principle, because the relation which holds as regards the perversion or denial of the groundwork of religious ideas, is quite distinct from its erroneous rights and applications of them.

REMARK 4. The original constitution of humanity is such that it seeks after God, who allows himself to be found, ζῆτεῖν τ. θ. דַּשׁ בְּקֶשֶׁר Acts of the Apostles, xvii. 27, *i. e.* man does not shun God; but ever strives after a more perfect communion with Him; and this amounts to *religio activa* (not *actualis practica*). *Book of Wisdom*, i. 1, 2. φρονήσατε περὶ κυρίου ἐν ἀγαθότητι—ζητήσατε αὐτόν. ὅτι εὐρίσκεται τοῖς μὴ πειράζουσιν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐμφανίζεται τοῖς μὴ ἀπιστοῦσιν αὐτῷ. Compare vi. 11, 12. φθάνει τοὺς ἐπιθυμοῦντας, 15, 16. Such is the kind of subjectivity which divine revelation always employs, either in a wider or more confined sense, as its individual means. *Passive* or *pathetic* subjectivity, (*passiva pathetica*), which can only be pursued and constrained by conscience and truth, is alone the cause of unbelief or of superstition. See *Über den Religionsbegriff der alten, Studien und Kritiken*, &c.; Bd. I. Heft. iv. p. 729–32; and *Theol. Beantwortung der Philos. Dogma*, von Dr Strauss, *Theol. St. und Kritik.*, 1842, p. 627.

§ 14. DEFECTS.

To this extent sensuous self-consciousness naturally and involuntarily continues to develop itself; but not so religious consciousness; the development of the latter depends upon the free elevation of man, which elevation appears to him degradation; so that he prefers a mere semblance of freedom.¹ This reserve and alienation of self, however surmountable it may be on the one hand, and impracticable on the other, has, nevertheless, one consequence; for it follows inevitably, that man's inert persistence in sensuous self-consciousness may lead to a life-development, which either becomes increasing unbelief,² (*i. e.* a denial of the mind's fundamental perceptions of

God and the world,) or superstition,³ (*i. e.* an unlawful separation and intermixture of these perceptions with the facts of sensuous consciousness.)

¹ By this we do not mean to affirm the necessity of our fall from God, grounded on the absolute constitution of man's nature. The subject under discussion, so far as the philosophy of religion is concerned, turns on the occasioning cause and the possibility of this fall. The consciousness of God abiding in the human spirit, considered as a mere disposition or power, requires, in order to attain development and activity, motives and experience, without which there is in general no development of the finite spirit. By means of impressions and experience, however, self-consciousness is unceasingly excited at once or primarily in its sensitive faculty; and self-consciousness may continue passive or active, as relates to this Divine feeling incited simultaneously along with it. In proportion as a feeling of dependence on God, in a free and conscious manner, is blissful, in the same proportion is a feeling of a purely necessary and servile dependence unblissful. Still, a delusion here is possible, and does actually occur; and the delusion consists in this, namely, the Ego conceives itself to be more egoistic, more free, and more blessed, when it excludes to the utmost extent the feeling of dependence, persists in its sentient affection, and represses those conceptions and impulses which only arise out of Divine consciousness. If this occurs, man is not indeed entirely estranged from religion, but he simply allows its access, and this may be denominated passive piety.

Man is of necessity religious, for it is admitted that it exceeds his power to be devoid of conscience. But against this MUST, even the egoistic spirit revolts (*Καὶν ὁ πάντα ἀναφέρων ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν*, by קבה Philo. qu. *deterior potiori insid.* §. 10,) and that in two ways: First, it makes an effort from whence proceeds unbelief, and then another effort, out of which arises superstition. In the evil activity of passive piety, man chiefly endeavours to nullify entirely or partially the facts of religious consciousness, (*Psalm xiv. 1. Book of Wisdom, ii. 2. ὅτι αὐτοσχεδίως ἐγεννήθημεν, κ. λ.*) by which means the phenomena and the reflections arising therefrom come to his aid, in the manner described by Philo (already referred to), and in the Book of Wisdom. But in case consciousness of God obtrude itself, man rushes from unbelief into superstition, *i. e.* he

determinates the Divine to be something human, sentient, and mundane, and decomposes the Divine feeling into the sensuous, from whence fanatical representations, sometimes servile, sometimes audacious, arise, and in accordance with which his inclinations are moulded. See Romans i. 21–25. From this perverted process is derived Heathenism, which, indeed, is religion, but of such a kind, that its Element consists in passive religion, and its Principle in active ἀγνώσια Θεοῦ. (See *Book of Wisdom*, xiii. 1. ἀμαθία. Plutarch *de Superstitione*.) For a similar construction of Heathenism, see *Book of Wisdom*, xiv. 11–31.

² A term not confined to Holy Scripture; ἀπιστία occurs in Plutarch, *de Superstitione*, 2.

³ According to the strict meaning of the word, *Superstitio* implies a superabundance of religion—a supplemental religion (supersistere). For the primary question that interested antiquity concerned the established religion, about which the sacerdotal authorities gave information. Those who added to the *mos approbatus* various domestic, foreign, and novel forms of worship and expiations, were the *superstitiosi*, as distinguished from the *religiosi*, qui faciendarum praetermittendarumque rerum divinarum secundum morem civitatis dilectum habent nec se superstitionibus implicant: according to Festus. The direct reference to *superstites* in Cicero, Servius, and Lactantius, is erroneous. But the same idea is conveyed by the term Superstition that Plutarch, though by a false etymology, ascribes to θρησκεία, ἱεροουργία κατάκορος καὶ περιέργος. The Greeks expressed the same thing by ἐθελοθρησκεία. But the ancients overlooked the fact, that an excess of superstition is not merely in truth and intrinsically a deficiency, but even that it may originally spring from unbelief. Compare Plutarch, *de Superstitione* i. in. with Romans i. 21, 23, 25.

§ 15. FORMAL DEFECTS.

Now some mixture of unbelief or superstition, of false admissions or misconceptions, universally arises wherever the defective in religious life becomes apparent, either under a formal or material relation. The formal defects, indeed, primarily consist in the disturbed relation of those functions in whose harmonious totality religion ought to pervade life. A partial exaggeration

ration of one function produces restrictions and renunciations of another, whereby either too much frigidity of unbelief, or too much fervour of superstition, as Plutarch has pointed out, become master of the whole. The restriction of religious life to feeling, or mysticism,¹ is in a certain degree the more innocent and less dangerous defect; whilst, on the contrary, fanaticism,² or the restriction of religious feeling to fancy and empiricism, merits the appellation of the worst. Moreover, a partial indulgence in religious speculation and reflection,—Gnosticism; and, on the other hand, an exclusive bias for action, practice, exhibition—Nominalism, Pharisaism, and for creeds—Orthodoxy,³ will ever tend to attract towards themselves some fundamental defect or other.

¹ In our day, it is partly ignorance, and partly an actual recoil from the profundities of knowledge and life, which trifle in a blameable and senseless manner with the terms Mysticism and Mystic. On the one hand, this latter word is used synonymously with “Visionary” and “Fanatic;” although, in truth, it is as utterly remote from these, and about as dissimilar, as Jansenism and Loyolism; on the other hand, the term has been erected as a boundary-mark for the realms of the commonplace understanding against every doctrine cognisant of an objective truth, of an immanent thought, or of the immediateness of Divine operations and communications; so that not only Herder, Hamann, and Claudius, but even Lessing, nay, Kant and Fichte, almost all come under the category of Arch-Mystics. See, in *Theol. Stud.* 1828, my account of Twisten’s Lectures, p. 199. Generally, the error under consideration is expressed by the phrase: To run wild in gloomy feelings (or even to revel in them); in which this much at least is admitted, that the question, certainly, turns upon feeling, contemplation, and, in general, upon the mode of cognising what intuition is, whenever the discussion turns upon the mystical, or mysticism, and upon internal experience. The term is derived from the Greek worship, the most important part of which consisted in solemn self-communications of Deity. The Supreme Being had not only bestowed upon a country and a people, at once and originally, some essential constituents of civilisation, such as law and usage, agriculture and the

cultivation of the vine, and the active faculties associated with these, and in the enjoyment of which, fellowship even with Deity was partaken; but, more than this, He had also instituted permanent rules, and bequeathed them to man, from the very foundation of Theophany; (see *Hymn. Hom. in Cererem*, 474,) by means of which particular races, as represented by virtuous individuals, might partake in the blessing of a full consecration to a higher life. The consummations pertaining to this, in so far as they were completions of the human state, and the goal of human efforts, were called *τέλη, τελεταί*; in so far as they were, in the highest sense, representative and executive actions, they were denominated *ἔργια*; and finally, when they were concealed and included, and demanded a denial of common experience, meditation, speech, and act, they were designated *μυστήρια*. *Μύω*, to wink, *μυέω*, to place a person in that condition, *i. e.*, to bring him from a state of non-sight to sight, or the reverse—to a state of secret experience. *Μύστης*, in this point of view, is one who is experienced, one who is initiated. Thus, the matters, actions, and the conditions appertaining to them, were styled Mysteries. Instruction in these, and a skilful manner of performing them, were, for example, termed *μυστική ἐρμηνεία*. The mystical, therefore, when taken in an objective sense, is always Divinity, in the act of communicating itself to man by means of an external or internal medium; as, for instance, by a sacrament. On the other hand, in a subjective view, it is an especial experience, perception, and discovery of the same, subjected to peculiar conditions and processes. For although man, in the abstract, is capacitated and designed for Divine communions, still there is, at the same time, essentially associated with this capacity, a certain self-restraint, ascetic self-denial, and self-renunciation, arising partly from sensuous, partly only from mental idiosyncrasy, in order that, while still a member of a common, earthly and temporal state, he may become acquainted with, and participate in, that which is uncommon. It is consequently evident, that every religious and believing man, as such, is a Mystic; for he who has no consciousness of the Deity is unable either to discern or venerate Him; and whoever gives God merely a passing thought, unaccompanied by love and purity of heart, is incapable of livingly apprehending Him; far less is he, who desires to see Him sensibly, capable of discerning Him spiritually. The internal living energy of religion is always Mystical; and the Christian

notions of illumination, of revelation, incarnation, regeneration, of the sacrament and of the resurrection, are essentially mystical elements. Whenever the religious and church life recovers from the effects of external perception and sterile scholasticism, and once more refreshes itself from its own pure fountains, and directs itself towards its true aim; then does it appear more and more mystical, giving rise to the outcry, that Mysticism is gaining the ascendancy. Mysticism is a partial domination and degenerated form of the Mystical tendency. Internal perception may already be defective, by renouncing the historical and ecclesiastical element of true religion; as for example, whenever Christians seek after and pretend to an internal light independent of God's word; or when they reject and condemn the sacrament, in order to indulge a preference for prayer. This inwardness becomes still farther defective, when, in the form of exclusive sensitiveness, it opposes the claims of thought, divests itself of action, and prematurely desires a violent gratification, partly of intuitive love, and partly of Divine rest. Instead of intellectual contemplations, there arise empirical fantasies; instead of rest in God, indolence and *quietism*; and what is worse than all, instead of love for God, there is evinced a wanton and impure coquetry with natural beauty, and yet, notwithstanding this, there exists a pietistic and ascetic sternness towards the purely human and rational. For a full view of the idea of Mystic and Mysticism, see Sack's *Christliche Polemik*, Hamburg, 1838, p. 288 seq. These blemishes at least, if they do not fully attain to the character of degenerations, occur in all the principal manifestations of mystical religion. Their original historical domicile is India and Egypt. When Greek science was first occupied with religion, and chiefly (as among the Orphicans) with the positive religion of Myth and Symbol, there arose a mystical interpretation, which was reiterated in Judaism and Christianity, and a physical Mysticism which rapidly degenerated in the most abominable manner into Magic and Theurgy. From the time of Socrates, it became metaphysical, and withdrew from positive religion. The rational ground of Phenomena, the supernatural idea of Things, was the object towards which Socrates directed his attention with ceaseless and untiring assiduity, (*Plat. conviv.*) The road which conducts to an assimilation unto Deity, as Plato describes it, lies essentially through and in science; but this science developes itself into a loving con-

templation, and to an apprehension of the Divine object, under invariable moral conditions. Subsequently, the Mystical associates itself, again, with popular religion. It desires to subjectivate consciousness entirely, which at first is merely historical, at least, in men duly qualified and endowed, and thus, by means of a spiritualizing interpretation, exercise, and imitation, to emancipate it and render it ecstatic. The spiritualizing process, as explained by the Judaical Philo, the Greek Plotinus (Porphyry), and the Christian Clemens of Alexandria, is nearly similar, in as much as they were all under the influence of Platonism, and contended against the internal experience of an historical religion. Super-sensualism is only introduced by dialectic reflection; it is first consummated in the height of pure intelligence; but does not occur theoretically without, at the same time becoming practical. Virtues themselves are only stages of purification for the contemplation of God; or rather, (according to Plotinus) the question turns on ἐνωσις,—on the entrance of the centre into the centre. See Vogt's *Neoplatonismus und Christenthum*, Berlin 1836. The mystical dialect adopted by the Neoplatonists passed over to the Christians. In proportion as the Christian mystics draw from that source, the more decidedly do they manifest their errors. In Augustin, (*Confess.* and *de Vita Beata*), the combined elements of mystical and speculative theology are conspicuous. Hugo von S. Victor, Richard and Johann Gerson, direct their efforts towards a similar combination; so that the renouncing love of God becomes the attending complement of science, or the latter, in all its three gradations (ecstasy, association, repose,) is merely a means of elevation to the point of *affectio amorosa*. The Mystics of the middle ages all more or less mistake the dignity of faith; consequently, there are many who almost contemn the historical Christ, and especially treat the Divine manhood as a general relation, and as an idea to be realised hereafter. The relation of extraordinary Charismata to the common gift of the Holy Spirit, and the relation of ascetic to Christian life, appears to them unscriptural. These remarks apply not only to M. Eckart (see Schmidt *Theol. Stud., u. Kritik. Jahrg.*, 1839, Heft. 3); but also to Joh. Tauler. Fantastical and sensitive extravagances are particularly discussed by Ruisbroeck and Suso. Compare Liebnér's writings on Hugo, Richard, and Gerson; likewise the more modern works of Helffrich and Martensen. In the history of the

reformed church, the mystical tendency of a Wiegél, whom J. Arndt made use of, was called forth, through the authority of external orthodoxy, and by the direct relation between the letter and the word of God, between justification and sanctification. In Böhme were united, with a mystical and practical tendency, Theosophy and natural philosophy. Gichtel and Swedenborg, besides this, combined prophecy and a new revelation, together with a claim to renovate the church. Mysticism and Gnosticism, on account of their common bearing, are equally related to historical religion; even a self-reflecting faith may labour to impart a life's breath of love to ideas (Bonaventura). Both may tend in a more or less degree towards a denial of a personal God, of a Creator, and of an historical Redeemer; and both may reject contemplation as well as reflection, and, together with faith, deny both the active and passive religion of love. The historical idea of gnosticism has been copiously illustrated by Baur; see his *Christian gnosis, or die Christl. religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Tübingen, 1835, and *Theol. Stud.*, 1837, 511. *Kritik. Studien, über den begriff der gnosis.*

² FANATICUS, derived from *fanum* (a place of divine manifestation and revelation, where Divinity was experienced or surrendered up through the senses to sense), was used by the Latins generally *in pejorem partem*; hence the simplest and most prevailing idea of fanaticism is, an exaggerated esteem for the external and isolated facts of revelation. The fanatic opposes not only understanding, but is indifferent to, or disclaims even reason and the inmost sanctuary of man. He says in his heart, there is no God; He may perhaps be perceived in this way or that, or discovered here or there; there is no atonement—it may be attained through this or that ordained expiation. The fanatic fills up the vacancy in his understanding with fantasy, the void of feeling with emotion. Hence it may be asserted that fanaticism is fantastical or emotional piety (*ἀπάτη φλεγμαίνουσα*, according to Plutarch), at times a frantic affirmation, originating in an innermost negation.

³ See Lessing's Works, Th. vi. p. 105 (*Duplik*, v. 1778). "The orthodoxist (not the orthodox, for he is on my side; I was not the first to distinguish between orthodoxist and orthodox); the orthodoxist simply affirms," Sack's *Polem.* p. 141.

REMARK. As a preliminary remark—how far removed Christianity is from every partial gratification of any particular

function of religious life, may be learned from this: namely, that all the above-named exaggerations have believed themselves competent to take possession of Christianity. And abstractedly it is evident that Christianity demonstrates itself to be alone, of all religions, just as rich in mystical as in gnostical elements; to be as practical as it is theoretical, and equally representative as it is meditative and active. Compare *Theremin Abendstunden*. Berlin 1833, p. 103. *On the Nature of Mystical Theology*, where the equal authority of historical, speculative, and mystical theology in Christianity is shown from the nature of the subject and from the sum-total of the requirements to which Christianity ought to correspond.

§ 16. MATERIAL DEFECTS.

Each of these formal defects necessarily includes a tendency to some *material defect*, or so far tends that way, as that each fundamental thought of the religious Spirit, and some one in particular, is denied, or becomes clouded. In Atheism of any kind,¹ in Pantheism,² and in Polytheism, this defect appertains more to the idea of the Eternal, or the one Absolute Cause: In Fetich worship, in Idolatry,⁴ and in a certain kind of Dualism,⁵ it occurs more in the idea of the good, and in Fatalism and Casualism, it tends to the idea of freedom and personality.

¹ In reference to Atheism, we must first remark, that in its time, each of the material defects above named has been associated with this miserable negative title. The barbarian who observed no religious RITE; the citizen who forsook the established religion, (*religio civilis*;) was regarded by the Athenians or Romans as a person without God, and eminently godless. Whoever, like the heathen, confines his veneration of Deity either to the adoration of nature, or merely recognises the general abstract idea, τὸ θεῖον, is, in the apostle's view, an ἄθεος; that is to say, one who stands in no covenant relation to that true God, who has revealed himself to man by testimonies. A house where idols were worshipped, was called by the Greek Jew οἶκον ἀθεΐας. See *Symm. Hos.* iv. 15. Whoever did not acknowledge the

Trinity, or denied the *ὑπάρχειν*, the *οὐσία*, the EXISTERE of God, obtained also the title of Atheist; and sometimes even those who critically or sceptically held views contrary to particular theistical systems, were, in like manner, denominated Atheists. The title dogmatic Atheist pertains to the physical philosophers of antiquity, and to the Gallican sensualists, and even in those cases is actual Atheism, when it denies, not the existence of God, but providence. As all the defects and excellencies of religion are accustomed to control unequally the cognizing and acting subjectivity, on that very account, is Atheism either extremely rare, or everywhere imperfect; or else, very general.

It is self-evident that Atheism is involved in all other material defects; for the idiosyncrasy and egoism, which are fundamental to all the obstructions of piety, are atheistical. Philo *Leg. Alleg.* i. p. 72, ed. Lips. *φίλαυτος δὲ καὶ ἄθεος ὁ νοῦς οἰόμενος ἴσος εἶναι θεῶ, καὶ ποιεῖν δοκῶν ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἕξεταζόμενος.*

² Pantheism, had the ancients ever heard so strange a word, would in all probability have been understood as signifying a veneration for all the gods alike, and not for any one in particular. We do not deny that a necessity exists for denominating a certain religious habit of thought by the word Pantheism, or an analogous term; which habit, (hovering between atheism and theism), when it inclines more to the former, transforms Deity into an abstract or epitome of the world's properties; but when it tends more towards the latter, deduces from the world some attribute or quality, passion and condition of Deity.

The formula of Pantheism is not that each thing is God, but that the universe is God. Yet, strictly speaking, it is only the doctrine of Bruno, (*Della Causa, Principio ed Uno*, Ven. 1584), and Spinoza, that harmonizes with this formula, and also perhaps the Hylozoistic system; and if Parmenides imagined the All-One to be God, still with him that was a matter of course. But other systems, denominated pantheistical, make so vast a distinction between God and the world, and teach that the latter is so greatly conditioned by God, that they, in order to become again theism, merely leave what is defective in a pure idea of creation; which idea has no existence out of revelation, and in whose place are substituted doctrines of development and manifestation. With systems like these the above formula does not harmonize. And if modes of thought

so varied as these are all denominated pantheistic; modes which either do or do not strictly distinguish spirit from matter, which separate human thought from divine, and vain would recognise the former as conditionally free, and the latter unconditionally so, or not; then is it evident how dangerous and confusing such an appellation may become, if it do not receive a more comprehensive definition than has hitherto been current. The more religious Pantheism is, the more it ameliorates, in the region of error, Polytheism on the one hand, and Dualism on the other; yet in such a manner, as not to remedy their original causes, and it must consequently readopt their defects. That the ideas of the Absolute, the Good, and the Free have been outraged, (at least the two latter), by pantheism, is as certain, as that true religion stands in no need of it, in order livingly to retain the relation of God to things and conditions. In modern times, Jacobi ranks as the most distinguished opponent of pantheism. In opposition to the system of an impersonal logical God, and against the extreme offshoots of the latest speculative schools, Weise, Fichte junior, and Fischer, have boldly stood forward. With reference to the accusation, that Schleiermacher has introduced Spinosism into Christian Dogma, see Schleiermacher's supplement to Sack; Nitzsch and Lücke *Sendschrift an Delbrück*, 1827. As to the question, whether Pantheism, transformed into Theopantism, accords with Christianity? see Gabler *de veræ Philosophiæ erga rel. Chr. Pietate*, 1836, p. 43. This view is not supported, at least in 1 Cor. xv. 28, though the contrary has been maintained.

³ Πολυθεΐα, Gregor. Nyss; δόξα πολύθεος, Philo. Jud. The Monotheists show, that the notion of Polytheism is self-contradictory; (See Greg. of Nysa, *Catech.*, Introduction)—and, therefore, even in Polytheism there is associated a species of atheism or denial of the Infinite, the Good, and the Free, although principally the disavowal extends only to the Infinite. Considered in its historical manifestation, Polytheism consists in the veneration of a certain totality of natural powers, to which, in conformity with the natural philosophy prevailing at any period, the totality of nature's realms or seasons, conjointly with that of the destinies and instincts of human life, corresponds. In a moral aspect, Polytheism is related to Monotheism, just as the diversity of inclinations, mutually conditioned, is related to the unity of the the ruling and rational conscience.

The less there is of reason in polytheism, the more do understanding, sensation, and fantasy, enter into it; and, in this latter point of view, it ranks higher than many forms of Monodemonism, or even of abstract Monotheism. Historically, however, the reaction of reason evidences itself even in Polytheism, partly by a representation of the highest God, the complement of the will of the Deities, by means of fate, and by the adoption of *Dii Deæque omnes* as an unity for practical religious feeling; and partly the same reaction is evidenced by an especial dedication of *Mens, Virtus, Pietas, Fides, Misericordia, &c.* *Cic. de Legg.* ii. 8. In the philosophical religious systems of the ancients, as well as in some yet existing Asiatic religions, polytheism is only a poetical and mythical aspect of pantheism.

⁴ An idol, in the sense of the Theist or Monotheist, is generally a false god, or a spurious object of reverence, *ἐπίνοια εἰδώλων.* *Book of Wisdom*, xiv. 12. *κακότεχνος ἐπίνοια*, xv. 4. When, for instance, Cyprian, or whoever it may be, speaks *de idolorum vanitate*, he does not mean thereby the Images, *Signa, Simulacra*, but evil beings operative through them; or else the fantastic or delusive deities which they represent. And thus we understand the Apostle when he says, An Idol is nothing, 1 Cor. viii. 4. How the admission of UNREALITY, *εἶδωλον οὐδέν ἐστι*, can be reconciled with that of REALITY, 1 Cor. x. 20, *ἃ θύει τὰ ἔθνη, δαιμονίοις θύει*, is shown in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, i. 4, p. 740. Moreover, there is a species of idolatry arising out of the cultivation of art, and the contemplation of nature; another, which may be regarded as incidental Fetich worship; and another again, as Mythical Anthropomorphism. But no form of idolatry can be justified by the sensuous requirements of man—*Cic. de Legg.*, ii. 11, *est quædam opinione species Deorum in oculis, non solum in mentibus*—or by his consciousness restrained and capable of discriminating between signs and things; for that requirement arises from unbelief, and this consciousness is not only transient and untenable, but even does not remove, where it exists, superstition, or the spiritual complication of the idea of God in combination with created being. The self-judgment of heathenism, in this point of view, teaches us more livingly to feel the inestimable worth of the Mosaic prohibition of idols. See concerning the origination and various stages of idolatry, *The Book of Wisdom*, xiii. and xiv.

⁵ A certain kind of Dualism arises in a twofold manner

from amidst Polytheism; and, first, in such a mode, that NATURA, as generally worshipped, is separated into a male and female principle (Sun and Moon, Fire and Water), whether as Osiris and Isis, Belus and Astarte, &c., or as Liber and Ceres, &c., the whole idol system being represented in it as a conjunction (*συζυγία*). See my *Theol. Stud.*, i. p. 44. And secondly, the useful and injurious deities in their plurality or unity are antagonistical. The general ground of the latter peculiar kind of dualism has been sketched by Plutarch, *de Iside et Osiride*, 45, who has alluded to it in a very interesting manner. *εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γένεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὲ κακοῦ τὰγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν παράσχοι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχήν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν.* Now, comparatively, it is rather Eastern than Hellenic Pantheism which exhibits such opposites, in myth, worship, and philosophy; for the Hellenic deities all occasionally commit evil themselves, or leave it to be effected by inferior Genii, or by Fate. Philosophers, from the time of Socrates, and the Stoics absolve the gods from the charge of committing evil, and ascribe the accusation to Homeric inventions. The Stoics, especially, represent the gods as entirely innocent and harmless, and consider Providence to be pure and single. So long as Plutarch maintains, in opposition both to those who deny a providence and to those who dread the gods, and therefore in accordance with the Stoics—*non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epicur.* 22—all the gods are regarded by him as *μειλίχιοι, ἀλεξίκακοι, &c.*; but afterwards he again opposes the Stoical doctrine of the One good causality of the world, and seeks for something corresponding to the opposites, Osiris and Typhon, Ormuzd and Arimann, which he really conceives he discovers everywhere in Plato, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, and even in the Greek myth; and thus he often confounds the pure negation of the Good, or the mere possibility of the Bad, with its concentric and positive causality. Indeed, Dualism, according to his accurate explanation, is always attempered by something, in each of even its most complete forms. Either the good causality is only *θεός*, and the other *δαιμονιον*, or there is an ultimate victory achieved by the good, out of which, spontaneously, a higher essence of causality accrues to it; or else a third mediating principle restores, even during this Aeon, a *good* equilibrium: which principle, Plato is said to have first clearly propounded in his old age, and which corresponds to the Mediating Essence of Isis, Mithras

(according to his explanation *μεσίτης*), and Harmonia. Again, the sublunary world alone (*κόσμος περιγείιος οὗτος καὶ μετὰ σελήνην*) is exposed to the influences of the evil deity. According to Plato and Plutarch, the Bad cannot be altogether subdued. Orus (*de Iside et Osiride*, § 55) is himself circumscribed, and has never yet destroyed Typhon. Dualistic worship, whether it consist in offering propitiatory sacrifices to the evil deity or not, is the religion of anxiety and hatred. If this form of religion does not offer sacrifices to the aforesaid Good Deity, but, on the contrary, as is the case amongst the heathen of Africa, and many of the Asiatic and Polynesian Islands, offers them almost exclusively to the God of Murder, War, and generally to all demons who work evil, then assuredly does such form of worship exhibit the most abandoned and most profligate aspect. But it cannot be denied, that Dualism, particularly in the Zoroastrian system, in its moral earnestness and detestation of evil, far surpasses in truthfulness the beautiful Greek Polytheism. Greek ignorance of the Bad and Oriental Polymathy, constitute a contrast of errors resembling that presented by Pelagian and Manichæan Christianity. See my Treatise on the Religious Notion of the Ancients. *Stud. u. Krit.* i. 4, p. 746, seq.

§ 17. HISTORICAL AND POSITIVE RELIGION.

It is not to be supposed, nor does experience warrant the conclusion, that a religious community,¹ merely regarded in itself, (whatever be its origin, and however complete its authority,) should remedy those defects, and carry out a general and rational plan to perfection. It is not to be supposed, that religious fellowship, when the internal reaction of fundamental consciousness upon religious perverted life has proved insufficient, should be adequate to remove the bias of unbelief or superstition, together with its effects. For, although it may be imagined that an individual, in his relation to the community, may be more co-operative, and that fellowship may be more productive, or more passive and receptive; yet will his own personal corruption cooperate in the former case and be comprehended in the lat-

ter. It cannot by any means be admitted that individual religion, just on its being imparted, should immediately purify and rectify itself. We could as easily imagine, that when an opportunity or necessity for action is afforded, either conjointly or reciprocally, all the immoral elements of the individual will should immediately be reduced to a negation or a mystery. For even experience, from the standing-point of heathenism, testifies to the contrary, and how much more so from that of Christianity. Historical religions, (*i.e.* those grounded on myth and symbol,) and positive religions, (*i.e.* dogmatical and ritual,) resting upon external authority, more or less permanent, can scarcely be said to have resisted superstition; rather may it be asserted that such religions, (as indeed the idea of heathenism, not derived from them, fully declares,) each in its kind, has become the distinct seat of superstition, and thus again the exciting cause of dominant unbelief.

¹ With reference to the relation which individual religion bears to the religion of the community at large, a subject hitherto but partially investigated, we refer the reader to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, i. p. 49; 2d. edit. p. 36, and to De Wette's *Bibl. Dogm.*, p. 24. The expression church, there made use of, we confine to Christianity; although we may here venture to observe, that Christianity, in behalf of its accordance with the universal knowledge of religion, and by means of its generic fitness, cannot do otherwise than extend certain ideas which it has itself generated, to this extent, that they become generic in relation to connected religious history, for example, revelation, church, kingdom of God, &c., and then determine other Ideas, which Christianity only has taken up and adopted, such as religion, dogma, sacrament, liturgy, &c., up to this extent, that they, in their kind, become new and specific. *On Religion*, see also Schleiermacher, 2d edit., p. 40.

REMARK 1. The historical and positive are not to be entirely excluded; for external religious authority could not be maintained without some sacred fact, by means of which the founder of a religion, or a testimony is authenticated. And, again, sacred histories, without permanent oracles, pontifical authorities, or unaccompanied with records which are capable and participant of a

continual interpretation and application, could not preserve a religious community. Yet, on the other hand, the religion of a community may be more historical than positive, or *vice versa*, and it betrays a narrow view of religious history, if it be asserted that the distinction alluded to is somewhat arbitrary. Moham-medanism is more positive than historical, although it endeavours to supply its internal deficiency of an historical element, by supporting itself on Judaism and Christianity. The more ancient religious community was ever more dependent on the immediate operation of facts, and maintained its permanent existence through myth and poetry; and partly through the institutes of a Numa and a Lycurgus, and partly by the aid of mysteries, it supplied what it required in dogma and legislation; thus the contrast here alluded to is still farther expressed by the terms Myth and Dogma; or by æsthetical and ethical religion.

REMARK 2. A religious community does not attach itself chiefly to the universal facts of nature which are everywhere alike (*experientia communis*), but to some peculiar and extraordinary phenomenon; and from this centre, again, attains religious and comformable views of nature as a whole and in part: and this is the case partly, because the limited powers and weakness of man's nature take that course, and partly because religious community can only arise in conjunction with other social institutes; and this ever by means of miracle only; that is, through the introduction of an entirely new relation of man to nature, differing from that in which he is placed by civilization. If, then, piety, and a religious contemplation of nature, together with a pre-eminent regard for certain isolated experiences, are supposed to precede the formation of a community, then he who leads and regulates, or follows and yields to such precursors, and participates in the founding of a commonwealth, cannot do so without the aid of Deity, and is enabled to effect this object only by means of some Divine act: a Ceres must appear, and sow the fields with corn. No Commonwealth or History exists without a Theophany; with it a distinct sacred history of a people, a country, and of the world is acquired. Myth is the oral narration, and then the tradition of whatever has to be told, transmitted, and repeated, that is of paramount importance; it is the language, the remembrance of the manifestations and favours of the gods. In each peculiar myth, or in such as is fundamental to some common veneration and constitution, there is

another theological, or rather theogonic and cosmogonic myth included, constituting a primeval history, not of a state, but of the earth and of nature. We cannot discuss the subject of either philosophical or poetical myth in this connexion.

Myth is religious primeval history: but it differs from pure history, not merely in its origin, being prior to all fixed chronology and records; but in an especial manner because it does not interrogate and inquire, (*ιστορειν*), but asserts and testifies, or principally speaks, to produce faith, and not to impart knowledge; and it is also distinguished from history by speaking, in part, of things which do not admit of the testimony of eye-witnesses, and in part by delivering the facts, and their credible apprehension unanalyzed, and the actual and true undivided. In this definition, nothing is involved which interferes with the discovery of myths in the Holy Scriptures, which are the records of true religion. The rather it may be maintained that, in certain respects, the Holy Scriptures alone contain Myths, and heathenism none. But from a different point of view, on the other hand, it may be asserted, that Myth is not contained in the Canonical Scriptures, namely, from that point whence the homogeneity of heathen primitive history, originating out of fantastic subjectivity, presents itself under the name of myth, mythology, in contradistinction to theology. But if myth be considered in the purity with which it excludes intentional or unintentional fiction, or rather as it includes everything founded on fact, and on the other hand, represents what is new and strange in matters of fact, as they are reflected, variously modified, through the child-like subjectivity of the first witnesses, then is the idea of Myth also applicable to the narrative of the New Testament. The primitive history of Christianity is a new primitive history of humanity, involved in a narrative already historically unfolded. Christ is an impersonated miracle, a second Adam, and, in his kind, just as much a commencement as was the first Adam. The actions of Jesus, whom Pilate crucified, as they are avowed in universal history, infallibly demonstrate that such a person existed; consequently the trace of the marvellous in his deeds and destinies does not by any means confirm the prepossession that they were unreal. The actual and indisputable character of Christianity, as originally experienced in man's consciousness, presupposes a kind of origin, in accordance with which its origination and foundation, could

not by possibility be an invention. The reality of miracle, or the miracle of reality, necessarily imparts to history a typical and poetical, and, to a certain extent, a mythical character. If the theological criticism of evangelical history discovers elements of narration which are not founded on testimony, or which perhaps have only a general *ὄρα* for their basis, and acquire the *πίστις* through an *a posteriori* inference from attested fact to the unknown, and thus include more truth of faith than reality of incident; or if theological criticism meets with contradictions which are inexplicable by reason of the dissimilar reflex of the event upon the subjectivity of the eye-witness, or through the different degree of immediateness of the original witnesses yet left; then is this criticism, according to the condition of things, upon the whole, only necessitated to separate, in the first place, particular kinds of narration in the New Testament, as for example, previous and public history; or it is required to adopt a symbolism, not of the idea, but of the fact, a symbolism which assumes for its firm basis—the historical verity of Christ as the Son of God; or it is necessitated to suspend its judgment, or to separate the apocryphal from the canonical. Upon the subject of Myth in its highest form, as contained in Sacred History, see Lange, *über d. geschichtlichen Charakter d. Kanonischen Evangelien*, &c. Duisb. 1836, p. 29, 41. In reference to Myth being irreconcilable with living, historical Monotheism, see Dr Sack's *Bemerkungen über den Standpunkt der Schrift*, and *Das Leben Jesu krit. bearb.*, by Strauss. Bonn 1836, p. 36. Concerning the idea of Myth in general, and the incompatibility of an undesignedly invented tradition with the nature and position of the primitive apostolical communion, see Jah. Muller *Theol.-Studienkrit*, 1836, 3 H. p. 839—84. Finally, on the various kinds of sacred historical narrative, see Schmieder's small but excellent treatise, *Präliminarien zu einer gründlichen Rechtfertigung der Biblischen Geschichte*. Naumburg, 1837.—In the presence of history the substance of Myth is represented and preserved by symbol (*conjectura*), *i. e.* by means of that natural or artificial, real or striking object, which obtains a prominent recognition in and beyond itself. Indeed, in one sense, every visible object, whether produced by nature or art, has a symbolical aspect. For no sooner does an object become apparent, than it immediately indicates its evil or good principle, its proximate or higher aim. Every thing indicates a something peculiar to itself that

can only be spiritually contemplated. In a more limited sense, the symbol does not primarily originate the idea; but the idea selects and creates the symbol; or memory extending over all co-existence, and contemplation extending over all that is visible, represent and illustrate themselves in a character calculated to effect their reconciliation with the present and the sensible; for this purpose the symbolical instinct, as well as the intellectual mystagog, grasps unreservedly at whatever is either the simplest, most vital, and most fruitful immediately discoverable in nature, or freely compounds from them objects not formed by nature, or represents her as renovated, and under a new aspect, as for example under that of a Greek idol. But heathenism errs in this, that, in the first place, it continues unconscious of the distinction between Symbols and Ideas, as well as of their various properties and qualities; whereby it converts symbol and myth into magic and divination; and in the second place, it does not reserve the very highest—the formless, and the free, for spiritual contemplation. True, pure symbol, therefore, just as genuine myth, is only to be found in the region and service of revelation. On the subject of Symbol and Myth in general, see Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythol. der Alten Völker* I., 1st book, Synopsis, p. 146; and Baur's *Symb. u. Mythol. oder die Naturreligion des Alterthums*, Part iii. Stuttg. 1825.

REMARK 3. The idea of *positive* religion primarily passing from political economy and jurisprudence into theology, is but slightly exalted and illustrated, by being exchanged for an arbitrary constitution, (*arbitrium Dei in constituenda religione*). It is with the will in the region of truth and righteousness, as with contingency: we are compelled in the first place to retract these ideas again as often as they have been made use of. Absoluteness is in no case competent to contend with the necessary and the free; and the authority of revelation, of the state, and of law, has ever been most undermined by those, who, like Hobbs and Thrasymachos, (above mentioned), have endeavoured to support that view. Fischer, therefore, in his *Introduction to Dogma*, p. 26, ought not, even preliminarily, to have rejected the grounds and counter-grounds of rationalism and supra-naturalism, as he does in the following remarks: “For it becomes us not to desire to judge what may be suitable or unsuitable for God, or what is expedient or inexpedient for his divine intentions towards humanity;” for we might with just as great propriety assert, that it does not become us to judge whether anything be possible for God;

whereby the discussion concerning even physical grounds might be set aside. It is equally incorrect, in *Nigidius b. Gell. N. A. x. 4*, to solve the question of philosophers, *φύσει τὰ ἰνόματα ἢ θέσει*, by another, *cur verba possint videri naturalia magis quam arbitraria*. For the opposite of the positive and natural is less absolute than that of the natural and arbitrary. Now, those who find the positive in whatever may be universally appended to the natural, appear to acknowledge this. See *Baumgarten-Crusius*, already quoted, p. 79. But the question may be asked, How and wherefore is the addition? If, for example, the particular creed *vi INERTIÆ*, according to Kant's doctrine of religion, be added to a pure religious faith, then those who place great stress upon the difference between the positive and natural may find themselves dissatisfied. The *Opera Supererogationis* and productive dogmas would in that case constitute, for the most part, the positive. But Schleiermacher claims (*Glaubensl. § 19, p. 93*) the super-added, but then in another way. If there be, says he, a something added, then the natural must be the same in all; but on the contrary, as the natural is in every one different, and consequently the general and abstract is so likewise; so the positive, even, can only be that peculiar determinateness with which religion exists in each; and, in reference to religious communion—is the original and direct something which is given. In reply to this, we would ask, Is not the *natural*, also, immediately bestowed; and does it not, perchance, commence for the first time to exist and co-operate with comparative critic and history? Has not the natural, in a peculiar and characteristic manner, accordingly as the common dogmas have moulded themselves in each person, an active share? We would defend this principle, therefore, against Schleiermacher, as Marheineke and Wegscheider, each in a manner peculiar to himself, assign to the religion of reason (which is alike in all) the name of positive; wherein the latter only errs by constructing the positive of the rational system out of rational truths and the demands of Scripture; since the Scriptures, considered in the light of a Divine *position*, cannot possibly furnish any other than that of reason. Marheineke handles the subject in a different manner. And beyond a doubt, the natural and positive constitute two principles, and in some measure two authorities of religious life, which are intimately related without absolutely negating each other. The character of the natural is intrinsic, that of the po-

sitive extrinsic; or, to prevent being misunderstood, we seek the authority of that which is immediately beyond us for the positive, and for the natural, that which is immediately within us. The desire we feel within us to exalt the subjective to the objective, is, in accordance with man's destiny for social fellowship, closely interwoven with a desire to experience the specific in the universal. This holds also in regard to the necessity of interrogating experience and history relative to matters of fact, which either confirmatively correspond to those of consciousness, or anticipate the developed consciousness by exciting and typifying. By means of the *argumentum a consensu gentium*; by the universal proposition concerning the indispensableness of experience for the development of self-consciousness, and by means of the doctrines of the development of reason anticipated by revelation, and such-like arguments, this relation of the positive to the natural may be elucidated. Still this view of the subject is not exhaustive. In a strict sense, the positive continually offers novelty and variety, such as at any time was to be developed from mere reason, and yet only such as, without prejudice to freedom and spontaneity, is received and adopted, because it either corresponds to natural inquiries and expectations, or, in its connection with facts and the testimonies of God, internally or externally, it can trust itself to faith, even before its assimilation and union with conviction. Thus, then, the positive exists in religion, in conjunction with what is common, with what is founded on fact, and with what, in this relation, is attested by God.—A positive religion claims an especial authority for Dogmas and *Ritus*. Dogma is a declaration of the mind or will, which either exacts obedience and observance, or, above all, demands, without farther ceremony, assent and confession. It is only in the former sense that it occurs in the Septuagint, Daniel ii. 13, vi. 9; Esth. iii. 9; 2 Macc. x. 8; Luke ii. 1; Acts of the Apostles xvi. 4, (where it is used in reference to the Apostolical canon intended for the Gentile Christians,) Acts xvii. 7; Ephes. ii. 15; Col. ii. 14. In the latter texts, Chrysostom and Theodoret have erroneously adopted the other meaning. But even these Fathers of the church, and before them Ignatius, Clemens, Origen, and Eusebius of Cæsarea, speak of Christian doctrine (*διδασκαλία ἀποστολική*) as of dogma, dogmas of the Lord, dogmas of the church; but not in such a sense as that derived truth, or a scientific idea, or church

form, or even a subjective apprehension, should be understood thereby. But dogmas, in so far as these Fathers found them in Christianity, and held them in esteem, were considered by them as the fundamental truths of the gospel, which must first be received, and without their acceptance there could be no Christian orthodoxy. This phraseology the Fathers adopted from the Stoics. Marc. Aurel. *ἐἰς ἑαυτι*, 2, 3, from a *Treatise on the Harmony of the World*, *Ταῦτα σοι ἀρχαίτω, ἀεὶ δόγματα ἔστω*. Of these dogmas, he says, (4, 3,) they must be briefly conceived and expressed in order that they may be readily applied to the conduct of life. They are denominated by him (3, 6,) the dogmas of *νοῦς*, eternal truths founded on reason. Seneca, *Ep.* 94, 95, terms them the roots of moral knowledge and doctrine, the elements of which the body of wisdom consists, the heart of life, &c. Compare also a phraseology detected by Baur, (*Tub. Zeitschrift*, 1832, 4, p. 194,) according to which *δόγματα* were, in the Pythagorean system, tantamount to principles, *στοιχεῖα*. It was just this idea of the first principle and essential nature of truth, requiring, as it does, faith rather than *ἀπόδειξις*, which the Fathers expressed by dogma. Even the distinctive contrast between *δόγμα* and *κήρυγμα*, laid down by Basil (*de Spir. S.*) as well as that of esoteric and exoteric Christianity, admits of illustration from Seneca. In short, to prove the opposite signification of the word, Marcellus of Ancyra has been appealed to, who, in Eusebius, *c. Marc. Ancyra*. i. c. 4, blames Asterius for grounding the doctrine of the Son rather upon the dogmas of his predecessors, than upon the *θεῖος λόγος*. And it is universally admitted, that even this incorrect signification of the word dogma must necessarily have occurred both among Greeks and Christians. All scholastic disputation falls back upon, and proceeds from, recognised fundamental positions. Even the sceptics, whilst they stopped short of affirmation and demonstration, or subverted what previously may have been maintained, still cherished negative canons. Now, as in every association of doctrine, there appears a manifest inclination, upon false or unseasonable authority, to accept and to establish a something; so there arises not simply a highly manifold conflict between the established principles of the schools, but also a contest concerning the determinableness of truth itself, and even hatred and suspicion are excited against the tenets of schools and churches. Thus, the terms *Δόγμα*, *δογματίζειν*, &c., acquire

their secondary signification, and come capriciously to denote the human, the non-existent, the arbitrary, the temporal, and the mutable. The sceptic charges the dogmatist with giving him *ἀπόφασις*, when he asks for *ἀπόδειξις*; and, in like manner, the practical man says to the theoretical, I ask for *ἀπόδειξις πνεύματος*, and you give me *ἀπόδειξις ἑλληνική*. The Biblical theologian addresses the confessor of the church-creed and requires *θεῖος λόγος*, who gives in return *δογματα πατέρων*. Upon the whole, the ancient church was not aware that doctrines, in their development and differences, as entertained by bishops, were related to the *θεῖος λόγος*, in the same manner as the Greek *διαφωνία* of the schools was to absolute rational truth; but ecclesiastical teachers compare the scholastic controversies of the Greeks with the contradictions of heretics amongst each other; and only such an isolated phenomenon, as Gobarus the Monophysite, refers to the contradictions of even the so-called orthodox. It was equally unacquainted with the contrast between the direct believing apprehension and the scientific formula; for the contrast of *πίστις* and *γνώσις*, or *κήρυγμα* and *δογμα* had still another signification than this. Thus, if the subject discussed related to *dogmatibus ecclesiasticis*, and was paraphrased after the manner of Gennadius of Marseilles, or Isidor of Seville, still doctrines were not intended thereby, such as the church originally had anything to do with, nor even the mere forms which she had given to truth; but only that which she had received with the Divine word, which she might preserve and hand down, by means of her inherent authority, as essential. Hence, Vincent of Lerins does not entitle his work, *Cœlestis Philosophiæ Dogmata*, nor Dion. Petavius his great one, *Dogmata Theologica*, because they desire to quote a mass of the doctrinal opinions maintained by theologians, but because the latter wishes to describe, after an historical method, the system of Christian tenets as they are recognised by the Holy Scriptures, and by ecclesiastical tradition. Now, so far as every catholic paraphrase of Christianity admits ethical axioms, so the latter also are included by Gennadius under the idea of *Dogma*. But as, upon the whole, Christian action is derivative and determinate, and Christian faith is primary and determining; so the ancients partly opposed, and partly fused into one whole, after the example of the Stoics, dogmatism and ethics. See Clem. Alex. *Pædag. Exord.* where the

Divine Logos in its two-fold function is represented, as διδασκαλικός, δηλωτικός ἐν τοῖς δογματικοῖς, and as πρακτικός and παιδαγωγός. See also Theodoret, z. 1. Ps. Τινὲς μὲν τοῖ—ἡθικὴν τοῦτον ἔφασαν τὸν ψαλμὸν περιέχειν διδασκαλίαν· ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐχ ἦν τὸν δογματικὸς ἢ ἡθικὸς ἔδοξεν εἶναι. Hence a judgment can now be formed as to whether Budde and Pfaff were not justified, according to the ancient usage of language, in opposing and combining *theologia dogmatica et moralis*; and whether Döderlin, who has many followers, was not in error, when he says, in his *Inst. Theol. Christ.*, ed. 4, p. 192, *Theologiam theoreticam male nostris temporibus dici cœptam esse dogmaticam, auctore haud dubie Buddeo, theologo alias summæ et accuratæ disciplinæ, Tittmannus I. c. monuit. Nam theologia dogmatica proprie est, quæ agit de placitis et opinionibus theologorum. Nec enim apud veteres δόγμα dicebatur de doctrina ipsa, sed de sententia doctoris alicujus, &c.* Of all these assertions, apart from the praise bestowed on the excellent Budde, and without depreciating the merits of Döderlein, the very reverse is true.

REMARK 4. The above position is subject to an unavoidable ambiguity, since it may exist under different modifications, according as Christianity is included or excluded; for, on the one hand, Christianity being only an historical, common, and imparted religion, never forming in itself a bulwark against unbelief or superstition; and, on the other hand, the more it was embraced as an historical and positive religion (which happened in other religions also), it must incur the charge of superstition, and through this, of infidelity; yet altogether apart from the distinction of the true and the hypothetical, there are, with reference to the historical and positive, the following contrasts between testamentary and extra-testamentary religion.

a. Whilst the sacred history of the Testaments is linked by an unbroken chain to the earliest dawn of primitive history, and comes down to the time of the Roman Augustus, heathen religions can only revert to the mere primeval history of civilization, and supply their deficiency partly by poetry on the history of nature and nations, and partly by means of isolated miracles and magic. They rely on history without possessing any, and they are destitute of prophecy and fulfilment.

b. The institution of religion coinciding with the foundation of a state, is, when not sanctioned by testaments, vassalage; but

authorised by them, it becomes a governing and conditioning power, and this in such a manner, that the state appears manifestly to be merely founded for the sake of religion.

c. In many cases, Heathenism, in proportion as it is historical, is so much the less positive; and the less historical it is, so much the more dogmatical is it. Supported by testaments, the most intimate connection of both from beginning to end, takes place, though varying according to the varying stages of revelation.

§ 18. NATURAL¹ AND RATIONAL RELIGION.

Although the Idea of religion, abstractedly considered as true, original, and rational, has not left itself untestified upon such occasions as have been afforded to it by the contemplation of nature and by experience; and has still more, by means of moral and state education,² and that through the organ of science and schools, unconsciously developed itself to a thoroughly conscious renunciation and struggle against superstition; (as, for example, from the time of Socrates among the Greeks, who may be selected as an adequate representative of the rest;)—still, all improvements achieved by this mode have either directly and at once degenerated, or else they have, partly in their intensive and partly in their ex and protensive relation, shown their incompetency to overcome that fundamental evil, which in some measure is original, or have failed to supply a remedy capable of victoriously subduing it.

¹ The term Natural Theology, with the religion involved therein, occurs, [especially in contradistinction to mythical and political, as well as to historical and positive religion], in Varro, of whose work, *de Divinis Antiquitatibus*, some extracts are to be found in Augustin *de Civ.* 4, 27, 6, 2, 5, 7–9. The Pontifex Scävola, and Cornutus the Stoic, observed the same kind of division of theology. See Villoison *de Triplici Theologia Mysteriisque Veterum*, appended to De Sacy's edition of Sainte-Croix's *Recherches sur les Mystères, &c.*, vol. ii. The natural philosophy of the ancients was not so universally anti-theological as it was represented by Epicurus and Lucretius. It did not, it is true,

become, strictly speaking, theological by acknowledging a mythic god, together with his attributes, [as interpreted from the history of natural phenomena] of which Clemens Alex. (*Stromatum*, v. p. m. 244) has cited many examples from the Orphic philosophy. But Varro preferred to treat of the physical gods in the higher sense of the Stoics. General natural philosophy and natural history is the source from whence springs the knowledge of religion and criterion of truth, but it is not the sole mythic *fact* or especial sacred history; this principle created natural religion and theology; and in this sense its acceptance appears necessary, in so far as it is desirable to distinguish it from rational religion, which is educed from the facts of consciousness. For as soon as conscience and experience come to be regarded as the inseparable factors of the origin of religion, both terms, each for itself, monopolise everything opposed to historical and positive religion, and merely in this antithesis become current as the more perfect or imperfect, as the ideal interpretation or critical solution, or as the required preparation of the positive. Augustin blames Varro for esteeming physical theology as the only true kind, and yet, at the same time, regarding positive religion (particularly the established) as necessary and useful. Varro, after the example of the greatest philosophers, did not directly assail state religion. The sages of antiquity, for the most part, contented themselves with allegorising mythic dogma, or with representing positive religion as a school for rational religion. The same relation occurs in regard to Mysteries; and if here and there the same thing be repeated by Christian philosophers and theologians, still the followers of Wolfius assumed the reverse relation; whilst others, as, for example, Ferguson and Gruner, (*Instit. Theol. Dogm.* § xii., *et Scholion*,) regard reason as a mere formal intellectual faculty, the doctrine of the light of nature as wavering and confused, and *theologia naturalis* as empty and null, or as stolen from Holy Writ. These opposers of natural theology, however, were willing to admit a *rationalis theologia* within certain limits; that is to say, a philosophy of the Christian religion, by means of which (according to Meyer's method, or after the example of the Cartesian theologians in Holland,) the substance of Christian mysteries might be conceived, and, to a certain extent, rendered comprehensible. Herm. Alex. Roel, *Diss. de religione rationali*, ed. sexta, Ultraj. 1713.

² If, in this point of view, the Athenian or Roman State, oratory and the plastic art, or the popular life of the ancients, as represented in their comedy, be considered, it will then be perceived how often they serve to separate the *Idea* of religion from common religiousness, to retain it in the region of the beautiful, the useful, or the suitable, and from thence to secure for it a power which in part may counteract gross atheism, and in part oppose the inert mixture of holiness and unholiness. Comedy appears to deride all specific gods and modes of worship; and yet this appears to be done only for the purpose of turning the devout wicked into ridicule; those who—in *animum inducunt suum, Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis; et operam et Sumtum perdunt*—*Plaut. Rud.* v. 22;—or else, that by so doing, Ideal monotheism, which lies at the foundation of *Dii Deæque omnes*, might not be injured, but, on the contrary, benefited. And thus did comedy co-operate with state law, which interdicted foreign or private religious services, and expiations for what was inexpiable.

§ 19. SUBJECT CONTINUED.

The proofs of this position consist of indubitable facts: *i. e.* upon the path of this reaction, (which reaction being eminently scientific, and which had been deprived of every participation of life), atheistical opinions were directly produced, either by means of a partial and negative Protestantism;¹ or, polytheism and idolism, for example, were only corrected in their moral aspect; and in other respects, at best but exchanged for dualism and pantheism;² or finally again, the whole system of superstition was adopted as an integral part of that religion which is eternal, and universally authentic.³

¹ In place of any other examples, see Lucretius, i. 63.

² Greek philosophy, in its whole range of development, from Anaxagoras to Plotinus and Porphyry, was restrained within these two limits of pure theism.

³ See Jamblichus on the *Egyptian Mysteries*. Porphyry on *Sacrifices*, which even the latter defended, though offered to evil spirits.

§ 20. SUBJECT CONTINUED.

Now, if by means of the reaction above described, the totality of religious doctrines (admitted by Christians as rational truth) or pure Theism,¹ had been in some way or other brought to light; still it did not therefore follow, that it would likewise have mastered every province of individual and common life, or even gained for itself an original point, from whence it could proceed to farther efficiency. But rather we perceive, that it sought the esoteric form of existence and action, and that vigorous efforts for religious fellowship only first appear when natural and rational doctrines had entered into a compact with that positive religion, which had previously been opposed by them.² The same condition in which, and by which natural and rational religion essentially consist, (the divesting truth of its facts and history), renders the religion of nature and reason incapable of founding a communion through itself, and for itself.³

¹ For a view of the doctrine of a World-Creator, who is not a mere world-constructor; of the doctrine of a personal God, not a mere Θεῶν, and of the doctrine of a merely free and good Being, entirely distinct from the evil, ἀρχή, and equally so from passion and fate, see Christoph. Meiner's *Hist. Doctrinæ de vero Deo omnium rerum auctore atque rectore*, p. 1 et 2, Lemg. 1780; and Bouterweck's *Treatise iv. Der reine Theismus*.

² The neoplatonic divines are chiefly zealous for the altar, and only a Julian employs every possible means to re-establish a philosophically reformed priesthood, and a real sacrifice.

³ How unconcerned are Seneca and Marcus Aurelius that the institutions which inculcate reverence for the gods, and which they despise, should be destroyed, and how equally indifferent, that for the reverence they laud, others should be instituted.

§ 21. CONCLUSION.

It would seem, however, that the Idea of religion had, notwithstanding, been on the point of realization, through the powers of rational thought in the human race; and this, too,

in the path of Teleology. For it extended so far, as not only to perceive the evil with which the actual world is afflicted, but had even advanced to the Idea of redemption, and to inquire whether the process of the actual redemption of the world had not already been introduced, at a time when the spiritualized and reclaimed course of human life had already been pervaded by Pythagorean and therapeutic institutes, and had produced such champions against evil and error as the hero of Philostratus¹ or a Plotinus. Moreover, it farther inquired, whether science, when it had become wisdom, could not be advanced to the public spirit of a church, and be competent to represent the Platonic Son of the Good—the offspring of God, in humanity. But this was not achieved; and we can perfectly understand why it could not have been so. The bad itself, or evil, is not an idea, but a sign and experience, obtruding itself upon man during the contemplative and active operation of his original and ideal consciousness in life, considered as such. Hence it happens, that those in whom the happiness of ideal cogitation has arisen, in order to prevent it from becoming obscured, conceal and diminish the greatness and the depth of human misery to the utmost, or else they endeavour to represent it either as being natural, as being a channel for good, or as something altogether isolated and accidental. In this unseasonable attempt to triumph over evil, we find (in comparison with oriental nations) the Greeks especially involved, and among these particularly, the Stoics, whom we venture to call Pelagians, before Pelagius. The reverse of this holds good with Pythagoras and Plato. In them the religious Idea of the good was sufficiently strong to perceive the prevailing evil condition of the world, to confess it, and with deep earnestness to lament over it, and yet to maintain and to believe the possibility of the triumph of the thinking will over seeming life. Philosophy proposed for its object the welfare of the world, but *that* it could not effect.² It was in some way or other able to conceive or desire a Saviour, but could neither predict his appearance, nor believe in him before his actual appearance. It

was able to perceive a few, (and these always increasing in number) who being qualified to philosophise, ransomed themselves more and more; but it could not apprehend actual redemption, and accordingly could not recognise the origin of evil; it could not venture to ascribe it to the will—was compelled to derive its origin from matter—was unable to convey the holiness of God to the living conscience, or to perceive the freedom of the will and personality; and finally, was forced to naturalise and fatalise the history of the Spirit; thus imperfect Teleology and Aetiology mutually corrupted each other, and the entire truth of religion remained entangled in the knot, which neither history, nor any compensation between idea and history, could disentangle.

¹ Apollonius of Tyana, the Pythagorean, whom Philostratus, under a poetic and implied kind of parallelism, about the time of Vespasian and Domitian, represented as traversing the world as the messiah of heathenism, and filling it with the marvels of Indian philosophy and sanctity. See Baur *Apollonius von Tyana und Christus, oder das Verhältniss des Pythagoreismus zum Christenthum*. Tüb. Zeitschrift. f. Theol. 1832, H. 4.

² Ackermann: *Das Christliche in Plato, &c.*, p. 332, “The essence of Christianity consists in its remedial power, that of Platonism in aiming to reach the same.” This remark still continues perfectly applicable, notwithstanding the emendation essayed by Dr Baur, *Das Christliche in Platonismus oder Socrates und Christus*. Tüb., 1837—for the efficient and the realized idea are quite distinct. The latter is not produced by the former, but by him who created the idea.

B. Of Revelation.

§ 22. IDEA.

If, however, we continue conscious of our immutable destiny for true religion and for fellowship in it, this consciousness generates, in union with that experience derived partly from historical and partly from rational religion, the *Idea* of revelation. Undoubtedly this idea itself would be, at the least, but very imperfectly exhibited, and would not, as it now is, be at

our command, if its realisation did not precede; for the two factors of the requisiteness of revelation, which we have just now pointed out, first exist adequately and vigorously in revelation.¹ Once only, and that in a very apocryphal manner, Heathenism dived into futurity, demanding and hoping for some new and Divine remedy for that religious and moral corruption of the world which had reached so terrific a climax.²

¹ Upon the whole, man in a state of heathenism is so far from desiring or expecting any new development of religious history, in opposition to the one under which he is reared, that, on the contrary, he only anticipates, either from an increasingly penetrative philosophy, or from some reawakened ancient theology of mysteries which have been preserved in a state of purity, if not a remedy, at least some abatement of evil. Moreover, whatever has perchance been either supposed or admitted by Stoics and Platonists concerning the continual communications of the gods, is incompetent to fix the idea of revelation. The expression of Marc. Aurel. lib. i. § 17, is remarkable: he congratulates himself in having been enabled to attain a distinct and operative idea of life, strictly conformable to nature; and that, in so far as it depends upon the gods and their suggestions, nothing is wanting to enable him to lead, even now, such a life: the fault must be attributed only to himself if this result be not attained, inasmuch as he may not perhaps have duly attended to the admonitions (ὑπομνήσεις) of the gods—which, however, may be unintelligible doctrines (μονονουχί διδασκαλίαι). Thom. Gataker adduces on this passage the assertions of Plato, in *Philebus*, of Cicero (*Tusc.* 1.), and Seneca (*Ep.* 90), where philosophy is so represented, that if it be not in reality the gift of the gods, it would be more than all they could bestow. Thus, philosophical religion, whether it be regarded as a Divine gift, beyond which nothing is desirable, or as a higher form of human spontaneity, which bestows the *bene vivere* just as the gods only confer the *vivere*—such religion must, in either case, obstruct the idea of revelation.

² See, among the works of Appulejus, the treatise *de Natura Deorum*, ed. Elmenhorst, page 90, 93, where may be read a prophecy both against and for Egypt, as the holy land of the earth; which must either be considered a version from Christianity or a monument of heathenism, essentially surpassing itself.

§ 23. REVELATION AND REDEMPTION.

It is at least necessary, if we desire to express the peculiarity of Christianity through the idea of revelation, to endeavour to comprehend it as deduced from, and as combined with, the doctrine of redemption; a mode of proceeding which perfectly accords with the tenour of the previously deduced IDEA; inasmuch as we were compelled to look for the original cause of degenerated religion in a tendency towards an unreal freedom, which had become a second nature, and which state man enjoys through the suppression or change of his higher self-consciousness; consequently, we found, in a moral point of view, that the entire development of religious thought is checked, from the impossibility of realising its fundamental *idea* in a world afflicted with evil. At all events, the ground, object, substance, and characteristic of revelation, regarded in a Christian sense, cannot be defined without assistance from the *idea* of *salvation*. Undoubtedly, whenever a revelation is made, our perceptive powers and energies are influenced; but it by no means follows from this that a revelation from God should be at once declared a Divine (immediate, original, supernatural) communication of certain notions more or less transcendental.¹ Essential changes in human perception, such as are here supposed, can never exclusively or directly apply to the separate intellectual or imaginative faculty. Otherwise, the *idea* of the unnatural would rather be given by these, than that of the supernatural. On the contrary, the essentially new definiteness of this mode of perception originates in the correlative consequence of an activity which is wont to renew human life or human condition, that is—in the redeeming activity of God; and the fact, which is of great importance, enforces this view also, namely, that the word Revelation in the Holy Scriptures indicates, only in a subordinate and derived sense, Divine, internal, perceptive communications; whilst, in the chief passages which assert a revelation from God,

it imports a Divine discovery of the decree of salvation, or of the truth of salvation, communicated, not to individuals, but to universal man.²

¹ It is this idea of revelation around which the controversy between the Rationalists and Supranaturalists has principally revolved, partly during the Cartesian, and partly during the Kantian period. The error of the supranaturalists consists mainly in their only assuming, in the first place, the miracle of knowledge and then subsequently other miracles. But the correct method of detecting this error, and setting it aside, would compel the Naturalists, or even the Rationalists, (if they desired to use this method,) to discern their own error, since it is simply the counterpart of the one into which the Supra-naturalists have fallen. In addition to the corrections this partial super-naturalistic idea of revelation has received from Daub, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Marheineke, Bockshammer, C. L. Nitzsch, Märtens, Kähler, and others; see B. Crusius' *Einl. in d. St. d. Dogm.*, p. 93, "A great institution for all times, for the preservation and bestowal of the holiest benefits on the souls of men, and, above all, of faith;" see also Fischer's *Einl.*, &c., § 19–21; but especially Twisten, p. 345: "By revelation we understand here (where revelation, in a more limited sense, is the subject) the declaration of Divine grace for the salvation (*εἰς σωτηρίαν*) of fallen man, in its original operation upon human cognition."

² The word most directly corresponding to the theological idea of revelation is ἀποκάλυψις, the unveiling of what is hidden, not directly φανεροῦν, *manifestare*. For the former is not used when speaking of the testimonies God gives of his existence and being, through reason, nature, and universal history; not even by Matthew, xi. 25, where, on the seemingly opposite assertion by Knapp, B. Crusius, and Hahn, may be referred to. But the latter is termed φανεροῦν, Rom. i. 19, οὐκ ἀμάρτυρον ἑαυτὸν ἀφῆκεν, Acts of the Apostles, xiv. 17, and φωτίζειν πάντα ἄνθρωπον, Joh. i. 9, in so far as the essential word of all rational cognition is the medium. On the other hand, the opinion supported by Baumgarten-Crusius appears untenable, namely, that φανεροῦν may be the more trivial, for example, the more remote explication of the object given through ἀποκάλυψις. For in the two passages in Rom. xvi. 25, κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου, φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν διὰ τε γραφῶν προφητικῶν κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ αἰωνίου Θεοῦ, and in

1 Pet. i. 20, φανερωθέντος δὲ ἐπ' ἐσχάτων τῶν χρόνων δι' ὑμᾶς is equivalent to the word otherwise peculiar, only that it refers upon the whole more to external than internal manifestation. For a fuller discussion on this phraseology see Car. L. Nitzsch *De Revelatione Religionis externa eademque publica*, p. 8, sqq., and especially the first four essays; see also B. Crusius, *Bib. Theol.* p. 222. A correct display of the idea of revelation, as contained in the New Testament, might be comprised under the four following heads: *First*, The revealing of the great mystery, namely, the decree of salvation and its bearings, resulting from the combined operation of the personal appearance of the Redeemer with the Holy Spirit in the apostles and prophets, is made known to the world for the obedience of faith, Rom. xvi. 26, compare i. 17; 1 Pet. i. 20; Eph. i. 9, iii. 9; 1 Cor. ii. 7; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 2 Tim. i. 9–10; Tit. ii. 11. ἐπεφάνη—πασιν ἀνθρώποις. A public manifest appearance which the word קָרָה, for example, in Jerem. xxxiii. 6, also signifies. In so far, however, as this disclosure of salvation, and even redemption is to a certain extent incomplete, and we still stand in hope, there is, in the *second* place, an unveiling of the mystery of salvation for our contemplation, and this, too, in a public and manifest manner, with the return of Christ, who is now concealed along with our true life. Luke xvii. 30; Rom. viii. 18, 19; 1 Tim. vi. 14; 1 Pet. i. 5; in the same manner as the conditionate differs from the condition, so the revelation of the Son of God and that of Divine wisdom differs; which results, in the *third* place, in the consciousness of faith, Gal. i. 12, 16; Eph. iii. 3; compare Matth. xi. 25, xvi. 17. Even this revelation is the act of God or Christ, through the Holy Spirit. *Fourth and lastly*, Through God's grace more abundant developments of that consciousness which is determinated through Christ, fall to the lot of the apostles, and believers influenced by their preaching; partly in behalf of doctrine, 1 Cor. xiv. 6 and 26, Phil. iii. 15, partly in behalf of acting, Gal. ii. 2, and still more particularly for its apostolical and Christian perfection, 2 Cor. xii. 7; in all these bearings μυστήριον is the object of that contemplation, which is effected through revelation.

REMARK. Nothing has been revealed unto Christ of God, not even according to Revelat. i. 1, nor Joh. viii. 26, 28, &c.; but Christ is the object and mediator of revelation, and is such because He pre-eminently and originally participates in knowledge with God, or in an entire fellowship with Him. See Nitzsch *De*

revel. p. 10, 13, and B. Crusius' *Bibl. Theol.* p. 234; an observation which of itself alone might have obviated innumerable modern definitions and expositions of the idea of Christian revelation, or at least have imparted to them another direction.

§ 24. ORIGINALITY OF REVELATION.

Of those elements, from whence arises the idea of Revelation, in its connection with redemption, the *first* is this, namely, that nothing save the creation of the religious disposition itself is equal to it in originality; or this, that revelation (despite its perfect relation to the subsisting development of the *first beginning* of religion is a *new commencement* in the religious life of man, which manifests itself as such, partly in the consciousness of those who are enlightened by it,¹ and partly in the determinations which the world and the world's history receive through it. If revelation, then, is to be regarded as active in any way in the world,² like redemption from the existence of evil which it is intended to overcome, then nothing can belong to it but what pertains, in a perceptible manner, and as a co-operative and developing power, to uninterrupted, progressive, or permanent, true religion.

The element of originality becomes by this means at once exclusive and antagonistic, so that the universal idea of revelation, such as the Gnostic parties³ among and near to Christians, or even newer doctrines have commended, is inadmissible.

REMARK 1. The element of originality as regards the idea of revelation, is just as much obscured as it is recognised by such explanations as those contained in the *Red. üb. die Relig.* p. 153, and in Schleiermacher's *Glaubensl.* i. § 19. This theologian has taken his idea of revelation, not from the Holy Scriptures, but from the philosophy of the general usage of language; and, indeed, this is the reason why he considers such as too imperfect to express the peculiarity of Christianity. The entire immediateness of revelation would appear to him as only perfectly applicable to Christ as an authentic person; but it is deserving of remark, that, according to Scriptural guidance, this view is here

inapplicable; for what has been objected to our assertion, as, for example, by Böhmer—see Pelt's *Encycl.* p. 251—an ἀποκαλυψις, or revelation in the above sense, has not occurred to Christ. That he taught what he heard, is something quite different, for that even does the Holy Spirit. Moreover, it is utterly impossible to maintain the idea of revelation, if originality could alone produce it. See Vatke *Bibl. Theol.* i. Berlin 1835, p. 88, where he says, "certain religious elements, which maintain in the consciousness of spiritual heroes a mere objective position, admit of being explained only as revelations of God, who thereby becomes himself objective;" and, again, at p. 101, "God-consciousness must be conceived in an especial manner as revelation;" and yet, at p. 668, he asserts that "the idea of the Old Testament religion, according to its true import, had been revealed to the Hebrews."

REMARK 2. Originality evidences itself subjectively by consciousness, (which is indebted to revelation for its determinations,) at once pointing out that it has obtained such by means of an especial history, included in history,—by means of a separate community, and altogether in a mode distinct from the general creation and preservation of spiritual life; and that these determinations maintain within themselves, according to their value and power, an immediateness, to which the facts of conscience, either merely arise equally, or, (in reference to what they have become, as simply *δυναμις* without actuality, or through an irregular development), do not arise equally. Originality also evidences itself objectively by the continuity of the preparations, and uninterrupted operations, by means of which, as from a certain middle-point of world-history, and radiating from thence, true religion has become predominant. If, for example, it be supposed that an imageless and moral theism indispensably appertains to the authority of true religion, still it cannot be proved that the agency of a Pythagoras or a Zoroaster should essentially and organically succeed to make its way into the history of the world's progress in this theistical subjection of superstition or unbelief; but, indeed, it may be assumed, that Abraham and Moses, by means of their relation to Christ, still advance in an infallible manner to such a goal, and that all the monotheists in the world are the spiritual children of Abraham. See *Theol. Stud. und Krit.* 1842, p. 638. sq.

¹ Hence the originality of revelation is expressed in as strong

contrasts to *άνθρωπος, σάρξ και αίμα, σοφία τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*; for example, in 1 Cor. ii., Gal. i. 11, as is the originality of redemption by John i. 13; iii. 6. Compare 2 Cor. iv. 6, *ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ὁ εἰπὼν ἐκ σκότους φῶς λάμψαι* (Genesis i. 3) *ὅς ἔλαμψεν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης του Θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ*—a full designation of the two elements, originality and historicalness, which represent the genuine supernaturalism of the idea of Christian revelation; and unanimously with this view, catholic antiquity comments, as Origen does, *c. Cels. i. p. 5*, ed. Hoesch, *λεκτέον δέ τι πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐστὶ τις οἰκεία ἀπόδειξις τοῦ λόγου θειοτέρα παρὰ τὴν ἀπὸ διαλεκτικῆς ἐλληνικῆν. Ταύτην δὲ τὴν θειοτέραν ὁ ἀπόστολος ὀνομαζεῖ ἀπόδειξιν πνεύματος και δυνάμεως*. Compare Justin Martyr *de Resurr. init.*

² See Twisten's *Vorl.* p. 322. "Since the Divine decree of redemption and reconciliation is to be considered as an eternal one, so must its accomplishment also begin simultaneously with the fall of man."

³ Samaritan and Alexandrian blenders of religion, as, for example, Simon the Magician, as he is represented in the *Homilies* of the pseudo-Clemens. The favourable judgment of a Clemens of Alexandria on certain Gentiles and on certain Greek doctrines, is quite of a different kind. See Neander, *K. G.* i. 3, p. 919.

§ 25. REVELATION HISTORICAL.

If revelation, in reference to the degeneracy and incapacity of natural faith, operate in a redeeming manner, in that case it requires to be, not only in its form, but also in its substance, in a peculiar manner historical, and at the same time to contain, under certain aspects, something entirely new. For supposing that the salvation of the world be an idea of pure reason, yet, as evil does not arise from rational necessity, the idea alluded to can only be termed a deduced one, and as such, could never be elevated to a necessity parallel with the original facts of consciousness. But in truth, Christians are conscious of salvation just as if it had been revealed unto them, not only through facts, but as a fact. To Christians, indeed, an eternal decree of salvation has been communicated, but inseparably united with its accomplishment in time, and in

union with the whole higher history of the human race ; and this in such a manner, that the word of God, upon which Christians depend differently from what they do on rational principles, contains, in no stage of revelation, mere qualities alone of God or of the world, or bare permanent relations, but, in addition, invariably possesses Gospel and Prophecy. But the attributes and general relations of God and the world universally maintain, by means of the revealed facts of salvation, new determinations ; hence we do not entirely concur in that theological view, which, although in other respects it does justice to the originality and exclusiveness of revelation, only admits it to be a maturing preformation, or a public and actual introduction and exciting cause, of rational religion confined to the world.¹

REMARK 1. The loftiest and purest theistical conception occurring in the development of natural religion is ever produced apart from history, and in opposition to it ; hence the idea attains the highest popular form in those ambiguous inscriptions “to the unknown God.” The Lord of heaven and earth, as Jehovah, as the God of Abraham, establishes from the very beginning, historically, an imageless and moral worship. And this peculiar historical character of revelation is admitted, even by Lessing and Kant, these fathers of modern rationalism, who have been but too much neglected and disowned.

REMARK 2. In natural development, the historical or mythical material in due time recedes altogether, and a purely dogmatical one stands forth, which is incapable of founding a communion, and only maintains its ground by a negative contest. As often as it endeavours to complete itself by history, it is a natural history, which perchance terminates in a conflagration of the world, or begins anew by means of it, and into which history itself is absorbed. The doctrinal contents of revealed religion are, on the other hand, primarily combined with the ethical history of humanity, to which physical history is subordinate.

¹ With regard to this element of the idea of revelation, which we call historical, Lessing, (*Ueb. die Erziehung des menschengeschlechts*), and Kant, (*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen des blossen Vernunft*), who are opposed to naturalism, as well as supernatu-

ralism, deserve more credit than has yet been acknowledged. Lessing has left quite undetermined under what aspect revelation may be considered ætiologically; and has recognised it as being the perfection of the rational understanding, at once replete with Deity and providence. Revelation is an arithmetician, and precalculates results, which are afterwards re-examined; and thus, in accordance with ancient prejudices, Lessing almost exclusively sought religion in the faculty of perception, and education in practice. Kant, who at all times seizes on the practical point of view, requires, in order to maintain a good fight against the evil principle, an ethical commonwealth. Now he deems it a weakness that this commonwealth cannot be realized by pure religious faith alone; but notwithstanding, he esteems it a proportional gain, that there should exist a reuniting church faith. It is a direct consequence of his hypothesis, that in the sense in which cotemporary theologians spoke of revelation, he could neither discern its necessity nor its reality. Proceeding, however, from the undisputed fact, that pure morality never possessed a firmer basis than the monotheism of the biblical church faith, he insisted on its records, and its use of the idea of revelation, being so treated, as that the combined effect of the mysteries, which otherwise were passive and indifferent, or even injurious, might be accommodated to ethico-theistical decisions. His doctrine was, that we should avail ourselves of the Son of God, and his atoning death, &c., as historical expressions, as active types and pledges of practical and rational truths; and thus he sketched out a philosophy of Christianity, which comprehended the nature of the subject-matter as truly, as it ever possibly could do from such a point of view; and at least much more faithfully and intrinsically than any that had immediately preceded it. It was just this ingenious retreat into the positive (as in the mean time the grammatico-historical interpretation had begun to make its appearance) that those who too readily acquiesced in his negations, neglected to enter. As far as we know, there is only one theologian who has adjusted, not only these negations, (whilst pointing out in an historico-teleological manner the necessity of an external and public introduction of true religion, by means of revealing and inciting facts), but has also carried out Kant's attempt, upon the historical stand of the Gospel, to separate what represents from what is represented, and to indicate the latter in practical reason; and this, too, in

such a manner, as to form one of the most complete theories of revelation we possess. Nitzsch most rigidly distinguished divine, supernatural revelation from religion, and revelation as the outward form from inspiration, so as to combine a material rationalism with formal supernaturalism. His explanatory work, *Ueber das heil der Welt*, "On the Salvation of the World," Wittenb. 1817; and *Ueber das Heil der Kirche*, 1821. His preparatory one, *De discrimine legislationis et institutionis divinæ*, Viteb. 1802; and his supplementary essays, *De mortis a Jesu Christo appetitæ necessitate morali*, Viteb. 1810, 1811; and *De gratiæ Dei justificantis necessitate morali*, Viteb. 1812, 1813, may be compared with his principal work, *De revelatione rel. externa eademque publ.* The former treatises have been republished, together with kindred works, *De Antimonismo Jo. Agricolæ*, &c. under the general title, *De discrimine revelationis imperatoricæ et didacticæ proluss. acad. scr. recogn. et emend.* Carol. Lud. Nitzsch. Viteb. 1830. The theory of Christian revelation developed in these works, notwithstanding cotemporary literature has not done justice to its peculiar excellence, is one of the most important in philosophical theology, and belongs to one of the most remarkable transitions exhibited in our times. This theory has been the means of preserving many of its author's disciples, (among whom the present writer acknowledges his obligations with the fervent gratitude of a son,) from the entangling contest between neology and palæology, although some of them may afterwards, perhaps, have succeeded in accomplishing a more extended adjustment. The theory of Baumgarten-Crusius, in some points, approximates very closely to that of Nitzsch, without being identical. That of Dr Cramer of Leipzig has been derived from it.

§ 26. REVELATION VITAL OR ALL-AVAILABLE.

Although the revealing energy of God commences by effecting certain external facts, in which, as in their phenomena, the kingdom of God is attested; yet would such energy be incompetent to reform the spiritual tendency of mankind, if it did not reach, by an awakening and purifying influence, every primary point of religion and irreligion. A merely EXTERNAL revela-

tion, though retaining within itself attributes hitherto recognised, would only produce, if anything, fanaticism; whilst, on the other hand, mere INTERNAL revelation would generate mysticism. A revelation from God proceeds in conformity with the perfection and totality of man's life, whose progress is never to be considered apart from the reciprocal relation between the external and the internal, and partly between that of the word and work and partly of the imagination and the will. The combination of revelation with redemption consequently admits, nay requires, that, upon the whole, Divine manifestation (the Word in a more extended sense) should precede remembrance; but between the more early and subsequent gifts of the Word there must always be supposed a communication of the Spirit, an original inspiration of the mind; and the exhibition of the Divine does not afford an adequate conception, unless the subjective consciousness obtain Divine determinations. Hence the opposite of Divine manifestation and inspiration, which has become of late more prominent than formerly, is important and true, supposing that the unity of both acts, through reciprocal relation, be rightly perceived.¹

REMARK.—This relative determination is illustrated and confirmed by the Word and Spirit of God, partly by means of the distinction between objective and subjective religion, as formerly laid down, partly through the analysis of the biblical idea of ἀποκάλυψις, already mentioned, and finally, by the doctrine of the Holy Scripture.

¹ In reference to the illustrations which Bretschneider has given of manifestation and inspiration, in his *System. Entw. aller i. d. Dogma Vorkomm. Begriffe*, 3d edit. p. 166, two objections present themselves: In the first place, it appears strange that manifestation only should be considered as twofold; that is, first as universal, by means of which natural religion is induced, and secondly, as especial, by which Divinity is revealed to the spontaneous reason through individual facts; whilst, on the other hand, inspiration is regarded as simple. Whenever we carry over these ideas into the region of so-called natural revelation, there are grounds for considering inspiration to be also general and special. For all the signs of the idea of inspiration adduced

by this learned writer—namely, *1st*, that man is passively related to it, and, *2dly*, that nothing interposes between God and the recipient,—can also be applied to the original, general, and constant communication of the Deity, through which man is rendered a rational being, and possesses religious consciousness. The symmetry of his entire illustration is deranged, when he refers to manifestation what, in the latter point of view, is admitted to belong to Divine causality. This appears a strange explanation to associate with the former, viz. that manifestation merely tends to the natural activity of reason, but that inspiration leads to no spontaneity, and that a combined operation of both Divine activities is not pointed out. The one or the other energy, therefore, is either superfluous or insufficient. Its infallible and necessary connexion may possibly consist in God's inspiring through the medium of manifestation, and appropriating through inspiration whatever has already, by any means, become known. Now, precisely as manifesting facts always retain a certain natural and historical connexion, the like is the case with subjective and objective consciousness newly determined by inspiration. And again, these determinations are conformably related to that freedom and spontaneity for which man was originally called into existence. With what distinctness is this mutual relation between external testimony and internal assurance expressed, for example, in 1 Cor. ii. 6–16, xii. 3, Gal. i. 12, compare the 16th ver. with Matth. xvi. 17; particularly in the former, 1 Cor. ii. ver. 10 and 12. The objective, the Word of salvation and life delivered to us in the history and person (of Christ), we know and acknowledge as such, first through the power of the Holy Spirit—*ἐλάβομεν*—*τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν. κ.λ.* And although, upon the whole, the first act of revelation must be that whose participation is proclaimed so solemnly in 1 Joh. i. 1; or although the mission of the Son, and the incarnation and indwelling of the Logos, with their adjuncts, shall precede and accomplish the mission of the Spirit, still the latter, with all its distinct and derived effects, is to be regarded as an original and Divine causality, through whose instrumentality all faith, language, knowledge, and interpretation of the Divine word, are, for the first time, (according to 1 Cor. xii. and other passages,) rendered possible.

§ 27. REVELATION GRADUAL.

Neither human freedom nor the laws of being are disparaged by either act of revelation. For the *new* commencement of a religious life, which we assume with revelation, refers, in more than one way, to the *old*, and attracts to itself all, that in natural development, is, for the most part, either conformable to its origin or opposed to its degeneration. The determinations which, through revelation, fall to the lot of history, as well as those accruing to consciousness, obey the emancipating law of gradual progress. Doubtless,¹ the God of revelation elects those, on or through whom his testimonies act, by founding a communion; but the most select² agents are ever those who, when God seeks, respond to His call, or those who bear within themselves some other trace of excellence. And even the Son of Man, in whom the Word has become flesh, must thus far be considered as the most humanly free in the Divine necessity of his self-development, where, according to his accomplished work, he draws all men unto himself (John xii. 32).

Again, God does in truth speak through his Son to all nations (Heb. i. 1), and to a united world; but not until He had previously, by way of preparation, spoken to a disunited one through the law and the prophets, attended by local miracles, and had condescended to assume the form of a servant, and submit to national customs; not even until he had called those whom he pleased to inspire (according to the reserved limits of nationality) by means of the Word, which word, at the same time, was accommodated to human speech; that is to say, not until he had addressed their hearing, faith, and obedience, and had subjected even the heathen to that gradation which conducts through law and promise to the gospel. And finally, although this Word includes the Divine history of a kingdom, which throughout contains new and supernatural truth (*ἀλήθεια*); yet by its satisfying and developing power, it corresponds to pre-

existing religious knowledge, and this in proportion as knowledge (upon the ground of consciousness, and by means of candid reflection, as opposed to falsehood,) has produced and preserved the universal apprehension (*περίληψεις*)³ of the dogmas of God and Providence, of the victory of good over evil, of recompense and freedom. It is obvious that, even in this feature, Revelation can only be comprehended as it stands in connexion with Redemption.

REMARK.—The element of gradual progress might undoubtedly be also termed that which is natural or mediate in revelation.

¹ Gal. i. 15; Joh. xv. 16.

² Acts vii. 22, x. 35; Matth. xi. 25.

³ *Clem. Alex. Strom.* vi. p. 286, sq. Εἶπερ οὖν καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα ἢ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἢ παρὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐκμανθάνειν μόνως οἶόντε, εἰκότως παρὰ τῶν θείων λογίων τὰ μαρτύρια ἐκλεγόμενοι, τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐχοῦμεν ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, προφητευθέντων μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ σαφηνισθέντων· τὰ συνεργοῦντα δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἔυρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας οὐδὲ αὐτὰ ἀδόκιμα. ἢ γ' νῦν φιλοσοφία πρόνοιαν καταγγέλλουσα, καὶ τοῦ μὲν εὐδαίμονος βίου τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τοῦδ' αὐ κακοδαίμονος τὴν κόλασιν περίληπτικῶς θεολογεῖ· τὰ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν δὲ καὶ τα ἐπὶ μέρους οὐκ ἔτι σώζει· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὔτε περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν οἰκονομίας, ὁμοίως ἡμῶν διαλαμβάνει· οὐ γὰρ τὴν κατὰ τὸν Θεὸν ἔγνω θρησκείαν. διοπερ αἱ κατὰ τὴν βάρβαρον φιλοσοφίαν αἰρέσεις, κἂν, Θεὸν λέγωσιν ἕνα, κἂν Χριστὸν ὑμῶσι, κατὰ περίληψιν λέγουσι, οὐ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.—Justin and others: μίμησις τῆς ἀληθείας.

§ 28. REVELATION POSSIBLE.

If we understand that religion recommences under the influence of Revelation, and consequently is supernatural, we have then to show, in opposition to the views of the Naturalists (as they have been called, particularly since the time of Kant, in contradistinction to Rationalists,)¹ that revelation is neither objectively (metaphysically) nor subjectively (psychologically) impossible. In order to support the view of its objective possibility, it is not sufficient for an opponent to admit that every phenomenon, in its distinct peculiarity, partly allows and partly

requires a reference to the causality of the universe, and consequently an immediate reference to Divine omnipotence; for many Naturalists are willing to receive the mere general proposition, all is miracle, in order to enunciate on the other side of the same truth, their own thesis, that whatsoever happens is natural; and accordingly, an æsthetical view, at the most, of the supernatural, will remain, because, as is universally admitted, some phenomena invite more to a religious relation, others more to an intellectual one. But beyond all dispute, we are at liberty to maintain that the Will of the Almighty, although it will not indeed create anything in such a state of isolation as to be organically disunited from connexion with the universe, may, nevertheless, bring forth much to which and on which He has given to the lower order and stage of things a bare predisposition; so that certain phenomena may be regarded as developments of a higher nature in a lower, or as creative phenomena, or as originations.² With regard to subjective possibility, on the other hand, there cannot be, in reference to positive proof, any higher claim, made upon the belief of revelation, than upon religious faith in general. Now, we are enabled to obtain adequate certainty as to whether we are indebted for our religious life to redeeming revelation, or to natural development, partly through the kind of reception, and partly by the kind of effect, which that which is received calls into exercise.

¹ In reference to the historical determination of the idea of naturalism and rationalism, Dr Hahn deserves the credit he has obtained for his work, *De rationalismi, qui dicitur, vera indole et qua cum naturalismo contineatur ratione*, Lips. 1827. We fully concur in his assertion, that the term rationalism was not first introduced by Kant or Semler, but that it had always been employed, owing to an imperfect use of reason and philosophy, in Christian theology. We agree also with him in his opinion that rationalism is related to naturalism much in the same way as effect is to cause, or form to matter, or as the same things under different names are related to each other; as is evident, in fact, from his numerous quotations. It is undeniable, however, that such phraseology may gradually attain a more definite pre-

cision, and that even those polemical writers quoted by Hahn contended for certain broader distinctions between both modes of thought. Strictly speaking, the nature of the case, and in part the history of these terms, constitute the ground of their distinction. As regards the former, it is self-evident that faulty tendencies are denoted by such-like ISMS, and philosophers or theologians have invariably, in the first instance, contemned even ISTS of any kind, however unwillingly they may afterwards have declared in their favour. In regard to the latter it simply refers to the sentiments entertained on Revelation and Christianity, and not to what naturalism and rationalism may possibly signify, or may have said in the region of religious philosophy. The opponents of a revelation, or *the* revelation, may primarily be such in a twofold manner: either they already deny the causative possibility of revelation, or, while acknowledging that, may leave the reality problematical; whilst, on the other hand, they oppose the reality of a final aim (teleological reality). In the former case, the question chiefly turns upon the laws of nature; in the latter, upon the rights of reason. But it is likewise possible that there are many who do not oppose revelation on any of these grounds, but, on the contrary, assume the salvation of the world, and yet may be considered *anti-scripturarii* and rationalists; and this on the following grounds—either that they reserve for reason the highest law of truth under the form of apprehension and cognition, and explain the matter of revelation as truths rationally anticipated or historically moulded, or else they at least treat the conceivable mysteries of Christianity in a manner too much opposed to history, and permit theology to pass over too much into the philosophy of Christianity. If schemes the most heterogeneous shall not be all placed on an equality, it becomes necessary to separate the apologetical phenomenal point of that mode of thought opposed to revelation, from that kind of thought which may be styled dogmatical and exegetical. Now, upon the whole, the history of the name and matter corresponds to this point. The mode of thinking which has been ascribed to the celebrated Herbert of Cherbury, was especially denominated Naturalism (also Deism, see Lechler, *Der Englische Deismus*, 1841; also Free-thinking). In its more extended development, it stood, in its relation to Holy Scripture and to history, partly as deriding, accusing, and refuting, and partly, at least, it was related to

Holy Scripture and history in such a manner, that the theistical and ethical contents of the revealed records (as being the more pure doctrine, and the one the author had in view,) were used for the purpose of combating the other contents, according to the fundamental principles of accommodation and completeness. Modern naturalists adopt the latter mode, and in this view are to be preferred. On the other hand, that mode of thinking which was founded on the attempts of Descartes' and Spinoza's disciples, to explain the Bible on grounds in harmony with reason, and which in many points agrees with Arminian hermeneutics, has been designated by its admirers *Rationalis Theologia*, and by its opponents, Rationalism. In its fuller development, and particularly in its renovation by means of Lessing's, Kant's, and Fichte's principles, this mode of thinking was not opposed to, but admitted, (and this, too, generically,) the common super-naturalistic idea, and was opposed more or less problematically to the simple evangelical one; but whilst acknowledging some kind of necessity for revelation, and even sometimes recognising the super-naturalism of form, it entered deeply into the positive doctrine of the gospel, with allegorical or idealistic explanations. The Naturalist was thus more aetiological, the Rationalist more teleological, yet in such a way that both were enabled to approximate. The Naturalist, in whole or in part, denied the truth of Scripture; the Rationalist was rather their philosophical expositor. The extremes in the school of rationalism, at the Cartesian period, approximated closely, as they do in the present day. In lamenting that so many who boast in the title of Rationalists, have ceased to exhibit the profundity which Lessing and Kant have done, in their attempts to rationalize Christianity, we, at the same time, entertain the opinion, that those who have exhibited themselves so inimical to Dr Hahn, are, strictly speaking, only Naturalists, and by no means Rationalists.

² We entirely concur in Twisten's defence of the supernatural, *Vorlesung über die Dogmatik*, Part i. 363, Part ii. 117, 171. Compare my *Darstellung des Wunderbegriffs gegen Strauss Theol. Stud. u. Kr.*, 1843, i.

§ 29. REVELATION REAL.

The only religion which can pretend to reality, in the sense hitherto described, and which it attains from Divine Revelation, is the Christian, or that mode of life depending upon the consciousness of the world's redemption, and of a personal Redeemer,¹ even Jesus Christ. Hence it is evident that the religion which displays itself in "a virtuous course of life," or "in a practical belief in immortality and recompense," or "veneration of the Deity as founded by Jesus and a purified Judaism," are but very imperfect designations of what ought to be primarily maintained as the distinctive attribute of Christianity.

REMARK. The custom of employing the terms, "religion of Jesus," "doctrine of Jesus," instead of Christianity, is a clear sign of the mode of thought which denies or forgets that Christian sentiments and actions are related to Christ in a different manner from Mahometan sentiments and actions to Mahomet. Christians did not call themselves Jesuits, but "sum Christus."

¹ Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, i. p. 180; Erdmann. *Das Bewusstsein von der Versöhnung*.

§ 30. OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT.

The title, Christ, does not primarily take into consideration those religious *suppositions*, which either did or could exist among all nations at the time of the appearance of Jesus, but only *one* which was united to a distinct historical and positive religion, and which Jesus himself indicated when he decided against the woman of Samaria, "salvation is of the Jews," John iv. 22. For as in every consciousness of redemption, recourse is had to its necessity on account of sin, and through the consciousness of sin to the law, and through all this to the original destiny of man to God and by God. So, in like manner, the word of salvation must be re-

ferred back to a prophetic and legal word. Hence the Old Testament, in the unity of decreed salvation, and in the fact of revelation, is in truth one with the New, but not identical, the latter being related to the former, just as completion is to preparation, restriction to limitation, the direct to the indirect.¹

¹ We cannot entirely concur, either in Schleiermacher's definitions, which narrow the unity of the Old and New Testament (Schleiermacher *Glaubensl.* i. p. 121, et seq. Bretschneider *Dogm.*, i. 72, and Vatke, *Bibl. Theol.*, i. p. 62, 616, &c.) or in those which amplify it, as set forth by Calvin, (*Instit. rel. Chr.* lib. ii. cap. 9-11.)

The modern school designates Christianity absolute religion, yet in such a way that the religion of the Old Testament is made relative just as others are; that is to say, natural and subjective religion occupy the first rank, and the Old Testament is placed in the second, (notwithstanding all the pre-eminence accorded to it, in the fact that it alone recognises the wisdom and holiness of absolute power,) and thus is in the same category with the religion of the Greeks. This course is repugnant to the idea of religious history, and not less so to Christian consciousness. Indeed, every notion of religious history is incomplete and defective, which denies the varied course of religion, as manifested in the public life of the people, and in the esoteric opinions of the schools; and the same is the case, with every idea which persists in a partial consideration of the mere *not yet*, or in a confined view of the deficiency in absolute truth, without observing the perversity of the tendencies, or the untruthfulness and irrationality which have to be subdued. Both the one and the other defect and partial view, is connected in such a way that the process of man's religious life is merely regarded in its logico-metaphysical elements, as if the sentient and willing spirit took no part in religion. The author of the *Book of Wisdom*, xiii., and the Apostle Paul, Rom. i., philosophised in a far higher strain than our logicians, concerning the causes of nature-worship; they recognised in it the element of a passive state, of an inert will, of infidelity. Supposing, for example, that Hellenism had contended with and overcome the natural, and had elevated itself up to the pure subjectivity of the Divine, still this could only have been the case in its scientific disavowal and interpretation of myth; but not indeed, in its principle, as a popular

religion: in fact, Hellenism possesses, even as philosophy, the natural in itself. And how, then, is it possible to ascribe the glory of originating true religion, otherwise than to Hebrewism, which, in principle, excludes every form of nature-worship, granting even, that it is involved in the universality of the subjective? This logical caprice, indeed, which limits the God of the Old Testament to the sphere of universality and subjectivity, mars the explanation. It is not true, as might on a first view appear, that Jehovah is an abstract universality, like the Greek *Θεῖον*, or a mere subjectivity like Zeus, the Godhead in the highest sense; but Jehovah is the intimate combination of absolute unity and subjectivity, and as such, is the concrete personality, which, (whilst it administers itself in phenomena, elections and revelations, and becomes objective,) clears a way for the revelation of the God-man, in a manner altogether unparalleled. Whoever is enabled to perceive that the unity, holiness, and wisdom of God are alone revealed in the Old Testament, ought also to remember the conditions and consequences of such a revelation, and not merely discourse on the connection between the Old and New Testament history of the world, a connection so entirely contingent and external.

§ 31. TESTAMENTARY AND EXTRA-TESTAMENTARY RELIGION.¹

It must be admitted by those who are conversant with the idea of revelation, that even heathenism, by a certain kind of approximation and pedagogy, is related to Christianity. For how could Christianity have otherwise been competent to make itself so intelligible and estimable to innumerable heathen-Christians, seeing that it so entirely contemned proselytism? Or how could the collected apologists of Christianity, who had to contend with a yet existing heathenism, have ventured to borrow so many analogical proofs from heathenism itself? But the more heathen state-religion, or the stray mysteries and varying philosophy be considered, the easier can it be shown that there exists in the heathen mode of life, a negative and ideal preparation for a belief in redemption. The completeness of the contradiction, not the consequence of development,—the wandering of

contrasts,² not the firm retention of an only one and original, not the promise, but the ardent desire³ for the word of God, makes the heathen a natural catechumen of Christianity, as is so clearly attested in the biography of a Clemens of Rome, or a Justin. Hence positive and real preparatives, and the subject-matter of revelation exclusively belong to the Old Testament.

¹ Ephes. ii. 12, ξένοι τῶν διαθηκῶν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας—v. 19, οἰκειοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ—v. 17, τοῖς μακρὰν καὶ τοῖς ἐγγύς.

² Heathenism, according to its own self-judgment, presents to the Christian theologian, a particular apologetic view. See on the religious idea of the ancients, in *Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken*, i. 3, 4; which treatise has for its special object, the placing certain leading points of Greek and Roman heathenism in such a view, as to admit of their being considered by the Christian theologian.

³ See Ackermann, *Das Christliche im Plato*, p. 334, not. i. Cicero *Fin.* 5, 24, quodsi ipsam honestatem undique perfectam—*penitus viderent*: quoniam gaudio complerentur, quum tanto opere cius, *adumbrata opinioni* laetentur!—

§ 32. EVIDENCE OF THE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY.

The proof that the fundamental truth, by which all the doctrines preserve their Christian peculiarity is Divine truth, is, in a twofold point of view, either wanting, or exists only under one aspect. In the *first* place, Because every apologetic demonstration must rest upon that living and intuitive syllogism of the heart, intimated in John vii. 17; Romans i. 16; 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5,¹ 10; 2 Cor. iv. 6, 13. And in this point of view, the incapability of demonstrating the truth of Christianity has not only been cheerfully conceded, but also willingly maintained, by those whose faith is strongest; just as a certain religious philosopher of modern times rejoices and boasts in his ignorance.

¹ Οὐκ ἐν παιδοῖς σοφίας λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως. The *Eranist*, by Theodoret, *Dial.* tom. iv. p. 199, may well place the demand on the orthodox, ἀποδεικτικῶς, οὐκ ἀποφαντικῶς

χρὴ λέγειν τῆς ἐκκλησίας τὰ δόγματα, for they are still found in the region of science.

§ 33. CONTINUATION.

And, *secondly*, Because the empirical directions which go to complete the evidence of the Spirit, and which, on account of the force of our imperfections, sometimes take the lead, and sometimes accompany the proof, do not, taken separately, and each by itself alone, establish anything, but only demonstrate something in their due co-operation. In the first place, Jesus testifies of himself, (John viii. 14, compare v. 31); and his self-testimony is just as indispensable, (since he must necessarily be the most experienced and most certain of what he is), and just as valid, as it would, as he himself says, have been invalid, if it had been merely left to itself, and isolated. But that his testimony is true, is proved by the fact, that there is nothing contradictory in his personal conduct or sufferings; for who can convict him of sin? John viii. 46; but on the contrary, everything appertaining to him agrees with the evidence; for instance, the testimony of the Father, the works he performed, combined with the resurrection and transfiguration, effected through God.¹ Again, the testimony with which the word of God, speaking to the patriarchs and prophets,² witnesses of the Incarnate Word, and of the sufferings and glory of the Son of man. Finally, the witness of the Paraclete,³ which, whilst it takes all that is Christ's, out of fools produces teachers of the world, out of sinners saints, out of enemies friends, and out of the world a temple of God.⁴

¹ That the works (for the sake of which the eye-witnesses ought to believe, according to John xiv. 11, x. 38, even if, in the first instance, they do not credit the word), if they do not mean the miracles only, described by Matthew xi. 5, as the distinguishing marks of the appeared Redeemer, still imply the miracles principally, follows directly from the circumstance, that the Father doeth them, (John xiv. 10), that they are done

in the name of the Father, (x. 25), and that partly the same, and partly still greater works, (xiv. 12), shall be done by the disciples after our Lord's ascension. The same also is asserted of the signs (xii. 37) which is here asserted of the works. The *ἔργα τοῦ χριστοῦ* (Matt. xi. 2) are the same characteristic Messianic works which are enumerated at ver. 5; and although the arm of the Lord (according to John xii. 28) is manifested in them, still they are as little credited by those who are not of the truth, as is the preaching.

² The testimony of the word of God in the Old Testament, (John v. 39), *αἱ γραφαὶ μαρτυροῦσαι περὶ ἐμοῦ*. Moses also wrote of him, (v. 45). All Scripture testifies of his sufferings and of his glory, (Luke xxiv. 44). The Spirit of Christ was in the prophets, (1 Pet. i. 11), and they "searched diligently" "what manner of time the Spirit of Christ did signify."

³ The testimony of the Paraclete, (John xv. 26, xvi. 8), his dependence on Christ, (xvi. 13–15). This testimony, as a general one, which is given to the world, (1 Tim. iii. 16; Acts ii. 16; 1 John v. 8); as an internal and particular one, (1 Cor. ii. 12; Ephes. i. 13).

⁴ The testimony of vital Christianity and apostleship, (John xvi. 27). The foolish teachers of the world, (Rom. i. 16; 1 Cor. i. 27, ii. 6, iv. 15). From sinners, saints, (Ephes. ii. 1–6, iv. 12). Out of enemies, friends, (Ephes. ii. 14; Gal. iii. 28). Out of the world a temple of God, (Ephes. ii. 15, v. 27).

§ 34. MIRACLES.

If a miracle were simply an event opposed to nature's laws, a something unnatural and incomprehensible, and if the human understanding, together with entire nature, experienced, through its agency, merely a subversive shock, then would the defence of Christianity, a religion established by means of a grand system of miracles, have to contend against insurmountable difficulties. But the miracles of revelation, with all the objective supernaturalness essentially belonging to them, are in truth somewhat accordant with natural laws, partly in reference to the higher order of circumstances to which the miracles relate,

and which order also is a world, a nature of its own kind, and operates upon the lower order of things according to its mode; partly in regard to the analogy with that common nature which miracles in some way or other retain; and finally, on account of their teleological perfection. Moreover, the miracles of revelation must even, as the homogeneous manifestation of the internal miracle of redemption, not only be expected from out the standing point of Christian faith already finished, but also, by means of a connexion existing between the Spirit and nature, be considered as natural in its kind.¹

REMARK 1. We distinguish between subjective and objective miracles. The former consist in such changes as, by reason of their connexion with other external circumstances or internal conditions, cause them to forget their natural connexion, and immediately point to the Lord of nature, who will attest something. If man could, either by means of his perception or his action, find himself acquainted with the constitution of nature, miracles in that case would not happen; but since man possesses no such privilege, miracles do occur to his experience according to his subjective standing-point and relation to nature; and in a teleological point of view, they involve a complete supernaturalness. From the notion we have illustrated above concerning the element of constant progress, it follows, that even revelation is conformable to temporal and local necessities; and accordingly it does not admit of a doubt, that it also is accompanied with subjective miracles. Even naturalism admits their occurrence; and rationalism not only requires, but even looks out for them. See Nitzsch *De Revel.*, &c. p. 219. On the other hand, a relation to the universal and fixed necessities of humanity also appertains to revelation, in conformity with the element of originality, and only the phenomena of objective supernaturalness, as the person of the Redeemer himself, which is its middle point, correspond to this relation. By and in miracles, “The Lord hath created a new thing,” (Jer. xxxi. 22). יהָרָה תְּרַשָּׁה and כִּי-בָדָא כְּרִיאתָה, Numbers xvi. 30. Δύναμις expresses rather the objective idea of miracle, τερας, &c. the subjective. Σημειον, the intuitive sign of the spiritual fact of God’s kingdom.

REMARK 2. Even an objective or causative miracle is not un-

natural, since a full idea of nature has miracle, and a true idea of miracle has nature for its element. They cannot be separated in their diversity. The history of science testifies that even where the ideas of the Creator and creation are excluded, there arises the necessity (as, for instance, with *natura naturans*, in contrast with *naturata*,) for perceiving an infinite ground, the absolute ground of creation, and for discriminating it from the mere series of developments. The crudest naturalism—mere materialism, is alone ignorant of this necessity. The science of faith in a personal Creator, on the other hand, and in the creation, or in the Almighty by means of the idea of the so-called *creatio mediata*, has admitted originations and miracles into the system of the existence and history of nature. Though we admit a vitalizing power to exist in vegetable life, and an animating power in animal-soul life, still, either the creative act or the *natura naturans* will be further required, in order to realise the possibility and accomplish the predisposition. A more early day-work of God does not produce, independently of itself, a later one; the previous step, corresponding to its adequate cause, does not produce the higher stage, which must again have a cause adequate to its production. Or if the doctrine of *creatio mediata* be denied, still, must it not be admitted that the first historical originations, contrasted with the laws of generation and germination which at present exclusively operate, are miracles? At that time, powers, which are now reposing and have receded, were at work. Just as at this period, in the identical natural system, laws of an inferior kind are annulled by those of higher order. The commencements and issues of natural phenomena have another and a higher legality than that which lies between them. But all is harmony. There is no more disorder or incongruity produced in the region of morals or art, by a subversion of the lower laws for the sake of the higher, than there is in the kingdom of nature. Two such orders or circles do not absolutely repel each other; and the existing fundamental relations of soul and body, spirit and soul, life and death, continue the possibility of miracle.

REMARK 3. But the aim of miracle still remains. The question, indeed, is not whether a doctrine shall be proved by means of miracles wrought by the teacher. Jesus is the Christ—is that a mere doctrine? Salvation is come into the world—is that a mere development of thought? No, it is a fact; for a person and a work of God, which is mediated through it, are facts.

Miracles, considered in themselves, and in their connection with facts, can only attest something, and thus serve to awaken faith. But religion, like revelation, presents in general an aspect founded on fact. Just as little as you can prove to me, through any mode of development of thought, that Jesus is the deliverer from death, as little can I, by means of any fact, as such, render conceivable unto you that which cannot be conceived. (Compare *Fichte Anw. zum sel. Leben* 6 Beilage.) Nevertheless, the fundamental relation of the idea to history remains. The external and internal, spirit and nature, the arm of God and preaching, abide, Isaiah liii. 1. But in reference to the doubt whether miracles be not of the devil, Jesus himself has answered the question, Matth. xii. 25.

¹ See Twisten's admirable Treatise on the Idea of Miracles, *Vorless.*, &c., 363–79, in which some fundamental thoughts of Schleiermacher's occur (*Glaubenslehre*, p. 120): and Sack *Apologetik*, p. 85–88. Compare also my treatise on Miracle, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1843, i.

§ 35. PROPHECY.

Although the prediction of events depending upon Divine communication is neither so impossible as Cicero maintained, nor so useless or even dangerous as Kant attempted to show; still the evidence of prophecy, of which Christ and the apostles availed themselves, consists less in an historical characteristic of the Redeemer's person, (which, to a certain extent, is an assemblage of Old Testament prophecies; for with the exception of his descent from David there is an almost total deficiency of the kind of proof required,) than in the fact of the Old Testament conducting from the beginning, on the ground of the revelation of the true God and of His covenant sovereignty, to a holy definitive history, and this, under increasing development, leading to the expectation of a personal Redeemer. The distinction, however, between prophecy and type is to be duly observed; and this is firmly to be maintained, viz. that the representations of a manifested Lord, of a suffering Mediator, of the

Son of God, and of the Great Prophet, are united only gradually with the expectation of a true King, and are for the most part represented as separated from one another, whilst they appear in the testament united to fulfilment, as well by the actual person of Jesus, as through the prevailing interpretation.

REMARK. Divination (*μαντεία, προδήλωσις*, Plutarch, *de Oracc. Pyth. divinatio, presentio et scientia rerum futurarum*. Cic. *De Divin.* 1. i.) obtains an interest from its announcing a result which, humanly speaking, could not have previously been known, and so far was accidental. Even when foreknowledge is of no advantage, yet, as a mere pretext, it is capable of exciting salutary attention, and, in the event of its being confirmed by the result, of obtaining a testimony for persons and occurrences, and thus becomes further pregnant with design. Every causative and teleological possibility of divination requires that it be rarely and temperately exhibited, so as not to destroy the entire human relation to history; and this so much the more, because divination, in the cases to which it extends, can only reach its veritable accomplishment by means of the most definite statements of the peculiar marks of the fact. Otherwise, the remark made by Boethus the geometrician, in Plutarch, (formerly cited, § 10,) is a valid objection, namely, that divination conceals itself in a mass of dark and strange symbols, which, perchance, may meet with accidental realization. Διαφέρει says he, γενέσθαι τὸ ἔηδέν ἢ ἔηδῆναι το γενησόμενον. And upon that is added, the just προδήλωσις is ὅπου οὐ μόνον λέγεται τὸ γενησόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ μετὰ τί καὶ μετὰ τίνος. It follows, that divination is necessarily frequently accompanied by superstition, and must be very subordinate when used in the service of revelation. Divination is a subject of Divine prohibition, Deut. xviii. 10–14. For a very striking and comprehensive criticism on the popular supernaturalistic idea of the evidence of prophecy, *i. e.* on the authenticity of divination, see Ammon's *Bib. Theol.* ii. Introduction, and also at p. 10, where it is rendered evident how prediction in the Old Testament should in some way be conditioned to suffice the requirements of the popular view.

As used by the heathen, the word Prophet, hypophet, *vates*, does not primarily signify one who predicts, but one who enunciates. Prophecy, a term exclusively found in testamentary antiquity, and never used, for example, by the Greeks (the gods of

the heathen declare nothing, Isaiah xli. 22, 23,) is the represented future of the kingdom of God, grounded on an internal perception of the Divine decree, which, ever proceeding from a definite point of the historical present, points out with more or less distinctness of detail, the completion of the Divine economy; and whilst it is conversant with the Divine in history, but not with the outward matter, characterises *reality* only in those leading points wherein it especially accords with truth. The representing media of prophecy, therefore, can only be, in a great measure, analogical and symbolical. Chronology is subordinate. All prophetic numbers are, to a certain extent, symbolical; this has not been sufficiently admitted by Alb. Bengel and Crusius, although their chief merit relates to prophetic theology; and even in our own days has been too little attended to by the more rigorous apologists. The prophets “have enquired diligently” after the time, 1 Pet. i. 10. The computation of time has never been entirely settled. Types exist partly within and partly out of prophecy. Type is that element in the word, or history of the Old Testament, which, by virtue of the law of similitude and development, contains, besides its aim for the nearest, lower stage of revelation and redemption, upon which it first appears, a prognostication of something which is peculiar to the higher stage. The more the typical is contained in a prophecy, so much more does it look for repeated and gradual, for a very near and for a very remote fulfilment; as, for example, the prophecies of Ezekiel and the latter part of Isaiah. But type occurs entirely out of its province in the Psalms, for example, in the law, and in regard to historical personages and their actions or afflictions. The formula *ἵνα πληρωθῆ* is frequently applied to types, just as if they were prophecies. As the narration contained in the New Testament, and more especially that of the Old, is free from any doubt with respect to objective miracle in the Divine acts, and (apart from any scientific distinction of kind,) indicates miracles, the distinction being expressed, for the most part, by the various expressions *Τερας, σημεῖον, δυναμίς*; so, in like manner, does the apostle typify details on the supposition of the organic whole of a *λόγος προφητικὸς*, of which he has become assured in the central point of a great epoch of salvation foretold and fulfilled. The proper idea of type appears, especially in the Epistles to the Galatians and Hebrews. That there are types, follows even from the general relation of the Becoming to the Being and of history

to Spirit. The general aim of prophecy and type is to unite faith in revelation with belief in the government of the world; or to strengthen, upon a definite stage of Divine revelation, faith in the presence of the Divine Spirit and word, by means of evidence exhibited and prepared, and at the same time to excite a susceptibility for higher stages. It is true that the first formation of the apostles' faith commenced independently of prophetic evidence, and still less was it dependent on any external sign applicable to Jesus. Jesus is estimated by them according to what he is and becomes to them, just as he, in his reply to the question, Who art thou? merely answers, "even the same that I said unto you from the beginning," John viii. 25. The experience of Nathaniel or Peter, those original operations, both spiritual and moral, elicit Messianic faith afresh and anew. Through the glorification of the Lord they first receive with the Spirit, the explanation of the Old Testament. Experience, if it shall be received by the heathen and Jews into the joint historical consciousness, and more especially into religious contemplation, must preserve its indication in the past and its presage of the world's future course. In the writings bearing on this subject, those of Joh. Dav. Michaelis, Seiler, Herder, G. Menken; also in Pascal's *Thoughts*, and particularly in K. H. Sack's *Apologetik* (1829, p. 226,) *Fundamental Prophecies in the Historical Books of the Bible, Prophecies relative to the kingdom by the Prophets and Typical Prophecies of the Hagiographists*, or, according to the second edition, *Grund-Psalmen—und theokratisch-nationale—Weissagungen*; and, farther, in Hoffman's *Prophecy and Fulfilment in the Old and New Testament*, i. 1841; ii. 1844, there are rudiments for a theory of prophecy, which, however, as yet, has not been matured; and there has arisen a very important controversy between the advocates of Scripture faith and Scripture learning, in which the so-called Supernaturalists are partly opposed to one another; perhaps this may lead to a more extensive cultivation of a much-neglected branch of Biblical theology. Before this period, Hengstenberg, in his work, *die Authentie des Daniel und die Integrität des Sacharjah*, Berlin, 1831, p. 187, undertook to defend historical and characteristic prediction against the preceding remarks we have made relative to truth and reality. I pass over Hengstenberg's remark in reply to my observations, namely, that Christ himself has even publicly prophesied or predicted

what has no immediate connection with Divine truth; for that does not affect my position, since I grant there may be predictions in Scripture, only these are subordinate and not entirely characteristic of prophecy. His observation at p. 188 is more important, "whatever is related to reality, in so far as the same agrees with truth, has a connecting link in the mind of man, and consequently may easily be considered as mere subjective presentiment; as, for example, the prophecy of redemption might be derived in general from the felt necessity of redemption combined with a knowledge of Divine love." Here there is enunciated a very hazardous idea of prophecy, and an erroneous idea of revelation itself. Dr Hengstenberg, it is true, only appears desirous of preserving the prediction of particular external circumstances, and of elevating them, so as to constitute an essential element of prophecy; but, in truth, he argues in such a way, that prophecy, (in so far as it may be considered Divine, and as constituting an essential part and intrinsic sign of revelation,) can only be looked upon as a kind of prediction and divination. Thus, he infers, that whatever is prophesied from man's inward feeling of the necessity of redemption and knowledge of Divine love, can only be natural, human subjectivity, and in so far as such kind of prophecy does exist, there is no criterion of its divinity. But whatever there is, that finds no connecting link in the human mind, consequently whatever is entirely external and foreign to subjectivity, such as the prediction of a battle, a death, a conflagration, a name, and year, constitutes the divine and supernatural of prophecy. In this view of supernaturalism, I confess I do not concur; but on the contrary, I consider it very objectionable and dangerous. In the first place, at least, it is opposed to empirical psychology, to maintain that the possession and the expression of presentiments of future reality is contrary to the nature of the human mind; and what Hengstenberg asserts, relative to the presentiment of redemption (supposing that the question turned here upon presentiment—that it was a something subjective) is equally valid in the case of the presentiment of actual things. But what is meant when it said:—truth finds a connecting link in the mind of man? Truth in the abstract is ever approved by man, because he is a rational being. The natural man approves of, and is connected with the divine truth of salvation, (which according to our hypothesis constitutes the invariable contents of prophecy,) only

in proportion as he attains a consciousness of his natural depravity, and recognises God as mediating to his restoration. That an Israelite who worships God does possess such a knowledge of the love of God in the love of Jehovah to Israel, and such an assured conviction of redemption, by means of which he is enabled to view its truth, as one presenting itself for contemplation, and to receive the suggestions of the Divine Spirit as a testimony and representation of the contemplated salvation,—to suppose this, pre-supposes the whole question of revelation.

The fact that the Prophet possesses fundamental intuitions, which are in themselves independently dialectic and syllogistic, does not necessarily render him idealistic and poetically philosophic. The idea of abstract thought is perfectly conscious of its variance with the history of reality; but the consciousness of the prophet perceives that it is full of that same Divine word, which rules and renovates history and nature. Is that perchance, less supernatural or less divine, because the Israelites, of all the people of antiquity, alone and exclusively developed their monotheistic faith in the government of the world, up to the extent of believing in its redemption, and to the contemplation of a personal Redeemer, and Mediator of the people of God? On the contrary, it is rather first, through this great connecting prophecy, relative to the Divine realization of truth and goodness, that ordinary predictions retain their worth and credit,—predictions, which, if they should appear in the same fulness, consecutiveness, and precision, as the prophetic supernaturalist would fain desire, (as Hengstenberg, p. 189, himself, acknowledges) would destroy man's fundamental relation to history. But prophecy in its annunciations, realises the future in reference to time, place, and individuals, only in a relative manner; only in the great turning-points of the history of God's people, which points themselves, again, become typical with reference to the history of God's kingdom, as represented in the New Testament; as in the case of Jerusalem and Babylon, and in the restoration of the house of David; yet here even, it is only by an analogical approximation, or statement of particular *momenta*, which appear included in the reality, or by the rejection of a unity, which in the reality melts into the *momenta*, that prophecy attains realization. But this incongruity between the analogico-symbolical contents of prophecy and the external fact, preserves, on the one hand, the relation of man to history, which, in respect of faith,

includes a necessary ignorance of the future; while, on the other hand, it repairs itself upon the standing-point of fulfilment, by means of a typological retrospect on the personal, relational, and verbal types, which have been produced within its circumference and in its company.

Hence the most distinctive peculiarity of New Testament history contained in the Old Testament, is typified neither in a prophetic mode nor in the way of prediction; but is prefigured in type, and it is only in this point of view that the Psalms, for instance, are Christological, or that the lifting up of Christ on the cross, his resurrection, and ascension, his betrayal by Judas, &c., constitute the contents of the Old Testament. With reference to the typical kingdom of Israel, see particularly Bleek., *Theol. Stud. ii. Krit.*, 1835, p. 453, *et seq.* Hengstenberg has adopted, in his doctrine of prophecy, according to the preface to his *Christologie* iii., definitions of a more extended and accommodating character.

III. OF THE LAWS OF COGNIZING CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

§ 36. SOURCE AND INTERPRETATION.

It is not sufficient for mankind, that, along with Christianity, the truth of salvation and the preservation of truth in the world be obvious, and in some way or other operative. For, as revelation, no more than redemption, operates by a constraining or magical influence, but is united to the free and gradual progression of human culture; so, in like manner, it is exposed to misapprehension and abuse; and, consequently, at all times the question arises, from whence does the pure fountain of Christian cognition and action spring? and how can we draw therefrom? The former question is responded to by the doctrine of Holy Writ, the latter by the doctrine of its interpretation.

REMARK. It is certainly included in the idea of truth, that it triumphs over, and, like as it were, an eternal light, consumes those shadows and dissipates those obscurities which, on the occasion of its appearance, have been generated in persons more

or less susceptible. Eminently is this the case in the idea of revelation, of the word of God in an especial sense, which, from the beginning, must act as a healing remedy against fundamental error, and operate beyond a simple counterpoise or mere limitation to falsehood and sin. Thus, “one jot or tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled,” Matth. v. 18; and the word of the Lord shall outlast heaven and earth, Matth. xxiv. 35; an everlasting gospel, Revelation xiv. 6. But its mode of manifestation must have ever been secured, and its efficacy established and fixed on a stable basis; for it is equally true that the greater and more complete an epoch of revelation is, or the longer its duration, so much the more does it elicit a persevering contradiction of its more ancient stages. But opposition to revelation, upon the whole, resembles opposition to religion in general, *i. e.*, it passes over from mere unbelieving negation to an analytical affirmation. Christianity is appropriated, but it becomes again in the hands of those who embrace and defend it more or less the same legalized religious institution which ought to be subdued, it becomes a mixture of heathenism and Judaism, or a blending of legends and philosophy, &c. Now, if the epoch had not only taught or spoken, but also written, every reformation, considered in its ideal, becomes possible; and if the providential connection of history and language has been preserved, and this through the existence of Scripture, then the key to the record can never be entirely lost.

A. Of the Holy Scripture.

§ 37. THE WORD OF GOD AND THE SPIRIT.

The Word of God constitutes His witness—the witness of His kingdom, as a history and a fact which interprets and re-assumes itself by means of personal organs—a word which has pervaded the history of the world and human language, but has been accomplished in Christ, who, in time, reached his own full completion.

Doubtless the temporal presence of Christ on earth is now supplied by the mission of the Paraclete, and revelation is pre-

served, so far as the promise and gift of the Holy Spirit extends, in the preciousness and power of a similar origin. The gift of the Spirit, however, is itself administered through the Word proceeding from God, just as it again can only be morally and livingly appropriated, and only in a divine way, adopted through the Spirit of truth; a reciprocal relation which never ceases, so that Christian cognition can never be derived from a mere internal source, and every appeal to an inner light, whilst the external Word is contemned, leads to empty fanaticism.¹ In general this relation corresponds to the connection between internal and external experience, and between that of history and consciousness.

¹ See Calvin's *Inst. Rel. Chr.* i. 9, where, on the passages of Isaiah lix. 21, 2 Tim. iii. 16, John xvi. 13, he animadverts on the many erroneous admirers of subjectivity. If the apologist of the Quakers would only accord to the Bible the dignity of *manifestati verbi fontes*, even this determination for restoring the relation of things would be insufficient; for wherever the *fontes* are, there must the *principia* also exist. Private revelation, farther ἀποκαλύψεις can only be added to the common treasury of truth, on their standing the test of the canon. Phil. iii. 15, 1 Cor. xii., xiv., 1 Thess. v. 19.

§ 38. THE SPIRIT AND WORD.

Nevertheless, it will depend from the very first upon the correct tradition and pure preservation of the Word of God, and consequently, in a very especial manner, upon the work of the Holy Spirit on those whom Christ has commissioned, that they shall preach repentance and forgiveness of sins in his name. Wherever Christ's authority is in full force, those whom he has personally called and appointed to await the promise of the Father, and thereby prepared to be not so much our taskmasters as our fathers in Christ (1 Cor. iv. 15), even such must be held as the authentic sources of tradition, on the grounds of their peculiar connection with the Redeemer, and with the

fundamental facts of salvation; and except through them the Word of God cannot be received by any one;¹ just as it is out of the power of any one to represent them or assume their office.

¹ On the authority of the apostles see Twisten's *Vorless.* 406–10; and my *Protest. Theses.*, No. 2, 3. Tert. praescr. 6, apostolos domini habemus AUCTORES—.

§ 39. SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

But, lest apostolical tradition should lose its originality, and cease to be authentic, inasmuch as it is transmitted to posterity through bishops, synods, and especially by the church, perverted and intermixed as it is with secular philosophy, it is preserved, under the gracious favour of Providence in the same manner by means of Scriptures, as the Word of God, which was spoken to the patriarchs, and through the prophets, and which had acquired a permanent written authenticity long prior to the period of scholastic and sectarian views of revelation. But the authority of the apostolical Scriptures does not rest alone upon the fact of their being accredited to the church as apostolical—to that church which had been raised by the oral teaching of the apostles; but it rests also upon the fact of their being even now accompanied by the operation and testimony of that same Spirit which inspired Christian communities distinguishing them from the world, and fostering and preserving the life in Christ beyond every thing else.

REMARK. The church of Christ undoubtedly existed before the Apostolic Bible; it only required the living, oral teaching of the witnesses of Jesus to become apparent; but it does not follow from this that, in order to subsist, it did not continually stand in need of the immediate teaching of the apostles. The church is grounded on the Word of God, in apostolical tradition. If the last apostle has spoken out, then either the authenticity is lost, or it remains amongst the apostolical discourses which have been preserved by memory or through writing. The tradition which

shall from henceforth be considered valid, is, on the one hand, conditioned through the “demonstration” of the apostolical spirit, and life of its possessor; and, on the other, is subjected to those Scriptures acknowledged by the church as genuine, or rather, the Scriptures themselves determine genuine tradition. The church, however, has confessedly not made the Scriptures genuine; but the Scriptures have proved themselves to the church, and from henceforth made the church genuine. M. Chemnittii, *Examen. Concilii Trid.*, and Dallæus, *de usu Patrum*, have served as a defence for the directive rule and exclusive authority of the Holy Scriptures against the Council of Trent, and against the Jesuits. Of the more recent discussions on tradition may be mentioned, as particularly worthy of notice, Marheineke’s *Abh. üb. den wahren Sinn der Tradition in Kathol. Lehrbegriff und das recte Verhältniss ders. z. protest. Lehre.* in Daub and Creuzer’s *Studd.* B. 4; and De Wette, *Theoll. Aufsätze z. chr. Belehrung und Ermahnung*, p. 54. With reference to Lessing’s too comprehensive *Theses on the Rule of Faith*, and his controversy with Götze and Walch, the Protestant principle has (on the appearance of Delbrück’s *Phillipp Melancthon der Glaubensleherer, eine Streitschrift*, Bonn, 1826,) been recently examined and defended by Sack, Nitzsch, and Lücke, *On the Authority of Holy Scripture, and its relation to the rule of faith in the Protestant and the Ancient Church, three theological letters addressed to Professor Delbrück*, Bonn, 1827. See also my Protestant Theses (*Supplement to the Protestant Reply to Möhler’s Symbolism*, Hamburg, 1835, No. 1–16.) It cannot *à priori* be maintained that a written communication is a too extensive interposition of Divinity, is something too inanimate and too contracted, and, considered in the light of an active reflection of what is determined, is unworthy of transmitting the Word of God. If oral tradition be separated from its just ground and aim, from its living conditions, it exhibits similar uncertainty; if written tradition be maintained in unity with life, its importance will be found sufficiently great. An inspired person, in the sense of the Greeks, is not supposed to write; the Christian idea of an inspired condition is altogether a different one. Apart from the fact that the extent of publicity and duration, for the sake of which the writer communicates, may be greater, and the intensity of the loving will in faith is not enfeebled. So the Scripture represents the historical *momenta* of complete life, as, for example,

in the Gospels, and exhibits, it may be, in a letter to the Philippians, Corinthians, Galatians, the apostle in his entire being and nature, as completely and as conformably to the object as it was possible to do, more so perhaps than could have been the case in any point of oral discourse. And to this may be added, that the existence of Scripture neither disturbs the word nor the Spirit, but the question turns on Scripture with reference to its oneness with preaching, interpretation, the church, catechising, &c. Compare my *Abh. über die h. Schrift gegen Strauss Theol. St. u. Krit.* 1843, part ii. p. 378–88, and my *Sendschr. an Prof. Delbrück*, p. 62, *et seq.*

§ 40. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CANON.

These grounds for the authority of Holy writ are reciprocally related, and accord with the idea of a Canon. Originally, by the term canon, or rule, was understood that internal conscious criterion, according to which the Christian was enabled and was bound to examine any assumed form of Christianity; and partly also it denoted a summary abstract of the main facts, as they had been promulged, and in which particulars it was customary, from the days of Christ and the apostles, but more particularly on the occasion of baptismal confession, to comprise all the leading peculiarities of their belief.

REMARK. The primary signification of the ecclesiastical term *κανών* is not a catalogue of books. Opposed to this error, descended from the time of Semler, H. Planck has essayed a more correct explanation: *Nonnulla de significatu canonis in eccl. antiqua eiusque serie recte constituenda.* Goett. 1820. The Redeemer has given a comprehensive expression of the church creed, Matt. xxviii. 19; Luke xxiv. 47. The Apostles, however, acknowledge among the gifts of the Spirit, not only prophecies, &c.; but also the discerning of spirits, 1 Cor. xiv. 29, and exhort to try the free doctrine and the teaching Spirit, 1 Thess. v. 21, and 1 John iv. 1. Now according to what unity of manifoldness, or after what multiplicity of principles, shall each gift be tried? To this question, the New Testament furnishes the critic with a firm starting-point, without, however, prescribing any precise formula,

1 John iv. 2, compare ii. 22, 1 Tim. i. 15, iii. 16, 1 Cor. i. 22–24, xv. 1–4. The doctrine of the unity, thus grounded, St Paul designates a κανών, Phil. iii. 16, a word he derived from the popular language of the times, although the schools of philosophers had already, from the simplest laws of knowledge, employed the term, of which the canonic of the Epicureans is a proof; and now this κανών ἀληθείας, ἐκκλησιαστικὸς, regula veritatis immobilis et irrefragabilis, was sometimes considered by orthodox divines inexpressible and inherent in Christian objective consciousness, and sometimes was enunciated in the formularies of confession as well by particular theologians. (Irenæus, Tertullian, Clemens of Alexandria, Origen) as by entire communities and synods. On this subject, see my *Letter to Prof. Delbrück*, p. 41–61, and Pearson, King, and Walch, on the ancient creeds, and the apostolic Symbol, in particular.

§ 41. SCRIPTURE CANON.

Since both these kinds of canon, the vital and spiritually formal, as well as the directly formal, could only be in part based upon apostolical instruction, and partly expanded and developed by the same, so from the very first, the church was not only deeply interested in preserving, comparing, collecting, distinguishing, and attesting the writings of the apostles, and those claiming to be apostolical, (in which the external and internal evidences necessarily co-operated,) but it ever regarded the collected writings of the apostolical Bible, in its connection with the prophetic one, as standing above all subjective Christianity, and which Bible, it simply designated the Canon, as contrasted on the one hand with the doctrine and literature derived from other sources, and on the other, as distinctive from actual or possible heresies, and pretended paradoxes; apart from the fact, that the external and internal arguments have ever spoken with equal force, for each particular writing.

§ 42. SCRIPTURE AND WORD OF GOD.

From the relations arising out of this origin of the Canon,

it follows, as a direct consequence, that the existing church is founded upon a belief in the Holy Scriptures, that is to say, it rests upon the living conviction of Christians, that Scripture, by the same Divine act and power, to which we are indebted for revelation, and the word of God in the apostolic preaching, has been furnished as a channel of tradition for the word of God, which in itself is one, intelligible, and complete. But this Scripture faith, provided it does not become a literal one, antagonistic to Christianity,¹ can never be grounded upon mere ecclesiastical tradition and supposition, nor upon any inspiration, either exalting itself above or rendering itself independent of revelation, nor can it be founded upon any Divine operation which absolutely excludes the spontaneity of the writers.² On the contrary, the solid basis of Scripture faith reposes, in a reciprocal manner, partly on the indestructible certainty that the actual being and existing state of these Scriptures are necessarily and immediately connected with that, which the apostles of Christ had been and effectuated, and by means of which universal history has maintained its Christian novelty, and partly upon that spiritual experience we have of the internal agreement, as well as of the difference of Scripture and the word of God.³ The difference between the proto-canonical and deutero-canonical Scriptures, generally admitted by the church, evidences that different kinds and measures of inspiration may be allowed to exist in different portions of the canon, although the whole canon participates in it; whilst the attributes of infallibility, sufficiency, and perfection only pertain to the whole as such.

¹ John vi. 33; 1 Cor. iv. 20; 2 Cor. iii. 6.

² See Twisten *Vorless.* p. 417.

³ See Sack, *Vom Worte Gottes, eine Christliche Verständigung.* Bonn, 1825.

REMARK 1. Strictly speaking, it is not merely the existing church, or the post-apostolical one in general, which is based upon written records. Christ himself, and the Apostles, neces-

sarily referred to the Holy Scripture. There never was, in truth, an absolute interregnum of oral doctrine.

REMARK 2. A Scripture faith, in harmony with the belief in revelation and salvation, as already presupposed, exhibits, withal, a species and an impress of teleological faith in providence. Scripture faith requires and presupposes that the God of revelation and redemption will, by some means or other, preserve the originality of the Gospel. Its language is,—Scripture cannot lie, because God's word is truth: for whoever has once found truth in those points contained in Scripture, from whence every other emanates, or to which all tend, which truth again makes him, together with his entire capacity for it, free—such a one will either reserve his right and mistrust his own judgment in any matter offensive or apparently erroneous—in as much as whatever appears externally to be in organic connexion with a leading point, may be assumed to be similarly associated internally—or else such a person will act as the original Luther did. In order to emancipate themselves from believing in the authority of Scripture, as a rule of faith, some intellectual men, like Lessing and others, have said; “because truth is found in the Bible, it is not truth for being in the Bible.” We have, however, already frequently shown, that the first proposition, strictly speaking, conducts to the latter. See *Theol. Stud. u. Kr.* 1832, 2, p. 375. 1843, 2, p. 386.

REMARK 3. Scripture faith, indeed, is derived from a belief in revelation; but with a distinction. For, as the word of God, when united with the discourse of an apostle or prophet, who addressed a congregation, is accompanied by very different circumstances, than when it is contained in a Pauline epistle, which is read with other Scriptures, and which, in connection, constitute the invariable records of revelation; so in like manner, an especial economy will be found in each of the two distinct modes in which the Divine word operates; and in the history of the formation of the canon, all the wisdom and grace of the Lord, which in an especial manner have appeared in the production of the facts of revelation and of the covenants, have been magnified, in a new and peculiar manner. A record, in the full sense of the word, always constitutes an essential part of the fact of which it gives an account. According to the most rigid criticism, although in a varying mode, this remark may be applied to both parts

of the biblical canon, and to the individual books contained in each. Let it be remembered, how essentially the recorded fundamental laws of the Pentateuch are united with the ministry of Moses as the founder of Theocracy; or how the Psalms, Prophecies, and Epistles addressed to the primitive churches of Christ, and the descriptions and notices of the most important circumstances in the life of Jesus, in Galilee and Jerusalem, are combined with the entire activity of a prophet, apostle, or evangelist, with an activity essential to the founding and preserving religion. Faith in the records is never exhausted, either by the experience which many, all, or individuals have of them, or by the conception of these experiences.

B. On the Interpretation of the Holy Scripture.

§ 43. SCRIPTURE EXPLICABLE; ITS PERSPICUITY AND UNITY.

If He who, being in the form of God, nevertheless humbled himself, and was found in fashion as a man, Phil. ii. 7; and if the Divine word, from the beginning, made under the law of human speech, has worked out its own law,—(for hence it was that the life should be manifested, and in its appearance be seen, heard, and handled, 1 John i. 1.)—it would be unreasonable to expect that the Scripture, as a record of this revelation, would designedly veil its sense, and become an inexplicable enigma. Experience, however, teaches us fully and incontestibly, in the first place, that although the original languages are extinct, yet the key to their knowledge, inherited by cultivated people, is yet extant, together with that historical perception appertaining thereto; and, secondly, that Scripture reveals to the age, people, and individuals, who appropriately use this key, such an organic whole of ideas, as admits of a definite, and for the spiritual state in its totality, a changing and instructing appropriation. Neither is the profundity of Scripture opposed to that perspicuity universally conceded to it by all candid and skilful critics, nor does the diversity and difference of its methods and stages of instruction abrogate that unity which rests upon the ground of its being, and the scope of its operations.

REMARK 1. To suppose the records of revelation to be intentionally *literæ opinabiles*, or even to be veiled in an obscurity worthy of Lycophron, is contrary to the very idea of revealed records. To ascribe to the Deity the jest or earnestness of an enigmatical communication, may be worthy of a neo-Platonist like Jamblichus, but not of a Christian. To hope that mere unintelligible sounds, or inexplicable characters, should operate in a magical or salutary manner, can only be regarded as a remnant of nature-worship. A revelation of salvation to the world will, even in its written and original representation, be directed to the *sensus communis and publicus*, as that accords with the circumstances of various people and periods, or be administered through its medium. Revelation is the great concern of universal man. Nevertheless, because it unfolds itself, in its essence, only to its congenial spirit, and because the evidences of its interpretation devolve, in part, on a science in which all do not participate—it does not follow that a free use of the Bible should be forbidden to the laity, or that the Protestant principle of perusing Scripture, and the exclusive authority of the same, should be impugned. For the laity cannot be regarded as an abstract atom, as if, on their approach to the sanctuary, they were independent of tradition and translation. The theologian does not possess knowledge as the inheritance of his caste; and the clergy are not masters of a peculiar Scripture spirit, and exclusively possess a key to the records by virtue of their separation to their office. A church which shall prove itself worthy of a belief in Holy Scripture, dares neither refrain from a retrospective appeal to the original languages, nor neglect, by means of a *versio vernacula* which is under every possible form of control, to place the Scriptures in the hands of the people, whereby they may be enabled to examine “whether these things be so,” Acts xvii. 11, that they “may come and see,” John i. 46.

See the testimony of the ancients in reference to the perspicuity of Holy Scripture, by Chemnitz *im Examen Concil. Trid.* p. 43, sq.; also Augustin and Clemens of Alex. in my Letter to Delbrück, p. 76, seq. It is in perfect harmony with this perspicuity that universal scripture contents, inexhaustible in their depths, do not admit of being included in the circle of the absolute idea, that particular scriptures are reserved in preference to others for some particular period, and that translations and expositions (without thereby rendering a solid faith impossible,

because in that case the entire relation of posterity to history might be annulled,) contain something hypothetical. Even the Apocalypse of John is sufficiently explicable to exercise its church influence with safety. Compare Lücke's treatise, *Versuch eines Vollst. Einleit. in die Off. Joh.* 1832, pp. 23, 35, 40.

REMARK 2. The Bible canon has proceeded neither from Apostle, bishop, or council, but has been produced and pointed out by synods, after it had, by the providence of God, been formed by means of a reciprocal action between the attractive powers of the writings and historical public sense. From the following considerations it will be apparent that neither syncretism, nor external convention, but true catholicism, has recognised the canon as it is:—Those sects which had set it at variance, and only acknowledged, after a fastidious manner, certain portions of it, have disappeared; and the universal church, which received the canon, and handed it down in its entirety, has never in its turn been split into parties, at least by a partial recognition of the Pauline or Petrine portions, &c. The more modern history of exegesis has ever decidedly evidenced, that the complete interpretation and distinction of parts of Scripture, never impedes the preservation of one sole church faith. For the longer, the more keenly, and the more precisely, the prophetic or apostolic standing-points, peculiarities, systems, and characters, have been examined by theologians, the more clearly and truly have compensating elements of an unfolding process been discovered in them, as well as completing sides of contemplated fact and fundamental idea, the common basis of the prophets as well as the apostles; and in the entire unity—Christ, as *terminum ad quem* and *a quo* has ever been recognised.

§ 44. AIM OF INTERPRETATION.

The leading design in a Christian use of Holy Scripture, is to generate subjectively the objective sense or thoughts of the separate passages of each distinct writer; wherefore we are correct in speaking of a grammatical and an historical interpretation. But inasmuch as we already use the Scripture, according to its meaning and thought, to regulate by first principles our whole, and indeed our common character, a necessity arises to re-ex-

plain what has already been interpreted, and not only to comprehend each portion in the unity of the canon and spirit, but also to apprehend it in that relation to our faith and practice, which is universally valid. This kind of interpretation, which develops each distinct position, and refers to the higher whole, cannot indeed be termed (as in modern times has been done,) so much the higher, spiritual, or even productive, still less the philosophical mode, but rather according to Muzel, Carl Ludwig Nitzsch¹), Marheineke, Twesten, and Clausen the theological, and it only becomes objectionable when it ceases to rest upon a grammatico-historical exegesis.

¹ *De discrimine Revelationis Imperatoricæ et didacticæ*, fasc. ii. p. 227, sqq. See also Keil's *Elem. Hermen. N.T.*, p. 190. The seeming contradictions of Scripture of themselves suggest this second *act* of interpretation, by means of which the theory contained in the spiritual utterance, as it assumes more or less a practical direction, is rendered intelligible. Hence Nitzsch: Ver igitur theoria, sive ea rationalis sit sive superrationalis, eruenda erit per aliam interpretationem, quæ quidem improprie sic dicitur, quoniam non verba explicat, sed res verbis expressas, præsertim loquendi atque adeo cogitandi modos, scholasticæ ἀκριβείας expertes ejusque legibus haud adstrictos. See also Pelt. *Theolog. Encyclopædie*, 1843, p. 183.

§ 45. ANALOGY OF FAITH.

The bond of union connecting these two *acts* of interpretation, or this twofold scope of interpretation, is what has been denominated the analogy of faith, *i.e.*, the rule of faith applied to exegesis; and which, in so far as it can itself be only the result of immediate exegesis, has a retro-active effect on mediate interpretation, and is necessarily directive and determinative. For the knowledge of the unity of an object is, by an unceasing reciprocal action, connected with the knowledge of its manifoldness.

§ 46. ONE SENSE.

By maintaining an entirely equivocal sense of Scripture, or admitting several significations, its use as a record of revelation would be impossible; and by even assuming the subordination of the grammatico-historical sense to a higher or deeper one, all that is positive in revelation, as communicated by Scripture, would be undermined; and hence, we are justified in teaching the one sense of Scripture. But the possibility, nay, the necessity of a development, is not by consequence annulled, but, on the contrary, it is by such a process that this unity is often, for the first time, restored. Historical knowledge itself often enjoins, or at least does not interdict such manifold development of the one sense; and the necessity for such a development must, on the one hand, very frequently occur in the Old Testament, as containing the germ of the New; and a belief in the internal connexion of the one Divine word and Spirit with the Scripture, cannot, on the other hand, dispense with this development of Scripture when used by individuals.

REMARK. It has been the admission and experience of the universal Christian church at all periods, that the simple sense of Scripture and immediate exegesis are adequate to supply the rule of faith, or the essential key of Scripture, and to ground a faith necessary to the salvation of souls; which faith itself comes by preaching the word of God.

§ 47. MEDIUM OF INTERPRETATION.

As soon as the word of God becomes human, historical, and reduced to speech and writing, a knowledge of the medium through which it is revealed, that is, of the language and history with which revelation is the most intimately connected, must become an indispensable condition for the interpretation of its records. This constitutes the philological element of exegesis, which includes the grammatical and logical, as well

as the historical and psychological elements. Now if each object of interpretation be intelligible in the fullest degree only of itself and by itself, and by means of that spiritual analogy existing between it and the interpreter; and if revelation also must necessarily have constructed its own language and history, it follows that sacred philology, as an especial element, can only be perfected in a spiritual one.¹ Even the evangelical concurs, in this point of view, with the ancient church to a certain extent in maintaining, that Scripture is its own authentic interpreter.

Both exegetical principles are violated by conceding to reason anything beyond a regulative power and co-operation in the interpretation of holy Scripture, unless we understand by the term reason the Christian spirit itself, or religious consciousness, previously determined through the Gospel. Were we to follow the advice of Kant² or Fichte, we would wrong the historical element; and if we recognised the rules of an Ostorod, Schlichting, Ludwig Meyer, or even of an Episcopius, we might be said to forget that subjective reason, which in its spontaneity is more or less defective, is infected by an antagonism to the truth of revelation; and that, on the other hand, objective reason, even pure theism, ethical religion, *θεοπρεπές* is already represented and preserved, by means of the revealed records, in a manner far surpassing what any school of philosophy either has or ever could effect.

¹ See my letter to Professor Delbrück, pp. 79, 80. It must be conceded that the rational canon, the Holy Scripture, as records of antiquity, requires to be expounded like any other documents, according to the laws of general hermeneutics; and just as it holds with the fundamental position of Protestantism: *Scriptura sui ipsius interpres*, is applicable to writings not sacred. What appertains then, to the law of interpretation, farther than a penetrating insight into the peculiarity of the author, as also into the central and uniting point of his representations. A written spiritual expression can assuredly only, in the first place, become comparatively intelligible, through a knowledge of the circle of thought and language, whence it emanates; for

example, the New Testament becomes more intelligible through a knowledge of the general Grecisms or Judaisms, expressed in Greek; but if such expression be in its place new, in its kind, highly productive and original, or if, by a free extension and limitations of the signification of the word, it generates new ideas and judgments; then the interpreter must absolutely pass over from the mere comparative representation, into the objective and immediate one, and can only succeed in the proportion as he possesses a susceptibility for this spirit, and in proportion as he is penetrated by it, is he enabled to comprehend the same. Religious life knows itself only by, and through itself alone; hence, arise maxims like the following:—He who has not received the Holy Spirit, cannot understand one iota of the internal contents of Scripture (Luther).—The process by which Scripture is known, includes the testimony of the Holy Spirit, (Joh. Gerhard and others): opinions like these fully harmonise with the scientific claims of exegetical procedure.

² Religion within the bounds of pure reason, (*Religion innerhall d. Grenze nd. bl. Vern. Ausg. Rosenkr.*, p. 130, vi.) Church faith has, for its highest interpreter, pure religious faith.—“ Besides, an interpretation of an existing revelation requires a universal explanation agreeably to one sense, in accordance with the general practical rules of a pure rational religion. For the theory of a church faith is unable to interest us morally, if it does not conduce towards the fulfilment of all human duties, considered as divine commands,” p. 132. “ Moreover, such interpretations cannot be charged with unfairness, provided it be not maintained, that the sense we ascribe to the Holy books, was the one exclusively intended; but only that it admits of being so represented, and that it is possible, the author may be so understood.” Here, as elsewhere, Kant has distinguished not only the practical and theoretical, the moral and historical; but has also divided and balanced the one against the other. The Arminian and Socinian interpreters, and Ludwig Meyer, the anonymous author of *Philosophia s. Scripturæ interpretres*, 1666, treated on actual and objective interpretation, when they all asserted *recto ratio*, to be in part a sufficient means, in part an *infallibilis norma*, against Catholics and Protestants. But they differed in their interpretations. Episcopius, for example, understood sound reason to be merely the morally free operation of the scientific understanding, as

being a perfect susceptibility for the Divine Contents, as they impart themselves; Meyer, on the other hand, could only imagine revelation itself, as simply being developed or objective reason. On either side, Divine revelation, considered *in abstracto*, is viewed as Scripture contents; but it was only by the followers of Spinoza, that philosophy or reason (apart from the formal scientific faculty) was assumed to be a universally valid and material principle of cognition, without their venturing, however, to assume that Scripture was anti-philosophical. For the most acute defence of the law of Protestant interpretation of Scripture, within the bounds of scholasticism, see Joh. Musäus, *Introductio in Theologiam, &c.*, 1679, P. ii; de objecto theologiæ revelatæ formali.

IV. ON THE ATTEMPTS TO CONSTRUCT A DOCTRINAL SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY.

§ 48. HISTORY.

It is unnecessary to remind the reader, that, from the first, theological reflection referred Christianity partly to cognition, and partly to action; the mutual condition moreover, of both elements, as well as the dependence, (within the territory of doctrine) of the latter on the former, I have elsewhere admitted.¹ But if we demand a theological development, of this undivided Christianity, or its systematic representation, we need not be surprised on finding that the only approximation to such has amounted merely to attempts and hints, and that the systematic efforts likewise, however dissimilar and imperfect at different times they may have been, have still, regarded as a whole, retained a great similarity.

Christian theology was originally cultivated as an apologeto-polemical, and afterwards as an exegeto-historical subject, and in its earlier period, had not attained a systematic form. It was only after theology, at first struggling and defensive, had acquired a solid and durable foundation, (after the age of Augustin) and had, for the preservation of the historical ground-

character of Christianity, exhibited the authority of a church and conventional *formula*, in defence of each axiom of the creed, it was only then, that a survey of its acquired territory was attempted, such as we find, for example, in John of Damascus. In his system, as well as in those derived from the Scholastics, we at once see that they have sprung from polemical and not from exegetical theology. They assume a whole and a unity, and commence by division and partition; they employ definition and dialectic discussion, in order to decide those questions possessing practical interest, in the school of the period, or in church life, whereby the development of the system, from the original nature of the subject, becomes impossible. It was precisely this last defect, that the Systematics of the Reformation endeavoured to amend, only that they laid, as a foundation, the bare unity of Holy Scripture; and by this means, although they acquired simpler and truer leading ideas, still these were but *locos, articulos*, apart from the fact, that they admitted into their system, on the one hand, the contrast of the Old and New Testament, of the law and the Gospel, and yet, on the other hand, did not carry it out at all; whilst they forced into the Decalogue the representation of Christian life. The chief stress of their labours was consequently directed to the element of cognition, and the ethics of the system were entirely neglected; whilst in the prominent points, relating to ecclesiastical, civil, and domestic life, as for example, in the ministry, church discipline, the magistracy, and marriage, the latter were rendered disproportionably obtrusive. The reparation of this defect has been ascribed to George Calix, in his distinct treatment of the subject, and since his time, this deficiency has been richly compensated; only that its relation to Christian Dogma, since that period, has become so much the more uncertain and contingent, if, indeed, it can be said to remain at all; and as yet the advice of Ernesti and Putter,² to exhibit a reunited representation of Christian doctrine, has been followed with but trifling results.

An English divine, Thomas Burnet,³ has left us an ingenious

essay, in which he endeavoured to exhibit this unity,—the Christian religion as a combination and interpenetration of faith and life. Yet this performance can as little be said to solve the theological problem in question, as can a similar attempt by Theremin,⁴ although the latter proceeds upon the mere unity of the idea of religion. As we cannot, on this occasion, enter into the consideration of the catechetical and ascetical writings or homileto-practical manuals on this subject, we must conclude by merely alluding to hints and outlines, as yet but imperfectly filled up, such as have been published by C. L. Nitzsch,⁵ Schleiermacher,⁶ and Schwartz,⁷ and to the essay of H. Karsten.⁸

REMARK. The question here entirely turns on the history of the Christian system in reference to the union between the doctrine of faith and morals.

¹ In the *Shepherd of Hermas*, the contrast between ἐντολαι, and appearances and similitudes.—Cyrill, *Catech. Illum.* iv. ὁ τῆς Θεοσεβείας τρόπος ἐκ δύο τούτων συνέστηκε, δογματῶν εὐσεβῶν ἀκριβείας καὶ πράξεων ἀγαθῶν. κ.λ.—Clemens of Alexandria, in the introduction to his *Pædagogus*, examines the varied relations of the Divine logos to man's need of salvation. The Logos, indeed, is one and the same, but it partly conducts man to the contemplation of truth, as δηλωτικὸς, ἀποκαλυπτικὸς, and partly as πρακτικὸς, forms him for a believing and blessed contemplation. In the latter point of view, the Logos is in part again προπρεπτικὸς, παρορμητικὸς (principle of a preparatory ethic of an apologetical signification,) and in part παιδαγωγὸς (principle of a preparatory ascetic.)

² In the preface to the *Christian Religion, in its true connection and its excellency*, by Putter. Gött. 1779.

³ *De fide et officiis Christianorum*, Londini, 1727, (a work, according to the preface, printed after the author's death, for private circulation among his friends.) The first four sections contain an historical construction of Christianity of an apologetical tendency. According to our author, there is a *religio primo æterna, immutabilis*, in which all positive religions are rooted. It appears not simply in the abstract form of philosophy, but also in the life of individual patriarchs, as of an Enoch, a Noah. Heathenism, in its public expression, is the grossest disfigurement of this *religio prima*. In the Mosaic economy, it is restored, by

Divine authority, yet in a national manner; unfettered by national restrictions, it has been renovated by Jesus Christ up to a more perfect development of the hope of a blessed immortality; but the author does not maintain the absolute perfection and exclusive self-sufficiency of Christianity. He describes, in five sections, the *Lex Christiana*. In the first, he treats on the worship of God in spirit and in truth, and the simple rites by which it is embodied in an external and public form. In the second section, he discusses the highest rule of ethics, and also touches on rewards and punishments. In the third, he examines the Christian faith in general, according to the apostolic symbol; and, in the fourth, he considers those definitions of faith, which are especially liable to be variously apprehended, such as original sin, justification, atonement, freedom of the will, grace, election, and in reference to which, in so far as they are conformable or not to the moral idea, our judgment thereon must be with a reservation. The fifth section treats on the church, and the form of church government. Of the personality of the Redeemer, the author knew nothing. The Godhead of Christ is doctrinal authority. Whilst he professes his entire belief in miracles, revelation, and in Scripture, yet his exegesis has a rationalistic tendency, because he reduces everything to the *religio prima*, and with regard to his views of redemption he is a Pelagian.

⁴ *Die Lehre vom göttlichen Reiche*. Berlin, 1823.

⁵ *De revelatione religionis externa eademque publica*, p. 200, and *Prelusio ii. de antinomismo*. Jo. Agricolæ, pp. 35—38.

⁶ *Glaubenslehre*, i. p. 159. Compare *Kurze darstell. der Theol. Studien*. 2d edition, § 223—31.

⁷ *Grundriss. der Protest. Dogmatik*. Heidelb. 1816, p. xxii. and *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1832, p. 107. “*Aphorisms for the Union of the Doctrines of Christian Faith and Morals, with reference to Nitzsch’s System of Christian Doctrine.*”

⁸ *Manual of the Christian Religion intended for the upper Classes of the higher schools*. (Lehrbuch der Christlichen Religion für die Obern Classen höherer Bildungsanstalten. Rostock, 1838.)

§ 49. AUGUSTIN.

Andrew Hyperius,¹ in a sketch contained in his *Theological*

Methodology, has portrayed the most distinguished Christian systems extant, up to the period of the Reformation. He very properly commences with Augustin's scheme; for Origen's book, *de Principiis*, is purely and simply dogmatic; and Gregory of Nyssa's *Large Catechism*, and even the treatise of Athanasius on the *Incarnation*, contain but the germ of ethical Christianity; and if the ethical notions of Lactantius be placed in juxtaposition with his ideas on dogma, sapientia, justitia, cultus vita beata, it will be evident that he was far from having any just perception of an arrangement of Christian doctrine. Now, Augustin² proceeds from the idea of subjective veneration of deity (pietas) and divides it into fides, spes, et charitas; and although his *Christian Manual*, addressed to Laurentius, is really executed according to this classification (in which the doctrine of love only is very imperfectly developed, from so much of the work being devoted to preceding matter), he intimates, from the very first, the concealed objective unity of the system, *the person of Christ*, and even pretty clearly hints at the possibility of some other arrangement.

¹ *De Theologo s. de ratione studii Theologici libri iv.* Basil. 1556, vid. lib. iii. p. 445 variæ formulæ colligendi locos communes in theologia.

² *De vera Religione*, and more fully in *Enchiridion ad Laurentium Urbis Romæ primicerium*. Hyperius did not apprehend with sufficient accuracy Augustin's scheme.

§ 50. GENNADIUS.

Those paraphrases of the entire Christian doctrine, such as have been given in the form of more extended church Symbols and doctrinal confessions, by Gennadius of Marseilles and Isidore of Seville, are wholly involved in the field of polemical theology and church discipline. The former, under the title, *de Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis*, is found among the works of Augustin, and the latter, amongst those of Isidore, in his

treatise *de Officiis Ecclesiasticis*. Both include those ethical dogmas which had, till that period, been elicited either by public controversies, or called forth by the necessities of the church communion. Moreover, the moral elements, as laid down by John of Damascus, in his exposition of the *Ecclesiastical System*, are not altogether overlooked.

§ 51. THE SCHOLASTICS.

In the four books of *Sentences* concerning God, the creature, redemption, the sacraments, and a future life (or upon earthly and heavenly fellowship in salvation) Peter Lombard has united dogma and ethic in such a manner, that the entire moral philosophy and doctrine of sin, in all its degrees, is connected with the doctrine of the second book on the fall; in the third book, love develops itself out of faith in salvation, and from love springs the doctrine of duties and morals, and then follow the commandments of the decalogue, the law, and the gospel. Lastly, in his fourth book, he treats of the relative duties of ecclesiastical as well as those of civil and domestic life, although after an imperfect and disproportionate manner. Still, in the book of *Sentences*, we discern the natural order of Christian doctrine much earlier than in the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas, the first part of which embraces the subject of Ontology, reserving for the second part, practical Christianity, and, for the third, the historical doctrines of Christ, and the ecclesiastical relation.

§ 52. THE REFORMERS AND THEIR SUCCESSORS.

The Reformers and their disciples, notwithstanding the opposite bent of their minds, and the entirely different mode of handling the subject, frequently fall back upon the classification of Peter Lombard, in so far as it corresponds with the apostolic symbol, and the nature of the case. We find in the Reformers the

same combination of the moral elements with faith, hope, and love, and with the Decalogue, and a like union of the doctrines on the domestic and civil state with that of the church. In a genetic point of view, Calvin's method is more complete than Melanchthon's; but the simple thought of Luther deserves to be very forcibly enunciated, *i. e.*, that the Christian scheme, in the first place, is a doctrine of faith, consisting of two divisions—sin and grace; and secondly, a doctrine of love, comprehending, on the one hand, service, and, on the other, patience,

§ 53. HYPERIUS AND JOHN GERHARD.

Besides the above, there are two distinguished theologians belonging to the period of the "methodus localis," deserving especial notice—Hyperius and Gerhard; the former, because by means of a thought, on the Christian system, designedly thrown out for our use, compasses the arrangement which he commends to students; and the latter, because in common with Melanchthon's more elaborate work, the *Loci Theologici*, appears to have served as a model to a succession of systematic divines. Hyperius, in his system, indicates, though delicately, what he disapproves of in the arrangements of his immediate predecessors and cotemporaries, namely, that they allowed the system to be too much influenced by the questions of the day; which remark, however, was not applicable to the first, simple scheme of Melanchthon; and further, he implies that they had mixed up principal divisions, *κεφάλαια γενικώτατα*, with sub-divisions. The sum of revealed religion he expresses in the following proposition:—*Deus condidit mundum et in eo homines, ut ex his constitueretur ecclesia, in qua ipse secundum doctrinam legis et evangelii coleretur, ad seculi usque consummationem.* Six terms flow out of this proposition—God, creature, church, doctrine, sacrament, consummation, and in these are founded the entire family of Christian doctrines. Of course these terms must ne-

cessarily be referred to a unity; ponatur igitur vestibuli vice locus separatus: verbum Dei s. sacra scriptura. With the exception of the first and last article, the antitheses, ante lapsum et post lapsum, pervades all the others; for there is implied in both states, a church, a law and gospel, and a sacrament. Moreover, in the doctrine, the law or the doctrine of love commences, which, after the fall, continues in the decalogue, and then succeed the doctrines of faith and hope; and in this subdivision, so profoundly and multifariously contrived, is concealed, as it were, the true *terminus* of Christianity. The idea of salvation—*fides concipitur ex evangelio, evangelium post lapsum*—*Christus homo factus et mediator*, whilst the historical antithesis only of the primeval state and fall, which could not be manifested in this multiplicity, without a state of grace, runs through all the doctrine, and yet in such a manner as not to appear anywhere in the members of the principal divisions. The defects of this arrangement are striking but instructive. The idea of the Divine doctrine is the combination of the whole, and, at the same time, agrees with the six members. Instead of *doctrina* (lex et evang.) standing as the medium of salvation, salvation simply stands for the content of the doctrine; and from the content again of the doctrine, the relations of God to the creature in his attributes and works, to all appearance, are excluded. The important position he ascribes to the church is new, the idea of which has been taken up, amplified, and unfolded, much in the same manner as “the covenant of God,” “the kingdom of God,” has been by other systematic divines.

John Gerhard begins much more simply and less scientifically, but proceeds, at least in his Aphorisms,¹ with admirable strictness in the combination. De scriptura, de Deo, de persona et officio Christi, de creatione et angelis, de providentia, de electione et reprobatione, de imagine Dei in homine anti lapsum, de peccato originali de libero arbitrio, de lege, de evangelio, de poenitentia, de fide, de bonis operibus, de sacramentis, de baptismo, de s. coena, de ecclesia, de ministerio ecclesiastico, de ordine politico,

de conjugio, de quatuor hominis novissimis;—these are the subjects which he handles aphoristically, *i. e.*, briefly, but not unconnectedly. Except that he treats on the incarnation before creation and redemption (because whatever related to the personality of the Redeemer, he considers to be necessarily closely allied to the doctrine of God), the connection of his divisions is sufficiently preserved, and has been presented by the author in a preliminary dissertation full of vigour. But he does not by any means place the representation of the Christian life in the doctrine of the decalogue; for, in so much as the law is not designed to realize the Christian life, he treats it merely as the perfection of obedience revealed for the condemnation of sin. On the other hand, according to his theory, regeneration is combined with Divine justification; or from faith, which worketh by love, proceed good works, and these refer to our duty towards God, ourselves, and our neighbours; and he holds this threefold character of the doctrine of duty and virtue so firmly as to discover its expression in the *σωφρόνως, δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς*. Tit. ii. 13, as well as in the anti-pharisaical doctrine of Jesus on fasting, alms, and prayer. This division appears to be original,² as does also his transition from the doctrine of the church to that of the final consummation of all things in the following proposition—*ecclesiam suam Deus hac in vita subjecit cruci—tandem antem in futura vita eam glorificabit*. And thus, indeed, it may be said, that he finds room for the comforting doctrine, *de cruce et afflictionibus*, which has been more fully carried out in the systems of his successors, and particularly by Melancthon. For Christian hope is the correlative corresponding to the idea of the dogma of the consummation of the Church in the glory of the second advent of Christ. Up to the period when Christian ethics were separated from dogma, the leading points concerning good works, adoration, the cross, and the probationary state, are brought prominently forward in the joint representations of Christianity.

¹ Aphorismi succincti et selecti in xxiii. capitibus, totius

theologiæ nucleum continentes.—a Joh. Gerhardo, *Th. D. et Sup.* Heldburg, Jenae 1611. 8.

² If, perchance, it be not borrowed from Calvin's *Institt.* iii. 4.

§ 54. IDEA FIDEI FRATRUM.

Even after the epoch of divided ethics, those who followed the track of Spener's method, as for example, Freytingshausen, Rambach, and Spangenberg,¹ either endeavoured in general, to approximate the theological system to the catechism, or to give to those practical points, already constructed, since Melancthon's time, the requisite amplification; and although Spangenberg's brief notion is entitled *idea fidei*, yet between the doctrines of sanctification and communion, there intervene, as leading-divisions, discussions on the commands of God, and on the love of God and our neighbour. Among those who have opposed the view of an internal connexion, and comprehensive idea of Christian doctrine, Friedrich Christian Oetinger,² is distinguished. His idea of life is that which is developed through Christianity; but even admitting that this idea were just, he has not developed it, at least expressly and scientifically, so as to represent ethical Christianity.

¹ Vide *Idea fidei fratrum*, or *Summary of the Christian Doctrine of the Evangelical community of Brethren*, by August Gottlieb Spangenberg Barby, 1779.

² See, *Theologia ex idea vitæ deducta, in sex locos redacta, quorum quilibet*, 1. *Secundum sensum communem*, 2. *Secundum mysteria scripturæ*, 3. *Secundum formulas theticas nova et experimentalis methodo pertractatur*. Auctore, Fr. Chr. Oetinger, &c., Francof., 1765, præf., and p. 512. 1. *Deus est ipsissima vita et ἀφθαρσία solvi nescia. Creaturæ non habent vitam solvi nesciam. Vita est duplex, physica et spiritualis.—In Deo est utraque vita una et indissolubilis.—2. Homo constat spiraculo vitæ duplicis. 3. Lex non habet locum, ubi unum tantum est, hinc solus Deus est sine lege. Unum est et manet unum, nec est deviationis capax. Ubi lex est, ibi vita ad minimum duplex, solutionis et aberrationis possibilitatem habens, esse debet. 4. Peccatum est ipsa aberratio vitæ duplicis a primæva colligatione, adeoque a*

lege, quæ solutioni mortem præseit. 5. *Gratia* est illud beneplacitum Dei, quo reducendi vitam spiritualem ad vitam naturalem certum ordinem constituit. 6. *Ecclesia* est coetus, in quo est unitas spiritus, una præsentia Dei in vita omnibus membris communi. Unitas spiritus fundatur in unitate fidei: adeoque vita spiritualis per verbum rursus vitæ naturali est coadunata per singula membra. 7. *Novissima* sunt, ubi vita interior tum naturalis tum spiritualis est extrapostita; ubi occultum fit manifestum, ut in resurrectione, morte secunda, nova Jerusalem, nova terra, præeunte iudicio extremo, donec Deus post æonas æonum erit omnia in omnibus.

N. B.—In the execution of the work, Oetinger comprehends under the doctrine of the law that of sin, and therefore in the title page, only six *loci* are enumerated.

§ 55. MORE RECENT ATTEMPTS.

Carl Ludwig Nitzsch endeavoured to show that the idea he had formed of revelation, as indicated in Scripture, was eminently fitted to finally complete the theological structure,¹ and at the same time, denounced the blending of the rational and historical contents of Christian dogmas, which prevails among both ancient and modern Divines, as the essential cause of the failure of systems. And in fact, he has shown, how it is possible to deduce, from the single dogma of Jesus, the Messiah, (s. *Homine veri nominis eodemque Dei filio*,) by means of an assumed distinction between the idea and fact; 1st, A doctrine of religion, being that of man, God and of divine beatitude. 2dly, A doctrine of revelation. 3dly, One combining revelation and faith.² Nothing can be more correct than this statement of a middle term, and neither in the principal or subordinate members, are the excluding or including terms missed, nor throughout, is the exhausting one absent; but we cannot acquiesce, according to our view of the subject, either in the separation of the first and second chief member, nor in the prominence given to anthropology.

When it is remembered to what an extent Augustin availed himself of the idea of a *kingdom of God*, and how much others

effected with that of a covenant God, and how much our predecessors and contemporaries included in the term *church*, we need not be surprised that Theremin endeavoured to deduce, from the fundamental idea of the kingdom of God, as declared in Scripture, not only the doctrine of divine and human qualities, and the doctrine of redemption; but also the whole doctrine concerning virtue, relation, and duty. This admirable effort has opened out some important views, as regards the union of ethics and dogma; and, indeed, how could it fail to do so, since the fundamental idea not only unites God, men, angels, and worlds, in the highest moral and religious idea, but also appears to unite the loftiest conception of reason, with the truth of revelation and redemption, together with its realization. The many and various difficulties, into which the systematic divines have notwithstanding fallen, cannot in this place be discussed. Nevertheless there lies concealed in this arrangement an undoubted illusion, namely, that that idea of the Divine *state*, whence, by an unbroken progression, an entire system of religion admits of being unfolded, is, as it relates to the biblical doctrine of God's kingdom, an abstract idea, and for which, a direct and adequate expression is no where afforded by Scripture. But granting that it were so—and the expression may be found, at least in the stoical doctrine of the highest *πολιτεία*, or *Βασιλεία*, more directly indicated; still it would be impossible to derive from such a representation, the doctrine of the positive fall through sin, and of actual salvation.

The biblical idea of the kingdom of God is totally different. This latter idea universally brings along with it what Theremin excludes, namely, the world, the kingdoms of the world, the kingdom of darkness and of the prince of the world, together with its opposite; and hence falls back upon the more elevating idea of grace, election, and divine decree of salvation. But even if the author of the doctrine of a divine kingdom had applied his universal idea to the division and memberment of the doctrinal system of Christianity, by means of the various definitions and relations which his idea admitted (as, for example, those of the

natural disposition of the kingdom of God, the fall, the restoration, the diverse aspects of the divine state, and of the admission of man into the kingdom of God, &c.); still, it would be evident that this cannot correctly be the uniting middle term, and that ἀπολύτρωσις, σωτηρία has a much higher import in this point of view.

F. H. C. Schwartz, in the dogmatic alluded to above, does not fail, on the one hand, in several places (as, for example, § 129, 32, on the Divine life, and § 177, on union with God) to scan the whole field of Christian ethics; and on the other hand, to point out, in brief remarks, a certain parallelism between the doctrine of faith and morals. He divides the doctrine of faith into three—that of God, of man, and of man's relation to God. Now, the mode in which this ethical triad, faith, love, and hope, corresponds to these divisions, can only become apparent by means of sub-divisions. That is to say, there is combined with the doctrine of faith in God, absolutely considered, the ethical doctrine of the divine law, to wit, the will of God in the conscience; with the doctrine of faith in God's relation to the world, there is combined the ethical doctrine of deference for the law (or for individual laws); with the doctrine of faith in the Trinity there is combined the ethical doctrine of the adoration of God as the highest good. With the doctrine of faith in the Divine image, there is associated—self-love; with the doctrine of faith in redemption—the love of our neighbour with that of man's salvation—the love of God. Finally, in the third division, there is combined with the doctrine of faith in the operations of grace—a striving after holiness (moral character); with the means of grace—activity in the kingdom of God; and with eternal salvation—resemblance to God, as the eternal aim.

Finally, Karsten, guided by the doctrinal method pursued by Schleiermacher, has sketched out and completed a *Christian Manual*. The appearance of Christ in the world, as the central point of devout Christian self-consciousness, is assumed by him as the ground of the classification of his view. The first part

of his work treats on the person of Jesus Christ, in such a way that the formation of the new life through Christ is included in the second, and the new life in Christ in the third part. However highly we may esteem the decision with which the actual fact and experimental nature of Christianity has been throughout maintained, nevertheless, we entertain many doubts of the correctness both of the plan and its execution. The appearance of Christ, which constitutes the basis of his classification, comprehends the person and works, but there is no third element mentioned; the divine causality, which must re-enter before the new life can be generated in a Christian individual, is the Holy Spirit. The third element is not at all co-ordinate with the two former, and could only be so through a dialectical treatment of the work of Jesus—for example, self-representation and self-communication. Whatsoever excellency the three performances display, there is still this objection, that the doctrine of the Divine essence and attributes is separated from the objective idea of an immediate revelation of God in Christ, and is united to the subjective one—Christian devotion.

¹ *De Revel. &c.* p. 200. Nam systema veri nominis, quo universa illa doctrina (Christiana), qua materiam et formam, ex una eademque notione derivetur, multis hodie agnoscentibus et fatentibus, adhuc desideratur.

² *Ibid*, p. 201, sqq.

A. De religione rationali divinitus promulgata;

a de *homine*—qualis esse debeat et qualis sit;

b de *Deo* ejusque perfectionibus et triplici personalitate;

c de *religiositate* interna atque externa.

B. De religionis revelatione:

a de *modo* revelationis, s. de historia et institutione Jesu Christi,

b de *forma*—s. de divina ejus origine atque auctoritate,

c de *effectu*—s. de ecclesia.

C. De fide revelatione habenda:

a de *causis* historicis et moralibus huj. fidei,

b de *effectu*—s. de immutatione morali,

c de *cultura* huj. fidei, pars ascetica.

§ 56. MIDDLE TERM.

The opinion maintained by some ancient and modern theologians,¹ that a true system of Christian doctrine is neither possible nor admissible, is refuted by a closer definition. Wherever any peculiarity of life and consciousness, of doctrine and word exists, it either merely assumes the appearance of permanency and individuality, or there is discoverable in it a state of manifoldness, and, at the same time, of order, and consequently of unity. Whether or no this unity be merely simple or synthetical, is another question. We maintain that it is not merely a simple unity. Christianity, as a self-realizing idea of religion, has, notwithstanding its divine novelty, and its being founded on fact, a relation to religion in general. Now, since religion in general, as being a mode of conception and cognition, instructs us concerning the *being* and *becoming* in existence, up to a post-finality of being, or may be said to conduct us to a state of consciousness; so there can be no religious doctrine which does not bring into relation God and the world, God and man, with respect to cause and aim, and that, too, ontologically and teleologically. These are the necessary and infallible elements or internal relations of universal religious thought. But the question is, whence arises this thinking emotion, and from what point can the circle be drawn. Now, it is maintained by some that this point is presented by every dogma; for, by way of example, the doctrine concerning man being fully determined, concentrates all other doctrines; or, the truth of the scope of history, being sufficiently recognised, illumines the foundation and commencement of the same. Now, as in this mode no primary dogma already contains within itself its determinateness, for example, its Christian character, but must derive it from some other source, so we are compelled to extend our inquiries after a more accurately defining primary dogma, and the system is only completed by a presupposition of its own. In fact this is

universally the case, whenever (as has been done, for example, by Melanchthon, Hyperius, and others), the Christian system is founded upon no other unity than that of the holy Scripture or the Divine Word. Some modern divines have grounded the system on the idea of "the doctrine of Jesus;" or, have combined the dogmas with the systemless holy Scripture, by means of the idea of Theology, the question then turning on the *object* and *subject* of the same, and on the causality and finality of their relation to one another. It is obvious that none of these methods were sufficient, for none of them make known the definite perfection of the Christian religion, and none exhibit a primary, or fundamental or inclusive dogma. By assigning to the idea of God, or to the idea of the Divine kingdom, or to the idea of life, the source of the Christian scheme, equal justice was endeavoured to be shown to both claims. The first case promises to produce the most absolute logic, the second, the most perfect ethics, and the third, the physics of Christian theology.² In regard to the two last, they are enabled of themselves to exhibit the object and subject of religion, including the being and becoming, and, at the same time, to inculcate such biblical representations as are confessedly of importance. Still, the latter (as has been formerly remarked in reference to the notion of the kingdom of God), is a mere semblance. For even ζωὴ αἰώνιος or ζωὴ requires to be first extended and generalised over the biblical determinateness by the philosophical idea, ere it is able to realise that conclusion, or represent that unity of the religious substance. With regard to the idea of God, it is not only inclusive, but, at the same time, remarkably productive, and appears to meet all requirements, since it can appear in the Christian definition, as the doctrine of the Trinity. But a great difference exists between absolute logic and Christian theology; admitting that we apprehend the logos of God by means of a logical evolution of the idea of God, and also discern the Spirit of God, and the existence and consciousness of the world, still the truth of ὁ λογος σὰρξ ἐγένετο far transcends this logic. Neither the reality of sin, as a universal condition,

nor the incarnation of the Son of God and redemption subsisting in him, can be deduced from the mere idea of the logos. The perception of the Christian Trinity is rooted in the knowledge of Christ, the Son of God, although Christ himself can only be apprehended by an original and previous knowledge of God; a relation which has ever been recognised by Christian theologians, but yet in an imperfect manner. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the idea of a Redeemer, or the dogma of Christ, is the primary, fundamental, and inclusive dogma of Christian doctrine, as such; only the series of Christian dogmas cannot be developed in one and the same direction from the doctrine of the Redeemer; for the mere progressive development of the dogma of Christ looks back, in all its elements, upon other truths, which, indeed, though not independent of Christ, of his being and state, still, at the same time, are acknowledged as suppositions of his personal being and work, by means of a regressive development. The Redeemer, as such, refers to the Divine creation of man, to man's divine and human nature, and to his original and fallen state; and, in these relations, we are enabled to recognise those conditions only in him, and through him, as being the necessary supposition required for a correct doctrine of justification and sanctification, and of the means and end of redemption; but even here it is evident that there is a twofold aspect under which the Christian system, as founded on the person and work of the Redeemer, presents itself. We designate, therefore, the unity of this system, a *middle term*, *i. e.*, such a term as, in the first place, conducts to certain pre-suppositions, before it admits of analysis. The redemption of the world by Jesus Christ, is such a *term*. There are various facts which afford preliminary proof that, for the foundation of the system, Christ is requisite and capacitated. How he imparts to all the apostolical doctrines their peculiar determinateness, appears from Rom. i. 17; 1 Cor. i. 30, iii. 10, 11, xv. 3; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 2 Pet. i. 1–9; from the whole tenor of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and from the signification of the word *gospel*, in a man-

ner not to be mistaken. With regard to the apostolical symbol and its occasion, as intimated by Matt. xxviii. 19, it can easily be proved that its first member, ere it can generate the second and third, must itself have previously been produced from the second; and that baptism into the Father, Son, and Spirit is the same as baptism in the name of the Lord Jesus, Acts xix. 5.³

Clemens of Alexandria, and Augustin, clearly enough ground their system on the doctrine of the Son of God, or salvation in Christ; and it is evident why so many ancient dogmatists unite the doctrine of the Redeemer's person so intimately with the doctrine of God.

¹ See Melanchthon, *Loci, &c.*, ed. 1543. *Præf.* p. 7. Planck in the *Theolog. Encyclop.* Schwartz *Protest. Dogm.* p. xxi., N. 8. The closer definition we desire has already been given in some measure by Melanchthon—*In artibus tradendis singulari cura monstratur ordo partium et indicantur initia, progressiones et metæ. Hanc explicandi formam in philosophia vocant methodum: sed hæc in iis artibus, quæ demonstrationibus extruuntur, aliter quam in doctrina Ecclesiæ instituitur. Nam demonstrativa methodus progreditur ab iis, quæ sensui subjecta sunt, et a primis notitiis, quæ vocantur principia. Hic in doctrina Ecclesiæ tantum ordo quaeritur, non illa methodus demonstrativa. Nam hæc doctrina Ecclesiæ non ex demonstrationibus sumitur, sed ex dictis, quæ Deus certis et illustribus testimoniis tradidit, &c.* Though true as far it goes, still there is not order without unity; and that the Christian system possesses some other kind of unity than a mere formal idea of revelation, he has himself sufficiently indicated, *Loci* a. 1521, p. 9, ed. Augusti, and thus agrees with Augustini *Enchirid.* § 5. where the proposition, *certum propriumque fidei catholicæ fundamentum Christus est*, is previously defended against those who might reply, that in that case, heretics would be on a par with Catholics.

² J. T. Beck has actually undertaken to comprise the whole scientific doctrine of Christianity according to biblical records (Stuttgart 1840 i.), under the representation of the fundamental doctrines of God—as logic, ethics, and physics.

³ See *The Analysis of the Apostolic Symbol*, in my letter to

Professor Delbrück, p. 50. We must not forget that the first member of the creed, denominated apostolic, in its original form, was only opposed to monotheism, heathenism, and nature worship, and that *credo in unum Deum factorem cœli, &c.* only by degrees gave place to *credo in Deum Patrem*. In so far even as this occurred, the term *Pater* did not at once include the hypostatical signification.

§ 57. PRINCIPAL DIVISIONS.

Since the articulate method has been abandoned, much pains has necessarily been bestowed on the arrangement of leading divisions, and for this object, the mere causal, final, and medial categories soon became insufficient. We could not revert to Augustin's subjective arrangement, inasmuch as ethics meanwhile had been separated from dogma. Now, those who were unwilling entirely to surrender the characteristic sign of Christianity, already existing in the term of the dogmatic principal division, which sign, by a mere antithesis of the doctrine of God and man, (according to Heilmann, Henke, and Knapp,) still very decidedly occurred—Such followed more or less, though, indeed, in a very different manner, a development, which, to a certain extent, was that of natural order, and which lies at the foundation of the apostle's creed. The first diversity that arose from this, consisted in the retention or analysis of the Trichotomy. The triplicity, again, could be retained in a threefold manner, so that either the Father, Son, and Spirit, or creation, redemption, and salvation, or the state of man by nature, grace, and his future condition, constituted the fundamental arrangement. This has, indeed, been realized most rigidly in the first case, and the same has been done by Marheineke's dogmatic.¹ We assume, however, that whatever of the Trinity may be included in the apostolical symbol, it is still incomplete, and exhibits rather the dignity of an historical combination, than a speculative theological meaning; and that the mere doctrine concerning the Divine essence is as little suited

to establish an organism for a system, as is a mere anthropology; which system ought to point out on all occasions, a relation between both sides, as well as a divine history of the world and humanity founded by the Son of God, who is the Son of man. Now, if, according to Döderlein, Eckermann, Ammon, Wegschneider, Bretschneider, De Wette, Schott, Schleiermacher, &c., a so-called Christology, soteriology, or at least a *providentia specialis (salutaris)* according to Grunner, appears as the principal division; then there immediately arises the question, by what other principal divisions, or by what number of them, shall the system be prepared? Perhaps by mere theology; as proposed by Döderlein and Eckermann, but which is inadmissible, precisely on the same grounds as the doctrine of God was considered insufficient to supply all the leading divisions of dogma. As little can Anthropology or Cosmology assume to be equal in rank with Christology. But it is of more importance to inquire whether, on the one hand, the historical doctrine of Sin, the basis of the doctrine of salvation, precedes, and how it does so; and on the other hand, whether the preceding ontological doctrines of God and man, shall or shall not be treated in accordance with their Christian and actual determinateness. In this point of view, there exists the greatest difference between Eckermann and Augusti, since the former, in his doctrine of salvation, does not in the remotest degree premise Ponerology, whilst the latter commences his leading division from the state of sin. Others include the doctrine of sin in their Christological leading division, or, like Schleiermacher, Schott, and Bretschneider, construct the historico-positive part of the system out of the doctrine of salvation and sin, and this in such a manner that the two former postpone to the end the doctrine of the Trinity, as the dogma including all others, and thus obtain at the very threshold, a purely theistical² and extra-historical leading division, or, in so far as it possesses in itself any thing historical, a division, that to a certain extent is Old Testamentary. There is still another question, In what way, if

Christology and Theology be co-ordinate, shall the *unity* of the system, as one of Christianity, be preserved? and on the other hand, in what manner, if entire dogmatic be preserved to Christology, can theology, &c., be included in it, or developed out of it?

We have in another place,³ suggested a division which possibly may meet all these requirements. Hitherto the person and the work of the Redeemer have been confronted; but the doctrine of the person of the Redeemer is that of God and man; and primarily, indeed, the doctrine of God's essence, attributes, and works; for the logos of God partakes of all divine properties, and transcends the Angels. Moreover, the dogma of the Redeemer is a doctrine concerning his humanity, and consequently, by a process of regression, is also one relating to man in his original and his fallen condition. But the doctrine of the personal unity of the Divine and human nature, and of their union in Christ, is also the doctrine of the antithesis of creation and preservation in connexion with redemption, and consequently is the doctrine of a Divine decree of salvation, and its gradual realization. Were it possible in this way, by means of the doctrine of the Saviour's person, to derive theology, anthropology, (angelology) and soteriology from Christology, then it is evident that the remaining leading division of religious doctrine, namely, the doctrine of the work of the Redeemer, would occasion no farther difficulty. But even in reference to the first part impediments arise. One consists in the dichotomy which pervades the system, appearing to infringe upon the doctrine of the Trinity, and has given occasion to certain Systematics, as for example, Rust and Kling, who found their system on Christology, to divide it, notwithstanding, after a trinitarian method. The latter proposes to treat, *1st*, Of the being of the God-man, as the image of God and the archetype of humanity. *2dly*, On the nature (?) and ministry of the Redeemer. *3dly*, On the work of the Redeemer as it consists and attains completion through the operation of the Holy Spirit; in one word of the Father, Son, and Spirit. In his third division he instructs us

concerning the Trinity in its higher sense, that is to say, ontologically. We limit our objections to the following remarks, namely, that this division, although trichotomic, is only in appearance trinitarian; that the true trinitarian division is alone adapted to speculative theology, but not for that of this author; and farther, (as indeed, the foregoing description of the division shows) that dogma, considered as a doctrine of the God-man Redeemer, cannot be classified in any logico-historical manner as trinitarian; moreover, the doctrine of the Trinity is secured by the dichotomous division, and in such a way that the ontological Trinity, God, Logos, Spirit, appertains to the doctrine of the person of the Redeemer, whilst the economic Trinity, Father, Son, and Spirit, belongs to the doctrine of the work of the Redeemer. Meanwhile there arises a much more important difficulty, and one which, even by the plan struck out by Kling, appears to be insurmountable. Kling is obliged to introduce his three divisions with a general doctrine of the God-man; now, the question arises, not only as to what amount of development this doctrine shall reach, or under what limitation and simplicity it shall be retained, so as not to encroach; but also how can this doctrine, when once introduced into the system, construct an independent commencement, without at the same time including its own pre-suppositions. The system of Christian doctrine does undoubtedly possess its own hypothesis; but that is nothing else than Christian consciousness, regulated by Biblical representation, and sustained by the spirit of the church. Under the protection and influence of this consciousness, and by means again of the relation existing between Christianity and religion in general Dogma may inculcate, as before, the order of being and becoming, and pass by the order of cognition and revelation; in other words, it may commence with the doctrine of God, and again be associated with the ordinary arrangement, and teach, in the first synthetical division, the suppositions of faith in the redemption of the world by Christ, before it teaches the analysis of faith itself. But the pre-suppositions of the doctrine of salvation, are God and the creature, or the good,

the absolute, and the dependent, and evil as the common condition in sin and death. Both these doctrines, equally conditioned, are related to all the developed members of the doctrine of salvation. As for the rest, each division of the Christian doctrine of faith which is grounded on the nature of the object, constitutes, at the same time, a correct arrangement of the whole Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, in order to render the proposed union of the doctrine of faith and morals prominent,—a view we have from the first indicated,—we shall entitle our leading divisions, Agathology, Ponerology, and Soteriology.

¹ See Twisten's remarks on the Trinitarian classification of dogmatic, p. 272.

² On the reciprocal action of the knowledge of God and of faith in Christ, Clemens of Alexandria has thrown out a spiritual and striking hint, *Strom.* v.—Καὶ ἵνα τις πιστεύσῃ τῷ υἱῷ, γινῶναι δεῖ τὸν πατέρα πρὸς ὃν καὶ ὁ υἱός. Αὐθις τε, ἵνα τὸν πατέρα προγινῶμεν, πιστεῦσαι δεῖ τῷ υἱῷ, ὅτι ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱὸς δίδασκει. ἐκ πίστεως γὰρ εἰς γινῶσιν διὰ υἱοῦ πατρός. γινῶσις δὲ υἱοῦ καὶ πατρός, ἢ κατὰ τὸν κανόνα τὸν γνωστικόν, τὸν τῷ ὄντι γνωστικόν, ἐπιβολὴ καὶ διάληψις ἐστὶν ἀληθείας διὰ τῆς ἀληθείας.

³ *Theol. Stud. und Krit.*, 1832, p. 171. Compare Kling. What form of dogma most perfectly corresponds, as well to the present state of Theological science, as to the principles of the Evangelical church? *Tübing. Zeitschrift für Theol.*, 1834, 4 H. p. 1.

§ 58. GENETIC CONNEXION OF THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH AND MORALS.

In order to exhibit a representation of the Christian system, it is unnecessary to avail ourselves afresh of the *methodus localis*, nor does the mere parallelism of the dogmatical and ethical elements tend to this object; but the nature of the subject in this case appears to admit and to require the *genetic* method. For from both the doctrines contained in our first division, concerning God and the Creature, there emanates spontaneously a doctrine on the moral nature of man and his

original disposition for communion with God; in short, the doctrine of moral nature. In our second division, there arises out of the ethico-dogmatical doctrine of sin, the dogmatico-ethical one of death or of evil, in its most extended sense. Our third division, under the title “of Salvation,” consists of an analysis of the idea of redemption, that is, the four doctrines concerning the foundation of salvation through the person and typical nature of the Redeemer, the appropriation of salvation through the grace of the Holy Spirit, communion in salvation, and the completion of salvation. The three sections appertaining to the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation, calling, conversion, and sanctification, are in part associated immediately and in part mediately, with the doctrine of the origin and development of the Christian course. Then, in order that the Christian communion be not considered merely in a dogmatical point of view, as a church; but at the same time be viewed in the light of a Christian household and commonwealth, *usage* has been introduced into the system, apart from the nature of the case itself requiring it. Lastly, the ethics of Christian fidelity and hope serve to introduce us to the dogma of the final history of redemption.

REMARK. Most modern systematic writers have either excluded the doctrine of the church or the doctrine of the *novissimis* of the doctrine of salvation, and then magnified the one or the other into a definitive leading division. Calvin, Bretschneider, Storr, and others, concur in the doctrine of the church and means of grace, and abandon in this point of view the track of the apostolic symbol; but, in our opinion, on insufficient grounds. Marheineke, Schleiermacher, and Hahn, correctly conceive Eschatology (the doctrine concerning death, judgment, happiness, and damnation,) to be the hope of the church, its completion or redemption. It cannot be disputed that Eschatology may naturally become the concluding part, and that then the doctrine of the church, in connexion with the former, may continue at the same time a subordinate member of the doctrine of salvation.

PART THE FIRST.

OF THE GOOD.

§ 59. SALVATION AND THE GOOD.

REDEMPTION cannot be considered merely a restoration, nor a mere perfected creation, but rather that it is the one through the other; at all events, redemption is related to an original good, apart from which the bad itself would have no place and opportunity for existence and continuance, seeing that redemption is closely and consentaneously related to the bad. Moreover, the good, in which bad and evil have found opportunities for manifestation, and which stood in need of deliverance, cannot be the same from whence redemption causatively proceeds; hence the presumption of an eternal Good, or a God, and of a created good or Divine creature is fundamental to Christian faith and life. A belief in the Redeemer cannot be separated from a belief in the Creator;¹ but first through a knowledge of the Redeemer, does the Creator, together with all his work, become known in his perfect goodness and truth.

REMARK. Manifold apprehensions are entertained of the danger of uniting in Christian theology, God and the creature, through the idea of the good. There are some who will never admit the ontological idea of the good; and others, again, who do, term it a Platonic rather than a biblical notion. Meanwhile, be it remembered that neither God nor the world, neither primeval man nor the human state, is here termed the good, but the conjunction of the whole, that is, God, as the Creator and Sustainer, and man, or the human state in its divine condition and conformability; and farther, that this occurs merely on account of the pro-

posed idea of salvation. Besides, Plato's dogma (vide *Politeia* vi.) namely, that absolute good is just God, and that the good is the primary cause of all being and thought, or that it stands over the *ουσια*, is not opposed to Christian theology, as appears even from 1 John iv. 8, 16. The word *αγαθός* is applied to God at least in Matt. xix. 17, and that, too, exclusively. See Theodoret's *Dial. de trin.* Opp. ed. Schulze v. p. 932, ὅτι ὁ θεός οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἀγαθότητος (as angels and men) ἐστὶν ἀγαθός, ἀλλ' αὐτός ἐστιν ἀγαθότητος. and p. seq. καὶ καθόλου πᾶσα ἡ ἀξία τοῦ θεοῦ κρίσις, μετοχῆ ἀγαθότητος, λέγεται καὶ ἐστὶν ἀγαθή· ὁ δὲ θεός, φύσει ὢν ἀγαθός, αὐτός ἐστιν ἀγαθότης. And since we comprehend, under the Good, the whole original condition of things, Christian faith is rather opposed to the doctrine of Plato than confounded with it.

¹ See Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. in. and Athan. *de incarn. in.*

SECTION THE FIRST.

OF GOD.

§ 60. EXISTENCE AND CAPABILITY OF BEING KNOWN.

Name of God.

Indeed “no man hath seen God at any time,” John i. 18; 1 John iv. 12; 1 Tim. vi. 16; and it is only mediately that his eternal power and Godhead are viewed in his works (Rom. i. 20), and his paternity seen in Jesus (John xiv. 9.) But there is a knowledge of God in men; yea in all spirits, as such, there is a consciousness of the existence of God. Rom. i. 19, 20; Acts xvii. 23; James ii. 19. For man's consciousness is the conscious existence of the First Being. God, not only as he is in himself, but also as manifested in nature and history, is the object of man's consciousness. “In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God.” The Divine Being, who is not only self-conscious but self-manifesting and a God who speaks, created by speaking, and by speaking

created; thus he produced finite existence and in such, finite consciousness. “In him (logos) was life, and the life was the light of men.” By means of this universally divine existence, there arises a gradual and proportionate apprehension and misapprehension of God. “The light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not.” John bore witness of the light, “he came unto his own,” “the word was made flesh:” by virtue of a distinct existence, God has a name, Exod. xxiii. 21; Levit. xxiv. 11, 16, that is to say, a manifestation and presence in his church, imparted to and awakening faith. Now, although such manifestation is essential and true, and becomes internal, so that we spiritually recognise that which is spiritual, and partake of the mind of Christ, yet so little does this remove what is inscrutable, unfathomable, and incomprehensible in God, that rather the inconceivable fulness of his life belongs to what is contained in the knowledge of his essence and attributes. In a general sense, God is capable of being known, so far as He allows himself to be known, and in so far as the receptive faculty of man for such knowledge extends.

REMARK 1. The biblical tenet—no man hath seen God at any time—has, for its opposite, either the knowledge of God, which is in the Son, and revelation through him (*ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο*, John i. 18), for the Son hath seen the Father, John vi. 46), or the human consciousness of God in love, or the intuitive vision of God, up to which point it behoves us to be elevated, and which latter kind of vision, at least, when compared with the present state of faith and intelligibility, will amount to beholding him. Still there is a distinction to be made when seeing (*ὄραν*) is represented under moral conditions, as is done in 3 John 11, compare 1 John iii. 6. The finite spirit must needs know God; for even man’s vain idolatry, nay, his hatred and dread, is a kind of God-worship. Man can also believe on the Word of God, and must believe that He is, Heb. xi. 6. If man *wills* what is divine and doeth it, he recognises God in His revelations, hears, and so much the more understands His voice, John vii. 17; 1 Cor. viii. 3. For God is perceived by the heart, Matt. xi. 25; and man must be known of God, in order to know Him, Gal. iv. 9. But if man

wills not, then he can and will know only what he is necessitated to know, John viii. 47; Mark iv. 12.

REMARK 2. Throughout the whole testamentary Jewish-Christian development, the assertion of John, that God is invisible, not to be known, and incomprehensible, is affirmed at the same time with the capability of God being known and revealed. It is evident that the question by no means exclusively relates to sensible and corporeal visibility or invisibility. In this point of view, an inquiry must be instituted into the mode in which the experiences and doctrines of the Old Testament are reflected in the Apocrypha, in Josephus, and Philo. The central point of the question concerning the internal or external, the physical or logical invisibility of God, is contained in Exodus xxxiii., xxxiv.; and universal orthodoxy so far settles the point, that if any one has known God by actual sight, it is Moses; but even Moses only saw a reflex of Deity, and only through a certain medium beheld God. John assuredly includes Moses in his general denial (even in that contained in chap. v. 37); for the negations, Exodus xxxiii. 20, 23, apply even to Moses himself. Concurrent with this is the fable of Isaiah's having been accused of heresy, and persecuted, in the reign of king Manasseh, for asserting that he had seen God, against which Sirach (xlviii. 22), defends the credibility of the vision of the great prophet Isaiah; and the ἀναβατικὸν Ἠσαίου ascribes to the soul of the prophet, wrapped in an ecstasy in the highest heaven, a transcendental contemplation of the Trinity. The Alexandrians, in reference to Divine appearances recorded in the Old Testament, did not enter upon the physical element of the appearance and vision, but upon the logical one. But upon what grounds could they maintain (as, for example, Philo did), that God was absolutely invisible to created beings, and yet affirm the universal capacity for knowing the Creator, to say nothing of the fact that Moses represents God as visible? Compare Dähne's *Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüd. alex. Religionsphilosophie*, Halle, 1834, i. p. 134 seq. In the first place they supposed purely absolute Being, relationless and devoid of attributes, as God. This view offers to the perceptive activity of the other no point of union: notwithstanding they attribute to every man, in addition to his being designed to perceive truth, also the possession of a germ of relationship to God. Doubtless, viewed in his sentient, passive development (φύσει, *Book of Wisdom* xiii. 1.) or as a heathen, man

does not attain unto a knowledge of God, but is, in an emphatic sense, μάταιος. Instead of wisdom, there is ἀγνοσιὰ Θεοῦ, with and by him. Thus consciousness of God is perverted into a veneration for the creature, or, what is still worse, adoration of the work of man's own hand. He could and ought even φυσεῖ attain to a knowledge of the Creator, that is, from rational inference drawn from the works, he might have acquired a knowledge of the Great Architect, (Sap. xiii. 4, 9). For, since *being* has disclosed itself in the world to existence, or as the logos (sophia) is destined to be the mediating cause of all things, so does everything clearly attest and confess His existence. Natural reason left to itself is only capable of knowing that God is, through a contemplation of His works, προσχόντες ἔργοις, ib. v. 1; but εἰδέναι τὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῶν ὀρωμένων ἀγαθῶν it is incapable of, since no comparison can be drawn between created beauty and good and the ὄν. It is only by abstracting man's whole spiritual life out of the sphere of sense and humanity, which process is excited and assisted by the attractive powers of the Divine Logos (as they disperse themselves through the world, and here and there become concentrated)—it is only by such a process that man, as a God-related spirit, is capable of being gradually raised to a higher knowledge, and to an intellectual contemplation of God; the first degree of which has been traced out through Abraham to Joseph, and the loftiest indicated by Moses. Of the absolute idea, from this point of view, our knowledge is as imperfect as our language is inadequate; not, indeed, because the elements of the logical perfection of our knowledge of God are inseparable from those which are ethical. In general, the identity of subject-object is nowhere assumed. Moses himself continues in humanity and perfectibility. And what Sirach affirms (xl. 27, 33,) of the inaccessibility and inscrutable nature of the Divine fulness and majesty, is not opposed to the doctrine of Philo.

The subject has, in general, been similarly treated by Christians. Those who, either entirely or in part, deny not only the comprehensibility of God, and the capability of his being contemplated, but even of his being recognised, frequently only do so for the honour of faith; but because they, in the first place, ascribe unto faith merely the certainty of God's existence, it by no means follows that they would be altogether contented with bare *existence* or *being*; on the contrary, it has ever been the Gnostics, the latest academicians, and such

like, who have placed a mere empty *ὄν*, or some absolutely nameless thing at the head of *Entities*. Now, since the latter have expanded this predicateless entity up to relations, those who maintain the doctrine of an immediate knowledge, or believers, by no means deserve the censure so often bestowed upon them, as if they desired to know nothing of God. We have already become acquainted with a doctrine “of immediate self-consciousness,” to which the censure of the speculative schools might be applicable, p. 17, but this hitherto stands quite alone. Comprehensibility rests upon the incomprehensible, thought upon being, knowledge upon belief and experience. And in this Absolutes can only change a pretended something. If Clemens of Alex. *Strom.* vi. 275, 276, and the *Constit. Apostol.* 6. 11. appear to maintain the perfect comprehensibility of God and of Divine things: they do so, not in the mode of an eunomy, but only in such a way, that thereby the perfect knowledge of God in Jesus, including the entire novelty and sufficiency of his doctrine, shall be acknowledged, e. g. v. 248, “God is only by virtue of revelation in Christ *διδασκός* and *ῥήτορ*.” Clemens may thus be harmonized with numerous later writers on the proportional incomprehensibility of God, and his incapability of being known, for example, with John of Damascus, l. i., *Κατὰ τὸ ἐφικτὸν ἡμῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐφανερώσει γινῶσιν*—and 2, *οὔτε μὴν παντα ἄγνωστα, οὔτε πάντα γνωστά*. It is a frivolous objection wont to be raised in these days against the incomprehensibility of God, namely, that revelation has revealed nothing, or has not revealed at all, if it have left what is mysterious, inexpressible, or unfathomable, unexplained. On the contrary, we begin only now to live and move in mystery, because there is a revelation, just as we only then become enlightened when we are conscious of our ignorance! In the biblical idea of Revelation there is nothing to justify an eunomian position. Revelation conducts to a new region of knowledge and experience of God, which, as regards the actual state of mankind, is the highest and most complete; but so far is it from removing the general limitations to human knowledge, that it rather effects a blessed consciousness of their future removal, and produces a not less blessed consciousness of the incomprehensible fulness of the being and becoming in which we already stand in our life and nature. Alas! for Revelation, as if it were nothing more than a logical triumph of opinions and truth as hitherto prevalent, or, as it were, a clearing away of

some existing superstition! Revelation, which is not simply a universal but rather a special one of fact—a redemptive revelation undoubtedly effects a concrete perception of God, i. e. a perception which, compared with an abstract or mere logical one, is absolute, but which nevertheless is free and blissful, not through a comprehensive knowledge, but by love in faith, and through faith up to vision. Human perception is absolute only in the purity of its tendency and in the truth of its foundation, as a perception proceeding out of God, and tending towards Him; but it is not so in the resolution of a theological process, nor is it to be considered as the identity of the Divine and human. A negation of knowledge is not happiness, but it is a knowledge concerning the power of susceptibility and the fulness of what is communicable, it is the knowledge of the connexion between what is known and the unknown,—being, feeling, and life. Every true human idea is a new reversion of a greater and richer possession. Hence it is incumbent on us to receive in all their fulness those passages which relate to the completeness or incompleteness of Christian perception, such as, John xvi. 13; 1 Cor. ii. 11; viii. 1–3; xiii. 12; Eph. iii. 18, 19; Rom. xi. 36. It is a genuine and profound theological truth which is enunciated by the simple son of Sirach in these words, (xliiii. 31), *πολλὰ ἀπόκρυφα ἔστι μείζονα τούτων, ὀλίγα γὰρ ἐωράκαμεν τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ.*

REMARK 3. The first question in theological science—the existence of God, is also in this sense a question of life, inasmuch as it presupposes the life of the conception—God. For we do not inquire because we have no conception, but because we have. The prevailing opinion of antiquity, that it is as objectionable to desire to prove the existence of God as to deny it, is one-sided. It is said, that to commence knowledge with doubt or negation is inadmissible. In that case they at once abolish science, in its relation to what is already admitted. Faith itself, according to Heb. xi. 1, is an “evidence” and “substance,” and so far emanates from a negation in knowledge, for God is neither visible nor comprehensible; and the faith which is necessary to please God is *πιστεύειν, ὅτι ἔστι*, Heb. xi. 6. How much more ought the science of God commence with this question! The opportunities seized by science for proving God cosmologically and physico-theologically, &c., resemble those referred to when discussing testamentary religion. The physical philosophers maintained the substance without Godhead, and now

commenced the Socratic school. Belief in Jehovah rejected idols and the gods of nature as false gods, as nullities, and accused the heathen heart of being guilty of atheism. Neither the one nor the other can be carried out unless faith accompany its proof up to general human experience and knowledge. Hence, Scripture preserves the analogue of the ætiological evidence (Rom. i. 20; compare Book of Wisdom xiii. as well as that of the teleological, Ps. xix., Ps. viii., Acts xiv. 17; of the practical, Rom. ii. 14; and of the ontological, Rom. i. 19, 32, Acts xvii. 24.) The proof which is peculiar to Christianity, independent and historical, is not indeed, as some designate it, miracle, but the accomplishment of the passage in Isaiah xl. 9, "Behold your God!" it is revelation in an *eminent* sense; the existence of God in Christ (John xiv. 9)—Christ. The contingent restraints of faith in God display themselves in a mode different from that under which science can exhibit them. The ordinary proofs are so far perfectly valid and true, as they are united with the evidence of the spirit or consciousness, or are regarded as the dissimilar causes of the latter. The ontological proof is the first and last. The proof of God's being is not syllogistic, but is the development of the consciousness of what is real. In our consciousness of reality, consists the knowledge of the original existence of the exact arresting point. See Suabedissen's *Sketches of Metaphysics*, Marb. 1836, p. 143. More recent criticisms and amplifications in the Appendix to Hegel's *Rel. Philos.* in Daub's *Lectures on Dogma*, and Phil. Fischer's *Examination of Strauss' Doctrine of Faith*, part 1.—As in the present day, God, for the most part, is denied in His eternal personality, because personality and individuality, being often co-ordinated in the grossest manner, cannot be endured in their absolute being. Thus the teleological proof again preserves its entire importance; for the latter does not assume God's existence without conceiving Him to be self-conscious and omniscient. Fichte *d. J.* in *der Zeitschr. f. Philos. u. Specul. Teol.* N. F. v. i. p. 2, "A reciprocal relation between the end and the means cannot exist apart from a consciousness imagining and realising this relation. Now, such relation to an end is universally found in the actual world; thus, the absolute in the realisation of the world must be an absolute that imagines the world and consciously penetrates it." Compare Trendelenburg, *Logical Disquisitions*, towards the end.

§ 61. DIVINE ESSENCE.

God is the infinite and personal Being of the good, by and for whom the finite hath existence and consciousness; and it is precisely this threefold definition—God is Spirit, is Love, is Lord—this infinite personal good, which answers to the most simple truths of Christianity.

REMARK 1. The conceivable expression of the Divine essence cannot be apprehended in a higher universal, for there is none. In as much as it can only be said, God is God, as occurs so many times in Holy Scripture, Isaiah xliii. 13; Exod. iii. 14. Neither is there any definition of God capable of giving an explanatory idea. But a knowledge of what is distinct and defined in the being of God's diversity is found immediately in our consciousness of God. The Divine Being is defined as he who destitutes all. Absolute kinds are to define and conditionate other being, but only that which is purely good and purely free. There cannot be higher and more equally worthy ἀρχαί of the Infinite Being than these, consequently they are the simplest elements in the conception of Deity, and in them the idea of the Divine essence is included. What is to be understood by the use of the word "infinite" is known.

REMARK 2. Instead of the expression, "God is love," we could not substitute the one of St John (1 John i. 5), "God is light," however possible it were to discover therein an intimate connexion between the intellectual and ethical ἀρχή, or—perhaps only the ethical? Meanwhile, light, as a cosmical and physical expression, so to speak, is subordinated to the anthropomorphic one, and cannot be co-ordinate with Spirit and Lord, as love is. Light, life, truth, are rather such ὀνόματα, as are related to the Logos as such. See John i. 4, viii. 12, xi. 25, xiv. 6. Assuredly Oetinger's definition, "vita absoluta," might be considered the most appropriate, if the attributes of the Deity could be immediately developed out of the idea of the Divine essence.

§ 62. GOD IS SPIRIT.

God is not a spirit, but Spirit; Joh. iv. 24, in other words, Perfect Life. He possesses the perfection of Being; whence,

in part, he is distinguished from putative gods, as being the Living and the True, and in part from other forms of actual life and being, as the one who alone hath immortality, 1 Tim. vi. 16, and who is the creator and annihilator of all things.

REMARK. Spirit, in the passage quoted, expresses absolute illimitableness, or the being simply perfect in its kind; although, primarily, according to its connexion, limitation in space only appears to be denied. See Oetinger, p. 53: *Deus enim dicitur vivus non tantum in oppositione ad idola, sed etiam in se, quoniam Spiritus Dei est in actu continuo.* The same holds with the name Jehovah, and Jabe of the Samaritans; for although both, according to Exodus iii. 13—16, compare Isaiah xliii. 13, xliv. 4, 6, Rev. i. 4, signify in the first place the immutability of being, and at the same time of will, still the etymology especially intimates the most absolute reality, the ὄντως ὄν, or the ἔστως according to the Platonico-gnostic notion. It does not occur here arbitrarily for the first time that the biblical idea of absolute being is considered analogous to the philosophical one of absolute essence. Is it possible that the true, real God shall have no relation to thoughts, and that idea and science shall have no susceptibility for Him? For an answer on this point see J. T. Beck's *Christl. Lehrwissenschaft*, sect. 1, p. 66. Hence we do not run after strange gods by tracking Deity in the history of nature or thought. John of Damascus says, *κρηϊώτερον* of every thing asserted of God in Scripture is ὁ ὢν. In the same direction, theologically considered, it may be said, that God is Being, or being Being, or beyond Being, above Being, but never non-being.

§ 63. GOD IS LOVE.

God is love, 1 John iv. 8, 16. The perfect one, Matt. v. 48. The absolutely good, and the only good being, Luke xviii. 19. The Father, the heavenly Father (compare Deut. xxxii. 6; Isaiah lxiii. 16; Jer. xxxi. 9). So that nothing can pertain to His attributes or works, which may not also be deduced from love. The very fact even of his performing works, that he creates worlds and consciousness in existence, is not

founded on infinity as such, but on the love of the infinite personal Being. For creation, revelation, self-communication, and communion, are grounded on love as the final cause of finite existence.

REMARK 1. It is mere assertion, that fatherhood, filiation, and brotherhood are unrevealed in the Old Covenant; the truth is, they are revealed, but only in a limited and mediate manner. It is an equally vague assertion to affirm, that the God of the New Testament is not an indignant God, full of majesty and power, and that Christians ceased in every sense to be servants; for by virtue of truth, which is in love, and by righteousness proceeding from it, all things even in the New Covenant retain their respective places.

REMARK 2. The thought of the absolute, for finite consciousness, has only thereby a permanent necessity, because it is and in so far as it is the thought of absolute good; and this harmonizes with our knowing and maintaining that absolute being, only as such, would not be either creative, revealing, or the Father of spirits (Hebrews xii. 9.) Thus even Plato and Philo conceive Being (in so far as it is the effective and creative, entering without envy into communion with non-being), as *τάγαθόν*.

§ 64. GOD IS LORD.

Seeing that God is Father and Lord,¹ so through each appellation of the divine nature, peculiar to revelation, we have a testimony that God is personal. There appertains to the personality of God not only his thought and will, differing from the thought and will of the visible creature, but also such a mode of the same as that through them only the entire personality of created beings, and all communion between them as well as between Him and his church, are fully granted and conditioned.

¹ Even in heathenism the gods of the first rank were revered as lords. The names, Baal, Moloch, Adonis, are equivalent to the title lord, as applied to the proper name of the Godhead.

With reference to others, such as ἀναξ, ἀνασσα, Βασιλεὺς, Κύριος, &c., they are general titles applied to the superior gods. See κύριοι πολλοί, 1 Cor. viii. 5, where we are not to imagine human but divine lords as understood. The idea of אֱלֹהִים and אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל opposes the personality of God to the individuality of many lords; and strengthens on the other hand the views of relationship, peculiar fellowship, and theocracy. Wherever God and Lord, θεὸς καὶ κύριος, as in 1 Cor. viii. 6, Elohim and Jehovah are connected or stand in contrast, the first expresses rather the causality of the world; and the other, rather the countenance as turned towards human society, towards the people and the church, as founding a communion; or, the former express rather the God of nature; the latter, the God of revelation. Oetinger correctly remarks: Jehova ad manifestationem Dei per foedus in Jesu Christo, uno verbo ad vitam Dei spiritualem: Elohim ad manifestationem ejus per opera naturæ s. ad vitam Dei naturalem refertur. Quamvis enim naturalis vita in Deo simul sit spiritualis indivisim, tamen per nomina diversa innuitur manifestatio unius vitæ præ alia. Deus est—omnium RERUM Elohim, omnium ACTIONUM Jehova. With less accuracy does Philo refer θεὸς to the creating and sustaining, κύριος to the governing, judging, and punishing δύναμις. With reference to the modern speculative school here and there teaching that personality is an element of the idea: absolute spirit, is God; is correctly expressed; only it must not be understood, as is frequently the case, that God completes this element of his idea only through his being individualized in finite spirit and yet is impersonal.

§ 65. ATTRIBUTES.

Man is not destined to possess the consciousness of this veritable God, who is love, in its absolute unity and just proportion; consciousness, in this pure relation to itself, must either become more foreign to man, or else, an abyss of speculation and longing. Man is destined, however, to realize this consciousness in all the vicissitudes of the conditions and circumstances which surround him, and in the entire succession of his experience and contemplations. In doing this, he conceives the Divine per-

fections under the mode of attributes. He becomes conscious of the perishable nature and limited extent of his existence; or he contemplates, sometimes the main object, sometimes that which is opposed to it, in the occurrences within his own immediate circle; or he feels the guilt or participation in the guilt of sin; he sees how evil overtakes the unrighteous, or, on the contrary, how much the righteous are doomed to suffer. By realizing one and the same idea concerning the essential nature and personality of true love, in every such condition, he acquires manifold representations of God, all of which can only be true and pure in proportion as they contain and presuppose the indivisible essence of Deity, and which, again, being regulated and mutually suited by reflection, furnish the proof of his united representation; precisely as the life of his piety and his faith manifests itself in the fulness of the reflections and dispositions, fundamental to the representations referred to.

REMARK 1. If this be the vital originating point in our ideas of the attributes of God, it follows that the doctrine of the Divine attributes is necessary, and is not exempted, but only prepared by the doctrine of the divine essence. Many object, that there is still another, or rather, only this origination of the notions of attributes, which exists by means of a continual speculative contemplation of the idea of God, and in a gradual development of the idea of the Divine nature; and indeed, this mode of procedure has always been pursued; consequently, there arise out of this view, many more conceptions of the attributes of God, than we allow are to be found expressed in Scripture, or are practically required; nay, there occurs even an indefinite number of such, whose firm position and limits, with the subordination of the individual to the universal, have never in any way, not even in the Scholastic period, been able to succeed. Still further, in accordance with this procedure, the doctrine of Essence, in its fundamental principle, is destroyed as an independent one; for after the existence of God is supposed or proved, the simplest and first definition is entered upon, that is—His being—and the so-called *ASEITAS*, as an idea of attribute, is already attained. With this are combined *infinitas*, *necessitas*, *simplicitas*, *spiritualitas*, *immaterialitas*, &c., in one way or another. Now, with re-

gard to the former, an illusion exists, in believing that the idea of Essence can be evaded, for the idea of existence presupposes the entire being at least as imagined. It is equally erroneous if the idea of the absolute is conceived to be secured in proportion, as more of its elements are traced out. Precisely the reverse is the case, since we derive this idea solely from self-consciousness, and not by means of experience, and we do not perfect it as an idea, but must and ought in this case, fill up the deficiency of the intelligible cognition, by feeling and contemplation.

Moreover, it is certain that there is one form of active conception, by which the essential reality of God-consciousness may be said to be separated from every other, and from the essential and identical reality of self and world-consciousness, and be comprehended in itself; and there is another form which is designed to determinate the relation of God to the finite, and as such to the mutable. In the first case, the doctrine of the Divine essence; in the second, that of the Attributes, (by means of both the doctrine of the determinations,—the works of God), is constructed. Hence, it follows, that for the former, again, a vital originating point of the idea, the immediate one is to be discovered, even if the absolute essence shall no longer be considered, but the attributes, and that definitions of the attributes must be abstained from, when the question turns on absolute essence. Thus, the pure ontological idea does not affirm God is πνευματικός, but πνεῦμα. Every adjectival definition does not in this place promote perception, but rather impedes and restrains it. Indeed both these doctrines of God, the ontological and axiomatic, are not unrelated to each other, and devoid of mutual dependence; for who and what God is, is discoverable in every proof of His existence, and every element in an idea of the Divine essence, is a connecting link in the doctrine of attributes. Yet in such mode, that, in the collective conclusion, each element in connexion with the rest embodies the confirmation of an idea peculiar to attributes, and does so in such a way, that Divine wisdom, omnipotence, and goodness, and what they are, can only be understood, upon the hypothesis of other attributes, and thus upon that of the Divine essence.

REMARK 2. The preceding deduction of the doctrine of attributes has been accused of partial subjectivity, or of limiting the attributes of God to his relation to the world. See Steudel

Tüb. Zeitschr. f. Theol. 1830, 4. P. 28. But inasmuch as it is included in the independent doctrine of the Divine essence, it possesses complete objectivity. In every conception of an attribute, the Divine essence is in some mode or other, as conscious and revealed, already supposed. Whoever constructs a dogma, which does not assert what God is, or by which he is barely viewed in the light of Creator and Governor of the world, before he has been contemplated in his essence, will afterwards endeavour to recover (as it were), what has been neglected in the conceptions of his attributes, and thus ontologise in the wrong place. What is the idea of attribute, if it be not that of related essence? And where is the religious and vital necessity for the doctrine on divine attributes found, if it be not discoverable in the manifold elements of the consummation appertaining to the universal consciousness of God? In God himself, nothing assuredly is separable; nor will it be maintained, that the nature of God can be known or deduced from the nature of the creature. But the idea of God discovers itself only under the mode of an attribute, on occasions when the emotions and changes in our consciousness of self and the world occur. I do not assert that a countless multitude of things constitutes God as omniscient, or proves Divine omniscience, but I become conscious of God as the omniscient, when I religiously apprehend the representation of what is concealed, what is innumerable, &c. This derivation of the idea of attributes is very convenient, because each purely scientific conception (in so far as it is religiously indifferent), only in this way admits of being distinguished from religious and theological ideas, and a definite province of the latter admits of being separated. Still the question might be raised, whether our doctrine of attributes, however much it may be considered in a religious point of view, does not recede from the definition as laid down by the word of God in the Holy Scripture. But this is not by any means the case. For we universally suppose a God, only in so far as he is cognisable, as a revealing God; we receive the attribute only as a special completion of the fundamental idea, which has already obtained a Christian definiteness. The process of the revelation of God, does not only include Divine operations, which renew a universal consciousness of the true God, and in this point of view, illumine the night of passive religion, but also such as call forth and confirm a consciousness of God, as especially viewed and con-

ceived under a mode of attributes; and in the same manner as we regulate the former by Scripture, so do we the latter also. Thus we are much less likely to neglect, change, add, or exchange those conceptions of God under the form of attributes, which are contained in holy writ.

§ 66. DISTINCTION OF ATTRIBUTES.¹

Every such perfect consummation of God-consciousness in any one especial element of self or world-consciousness, consists partly in a separation of the Divine from the created, and consequently in a much more secure relation of the former to the being and the state of the latter. But as the one or other predominates in every single complete idea of God, the attributes of Divine abstraction and relation, admit of being distinguished. But we dare not pause here withal; for since the Divine essence abstracts itself from the limits of time and space, since it denies itself to the evil; and again, almightily conditionates finite Being, and since, by communicating and operating it is connected with free existence or with consciousness, so great a distinction arises, that the attributes of the one or other kind become newly regulated according to a double distinction. Wherefore we distinguish, on the one hand, the limiting and the remote attributes, and on the other, those that are relational according to the different relations of God to the creature in general, and to the personal creature in particular; without thereby entirely depriving the one or other contrast of its intermediation.

¹ The following authors, in particular, have in modern times, laboured to perfect the doctrine of the Divine attributes, more especially with reference to its exclusive and exhausting arrangement. Tieftrunk (*Censur des Protestantischen Lehrbegriffs*, 2 Theil). Ammon, Bretschneider, Marheineke, Schleiermacher, Böhme, *die Lehre von den Göttlichen Eigenschaften*, &c., Altenb. 1821. Steudel (*Tüb. Zeitschrift*, 1830. 4. über *Eintheilung der in und an Gott zu denkenden Vollkommenheit*, Elwert, in the same work, *Versuch einer Deduction der göttlichen Eigenschaften*), Bruch and

Twisten. Each has attained peculiar results; not one of them does full justice to the distinction between the doctrine of the nature of God and that of his attributes. The following are some attempts, not so well known, on this subject. Fischer, in his *Introduction to Dogma*, p. 50, maintains that omnipotence is not a Divine attribute, but rather a characteristic of the Divine essence, and nothing else than infinity; the knowledge of God's wisdom, holiness and mercy, is first promulgated through revelation. But, in point of fact, even Divine omnipotence has first become known anew by means of revelation; and apart from the latter, the wisdom and holiness of God has just as perfectly or imperfectly entered into the consciousness, as has the attribute of omnipotence. How could it be otherwise, when the indivisibility of the object is considered? Apart from this, the whole doctrine of attributes is either annulled, or omnipotence remains a Divine attribute. In this view, it cannot be separated from omniscience and omnipresence. Nothing definite can be deduced from the proposition, "omnipotence is the fundamental characteristic of the Divine essence." Are there many such characteristics? or only this one? It is quite different if omnipotence be accounted an attribute, the modifications of which constitute the others—a doctrine which can only be adopted when all the other doctrines of Schleiermacher are admitted. Nevertheless Elwert's subtle essay closely accords with that of Fischer's. What is new and useful in this attempt, will be found in p. 12, where the attributes wisdom, justice, and goodness are represented as the destinations of omniscience, holiness, and blessedness, in which the absolute is related to the restored imperfection or irregularity of the finite. The entire doctrine of God is made much more significant and intelligible when Twisten, after he has rendered conspicuous the two leading elements, power and love, attends to the existing distinction in the relations of God; and when we assume Divine causality merely in itself to be absolute and exclusive, or at the same time, operative with the finite causes and powers, and through them. The power of God, accordingly, is omnipotence and omnipresence; love (applied to the opposite of happiness and morality, indicating goodness and holiness) is determinated, in reference to the spontaneity of finite being, as justice and grace. To this basis of Divine government, is added intelligence, *i. e.*, wisdom and omniscience.

REMARK. The idea of essence and attribute is mixed up with the doctrine of the ancients on the Divine name, (Dionys. Areop. John of Damascus.) For they adopted the *ἀνοματα* in the widest sense. A still greater confusion arises from determining the relationship of the Divine Persons to each other, as respects their attributes; when, for example, the definite term *ἀγεννητος*, as it pertains to the doctrine of essence, appears to conflict with it as it enters into the idea of the Trinity, a point which the Arians have taken advantage of. In the first place, the distinction between negative and affirmative attributes becomes always prominent, and even Petavius adheres to it exclusively, although the greatest number of the attributes denominated negative admit of being expressed positively, or are derived from the positive attributes. For attributes *via negationis*, δι' ἀφαιρέσεως, may be discovered and not expressed negatively. But if, instead of negation, the idea of illimitableness be assumed, as this, indeed, is indispensable, then neither the limiting attributes nor the elevating ones, (which are discovered *via eminentiæ*), for example, Omniscience, Goodness, will be opposed; or else the other distinction, (latterly in use) of the active and passive attributes, must be embraced, and from thence a transition made to those which have recently been the most relished, to the natural and the moral. In the last case it soon happens that the ancient adage, ἄνθρωπος μετρον παντων, is acted upon, and the human type, being and thought, feeling, thinking, and willing, are used for effecting an arrangement (of the attributes); as, for example, by Bretschneider, Hase, Hahn. The latter at least, has also made use of the element of feeling. In this manner all attributes are to be discovered *via eminentiæ*; for man, absolutely considered, is without sin, and as a pure personal being does not possess any thing, (except what is corporeal, temporal, and finite), which could absolutely be denied of God. But we say, except finiteness. And thus the *via negationis* cannot be entirely overlooked; consequently the human scheme is not altogether applicable. Moreover, they distinguish between attributes which are communicable [imitable withal] and incommunicable. Even this is impracticable. For if we become participant, according to 2 Peter i. 4, θείας φύσεως, the ethical attributes are incapable of exclusive communication. The latter also are not absolutely communicable. Thus the question may arise, whether the passive attributes are really in a state

of repose. The objection raised by Steudel to the attributes in and of God, or to the attributes of being and possession, is quite untenable. In point of fact, by this hypothesis, it is only the possessive attributes that can be considered the true ones, and, at the same time, the difficulty of conceiving a Divine attribute, or perfection, would be quite insurmountable if they were only in part found of and not in God. That the idea of passive or even natural attributes, reduced back into the doctrine of the Divine essence, is more clearly evidenced if they be designated rather transcendental, as by Tieftrunk, or by Bretschneider they are named universal. If this be done, which, however, appears at variance with the point of view in which the doctrine of attributes ought to be considered; then, I doubt whether it would not be more consistent to develop directly, as Gruner does, all the attributes of God from the conception of infinite spirit, or with Henke, to deduce them all from infinite goodness, or to treat the doctrine of attributes as the immediate continuation of that of the Divine essence, as done by Marheineke, who conceives the idea of the Divine Being in the true, eternal, and blessed God, and develops each of these members into attributes. "There are," (he says, *Grundlehren der Dogma*, 2d edition § 187) "in the doctrine of the Divine attributes three determinations of the *essential* nature, whose existence is absolute knowledge, and from whence all the Divine attributes follow, and which are distributed into such as are essentially the existing attributes of God as the true, the eternal, and the blessed." Whether and how this Trinity is derived from the unity of absolute knowledge, or recedes into it, is not distinctly asserted. A more extended analysis adopts definitions which we do not admit to be attributes, such as reality and personality. And again, there are others in which the trace of biblical representation almost disappears. Indeed the primary attributes, thus denoted, are not radiated fundamentally out of authentic Christian consciousness. For it is not to be mistaken, that by means of biblical revelation, omnipotence, wisdom, and justice, (considered at the same time as goodness, truth, and grace) encompassed by glory or holiness, are much more obtrusive than blessedness, or even eternity. Truth, (*ἀληθινός*) like life, is an essential or general definition of being. Passages referring to the whole doctrine in question are to be met with in the reflections on nature and history for example, in the book of Job xii. 13–16, where wisdom and strength

stand forth in all their splendour; or in the solemn invocations of Jehovah, 1 Chron. xxix. Dan. ii. 20–22, wherein power and wisdom are exalted. Other passages there are where a particular and exclusive holiness, endless duration, omnipresence, and omniscience are separately and more exclusively praised, and many in which justice and truth, goodness and truth, grace, mercy, and long-suffering are especially extolled, Isaiah vi., Ps. xc. cxxxix., &c. Exceeding all in majesty, and seceding from the creature towards the full causality of the universe of nature and history, are the following passages in 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 15–16, and the doxologies of the Apocalypse. Doubtless, the systematic reflection of later Judaism on the attributes of God, constitutes the basis of the latter. The most ancient examples of such a system are found in the writings of the Judaical Aetiologists, who, into their doctrine of second causes interwove that of the attributes, partly according to a logical, and partly according to physical philosophy. *The Thirty-two Ways of Wisdom*, together with the book *רציוה* edited by Meyer, Leips. 1830, may be adduced as a cabalistic example; and in the *Book of Wisdom*, vii. 22, 23, we find an Alexandrian one; only this latter example, which comprehends, under the form of attributes, twenty-one definitions of the spirit existing in wisdom, is not incapable of explanation. These definitions are as follows: “An understanding spirit, holy, one only, manifold, subtle, lively, clear, undefiled, plain, not subject to hurt, good, quick, cannot be letted, ready to do good, kind to man, steadfast, sure, free from care, having all power, overseeing all things, and going through all understanding, pure, and most subtle spirits.”

Their number is more easily explained than their position and arrangement, which, however, may not have been groundless or without an object. On this subject we refer to Meyer's preface to *Kabbal. Weltbildungsbuche* on the numbers twenty-one and twenty-two. These notions all admit of explanation by the aid of the Alexandrian aetiological doctrines. The question principally turns on the essential second cause of the world, which is not only represented as thought (*σοφία*), but in the thinking being constitutes the operative, formative, sustaining original life of the world, as well as the spirit of wisdom, which wisdom is active. God, wisdom, spirit of wisdom, are not definitions of attributes, but are essential determinations of the Divine existence in reference to the causality of the world; the former

can only flow out of the latter. In the first place, the Divine element, pervading the inner world, in relation to being, is simple and yet manifold; it exists in every essence, and yet in the manifoldness of finite forms, all of which contain a spiritual reality, it is manifold. It is, moreover, a thinking element absolutely clear and distinct, and, in addition, omniscient and directive (νοερόν, τράνον, σαφές, πανεπισκοπον) such as is proportioned to a true causation of the world. With this causation evil is unconnected. The spirit of wisdom, which permeates all things, is good, benevolent, philanthropic. The simple spirit, proceeding only from love, enters into the finite and the material, in order to divide acutely (ὀξύ), and in part to regulate; and this spirit is absolutely immaterial, λεπτόν, yet penetrating all other essences, even the purest, and is absolutely flexible and active; and thus it acts upon materialism, which without hindrance (ἀκώλυτον) and all-powerfully (παντοδύναμον) it elaborates and controls. But it is not related to this sensuous in the same way as the human spirit is, in as much as it appropriates the sensuous, partly as sensuous inclination, and partly as disinclination; it is rather absolutely holy (ἅγιον), passionless (ἀπήμαντον); and not only so (in so far it rules over sensuous existence) but it remains stainless (ἀμόλυντον), and also free from anxiety, secure and firm (ἀμέριμνον, βέβαιον, ἀσφαλές.) In many respects this instructive portion of the *Book of Wisdom* reminds us of various definitions of the good regarded as attributes which have been ascribed by Clem. Alex. (*Protr.* 6, 72), to Cleanthes, although they appear merely to embody an abstract of some passage or fragment of his remains. This Stoic, (whose school especially delighted in exhibiting the δημιουργὸν τῶν ὄλων πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, for the purpose of explaining polytheism, *Diog.* l. vii. 147), is said to have arranged together the following attributes: τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὄσιον, εὐσεβές, κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ (compare *Book of Wisdom* xii. 18), χρήσιμον, καλόν, δεόν(?) αὐστηρόν, αὐδεκαστον, (ἀπλοῦν?), αἰεὶ συμφερον, ἄφοβον, ἄλυπον, λυσιτελές, ἀνώδυνον, ὠφελιμον, εὐάρεστον, ἀσφαλές, φίλον, ἔυτιμον, ὁμολογούμενον, εὐκλεές, ἄτυφον, ἐπιμελές, πρᾶον, σφόδρον, χρονιζόμενον, ἀμεμπτον, αἰεὶ διαμένον. Alexandrian judaism has confessedly employed largely the doctrines of Cleanthes and Chrysippus in physics and ethics. Doubtless, those passages in the *Book of Wisdom* referred to, may be almost entirely and exclusively made use of for aetiological doctrine, and they even betray a wavering between an evolution of pantheism and dualism,

like so many other systems of that kind. Although the determination *χωροῦν διὰ πάντων πνευματων νοερῶν* appears again to annul Pantheism, and to accord to finite Spirit only what is inherent in the infinite, and thus completely to separate the identity, yet it is evident that these two leading tendencies of the doctrine of God contained in the Old Testament, form the groundwork of this system, albeit apocryphal: the one tending to spiritualize, in the highest degree, the idea of God, and to exempt it from the conditions belonging to the circle of human experience and conceptions; the other operating by bringing the Divine existence as livingly and closely as possible to man's cognition and contemplation. The intimate connection between both tendencies produces in Holy Scripture other manifestations; those, for example, of angels and the self-mediations of the Divine nature,—and it also has its sequence in respect to the doctrine of attributes, namely, by withdrawing, in the first place, God, in *His* relation to the creature, into the absolute, and separating Him from all created existence, action, and passion; and in the second place, by bringing Him to the most perfect existence and efficiency for the creature, and for himself in the creature; which twofold division again affects partly the universal finite, and partly the personal finite; and thus, in the doctrine of attributes, we are justified in using in this manner the two elements which are at all times prominent, namely, “illimitableness” and “causality.”

On the other hand, Elwert, in his work referred to, p. 5, reminds us that a middle term is wanting, which, as the ground of arrangement, ought to appear in both kinds of ablation and relation, or in what is illimitable and causative. The middle term is this,—the consummation of the absolutely identical God-consciousness in the elements of self and world-consciousness. And since the emotion which extends to this consummation does not lie in the contingent will of the subject, but proceeds from Divine life, nature, and word, it cannot consequently be said that this doctrine refers to subjectivity. Because God is and so is, He produces this emotion, and appears to the conscience from these and no other aspects, and in these and no other attributes.

Pantheistic dogma continues to deny in an intelligible manner the Personality of the Absolute Being, as well as the doctrine of attributes. The real contents of the latter it denominates the laws of the world. This content cannot be determinated; for

what can be termed absolute in absolute wisdom, goodness, justice, &c., if it be not self-conscious, or is only collected out of the mass and totality of finite self-consciousness.

§ 67. ABSTRACTION OF GOD FROM FINITE EXISTENCE.

A consciousness of the absolute being of God is fundamental to every complete act of consciousness of God whether distinct or under a mode of his attributes. Every representation of revealed Godhead commences with the illimitable distance of God from finite existence. Now, as the finite in general relates to time and space, it follows that God is to be considered as eternal, before all time and space, in which eternity, his immensity at the same time becomes conceivable. But finiteness is as little without God as above God; it is through and for Him. The succession and extension of existence as a natural infinity, is no more than nature a self-sustaining power, which, in such a case, would be approximated to God, or arrayed against him. But God is the eternal author of being as well as of time and space; consequently, the eternity of God can only be imagined in unity with his omnipresent and omniscient omnipotence;¹ just as holiness, righteousness, and wisdom can only be comprehended in unity with the immutability and eternity of God; and thus from the very beginning it is at once apparent that every Divine attribute is necessarily a conception of the idea of God.

¹ Romans i. 20, ἀόδιος δύναμις καὶ θειοτης.

§ 68. ETERNITY.

If we reach to a consciousness of God in the manifestations and sensations of that which is transitory, then is He before all and absolute in duration (Ps. xc. 2), as long as we continue in the representative mode of comparison and contrast. God outlives every world or age (Ps. cii. 12, 25, 28), is incorruptible, Rom.

i. 23, and “only hath immortality,” 1 Tim. vi. 16. But His life in and with time has no resemblance to that of the creature; for a thousand years are with him as one day, Ps. xc. 4; 2 Peter iii. 8. The present, as well as the negation of the past and future, constitute his existence. Thus, God is everlasting *αἰωνιος*,¹ Rom. xvi. 26; Gen. xxi. 33; that is to say, He is not only exempted from the succession of time, and from the temporal limits of being, but is also the efficient cause of time and of temporal things.²

¹ According to the more accurate language of the Alexandrian school, as adopted, for example, by a Philo or a Clemens, *αἰωνιος* may rather be considered as the opposite of *αἰδιος*. For according to Philo, what is asserted of God in the language and conceptions of this lower world is, *αἰώνιον ὄνομα*. In the Book of Wisdom xiii. 9, *αἰων* is finite existence in general contrasted with God; according to the fundamental idea, it is that infinity of the finite belonging to Deity, viewed as the uninterrupted being, and distinguished from whatever hath been. In this infinity the idea of eternity is involved; and, in like manner, *αἰωνιος* in the passages referred to, and in Baruch iv. 10, 14, 20, is really *αἰδιος*.

Immutability, Book of Wisdom vii. 27, is paraphrased *μένουσα ἐν αὐτῇ παντα κἀννιζει* Augustin. *Conf.* i. 4, *stabilis—immutabilis mutans omnia, nunquam novus nunquam vetus, innovans omnia*. The Divine habitation, Isaiah lvii. 15, 1 Tim. vi. 16, does not authorize the assumption of a *coæternum Deo*.

² *Operator temporum* Augustin. *Confess.* 11, 13. Compare Schleiermacher, *G. L.* i. § 67. “The eternity of God is only to be conceived as almighty eternity, that is, as that which in God conditionates together with all that is temporal, also time itself.” —*Βασιλευς τῶν αἰώνων*, 1 Tim. i. 17. Compare Tobit xiii. 6, 10, if this do not rather signify the eternal ruler or even Lord of the world. In no other mode, except through the operation of time, and through the revelation of his nature in time, can He participate in succession, however readily, in modern times God in history may have been regarded as a finite God. Compare K. Wilh. Theod. Voigt, *on Freedom and Necessity, as viewed from the standing point of a Christian and Theistic World*. Leipz. 1828, § 31, 32.

§ 69. SPACELESS.

Before we rejoice in any special approach and presence of God, as for example in his presence in the house of prayer, we not only maintain, together with his incorporeality and spirituality (John iv. 24; Acts xvii. 24; Isaiah lxvi. 1; Jer. xxxiii. 24), his ubiquity, but also that the entire heaven of heavens cannot contain him, and that he alone remains the almighty cause of all space,¹ 1 Kings viii. 27.

¹ Schleiermacher *Glaubenslehre*, i. p. 280. "God's omnipresence is only to be conceived as being almighty presence, namely, as that power which, through God, conditionates all that exists in space, and even space itself."

§ 70. RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD.

God is omnipresent, almighty, and omniscient.

REMARK 1. Although the syllable "all," and the idea embodied in it, appears to include the relation of the Divine life and action to the totality of things, still we stand in need of vivid conceptions corresponding to these attributes, on occasions when we claim for an individual creation the perfection of Deity, which conditionates the universe; *i. e.* in actual religious life the question turns rather on His actuating and knowing particulars, in the same manner as He does the universal, than on the absolute self-existing infinity of His power, knowledge, and existence. Hence the words παντοδύναμος, παντεπόπτης κ. λ. have been principally formed in a latter and reflective period.

REMARK 2. The knowledge of all these attributes, which more especially refer to the illimitable or causative relation of God to the creature, corresponds to the cosmological proof of the existence of God. Whilst in this way we know that God is, we at the same time know that he *so* is.

§ 71. OMNIPRESENCE.

Withdrawn into our limited condition in space, and especially in our state of isolation and abandonment, the infinite and invisible God, who is timeless and spaceless, can no more be escaped from than He can be removed by us (Ps. cxxxix. 7; Acts xvii. 27).¹ And just as a life of piety consists in a steady walk before Him (Gen. xvii. 1), so is He also especially nigh unto them who thus walk (Isaiah xliii. 2; lvii. 15; James iv. 8).

¹ The representations of Deity as the being who fills, penetrates, extends, and exists in all and through all (Eph. iv. 6; Book of Wisdom, i. 7; vii. 23; viii. 1.), are merely preparative for speculative thoughts on the omnipresence of God. The idea of His omnipresence admits of being supported before assuming His participation in materiality and locality; first, by the argument that His omnipresence may be regarded in unity with omniscience and omnipotence, as, for example, in the Book of Wisdom i. 7; viii. 1, whence the spirituality of the former, and the dynamic kind of all-being is a natural consequence; and, secondly, that the boundless (*ὑπὲρ πάντων*) or infinite being is already assumed by the previous definitions.

REMARK 1. Together with power in heaven and on earth, the Saviour is invested with authority to promise and vouchsafe to his own His proximity, Matt. xxviii. 20. The consciousness of his intimate presence, in reference to the Christian conflict with sin, death, and the world, stands pre-eminently forward.

REMARK 2. The omnipresence of God must assume the first rank among these three relative attributes, in order that, in the train of His infinity or spacelessness, the connexion with the ablative attributes, and their distinction from the relative ones, may be more clearly indicated.

§ 72. OMNIPOTENCE.

In relation to the Ever-Enduring, in so far as He impresses our freedom, we supplicate the God who doeth wonders, Ps. lxxvii. 14, xcviii. 1; Matt. viii. 2; Ephes. iii. 20; or the

God before whom “there is nothing too hard,” Gen. xviii. 14; Zech. viii. 6; with whom nothing is impossible, Luke i. 37; Matt. iii. 9, xix. 26; for God can create a new thing, Jer. xxxi. 22; Num. xvi. 30; and as He has made all things and upholds them by the word and power of His will, Gen. i. 3; Ps. cxv. 3, cxxxv. 6; Rom. iv. 17; Heb. i. 3; neither reality nor possibility, but only his will constitutes the measure of his power.¹ The idea of Omnipotence arises from the repeated and especial application of the conception we realize of the Creator of heaven and earth.

¹ *Sap. Sal.*, xii. 18, *πάρεστι γὰρ σοι ὅταν θέλῃς τὸ δυνασθα*. A power transcending the will, which, at the same time, presumes a distinction between ability and inclination, consequently supposes also a will which exceeds power, and therefore an imperfection. The will of God is almighty as the will of absolute wise love. To be absolutely infinite in power through goodness—*δεσπόζειν ἰσχύος*, *B. Wisdom*, xii. 18, is true power. But each attribute of God conveys the idea of God so clearly, that not only Omnipotence is the basis of the infinite wisdom and love of God, but is even the “beginning” of divine righteousness and goodness, according to the expressive remark in the *Book of Wisdom*, xii. 16, *ἡ γὰρ ἰσχύς σου δικαιοσύνης ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ παντῶν σε δεσπόζειν παντῶν φειδεσθαι ποιεῖ*. On the other hand, Divine power, considered in reference to possibility or reality, has been represented, at least literally, under a double form of erroneous modification. By Abelard, *Introductio*, 3, 5, it is asserted, *Deus non potest facere aliquid præter ea quæ facit*; and Origen remarks, according to Justinian, *πεπερασμένη γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ λεκτέον εἰάν γὰρ ἡ ἀπειρος ἡ θεῖα δύναμις, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μηδὲ εἰαυτὴν νοεῖν*. But the real weight of these expressions is commonly wont to be unjustly estimated. Origen is far from denying or diminishing the power of the Deity. He observes the philosophic language peculiar to the period as used by the Pythagoreans and Platonists, in harmony with which the illimitable is represented as something quite distinct from the absolute. The illimitable is the indeterminate, *τὸ ἀορίστον*, an attribute that does not quite reach perfect being. The opposite of limitation and that which is illimitable does not concern the Grecian, and consequently does not touch the question of the absolute; and correctly

this is so maintained by them. It is altogether a distinct thing to maintain the limitations of God, and the determinations of the absolute. God as absolute power, is a determinated, that is to say, an intelligent, wise, and absolutely a personal power. Origen does not intend to assert anything essentially contrary to this, and Justinian, therefore, has no grounds for charging him with heresy. Abelard, in the first place, only asserts that God can never act out of proportion with himself, *quod ei convenit*. But he afterwards maintains, and Schleiermacher concurs with him, that God can only effect the actual, or what He thinks must also be His act; and if this be his meaning, that the sum total of phenomena exhausts the conception of the Divine mind, and that finite existence is an adequate exponent of the infinite, in that case the position is untenable.

§ 73. OMNISCIENCE.

As the Almighty is present to things, so are they present to him. God is omniscient. For in reference to the multiplicity of things (Ps. cxxxix. 16, compare v. 4; Ps. cxlvii. 4) surpassing all the thoughts and experience of man; and with regard to the multifarious necessities which incite him to supplication, Matth. vi. 8, 32; and in reference to his invisible thoughts and sentiments, Ps. vii. 10, John xxi. 17, Acts i. 24; and to the concealment of sin, of innocence, and distress,—we confide in the knowledge of God, which is complete in circuit, Ps. cxxxix., and according to its kind immediate or intuitive, and eminently perfect, Heb. iv. 13.

REMARK. The questions whether Divine knowledge be operative for its object, and in what way Divine foreknowledge of free actions is consistent with the freedom of the latter, are questions foreign to the original character of the doctrine of omniscience. Both have been started when on the subject of the idea of prophecy and prediction, (and even by Cicero *de Divin.*) Indeed, the Omniscient God conditionates all self-life of the creature, and knows it as such. Just as he creates it free, he knows it to be so. The proper place for discussing these questions will be when the conditionation of human freedom is especially

treated; at present they may be dismissed, as has been done by Augustin, *de Civ. Dei*, v. 9, *de Lib. Arb.* iii. 3; and farther by Anselm, *præscit Deus me sine necessitate peccaturum, &c. præscit effectum eo modo eventurum, quo a causa procedit, ut a libera libere, a contingente contingenter, a necessaria necessario; or by Schleiermacher, "God foreknows the free, but as free."*

§ 74. ABSTRACTION OF GOD FROM THE PERSONAL CREATURE.

God is alone wise, glorious, holy, and blessed.

REMARK. By means of the characteristic, that God *alone* is something, for example, wise or good, there is also indicated a peculiar kind of attribute, just as He is something in relation to the ALL, although ordinary language cannot fully express this distinction.

§ 75. WISDOM.

It is in an actually existing world, and in its relations to the Divine purpose, that we at all times attain a consciousness of God; *i. e.* we confide in the wisdom of God, or in the perfect consciousness of His creating and sustaining love. Now, since the Divine purpose is nowhere so completely represented in any department of creation as it is in the personal, nor in the individual so clearly as in the genus, there consequently arises at all times a necessity of supposing or inquiring in what manner the physical world is, not only conformably related to itself, but also how, as revealing and inciting, and then again as being susceptible and passive, this physical world is related to the moral one. Accordingly, the wisdom of God is reflected in the all-original work of creation¹ and preservation. God saw that it was good, Gen. i.; Ps. civ. 24; Proverbs viii. 22–31; Jer. x. 12. Nevertheless, there can be nothing more antagonistic to the end in view than evil; and in so far as this exercises its destructive or perverting power in the world, the wisdom of God becomes in a certain measure new, and consequently in the facts of redemp-

tion from permitted evil it is eminently magnified, and this to such a degree, that the wisdom of God even in creation appears more fully exalted by the wisdom displayed in salvation. Remedial wisdom is especially “hidden wisdom,” 1 Cor. ii. 7; Ephes. iii. 10; compare Ps. li. 6. At one time indeed it establishes in man the entire consciousness of an aim, and reveals itself through law and promise, Ps. ciii. 7; 1 Cor. ii. 12, 16. This wisdom too inclines towards the susceptible, in order to communicate itself unto them, Dan. ii. 20, seq.; James i. 5; iii. 17. Yet in such a mode, that for the most part it will be recognised in the Divine covenant-history, (Book of Wisdom, and Sirach), and through this period which is past be especially exhibited for the future.

It is just the most apparent incongruities in the world’s condition, with reference to its aim, which should become the most certain occasions for men to think on the concealed meaning of the Lord, Isaiah xl. 13, lv. 8, to adore the unsearchableness of his ways, Rom. xi. 33, and to acknowledge the exclusive sovereign virtue of Him who is the only wise God, 1 Tim. i. 17; Jude 25.

REMARK 1. Wisdom is the excellency of knowing, consequently it is neither the quantitative and extensive, but the practical greatness, the intensive and productive perfection of knowledge. Hence wisdom is not omniscience, but is to be considered rather as knowledge absolutely proportioned to its object. Therefore, when we speak of God, wisdom must be regarded simply as the love of the Divine self and world-consciousness, or as the perfect sense and consciousness of the love of the omnipotent Creator, Preserver, and Governor. The knowledge that God is wise, corresponds to the physico and ethico-theological evidence of Divine existence, or is contained in it. Since we conceive wisdom as the unity of Divine omnipotence and love, and as being the conscious proportion between the world and the Spirit, so therein consists the ground for our regarding it as the necessary bond of both kinds of Divine attributes which determinate the relation of God to the creature in general, or to the moral one in particular. But inasmuch as we presume that, together with Divine Wisdom, God is *alone* wise, or at the same

time associate wisdom with the felt limits of our own conscious aim, it is placed at the head of those abstract or remote attributes which define the relation of the Lord to personal creatures.

REMARK 2. It is in conformity with these relations of wisdom to the Divine essence, and to the other attributes, that in the Hebrew Proverbs, cap. viii. wisdom is personified poetically, and in Judaism dogmatically. And in the Testament of expectation, wisdom must be revered more and more apart as the complete causality of all Divine communications, in the same degree in which its members relinquish or spiritualize the hope of the Messiah, and are content with the past. This view is confirmed by the Apocrypha. From this position we proceed upon the supposition, that in the law (the Mosaic one) is given the perfect medium of all Divine revelation and sanctification, just as Moses exhibits the most perfect stage of human fellowship with God. The law is the expression and manifestation of Divine thought in the world, the purport of all Divine conceivable aims. Hence the personal self-communication of God is termed νόμος, γραφή, &c. (just as it was at a later period designated λογος). Now, if it be required for all Divine cultivation of life, for all glorification of private and public life, for all salvation and redemption, that the right sense of the law be disclosed and communicated, and that it shall rule the world by means of the people of Israel, their afflictions and their triumphant fidelity, in that case it is only by knowledge σύνεσις, φρονήσις, σοφία, righteousness and bliss, and Divine knowledge, condescending to the law and to Israel, in other words, it is wisdom which can alone be the actual personal self-communication of God. Even by the cabalistic חכמה (different from כבודיהא) personal wisdom is to be understood as μετάρθρονος θεου, co-regent (*Book of Wisdom*, ix. 4, τὴν τῶν σῶν θρόνων πάρεδρον σοφίαν, and v. 10, ἀπὸ θρόνου δόξης σου πέμψον αὐτήν) or as σύνθρονος. It is safer to reject the derivation from *Metator*, or at least to doubt that from *Mithras*. But even in the prophetic tendency of the Old Testament, so firmly maintained, the causality which *conditionates* the universe, and which is love, can especially be recognised only as wisdom, so long as a particular barrier exists, and necessarily continues to do so. The non-manifested universality of grace, which was limited to Israel, allows contrasts which only admit of being reconciled by the idea of wisdom.

¹ Although we cannot admit the exclusive relation of wisdom

to redemption, which Schleiermacher assigns to it in the following definition, "Divine self-communication operating in redemption, as that principle which regulates and determinates the world," nevertheless, we assent not the less to its peculiar connection with love to which J. D. Michaelis, *Comp. Theol. Dogm.* p. 59, also alludes. Hence, in redemption, wisdom cannot be exclusively revealed because the creation and preservation of things is already the conscious self-manifestation of Divine love. Nature is revealed wisdom, partly in its relation to spirit, and its fitness to supply the spirit with impressions and an opportunity for activity; and partly in itself, as an organism and work of art. Now with reference to wisdom, pantheistic dogma endeavours to provoke a conflict between absolute spirit and the personal God, whilst endeavouring to demonstrate that absolute spirit cannot have an aim because it has no wants, and that nothing is a mean which is not at the same time an aim; Strauss, *Glaubensl.* i. p. 576, a view which is very unimportant. The propositions, "God has no want," and "the means proportioned to the aim is the aim itself," are unaffected, if God's purpose, or a Divinely-purposed aim, arrangement, or mediation, be maintained; for any requirement in a Divine aim does not devolve on God, but on the creature, and is *à priori* reserved or increases to love, and thus to perfection. Doubtless, God has in the means an aim, just as the aim again resembles the basis; God has in *aseitas*, also *adseitas*. He does all things for himself, as Scripture says; for God is truth, is love. But do we the less on that account require all these categories in order to develope the idea?

The idea of an order or an organization which is preferred, effects nothing more than a separation of the categorical sides, (of the question), but nevertheless maintains a distinction. It is incorrect to assert that Divine wisdom, regarded according to the conceived aim, is again necessitated to transfer its essential element, namely, its ultimate purpose, to some other attribute, such as to love. For wisdom resigns itself entirely, as does every other attribute, to another, or to the totality of attributes, and yet its peculiar element admits of being distinguished, when the final aim, as will and thought, and when the theoretical virtue of action are distinguishable, however inseparable they may be. The whole inquiry, however, does not in the least affect the theistical explanation of wisdom given in Remark 1.

§ 76. MAJESTY.

Although God has created angels and men, and destined them for his communion and similitude, still his freedom, and the fulness of his absolute self, is in no wise impaired thereby; but He is, and continues the king of his people and kingdom,—“a mighty God, and terrible,” Deut. vii. 21, with whom no being can be compared in dignity and power. As is expressed in the name Michael, and whose condescensions¹ and revelations all minister only to this purpose, that through obedience and reverence in love He may be still more glorified. This is the idea of Divine majesty and honour, to which in part the especial expressions and names, and in part the representations of the Lord as unapproachable and irresistible, correspond, Isa. vi. 5; Ps. xxxiii. 8, 13–18. What it is to offend God, cannot be mistaken in the region of grace; but there it is only the more willingly and livingly acknowledged, Acts v. 1–11; Heb. x. 26–31, xii. 25.

¹ In representing the glory of the Lord, the idea of attribute commences to become personal, just in the same way as in the Old Testament doctrine of wisdom. That which is infinitely concealed in His revelation and condescension is analogous to the Glorious One, the Glory of God, *וְכָבוֹד*, Exod. xvi. 10; xxxiii. 22; Numb. xvi. 42; *μεγαλοπρεπῆς δόξα*, 2 Pet. i. 17, in which the usual illustration, *i. e.* Deus ipse, is altogether insufficient. The subject of a discourse from heaven, or a phenomenon sensibly administered, could only, according to the then prevailing view, be some other second divine subject, or angel of the Lord. In its communication to the servants and ministers of the Lord, glory is at once the defence and negation of death, transitoriness, and corruption. Hence the glorification of Christ and Christians in the resurrection, John xvii. 22; Rom. vi. 4, viii. 11–30; 1 Peter iv. 14.

§ 77. HOLINESS.

However variously the representations of majesty and holiness pass into each other, still, upon the whole, through the latter idea, the Divine Essence is removed from fellowship with sin¹ and sinners, and this to such an extent, that sin, as a specific condition, (profanity), cannot possibly have any connexion with Deity, nor can God be conceived either as the author, accomplice, cherisher, or concealer of sin; and as to the sinner, it is merely in proportion as he separates himself from the common state of the flesh and the world, and in proportion to his holiness, that he is able to approach God. Thus, what constitutes the idea of Divine holiness, is not restoring love condescending to heal, but it is the truth of love, in its condescension and self-communication, destroying and punishing evil. Hence God, as the Spirit of the church, and indweller of the human heart, is eminently holy.

¹ The explanations of Divine holiness, whether it be the love of God to himself, or the legality and morality of the Divine will, deviate too far from the fundamental view laid down in the Bible. If, on the other hand, Zachariæ and Storr stand quite alone in their view of *incomparabilis, venerandus*, Knapp *Vorless.* i. 180, has thrown out some well-grounded suggestions. In point of fact, קדוש, Isa. vi., and ἅγιος, John xvii. 11; also Ps. xcix. 9, lxxi. 22, may signify an exalted distinction (of the Deity) from all other personal beings; but the fundamental meaning of קדוש is to be pure; and God is eminently the Holy One, in relation to the possible or actual impurity of the personal creature, Levit. xi. 44, xix. 2; 1 Pet. i. 14–16; Job. iv. 17. The idea of holiness does not merely rest on these words, but also on the assertions, that God can neither be the defender of iniquity, Ps. v. 5, or entertain it in himself, 1 John i. 5; Jas. i. 13, nor either cause or allow it, 1 Cor. vi. 9–20; 2 Cor. vi. 15, 17; Book of Wisdom, vii. 25, οὐδέν μεμιαμμένον εἰς αὐτήν (Personal Wisdom) παρεμπίπτει. Wherefore Isaiah exclaims before the face of the Thrice Holy, “Woe is me, because I am a man of unclean lips.” God is zealous, and consumes. His spirit is grieved by

the evil nature of men, James iv. 5; Ephes. iv. 30. Divine holiness is consequently the shield of love, the negative of Divine κοινωνικόν; hence it is unnecessary, in our idea of holiness, to assume "well pleased in the good." The definition of the more ancient dogmatist, summa in Deo puritas eandem puritatem a creaturis exigens, agrees for the most part with ours. On the other hand, we are unable, according to Schleiermacher, to identify the fact of conscience with itself, which indeed is an actual revelation of Divine holiness. None of the above definitions need be withdrawn on account of the objection to negative dogma.—*Strauss*, i. p. 592. Holiness belongs only to the will which by possibility may be unholy; thus it is unrelated to absolute will. For the possibility of evil and good in finite will perfectly suffices or obliges the Creator and Sustainer of finite will to supply Divine love with the negative or exclusive element, which is holiness. I am not concerned in the OBLIGATION of Deity, because it is by His will I ground the OBLIGATION of man, or direct and deny the will of the finite being. The Holy One, who is he alone that sanctifieth, Heb. ii. 11, is never he who is sanctified, otherwise than by a knowledge of his holiness on the part of those who shall be sanctified. Whoever cannot or will not regard that which God determines, knows, and wills, without resigning Him into the possibilities and contingencies of finite self-determination, let him consider how he resorts to his void and dead Absolute, which cannot but renounce the foundation of morality. Should the author, however, conceive that it would be an empty abstraction to imagine sin as possible in a man such as faith represents Christ to have been, how much more must the author's possibility, appended to or desired in his idea of absolute personality, be accounted as a similar abstraction. For Jesus himself, before he promotes or permits faith, points to Him who is alone good. In this decision philosophy and religion alike concur. And if we understand him correctly, the observation of Arnobius will signify little more than this, that wisdom, virtue, and justice, can alone be affirmed of a being capable of perfection. For a view of the whole subject, see K. Phil. Fischer's *Die Speculative Dogm.*, von D. Fr. Strauss, 1 bd. geprüft. Tüb. 1841, p. 61.

§ 78. BLESSEDNESS.

The Divine being, as the alone wise, is separated from the percipient creature; as the glorious and holy one, He is abstracted from the egoistical, and as the blessed, from the sentient. For as, on the one hand, the perfect unity of the Divine power, knowledge, and will, combined with love, presents the idea of Divine blessedness, so, on the other, His absolute freedom from imperfection and evil does the same. 1 Tim. i. 11; vi. 15.

REMARK.—Almost the only attribute of the Homeric gods esteemed as valid, and which they maintain, as contradistinguished from wretched men, has been incidentally mentioned in the testamentary veneration of God, which, for the most part, is concerned in the communicative and ethical attributes. Meanwhile, God has no want and “needeth not anything,” Psalm l. 10–14; Acts xvii. 25. This is an essential definition of God in the Alexandrian doctrine, ἀπροσδεής, ἀπήμαντος, ἀμέριμνος, Augustin, *Conf.* i. 4,—Semper agens, semper quietus, colligens et non egens—quærens cum nihil desit tibi: nunquam inops et guades lucris. Even His mercy or compassion does not render him participant of creaturely desire. Philo *de Cherub.* 122, Μόνος ὁ Θεός ἀψεύδως ἐορτάζει.

§ 79. DIVINE RELATIONSHIP TO PERSONAL BEINGS.

The holy love of God, applied to his communion with personal being in general, or to all his exhibitions of the same, is that which shows him to be just and faithful, or true.

REMARK 1. Δίκαιος is he who is consistently related to the position he occupies in the community. Δικαιοσύνη and עֲדָקָה when predicated of God, denote His integrity, justice, and perfect conduct, and thus immediately neither His goodness nor His impartial administration of justice. But since it appertains precisely to God, who is love, to be good, and gracious, and tender towards those whom He has created, called, and chosen, in order that He

may continue like unto himself, Hos. xi. 9, and, as it were, maintain His position, so are not only the goodness and rectitude of God very frequently placed together, but the latter is also more especially named in cases where the question more particularly concerns the perfect conduct of God in the good, as 1 John i. 9; Heb. vi. 10, if in the latter passage the more limited conception of justice or just dealing towards him who has acted in such or such a manner does not prevail. It is not in every passage where *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* occurs, that it signifies a Divine quality, and although it may do so in Rom. iii. 26, it does not in Rom. i. 17, or 2 Cor. v. 21. This genitive is sometimes more closely defined, (as in *πίστις Θεοῦ*, *ἔργον Θεοῦ* by *κατὰ Θεόν*, *εἰς Θεόν*, *ἐκ Θεοῦ*)—conformable to God, the Divinely effected righteousness of man.

REMARK 2. The conception of Divine rectitude is intimately united with that of His faithfulness and truth. Hence אֱמִינּוּת so frequently appears conjoined with צֶדֶק, and πιστος with δικαιος. God proves himself, by his uniform conduct towards those who are called, (1 Cor. i. 9; 1 Thess. v. 24; Rom. viii. 29), not as dependent in this respect, but as faithful even towards the unbelieving; because “He cannot deny himself,” 2 Tim. ii. 13. And He proves himself not less in the harmony of his word and work, and in that of the past and the future. It is impossible for God to lie, Heb. vi. 18. No unbelief, no falsehood of man can annul His faithfulness and truth, Romans iii. 3, 4; Numbers xxiii. 19. From the latter passage it is self-evident how far repentance pertains to God, Gen. vi. 6, and Jonah iii. 9; Jer. xviii. 1–11. The Biblical representations of God’s repentance, wrath, zeal, &c., possess reality and validity, but, then, it is that of a Divine, not a human emotion; and in like manner we only deny the existence of a sinful and passive element, but not an active and real one. Hence Augustin, *Confess.* 4, *amas, nec æstuas; zelas et securus es; pœnitet te, et non doles, irasceris, et tranquillus es opera mutas nec mutas consilium.*

§ 80. CONCLUSION.

The justice and truth of God determine themselves manifoldly, when viewed in their relation to the manifoldness existing in the personal creature. Some determinations regard

the passive state of the finite moral being, but any special determination relates to the spontaneity of each individual. Men simply viewed in that condition, which is universally alike in all, are necessitous and susceptible beings. God is to them, as such, good and humane. Psalm cvii. ; Tit. iii. 4 ; Matthew vi. 26. Viewed in their proportionate equality and universality, as respects their destitute condition, they are suffering, unholy, fallen, sinful beings ; as such, God is merciful unto them, gracious and long-suffering, Genesis xxxii. 10 ; Exodus xxxiv. 6 ; Psalm lxxxvi. 5, 15. Finally, towards all as free beings, and in relation to the contrast between good and bad conduct and feeling, God is just—that is, He is a perfect judge and rewarder of men, Rom. i. 24, 28 ; ii. 2, κρίμα Θεοῦ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, 7–9 ; 1 Cor. iv. 5 ; 2 Sam. xxii. 26, 27.

REMARK 1. With reference to goodness, כֶּדֶד and טוֹב it must be admitted that it also represents other qualities relative to the passive susceptibility of man, just as sinfulness may also be considered as a defect and deficiency, though not exclusively so. The Divine goodness can only be related to the sentient creature in general, in so far as it has previously been related to the spiritual and conscious ; for sentient welfare is not the ultimate aim of goodness acting through wisdom. The good is a claim upon gratitude, and presupposes a spiritual, thinking creature. Finally, goodness operates, in its wisdom and forbearance, even under the conditions of chastisement and correction, Heb. xii. 5–11 ; Psalm cxix. 67, 68. The relation of πνεῦμα φιλανθρωπον, B. of Wisdom i. 6, to the operation of God as the judicial searcher of hearts, is remarkable.

REMARK 2. The doctrine of Divine justice is eminently difficult and important ; difficult, because it does not so much pursue the development of God's relation to the personal world, as it appears to establish something opposed to it ; and important, because it decides on the idea of redemption, of the atonement, and justification. The justice of God is a necessary and inseparable idea of His love, wisdom, and blessedness. It is precisely in this respect that the God of Marcion fails to be full and true love ; because, as it were, from an aversion and antipathy to punish, He wills neither law nor justice, and from his

disinclination to be a legislator, such a God is not even a creator, or, at least, not one who originally imparts and reveals. The erroneous view taken by Marcion cannot be corrected by elevating the unresolved antithesis of mercy and justice up to the one only God, or by resolving the alone Divine majesty and honour into mercy and avenging justice, which is the error of those who construct every Divine will and work, after Theodor Beza's method, out of the dualism of these attributes. If justice and law, punishment and rewards, cannot in truth be the effects of love, then, assuredly must they be considered as merely æonic and demiurgic, and inadequate to represent what is truly Divine. To ascribe to God some other fundamental will, contiguous and external to his love, may be said to create what is incomprehensible. Perhaps we are not justified in appealing to Psalm xviii. 26, "With the pure thou wilt show thyself pure; and with the froward thou wilt show thyself froward," for frowardness and purity in this passage merely denote a change of relation, not one of nature or will. The explanation of Leibnitz, that the justice of God is His goodness wisely directed, includes a truth when it asserts that justice is the duration and prosecution of goodness. Only, in this aspect, justice is too exclusively referred to thought (wisdom), and it does not appear why holiness may not be referable to the will; and again, if goodness (according to Marheineke's *Principles*, first edition) should be considered as only a wise administration of Divine justice; in that case, both ideas would lose their independence, inasmuch as they could only preserve a reciprocal limitation. The explanations afforded by Nitzsch (in unpublished lectures on dogma) and by Schleiermacher, maintain, in so far as they accord, that justice is the holy will to punish, that it is Divine infliction, and that goodness is beneficence. But how much soever the connection of holiness and love is here to be commended, and the endeavour to deprive man of any legal claim to reward is acknowledged—*δούλοι ἀρχαίοι*, Luke xvii. 10, still too much appears effected for the latter object; for it is evident that goodness and grace are not estranged in the act of correcting, from benefiting, and, in like manner also, justice is not estranged from rewarding, supposing that God has influenced the capacity for reward, and bestowed the same. Reward has confessedly, as well as punishment, retained, in the Testament of Grace, its import; and, consequently, the complete idea of recompense has retained its value

also; and that this idea constitutes the purport of justice is unquestionable. If ever the idea of Divine justice shall obtain consistency, it must be in general through the relation of infinite holy love to the spontaneous and self-determinating capacity of the personal being, or the relation of Divine perfection to the existence of the economy in the universe. The basis of Divine government is love, its aim life and blessedness; blessedness being perfect fellowship in self-realization, perfect susceptibility and spontaneity in reference to the good imparting itself. The individual shall progress to a true self-realization and capacity for communion, and through one individual to another, and the good determinableness attain to a good determination. In this process there is the antithesis of necessity and freedom, of the individual self and another, of action and passion, separation and union, consequently the possible existence of bad and evil, of sin and death, of will and contradiction. The bad is possible for the realization of the good. But in God there is an impossibility for the bad, which is the holiness of his love. John xvii. 11—25. But, inasmuch as the bad is restrained in the world by an abiding reality, and for ever deprived of its necessity, and, moreover, the good is preserved in its exclusive eternity; thus it is, that the righteousness of God evidences itself. This idea embraces all the elements unfolded in Holy Scripture with reference to law and justice; there is no region where justice does not operate, attended by, and by means of, holy love, and wherein it may not become operative with, and in grace, goodness, and mercy, and where the latter may not reciprocate with the former. Since holy love desires a universal realisation, and as it only does so on and in the world, the universal justice of God, termed by theologians *justitia universalis*, is nothing else than the faithfulness of God's love, or his truthfulness, and consequently in its place is grace, mercy, and goodness. For wherever, in the preservation of life, by the gratification of necessity, the separation of the bad from the good, and at the same time the removal, limitation, or extinction of the bad, and the animation of the good is allowed, there goodness is at the same time justice, and justice is the preservation of consummate goodness. Hence, as in 1 John i. 9, Heb. vi. 10, Divine acts of pardon, as well as of punishment, and those of purification and preservation, are to be ascribed to God, regarded as the Just One. Especial justice

is in the first place to be viewed as legislative, partly directing and partly revealing, prohibitive and imperative; then as judicial, either condemning or acquitting; and finally as recompensing, either by punishing or rewarding—*Justitia legislativa, iudicialis, repondens*. The communicative goodness of God manifests that He permits spontaneity and liberty in general. His goodness and love likewise declare that he is the Author of blessings, for which he implants a corresponding necessity, and by these blessings induces spontaneity, and that, too, a common one. His justice is evidenced with reference to possible bad and good, by his effecting, on the one hand, the subordination of the endowments and emotions, by his setting bounds to action and passion, and by the preservation of all personalities against and for each other; and, on the other hand, by applying all this to consciousness, and expressing it in the conscience. God is just in his commandments; his laws are perfect; they shall stand fast for ever and ever, Ps. cxi. 7, 8; cxix. It is manifest that the law, considered as revelation, as assurance, and as an occasion for spontaneity and activity, is a communication of the good, and is goodness; as is fully declared in the Psalm last quoted. But, on the other hand again, law is also justice, that is, legislatively, in the economy of grace, in the reconciliation and justification of the sinner. For whatever God does, as the founder of a dispensation or as a lawgiver, (be it *νόμος πίστεως*,) whatever he does for the condemnation and enfeebling of sin, (should that even extend to the pardoning of the sinner,) is a proof of his justice. Obviously in this sense the institution of the atonement, as a proof of Divine justice, is exalted in Rom. iii. 25, 26. The mere *πάρεσις, ἀφεσις, ἀνοχή*, would not be complete evidence of God's holy love, if it did not point to a higher development of justice and legality *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ*. This righteousness, as generating law and relation, passes into judicial and compensating justice. James iv. 12. *εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ κριτής, ὁ δυνάμενος σῶσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι*. Now the just God maintains a relation to the actual conduct of individuals. For judgment and punishment indeed are included in the institution even of the new covenant through the blood of Christ; because wheresoever a Divine act passes judgment on the possible or actual existence of sin, there is a consequent condemnation of it, and because *ἐπιγνώσις ἀμαρτίας*, Rom. iii. 20, can alone be completed through *ἐλεγξις ἀμαρτίας*, John xvi. 8. But this punish-

ment is plainly none other than the separation of the sinful universality from sin, through the passion of the most highly exalted One, Phil. ii. 9, of the just, 2 Cor. v. 21; and the death of sin thus brought to pass (by repentance) is a punishment of grace, a redemption; whence it is apparent that the idea of a judicial and penal justice returns, upon the whole, into that of the legislative idea. If a state be no more than founded and organised, or is yet in the act of being so, then the individual citizens are not amenable to judgment; the judicial function has not yet realised its object. Even under the old covenant this was so far the case, that the law exhibited life and death, but still *πάρεσις*, *ἄφεσις* prevailed rather than full punishment. But as soon as the constitution is fully organised, justice begins its operation, not only by separating, in one and the same subject of humanity, abstract bad and good, but also by dividing those who are bad and good. And here at least an antithetical relation appears to step in between goodness and justice, remission of punishment and calling to account, and between grace and law. In truth, however, this relation is here a genetic one, and the fact of its being recognised as such constitutes the perfection and truth of Christianity. Mercy and goodness effect all who in their distress are about to be or are actually punished, not less than does justice, considered as recognising conduct and regulating action and passion, comprehend all who are pardoned; it being assumed that the ground and goal of the entire process is and continues merely eternal love unfolding itself to self-communication. What is said by Jeremiah, Lamentations iii. 33, כְּדָכָא עֵפֶה גּוֹנֵפוֹ, is at all times applicable; and equally valid is the assertion of Philo, that mercy is more ancient than punishment, or according to James ii. 13, that “mercy rejoiceth against judgment.” It follows merely from this that *δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ* in relation to the intervening bad always determinates itself to *κριτικὴ*, *κολαστικὴ*, &c., in order to be authentic, and to recede into itself. The elect, reconciled, pardoned, justified, and sanctified, are all punished, accused, and judged in their repentance. Even in those who are self-judged, and are therefore not judged, justice is evidenced. Apart from repentance, and a cry for pardon, there is no actual forgiveness, as Melanchthon correctly remarks, *punitur contritione homo*. On the other hand, God loves whom he chastises, and endures with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath, Rom. ix. 22; (he loveth all things that are, and abhorreth nothing

that he has made, Book of Wisdom, xi. 24, he spares those whose unrighteousness he hates and punishes, *ὡς ἀνθρώπων*, xii. 8, to the intent that we as *κρινόμενοι* should so much the more look for *ἔλεος*, xii. 22): only, the representations of a sin to be forgiven neither in this world or the world to come, of an undying worm, of an unquenchable fire, an eternal damnation and punishment, of a vessel condemned to destruction, Matt. xii. 32; xxv. 46. Rom. ix. 23. Rev. xx. 15, (of a seed cursed from the beginning, Book of Wisdom xii. 11, of a *Τέγμα τῆς καταδίκης ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἐπελθόν*, xii. 27,) only such representations appear to give a firm position to an ever-enduring contrast, and to exhibit it as an original one; whilst the pure genetic relation can only be maintained when love in its holiness and justice not only permits effects of wrath and punishment which separate the bad, but conducts them to the goal of universal redemption from sin and evil. If omnipotence and wisdom permit a distinction to exist after all between the blessed and the damned, the will also appears to admit of such a distinction, and even to be eternally involved in it. And thus we return again to the position taken up by Beza. But inasmuch as we are, *à priori*, unable to imagine an absolutely necessary justice as resulting from the naked absolute, from the mere formal will, not from the true will of the absolute good, so we confidently trust that the never-ending effects of penal retribution, or of a separating and negating justice, shall constitute the victory of the good over the bad, and become the interpositions of goodness and mercy. That punishment shall appear to the convicted themselves just and necessary, cannot be doubted; that a forced conversion and sanctification is not a work of love, is maintained by every one; that every death includes in itself a certain cessation and liberation from sin, Rom. vi. 7, and that in reference to the incapability of doing or willing evil, and to the necessity of knowing and acknowledging the works of righteousness, and that even the condemned share in redemption, is intelligible. It would be foreign to our subject to extend our remarks on this occasion. The point in question is merely to defend the inter-connection of justice and grace, or the genetic relation of both attributes.

§ 81. ONE GOD, FATHER, SON, AND SPIRIT.

It is only when contemplated in and with the unity of the Divine essence, that each one of these attributes is true. Of the “gods many” (*πολλοι*, 1 Cor. viii. 6,) none could possess any of these attributes. They are but impersonations and images of men, by means of which they assume, under a creative form, that of the Everlasting Being, in order to divide and decompose it. The “gods many,” are mere *λεγόμενοι*. God, is the one Lord, who is excepted from all number, as well as all individuality. Deut. vi. 4; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Ephes. iv. 6. Jehovah is Elohim, Zebaoth, the Lord of heaven and earth, and also the Father of Jesus Christ. But this knowledge of the Divine Being and his attributes, is disclosed to Christian faith through a knowledge of the Son of God, or of that Son of Man, and holy servant of God, who, unless he had participated originally in the Divine nature, or possessed Divine life in himself, could not have really been a venerator of the Deity. Whilst, therefore, contemplating through faith in Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, we recognise in him the incarnate Word, that was from the beginning, by whom all things were made; together with him, we at the same time apprehend the Father who has not come into the world, but by whom, through his Eternal Word, all things exist, and who has bestowed the Son upon the world, and of whom the Son testifies, and to whom he guides man; we are also enabled to discern the Holy Spirit who proceedeth from the Father, and is sent by Christ, the Lord, through whom we perceive the Father and the Son, and in the Son are united to the Father; and all this in such a manner, that in our spiritual being and becoming we feel our dependence, not on an absolutely single, but on a twofold, and in his complete development, a threefold Divine originator,—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, being, however, one in essence, and when received into the mind by faith, teaches us to recognise the self-relationships and self-mediations of the one God,

and we are enabled to distinguish the difference and the returning unity of God as self-existent and revealed, of God and the Logos, of God revealed in existence and consciousness, of the Logos as life and light. Hence it follows that we, regarded in our universal Being, refer to God, God's Logos and Spirit, to God the Lord, and the Spirit of God and the Lord, and in this conception of faith we have a monument of God's inconceivableness, not merely as it is supposed, but as it is the subject of our thought and apprehension.

REMARK 1. If faith in the Father, Son, and Spirit, were merely a connecting tenet for Christian doctrine, the juxtaposition and parallel included therein, must exclusively and chiefly be apparent in all cases where the substance of a belief in salvation, and the aim of its institution are represented by periphrase, as, for example, in many passages of the Epistles to Timothy and Titus. The equalization and juxtaposition in question, are, for the most part, apparent, where the condition of salvation may be regarded as derived from its highest operative causality. Baumgarten Crusius, in his *Bib. Theol.* p. 315, justly remarks, "that the source, as well as every blessing, of the gospel is derived from that Triad." For grace, by which the Christian is consoled, or the salvation in which he rejoices, is not derived simply from God or the Father; but, *first*, simply from the Lord, as, for example, in 2 Thess. iii. 18; 2 Tim. iv. 22, compare verse 17 and 18. *Secondly*, in the most uninterrupted twofold mode, from God our Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ, as, for example, at the commencement of all the Pauline Epistles; and, lastly, and *thirdly*, in a threefold Divine manner, and this in such a way, that in the last case the Spirit is added to the Lord and Father, or to God and the Lord, as, for example, 2 Cor. xiii. 14, with which the other notifications of the twofold (1 Cor. viii. 6,) and threefold causality, 1 Peter i. 2; 1 Cor. xii. 4, 6; Ephes. iv. 6, are to be compared. A fourth mode is inadmissible; and both Justin and Athenagoras have essentially erred, whilst indicating the fulness of the object of Christian veneration (σέβασθαι), and whilst earnestly desirous of averting the accusation of Atheism alleged against Christianity, they named something, besides the Trinity, as intervening between the Logos and Pneuma; Athenagoras regarding πλῆθος ἀγγέλων καὶ λειτουργῶν as belonging to θεολογικὸν μέρος, Justin con-

sidering *στρατὸν ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων* as such. Justin, *Apol.* i. p. 56. *Athen.* πρῆσβ. π. Xρ. p. 36, Rechenb. Compare also Neander *gegen Möhler Theoll. Stud. u. Krit.* 1833, p. 772, and *Weisse Theoll. Stud. u. Krit.* 1841, p. 389. From the threefold developed causality of salvation it follows, that wherever the Lord only, or the Spirit only, is mentioned, as effecting salvation, still the co-operation of the other Person, the preceding or succeeding and combined operation of the Father, Son, and Spirit, must be imagined and believed. Under such circumstances of apostolic doctrine, baptism also in the name of the Father, Son, and Spirit, (Matt. xxviii. 19), even if otherwise admissible, cannot be referred to a paraphrase of the doctrine peculiar to Christianity, but the catechumen must come by baptism into that communion with God which is a fellowship of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Faith in the NAME, to be baptized in the NAME, expresses, in Scriptural language, a covenant with God, which is founded on peculiar revelations, promises, and duties. Now, if we could hold with the Arians that we were consecrated to the fellowship of the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit, or as Christians had to offer praise and glory to the Father *διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ*, (but apart from the fact that in this case, in conformity with the entire Biblical mode of thought and expression, it should rather be said, Glory to God our Father through our Lord Jesus Christ in the fellowship of the Holy Ghost), still even this economic representation of the Trinity by no means excludes the other ontological one, but rather the former cannot perfectly exist without the latter. For the Son is never barely Jesus of Nazareth, as a man pleasing to God, but is at the same time also as one who is revealed, and his equal relation with the Father and Spirit to *δογμα*. as well as his being coequal with them in all things, causes the baptized to be bound to the Divine Being regarded as a threefold causality of salvation and life. In every case it is the relations of God to himself, and not merely those of God to humanity, which are fundamental to the Christian doctrine of Deity. For if *διὰ τοῦ λόγου* John i. 3, *διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ* Heb. i. 2, *ἐν αὐτῷ* and *δι' αὐτοῦ* Col i. 16, compare 1 Cor. viii. 6, be referred to the creation of all things and not merely to redemption, then the Father cannot possibly (as the Modalists contend) supply the exclusive relation of God to creation, or the Son the exclusive one of redemption. At least, the term Father includes the idea of the fundamental cause of love in reference to redemption, just as the term Son

intimates mediating love in the same relation. On the other hand, the term Logos refers primarily to creation. Strictly speaking, the Arian view is only another form of monarchism, in so far as it annuls the coequal essence of the Logos, and subjects the latter to the condition of a creature, although one highly exalted. The person of Christ also is rendered incomprehensible, and the complete conception of the human nature in Christ is annulled, and they are compelled to resort for succour to the Apollinarians. For a union of humanity with some other creature, however exalted, is inconceivable in a person, apart from the consideration that such a union is inadequate to the practical necessity of redemption. Thus Arius essentially corrupted the doctrines of Dionysius of Alexandria and Origen. Meanwhile, every doctrine of subordination proved erroneous when it comprehended the Pleroma of nature's causality, that of the empire of reason and of the church in three personalities, and, at the same time, also viewed them as three entities, the highest, the higher, and the high. The doctrine was right as regarded the error of Sabellius, but not so in respect to what is true in his system. It diminished absoluteness in the same persons whilst it increased their energy. On the other hand, the church was compelled to preserve its doctrine, as we find it defended by Dionys of Rome, Marcellus of Ancyra, and finally by Athanasius and Nicæner. The doctrine of Nicæner, it is true, is out of analogy with the Bible in its biblical mode of expression and proof, inasmuch as the expressions "begotten" and "proceeding" pertain rather to God's relation to the world, (to denoting *opera ad extra*), not to the relation of God to himself, (*opera ad intra*); an unsuitableness pointed out by John Augustin Urlsperger, Pastor of the evangelical church of Augsburg from 1769 to 74, in a connected series of treatises, (*Neue, dem Sinn heiliger Schrift wahrhaft gemässe Entwicklung der alten christlichen Dreieinigkeitslehre, &c.*, Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1774—"A new Development of the ancient Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, truly conformable to the sense of Holy Scripture"). The doctrine of the Church, too, is compelled to take refuge partly in transcendentalism and partly in the literal meaning of Scripture. But the Church doctrine deserves the credit of having fully given affirmations and negations, by means of which the entire preceding disturbances of Christian consciousness are averted; it had the merit of confirming practical faith in the Father, Son, and Spirit ontologically, and of vitalizing practically the ontological idea. See the explanatory

apology of the doctrine of the church by Sartorius : *Apol. des ersten Artikels der Augs. Conf.*, Hamburg 1829; and especially that of Twesten, and likewise my letter to Dr Lücke, *üb. die wesentliche Dreieinigkeit Gottes*, *Theoll. St. u. Krit.* 1841, 301–307. Urlsperger, on the other hand, absolutely separated the essentiality of the Trinity from the procession. The being of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is not concerned. The one God is the unity of three Divine powers of absolute spirit, which by no means generate or proceed from one another; it is even indifferent whether they be denominated persons. By means of an everlasting covenant, and for the sake of creation, redemption, and consummation of the world, God determines in His three ineffable fundamental powers, that the one, as Father, generate the second as Son, and that the Third proceed from the Father through the Son. These three Divine forces may be regarded as Power, Wisdom, and Love. Ought power to be considered as a distinct force? Upon the whole, nothing more is gained by this than that the object has been transferred into a new movement. That exposition of the Father, Son, and Spirit, which affirms God to have revealed himself through Jesus the Messiah as a holy being, (*πν. ἁγ.*), is so repugnant to the grammatico-historical, and, in other respects, so commendable an interpretation, that we cannot refrain from refuting it in every possible mode. For the best treatises on the Biblico-Christian confirmation of faith in the Trinity, as well as on recognising its practical signification, and its actual capacity to be the subject of instruction and reflection, we refer to Sack, *über die Katechetische Behandlung der Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, “on the Catechetical Treatment of the Doctrine of the Trinity,” (*Theoll. Stud. und Krit.* 1834, 1); to Twesten’s *Vorl. üb. die Dogm.* II. B. sect. 1; and to Sartorius, *die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe*, i. 1840. Compare Nitzsch’s *Sendschr. an Lücke*, *Theoll. Stud.*, &c. 1841, 2.

REMARK 2. The doctrine of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is by no means to be disassociated from that of the essence and attributes of God. But this evident tritheism may be considered as the consummation and preservation of true theism in all its most important characteristics. Doubtless the proportionate co-operation stated above, for vitalizing and preserving religion, have been ceded even to polytheism, pantheism, and dualism; but we maintain the practical advantages of the doctrine of the Trinity in quite a different manner; not as if it served only for a relative

truth without being one absolutely, but as being required for attaining to a correct knowledge of God, and its services being inseparably combined with its objective and eternal validity. Either God is considered as not true and exalted enough, or not sufficiently good and holy, or not sufficiently effective. These are the possible defects of the assumed theism. So long as it merely distinguishes God from the world, and never God from God, it is ever exposed to a relapse and transition into pantheism or some other denial of the absolute Being. It is the doctrine of the Trinity alone that affords a perfect protection against atheism, polytheism, pantheism, or dualism. For the absolute distinction between the Divine essence and the world is more securely and firmly maintained by those who worship the Trinity, than by those who do not reverence the same. It is precisely those systems of monotheism, which have, in the highest degree, excluded the doctrine of the Trinity, and have prided themselves on that very account, the Jewish and Mahometan for example, that have led, on account of their barrenness and vacuity, to the grossest pantheism. With the doctrine that the Word, which was God, became flesh, there arises, likewise, the same necessity of conceiving God as personally united to man without sin, as there is a necessity for absolutely distinguishing between the Divine essence and human nature. Faith in everlasting holy love, which is God, can only be theoretically and practically realized through the cognition of Him who is the perfect and eternal object of divine self-knowledge and love; that is to say, by conceiving the love of the Father to the only-begotten Son. Finally, the full animating nature and communication of God, which includes neither a diminution nor restriction of his essence, can only be preserved by the trinitarian doctrine of the Spirit. But whatever difficulty the view taken by the church concerning the Divine persons may involve, as soon as we connect it with the personality of the Divine Being, then is this seeming contradiction not so entirely inexplicable; notwithstanding the ancient orthodox church did not, for a long time, insist on three Persons, but often only on *ἰδίωτητες, ὑποστάσεις*, &c. It was only the Latin Church, from the time of Augustin, which sanctified the expression *personæ* by the *symbolum quicumque*. Even Augustin himself uses the expression “tres personæ, si ita dicendæ sunt.” Some will demand, in order to express the most perfect personality, a Trinity, and

thereby employ the metaphysics of consciousness as an analogical proof; see Schmieder: Cölestin, *drie Geistliche Gespräche*, 1834, i., on the Persons of the Godhead. Others, like Swedenborg, only acknowledge the proper personality of God in that one which by the church, is termed, hypostasis, *i. e.*, in the Logos, the Son, the Lord. Other writers, again, differ from these. In every case we ought, according to the admitted construction of the scriptural passages, not barely to seek the triad in the subjective representation, nor exclusively in the economy of revelation, but should acknowledge that immediate faith here includes the commencement of indispensable speculation; not merely because ancient theology, underived from Scripture, generates sure and higher theogonic conceptions from the period when such theology appears as a reflective gnosis above myth, (in the sense in which these theogonic ideas have been historico-critically treated in my *Theoll. Stud.* i.) nor solely because Christian theologians of all periods have made possible, and found necessary a certain rational apprehension of this mystery; although those phenomena of universal religious history avouch the insufficiency of deism. These attempts, on the other hand, (see Bretschneider's *Dogm. Augs.*, 3. i. p. 566, seq.), combined with the church's view, attest the conceivableness of the Trinity, and its connection with the doctrine of the essence and attributes of God. No, biblical theologians are here inevitably compelled, when they imagine the Logos, who is with God and is God, when considering the *ancient IMAGE*, the reflection—the Spirit of God who knoweth the deeps of God—to acknowledge the elements of the essential, immanent doctrine of the Trinity. For, of explanatory attempts, only those retain a trace of biblical theogony, which either proceed from the idea of God's self-knowledge and self-love, or from the distinction between God as concealed in himself, and that of his manifesting himself, and thus as admonishing. Twisten has recently illustrated the philosophy of the doctrine of the Trinity, partly historically and partly enriching its contents, by submitting the Trinity first *κατὰ τὸν ἀποκαλύψεως τρόπον* to an analogico-philosophical illustration, then *κατὰ τὸν τρόπον ὑπάρξεως*, and points out how both explications are connected. In the first view, he endeavours to effect an accommodation between the *ens absolutum* and the finite world, which nevertheless reveals the infinite, and finds this accommodation in the original and typical thought of God. He can only be revealed

to beings capable of knowledge, and finite beings can only know God through God. Herein are comprehended, God, Logos, Spirit, but still only as one God-being. God is the exact counterpart of his own revelation. This leads us to another reflection, namely, that the Ego, in order to possess a true living personality, must itself not only become as a second object, but must also be taken back into itself as a third subject, by means of another act—must conceive itself as an actual image of itself. There is nothing arbitrary or accidental in our speaking of an analogical explanation of the mystery, since human nature, according to Scripture, is just an analogy of the Divine. Upon this point Tertullian and Augustin have most reasonably grounded their views.

§ 82. THE FATHER.

The Father¹ has not come into the world, and Christ does not say that he is the Father, but that the Father is in him, and he is in the Father, and that they are one, John x. 30, 38. Indeed, since the Father sends the Son into the world, and through him is known of those who believe in the Son; and as through the Holy Spirit, together with the Son, He takes up his abode with such, and renders them children of God, John xiv. 23, so is the whole gospel, together with the revelation and communion of God the Father, fully and at once declared, and the entire kingdom of love, in its beginning and end, set forth. To perceive the Fatherhood of God aright, is at the same time to apprehend truly the Divine essence, Divine attributes, work, and promises. But as this Fatherhood, in the Old Testament, was typified as to his Son, purely in the relation of Jehovah to his chosen people,² so is it not absolutely related alike towards the Only Begotten and to all creatures. But God is the father of Jesus Christ in one sense, and the father of his disciples in another, John xx. 17; or rather, the name Father everywhere represents the love of God as conjointly conditioned and administered through the Son. Hence, in the ac-

knowledge apostolical formula, “the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ” precedes the “love of God.”

¹ The heathen representation of the Father Zeus, the Father of gods and men, of Jupiter, Diespeter, Marspiter, Liber Pater, conveys, primarily, the same idea of the principle of nature and the world, or of the highest genitor, as the biblical representation of the Father points primarily to the principle of freedom and love, or to moral relationship. Both, therefore, must rather be kept distinct than reconciled. It is not the myth of the sons of gods, but the Old Testament, in the passages adduced in § 63, and to which may be added Hos. xi. 1, that prepares us for a knowledge of what our heavenly Father is. The Jews, according to the judgment of Jesus, knew him not, John viii. 55, although they knew the Creator; “and no man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him,” Matth. xi. 27. All know the Author of things, although one kind of knowing differs from another kind. Even the “Father of spirits,” Heb. xi. 9, conveys more than the idea of “Author of spirits.”

² However the meaning of אֱלֹהֵי אֲבוֹתָם, Mal. ii. 10, has been disputed, at all events here, under the expression “one Father,” the universal Author of human existence cannot be understood. Rather might we refer the subsequent כִּדְנָה to the founding of the people according to the instances in Isaiah xlii., Ps. cii. 19. For throughout the whole passage the point is, the necessary opposition to be maintained between Israel and the heathen, and the necessity of keeping unmixed Israelitish marriages. Other passages already referred to, which name the Father-God of Israel, are not doubtful, Deut. xxxii. 18; Isaiah lxiii. 16; Jeremiah xxxi. 9.

§ 83. THE SON.

The Son simply, or the Son of God, (ὁἰος, not παῖς¹ Θεοῦ), the only begotten of the Father, does not indeed convey exactly the same idea as the Word which was with God from the beginning; for the human appearance of the Redeemer is ever included in the Son, whilst the Logos admits of being distinguished from this manifestation. Moreover, “the Man Christ Jesus”

(1 Tim. ii. 5) is undoubtedly he who conditionates all our knowledge of the Son of God; but this human manifestation, Jesus of Nazareth, is revealed in part immediately and in part mediately in the conscience of believers, in such a manner that it preserves for its Divine principle, not only the Father, who sends the Son, but also the Son himself, who comes into the world. For in the first place, as touching the explanations which Jesus gives of himself, he ever selects such a Messianic designation of his person, which, [as “Son of Man,”² or “the sanctified and sent into the world,” John x. 36,] combines and maintains, together with the indication of the office, a signification of the being or essential character of the only Begotten, according as little faith or unbelief afford him occasion thereto; not simply the relations of a rational man unto God, nor merely such as, morally considered, might be deemed peculiar, but he assumes to himself, in part, a continual heavenly existence, John iii. 13, a co-existence and exclusive acquaintance with the Father, John x. 30, 38, xiv. 1, 9, Matth. xi. 27; and a dignity inseparable from that of the Father, John v. 23; and in part a pre-existence with the Father, John vi. 62, viii. 58, xvii. 5. A Divine condition, as regards Christ, the knowledge of which, according to his declaration, had been prepared by the revelation of the Old Testament,³ Matth. xxii. 45. The apostles, from the first, confessed him to be the one Lord, 1 Cor. viii. 6, who, as such, is proved to have become a participator in the Divine power and glory, through the resurrection, ascension, and imparting of the Spirit, Acts ii. 36, 1 Tim. iii. 16, 1 John v. 6. But they cannot pause here, inasmuch as he only could be thus elevated, who, even in the form of a servant, had been marked by something so peculiar, and had put on this condition after so peculiar a manner; hence the apostles acknowledge him to be the Lord from heaven, 1 Cor. xv. 47, and from his very birth recognise the personal combination of his human and Divine nature, Col. ii. 9, Rom. i. 4, ix. 5. Furthermore, they confessed that he proceeded from the Divine state into the human, Phil. ii. 6, seq., 2 Cor. viii. 9, and, as

existing before and surpassing all creatures, he had co-operated with the Father equally as Mediator in all the works of God, (such as those of creation,) as he even now does in the work of redemption, Col. i. 15–19, Heb. i. 3. Finally and pre-eminently, they believe that in him the Word or original principle of all Divine manifestations, creations, and acts, preparatory to redemption, and consequently the God of revelation and revelation itself, had become man. Hence, in the Son, we are bound to venerate Love, testifying and mediating itself—which is God.

¹ See my treatise, in *den Theoll. Studien und Kritiken*, &c. 1, 2, p. 331, as to whether *παῖς Θεου* signifies servant or Son of God, in Acts iii. 13. That *παῖς Θεου*, in the Acts of the Apostles, is equivalent to *יְהוָה*, and which I omitted to remark in the observations referred to, had been previously pointed out by Bengel, in his *Gnomon* to Matt. xii. 18. Stier and Olshausen also give their unqualified assent to this being the correct interpretation. The relation of the Servant of God to the Son of God has not hitherto been sufficiently recognized in Biblical theology. The idea conveyed by the Old Testament regarding the true service of God, of the religious life of man, and of the Divine complacency, or righteousness included in that idea, is realized by the figure—Servant of God. This Servant of God is generally the subject of divine worship, and as such, is human personality, elected, qualified, appointed, and operative, for the mediation of true religion to others, and is consequently a passive personality, and not only a faithful and approved one, but also one that reconciles, and is finally glorified. A perfect type comparable to the ideal wisdom of philosophy. The law requires and demands a just servant; prophecy seeks, and intuitively perceives him; and history realizes him. In the relation of Lord to a nation, Israel is a servant. In the relation of Lord to Israel, Moses is a servant; and whether it be a prophet or king, or the just and faithful remnant, *רַשָּׁאִים*, Isa. x. 21, they are servants also. But the perfect future remains still to be realized. Meanwhile we may remark, that those subjects which convey the idea of a just servant, according to any one characteristic, bear the name, and possess the qualities of the Son of God. Thus the Lord says, “Behold my servant, whom I uphold,” Isa. xlii. 1; also Ps. ii., “Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee.”

Israel is a child, son in plurality and unity. Again, the individual upholders of the theocracy are gods, sons of God. Sonship and adoption, in the likeness of God, conformable in nature, a divine substitute, each is distinct, yet in unison with servitude. This is self-evident; for the fellowship of God is effected in the Son, as an original Being; in the servant, as a necessary action and passion. Hence the contrasts, in which the servile, considered as the bad or the defective, is related to the filial, are possible, Rom. viii. 15; Gal. iv. 7; Heb. i. 5, 7, iii. 5, 6. But just as from the true sonship and adoption, referred to in the New Testament, there is true, free service and dependence of obedience and of righteousness, according to Rom. vi. 19, 22; Heb. v. 8, *καίπερ ὡν υἱός, ἔμαθεν—την ὑπακοήν*. So in like manner the servitude of the Old Testament includes elements of affection and love, and a striving after sonship. Even the distinction between servant and child may entirely disappear in the idea of appropriation and love, as, for example, in the designations of the people of God in the Book of Wisdom, (where, however, the ambiguity of the Greek *παῖδες* must be taken into account.) The servant of God, moreover, as a free or chosen individual, may transcend the abstract of Israelitish adoption, or mere official sonship and dignity. Greek etymologists remark, that *θεράπων* signifies more than *δοῦλος*; that it means the preferred, *οἰκόνομος*, *atriensis*, the trusted one; wherefore Moses, who enjoyed the most intimate and elevated relationship to God, is called in a peculiar manner by those Jews who wrote in Greek *θεράπων κυρίου*.—*Josephus*, i. ii. lxx.; *Book of Wisdom*, x. 16. Nevertheless, no prophet, as such, is denominated Son of God; and the highest realization of religious personal life, is conceived under the title of Servant of the Lord. This realization in the Old Testament is indeed present and past, but far more future. In the New Testament, that person indicates himself, who manifestly sees himself in the suffering and action of the just servant, and yet who realizes this perception, not as a servant, but as a son, as the only begotten Son of the Father. And why is this? Because the true servant can only be one in whom communion with God is an original divine inheritance, or procession from the Father, and one who has come into the world. The perfectly religious servant cannot be born according to the flesh—cannot be represented through the reciprocal action of the law and the promise, but can only be predicted and typified. The absolute reality of a service and obe-

dience acceptable to God, regarded as the abrogation of that which is opposed to necessity and freedom, is only given in the Son, who surpasses individual servants, sons, and priests, Luke xx. 13. The Son alone can be sinless, only his reconciliation of the people, ἀπαξ, because it is at the same time a life-giving redemption. Only as a Son will he receive not only the Spirit in full measure, but also baptize with the Spirit and with fire. As such, he cannot be in a merely external, temporal, and typical manner the chosen Son; he must be such after the mode of natural reality—thus the God-man.

¹ The first proper name employed by Jesus is Son of man, (according to Dan. vii. 13.) It must needs be a Messianic appellation; at least it appears from John v. 27, that such was the meaning of the Lord. And again, from the question put by the Jews, John xii. 34, (compare Matt. xvi. 13), it would appear that Jesus, in adopting this name, had chosen one not current at that time. It is not unimportant, that (with the exception of Acts vii. 55) the apostolic language does not employ at all extensively the more frequently occurring designation of Christ.

² See Justin M. *Dial. c. Tryph.*, p. 221, m. Sylb., 1593. Μαρτύριον δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ὑμῖν, ὦ φίλοι, ἔφην, ἀπὸ τῶν γραφῶν δώσω, ὅτι ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων ὁ Θεὸς γεγέννηκε τινὰ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογικὴν, ἣτις καὶ Δόξα κυρίου ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου καλεῖται, ποτὲ δὲ Ὑἱός, ποτὲ δε Σοφία, ποτὲ δὲ Ἄγγελος, ποτὲ δὲ θεός, ποτὲ δὲ Κύριος καὶ Λόγος· ποτὲ, δὲ Ἀρχιστρατηγὸν ἑαυτὸν λέγει ἐν ἀνθρώπου μορφῇ φανέντα τῷ τοῦ Ναυῆ Ἰησοῦ· ἔχει γὰρ πάντα προσοιομάζεσθαι, ἐκ τε τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ πατρικῷ βουλήματι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θελήσει γεγεννησθαι. It appears from various facts, that the apostle Paul expressly participates in such a view of the doctrine concerning God in the Old Testament; for not only in his exposition of Israelitish history does he substitute Christ for the God of revelation, or for Jehovah, 1 Cor. x. 4, 9; but he assigns unto Christ also the attributes which in the Old Testament can only be explained as those pertaining to Jehovah; for example, in Phil. ii. 10, compare Isa. xlv. 23.

§ 84. THE HOLY SPIRIT.

God is spirit—absolute; (§ 62) for he is eternal, independent, thinking life and action. That God knows himself and

loves, comes to pass through God as spirit, for no one can understand the depths of God, or what is in God, but the Spirit of God,¹ 1 Cor. ii. 11. But God exists not merely for himself in the plenitude of his self-consciousness. His self-existent objective state, his eternal image, is the Word, through which, and the Spirit, in which he creates all things—through which, and in which, he produces a finite condition and consciousness in finite existence. Ought not, then, God, as creator, upholder, and lord of all in which his honour dwelleth, be venerated also as Spirit? Wisdom and Word, Word and Spirit, are here to be regarded in their distinction, relation, and unity. In so far as the Divine breath, even as Divine speech, is the representation of divinely manifested power, operation, and efficacy, there exists between the Logos and the Spirit only a distinction of representation.² The mere parallelism of fulness elicits such an expression as occurs for example in Ps. xxxiii. 6. In so far as the breath indicates the communication of a peculiar essence, it is the especial creator of conscious existence, or of reason in existence, Gen. ii. 7, and is distinguished from the Creator of universal existence. Or, in so far as all revelations, creations, and operations of God have a spiritual import, they proceed from, and exist for the Spirit; so that every thing external must be the outward expression of what is inward, and, as such, is admonitory; and thus it is evident, that there is already, as regards the creation, preservation, and government of the world in particular, a distinct and peculiar operation of the Logos and the Spirit.³ It is certain that creative operations, even miracles (granting that they produce physical or physico-ethical states and conditions), are sometimes in like manner ascribed to the Spirit as well as to the Word, and sometimes to one or the other in particular, Gen. i. 2, compare v. 3; Ps. xxx. 6; Ps. civ. 30, compare Ps. cxlvii. 15; Job xxxiii. 4; Isaiah lv. 11. The same relation becomes more precisely known in the particular works of revelation and redemption. For as under the old covenant those especial persons through whom the Word of God was declared in distinct messages, legislatively and pro-

phetically, and in whom the theocratic guidance and culture of the typical people was vested, persons like Moses, the elders, rulers, priests, kings, and prophets, must have been in a condition of peculiar internal communion with God, and, as spiritual men, possessed of an inherent fitness for the kingdom of God, 1 Sam. x. 6, xix. 20; Isa. lxiii. 10; Ps. li. 13; Hos. ix. 7;⁴ thus was formed a hope of him who was to possess inspiration in full measure, Isaiah xi. 1, compare John i. 33, iii. 34, and of the time which should witness, not single and successive inspirations of prophets among the people, but a simultaneous inspiration of the people, and of all flesh, Joel iii.; Ezekiel xxxvi. 26, 27. This period had assuredly not yet arrived when Jesus desired to kindle fire and baptise with fire, Luke xii. 49; and so far also “the Holy Ghost was not yet given,” John vii. 39. Moreover, the world, as such, knew him not, and received him not, John xiv. 17. But as the first Paraclete which had appeared in the flesh announced John xiv. 16 (*ἄλλον παράκλητον*), 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7—15, that after his departure to the Father another would come to perfect the communion with God, among those who believed on the first; and this came to pass, Acts ii. And if from henceforth no one could be regarded as a true participator in Christ and salvation, or be considered a citizen of the house, and a witness of the honour of God, who had not received the gift of the Holy Spirit, and believed in the baptism of the Spirit, Acts xix. 1—5, compare viii. 15, or could not call Jesus Lord in the Holy Spirit, 1 Cor. xii. 3, Rom. viii. 9; then must Christian faith be essentially a belief in the Holy Spirit; and not only do the distinctions of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, from God the Father, and the Lord Jesus, but also the comparisons of the same, with these names, persons, and causalities (Acts v. 3, 4; 1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 19, xii. 4—7; (Lord, God, Spirit,) 2 Cor. xiii. 13, indicate that we are bound to adore God, who is love, as the Holy Spirit, that is, as love equally divine, considered as animating communicating and appropriating through the Word; and hence, as Christians, we ought to feel ourselves just as

dependent on the majesty and glory of the God Jesus Christ, revealed in the sanctuary of the heart and conscience, as we universally do on God.⁵

¹ Hence it appears how Synesius was enabled to represent the Spirit to a certain extent as μέσον between the Father and the Son, God and Logos; or how Marius Victorinus describes the Spirit as the mother of the Son. See my *Theoll. Stud.* 1816, pp. 96 and 67: according to him the Father is *esse*, the Spirit *intelligere*, the Son *vivere*, and thus the complete triad, *Spiritus tripotens*.

² Thus, it is apparent that the Shepherd of Hermas is unacquainted with the Holy Spirit as the third person, and is in general unacquainted with any third, but rather knows him as the second, the Logos, Son of God, *Sim.* v. 4; and, in like manner, we can understand that the Spirit of Wisdom, according to the Book of Wisdom, i. 7, vii. 22, is the power of God, which sustains, conserves, and interpenetrates the universe.

³ Hence the Spirit in general is, according to Basilius, δύναμις τελειωτική, and thus generally is external to the economy of redemption, conditioning the finite spiritual being, from which it is distinct. Book of Wisdom vii. 23, και δια πάντων χωρῶν πνευμάτων νοερῶν καθαρῶν λεπτοτάτων. Compare Augusti's *Lehrbuch der Christ. Dogmengesch.*, 4th edit. p. 307.

⁴ From the circumstance of the Old Testament introducing Divine judgments announced by the prophets under the form—"The Spirit of the Lord came upon him," or "the word of the Lord came," we might indeed conclude that a state of inspiration in which they were, was not assumed, but rather claimed for the Messiah, upon whom the Spirit was to rest and remain. But the Spirit of the Lord, however, did not fall accidentally and indiscriminately upon this or that person, but upon qualified instruments, otherwise the names, interpreter of God, seer, or even אוֹשֶׁר־הַדָּבָר would not have been conferred on appointed persons.

⁵ There is as little reason to doubt the personality of the Holy Spirit, by what the New Testament says of the Spirit's indicating a state of sanctification, or holy definiteness for internal Christian life, as there is to believe that the words of St John i. 1, 12, he who has the Son has life, or the doctrine of Christ, who is to take a form within us, do away with the personality of the Son.

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF THE CREATURE.

§ 85. THE WORLD.

In every element of the Christian idea of God there exists a relation to a being, that is not God, but is of him, and for him. We perceive God in his works, and the world as the work of God; whatever is, and is not God, is the creature of God.¹ The regulated universality of things, or the world,² is not a mere semblance of existence, but has an actual being, because it has been created by God, and is preserved, governed, annihilated, and renewed by him.³

¹ Πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις, Rom. viii. 19–22, may signify the human race as it is by nature, just as in Mark xvi. 15, mankind, may be understood. Inasmuch as the contrasting verse (23) οὐ μόνον δὲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ only opposes the spiritually Christian man to κτίσις, we may venture to assume that κτίσις can only mean the conscious personal being, the natural human race. Yet the latter, as Olshausen justly remarks, if the question turns upon a need of redemption and a waiting for renovation, cannot assuredly be excluded, but rather appears alone to be taken into account. Yet the passage, “the whole creation groaneth,” cannot simply be regarded as a prelude to the yet incomplete redemption of spiritual mankind, verse 23, but the stress lies in its reference to verse 18, which is intimated by the particle γάρ. There will be, saith the apostle, a δόξα, an ἀποκάλυψις “of the children of God.” Christians are not alone in their suffering. The universe expects a renovation; but such can only come to pass by and with the manifestation of the “children of God,” and then there is for these also ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος. Hence we concur with the most recent expositors; but still there remains a difficulty in the words αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις ἐλευθερωθήσεται εἰς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς δόξης τῶν τέκνων τοῦ Θεοῦ.

² In the more ancient Hebrew, there is no single word to ex-

press *created universe*; for תּוֹלַד is only אָרֶץ, and עוֹלָם is in Psalm lxxiii. 12, not correctly translated world. In Judaism, of a later period, time, or the all of time, appears to have been used to express the all of the finite, hence αἰῶνες, Heb. i. 2; xi. 3, is equivalent to—universe; on the other hand, there occurs in the New Testament, with the circumlocution, heaven and earth, also the expression κόσμος (mundus), for example, in John xvii. 5, in which passage it cannot mean, as Schleiermacher supposes, (p. 209,) mankind, because the expression καταβολή does not admit of this interpretation. With reference to the Greek idea of κόσμος, see Plutarch *de Placc. Philoss.* ii. § 1. Πυθαγορας πρῶτος ὠνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιόχην κόσμον, ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως.

³ A religious view of the world does not merely consist in our perceiving in and upon it manifestations and impressions of the Divine perfections; for this perception even would be deceptive and contingent, were we to consider the world not as the work of God in its complete dependence on Divine causality; in our view efficient causes are to be distinguished from final ones. If we refer the dependence of the world to the final ground of its existence, there arises the idea of CREATION and CONSERVATION, to which the attribute of POWER pre-eminently corresponds; if, on the other hand, we refer it to the highest aim of all-wise love, in that case the doctrines of PROVIDENCE and GOVERNMENT of the world come into view. An adjustment between the aetiological and teleological ideas constitutes the doctrine of Divine co-operation (concursum), although, according to Twisten, (who, differing somewhat from De Wette, has ascribed to it more importance than any modern author), the latter belongs rather to aetiology. Creation does not exhibit a perfect idea of the world's dependence, for whosoever considers it alone, can imagine God as if receding from his work, and leaving it to itself; but God must be a sustainer of the world; thus the religious view does not exclude, but rather requires, that we should seek the ground of phenomena in the operation of final causes, so far as they extend. But even these do not merely operate because God has called them into being, and sustains them in the same; but they operate as they ought, and that, too, under his influence. For example, God blesses the operation of remedies. This feature of dependence especially demands the idea of a *concursum*. Still the question continually arises, whether co-operation be not a something in and on preservation, in and on the government of the

world, a necessary relation of both to the self-life of the creature, rather than something in itself, and co-ordinate with preservation and government.

§ 86. CREATION.

The all of the finite, together with its arrangement and conformity to its object, has originated alone through the will of God, by his manifestation of power,¹ or his word, consequently, it has no other source, nor is it self-derived;² and because it has been created by God, it is good.³ That the act of creation has a perfect unity of object and will with that of redemption, is assured to us by the fact, that the one God has created all things, not through serving mediators or independent agencies, but by the same Logos who became flesh, John i. 3; Col. i. 26; Heb. i. 2; 1 Cor. viii. 6. Consequently the world is not the eternal Word of God, but something distinct from God and his Word. But since it was created by the Word of God, it has been formed conformably to his revelation, and so regulated as not only to mediate Divine revelation, but also to partake of it.

¹ Genesis i. 3; Psalm xxxiii. 6; Heb. xi. 3.

² Even the expression ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα does not convey the idea of an efflux, or an irradiation from the Divine essence, but rather that of causality. God calleth those things which be not as though they were, Rom. iv. 17. The old saying, “ex nihilo nihil fit,” is not opposed to, but directly in favour of the idea of creation; instead of applying it as an objection to the truth of creation, we ought rather employ it against the mere logical or ideal ground of the origination of a world.

³ Genesis i. 31. ISIDORUS *de Officiis Ecclesiasticis*, lib. ii. c. 23. de regula fidei. Nullam omnino esse visibilem invisibilemque substantiam, nisi aut quæ Deus sit aut a bono Deo bona creata sit: sed Deus summe et incommutabiliter bonus, creatura vero inferius et commutabiliter bona.

REMARK 1. There are views of the origin, extent, and end of the world which cannot be clearly represented in idea. Of all metaphysical questions, the philosophy of time and space is that

which has been the least determined, and far too little so to cope with the suppositions of Biblical theism subsisting in this point of view. A view of the world's origin is indispensable, *first*, because the absolute condition of the world's existence through God, can only thus be represented; the truth of its creation, and the relative distinction between its creation and preservation, can only, in like manner, be so maintained; and, *secondly*, because the infinitude of time and the world would deprive the latter, together with its history, of its real and objective signification, and would likewise injure the conception of the ultimate aim. Realizations are either only a semblance, and therefore nullities, or they have a beginning and an end. The speculative difficulties of an origin in its relation to the eternal principle of creation have not as yet indeed been thereby removed, but they are not greater in regard to Theism, than they are with reference to Pantheism.

REMARK 2. Theologians, especially with reference to the occasion of the Mosaic primeval history, namely, to that of the six days' work, have correctly distinguished between *creatio mediata* and *creatio prima, immediata*. There are central originations of natural life, whose foundation is to be referred to a regulating omnipotence, not to an operating nature. Nature, existing and subsisting under human gradation, although corresponding to the creation of man, and susceptible of an act of human creation, is nevertheless unable to produce man by itself, and through mere self-development. See Twisten's *Vorlesungen*, ii. p. 81.

§ 87. PRESERVATION.

The created world exists by the same will and the same word from whence it originated, Heb. i. 3. *φέρω τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ*: whereon two judgments of faith are consequent, *first*, Notwithstanding the self-life impressed on it by creation, still the creature has no independent existence, and is in itself altogether mortal and transient, Psalm civ. 29; Luke xii. 5, 20; xxi. 33. *Second*, Nothing dies prematurely, nothing passes away without the will of Him who hateth nothing that he hath made, Book of Wisdom xi. 24, who hath bestowed the means for realizing the ultimate aim of existence, and who can rescue

from death, and has implanted, not in vain, a vital instinct in his creatures; Psalm cxlv.; cxlvii; Luke xii., &c. Acts xiv. 17; Heb. xi. 19.¹

¹ On the importance of the idea of preservation in Christian Doctrine, see Calvin, *Institut. Rel. Chr.* i. c. 16 in.; and for a too intimate union of this idea with that of creation, see De Wette, § 37, and Schleiermacher i. 194. Both views are not perchance only separated and united in holy Scripture, as, for example, in Acts xvii. 24–28; Heb. i. 2, 3, because the latter view does not recognise the abstract idea of causality, which is identical in both, or the idea of the first *motor*; but rather must Biblical theism as such, not only teach the existence of a Preserver, but also that of a Creator, not only of a Creator, but also of a Preserver. It is precisely the perfection of aetiology which requires distinction in the unity of both operations.

§ 88. GOVERNMENT.

Creation and preservation elicit a self-life, and a spontaneity in the creature which do not correspond to the final causes of things, mechanically or contingently. We know by faith the ruling, permitting, and preventing, the limiting and directing efficiency of omniscient and omnipotent love, which, slowly or speedily, attaining to either the revealed or hidden goal, realizes the object of creation and preservation in every element of the world, and which induces the best self-determinations through each point of relation between nature and spirit, between the external and internal, the individual and the universal—that love which reduces to order the evil and the bad, which are opposed to order, and displays itself most perfectly in the fact of redemption, Rom. ix. 11. No result entirely corresponds to human expectation or efforts, Proverbs xvi.; Isaiah xxviii. 29. And since among results, the fact of the world's redemption, or of its new destiny, through Jesus Christ, has in the clearest manner manifested Divine administration, in like manner Christian knowledge of the Divine govern-

ment of the world has been imparted in the highest degree through the recognition of Christ as the surety of the world's duration, and as a pledge for its consummation, Matthew xi. 27; xxviii. 18; 1 Cor. xv. 25, 26.

REMARK 1. We do not place God's ruling limitation and influence either at the very beginning, nor yet in the middle, nor exclusively at the end, of creatural spontaneity. The first assumption, God governs through the settled constitution of the world, *præstabilitio, prædeterminatio*, would, were it exclusively admitted, abolish even the idea of the world's government, that is to say, it would extinguish its occasioning cause, the self-life of the creature. Creation and preservation simply constitute the basis, and necessarily presupposition of the administration of the world. The second assumption, *concursum, influxus suavis, non cogens*, must certainly be added, and possesses, in the distinction of *concursum ad formale* and *materiale actionum entis creati*, a genuine meaning, (although neither a partial, physical influence, nor a mutual approximation or co-operation of Divine and finite causality is sufficient). Now, (according to the partial, third assumption,) human action can never by any means become the occasion of Divine ones, and thus pass into nullity and illusion; nor can Divine efficiency be limited to miraculous amelioration. But, after all, human action, as an empirical act, enters anew into the conditions of nature and of the world, and is, in its result, out of the power of man. They are bad, and yet take flight. They consult, yet nothing ensues. Design is from man, but what the tongue shall speak comes from the Lord. The truth of *occasionalismus* does not consist in denying the reality and freedom of human action, but in its administering to the whole; consequently, in all those modes, and in their connection, we recognise Scriptural features of the idea concerning the world's government as an all-conditionating agency. That this conception does not annul again the spontaneity of the creature, is apparent from the fact of the free action of man being in the highest degree that in which, and through which, God governs. But even free action is in general the direct and invariable will and aim of God. How invariably any new cause is related to free action, every point of the circumstance produced by Divine government shows. Nevertheless, if free action, as a contradiction to an aim, cannot be itself the aim, and if it not only

devolves on a limiting constitution, but also on jurisdiction, which is an element of government, then is it notwithstanding, related through an executive power to a means. All the elements in which we develop the idea of a rational state serve to unfold the idea of the government of the world by God.

REMARK 2. Divine providence, (*ἀιώνιος πρόνοια*, Book of Wisdom xvii. 2,) correctly speaking, in the sense of Hellenic antiquity, foresight, precaution, although at the same time meaning pre-consideration, is either to be understood as the unity of conservation and government, or as the intent of the administrator, or as government in relation to the possible or actual existence of evil. We become acquainted with Divine permissions and inflictions of pure evil (that is of natural evil) by redemption, as being preservations, acts of benevolence, and as reactions against the evil of lust, and as a medium for the revelation of supernatural good. Moral evil is, in its possibility, natural good; in its actual phenomenon as external, it is a counteraction against the bad of the internal; finally, in its intrinsic reality, although damnable, it is yet removed by the power of the Redeemer; thus being absolutely vincible, as it is in itself groundless. This forms the essential idea of a Theodicy. See Twisten's *Vorless.* ii. 1, who at first, indeed, lays aside the idea of Divine permission, but at the conclusion of his reflections accords to it a certain degree of indispensability.

REMARK 3. The idea of a special providence included in a universal one is therefore not to be rejected, because the ultimate aim of universal being is not in an equal mode and degree developed in all individual being; and the antithesis of that which is conformable to, and opposed to the end in view, being first based on the undetermined, is distinguished by finally becoming the determinate. Mankind are instruments for promoting the Divine glory, but some are only passive and resistant, others are susceptible and spontaneous. Compare the contrasts running through the Book of Wisdom, cap. xii. and xvi.—xix., and Romans ix.

§ 89. PERSONAL CREATURE.

The world, considered as created and preserved, governed, and redeemed by God, does not attain the perfect object for

which it was designed in all the creatures, of which it consists, but only in the personal creature.¹ For even the honour of God, or His revelation, would not constitute a sufficient aim for things created, if they did not minister to rational and free beings, partly by exciting contemplation, partly as serving for a bond of communication, and finally by providing *material* for discipline.

¹ That, on the one hand, anthropogony concludes the six days work, and on the other, is especially represented as the work of a Divine decree, Gen. i. 26, **סָדַרְנוּ אֶת־הַשָּׁמַיִם** is in the Mosaic cosmogony full of significancy. The plural in **הַשָּׁמַיִם** cannot alone be referred, as by Philo, who follows Plato, to the co-operation of inferior agencies, *de Opif. Mundi*, § 24, ed. Lips. i. 25. On the other hand, Theodoret opposes, *Quæst. xx. in Gen.*, and quotes from Theodorus the following instructive passage on the creation of man: *Πρόδηλον τοίνυν, ὅτι ἓνα κόσμον ἀποτελεσαι τὸ σύμπαν βουληθεὶς ὁ θεὸς καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν ἐκ διαφόρων φύσεων συστάσαν, Ἰδητῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων, λογικῶν τε καὶ ἀλογων, ὄρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων, εἰς ἓν τι συναγαγεῖν ἐθέλησας, σύνδεσμον ἀπάντων τὸν ἄνθρωπον καπεσκέυασεν. οὕτως πάντα πρὸς αὐτὸν συναγαγὼν τῇ χρείᾳ, ὥστε συνήφθαι τε τὴν συμπασαν κτίσιν ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ φιλίας αὐτὸν ἐνέχυρον ἐναργεῆς εἶναι τῇ πασῇ.*

§ 90. MAN AND ANGELS.

As the Son of God took not on him the nature of angels, but of man, Heb. ii. 16, we refer the design of the visible world especially unto man, without denying thereby the existence and aim of the invisible world. The latter, even, has been so far disclosed, in and by the facts of Divine revelation, John i. 51, that we possess an adequate knowledge of the existence, praise, and ministry of angels to animate our faith, hope, and love, by the representation of their typical innocence, servitude, and blessedness, and of the glory of God in them. But angels, neither fundamentally or determinately, influence our faith or our love; hence, strictly speaking, the question cannot be concerning a belief in angels, (which indeed might be faulty,)² or concerning

any duty or obligation to them which we might have to fulfil in this temporal state and world.

¹ Matthew xviii. 10; xxii. 30; Luke xv. 10; 1 Pet. i. 12.

² Col. ii. 18; Heb. i. 7; ii. 5; Revel. xxii. 9. If we admit the theory of a celestial hierarchy, introduced into Christianity by the so-called Dionysius of Areopagus from the Neoplatonic school, and which theory was more justly estimated by Gregory the Great than by the theologians of the middle ages, then must the subject be viewed in a very different light; for, in that case, the church on earth and the hierarchy could just as little conceive and venerate Diety, apart from the mediation of angels, as the laity of the church on earth could do so without its sacerdotal gradations.

REMARK. The idea in the expressions, message, charge, then messenger, servant of God, as occurring in the Old Testament, has its peculiar ground and origin in *ברכלאד*. It is neither a descent into polytheism, nor is it adopted from without; for, although the Jews acknowledge that their ancestors imported the terms on their return from the Babylonian captivity, and the dogma of the object was either due to, or occasioned by that intercourse, still the domestic origin is rather confirmed than otherwise by such considerations. It is equally far from being a poetic luxuriance of Jehovah's encircling pomp. An angel is consequent to, and the result of the veneration of a supernatural God in local, peculiar miracles and phenomena, particularly in such as are referable to the founding and preservation of a theocracy. An angel is not an independent thesis, still less a confirmed perception and experience, but is the hypothesis of an intelligent, Divine mediate cause perceived in miracle. Thus it might be said to be only a subjective representation. If we should attend only to Psalm civ. 4; Heb. i. 7, and to the varied definableness of the object, and predicate according to the Hebrew or Alexandrian text, the dogma might seem to derive its origin from poetry, especially if we take into account the kindred, Psalm cxlviii. 8, and the analogous relation of *Anger*, 2 Sam. xxiv. 1, and Satan, 1 Chron. xxi. 1. But apart from the consideration, that frequently, a free poetic use and direction of thought may be referred to a primary basis of dogmatic conception, still the observation of the subjective genesis of a cognition does not entitle us to deny to it a real

objectivity. Jesus treats an angelic creature, as an existing reality, at a period, and under circumstances where such was denied, Matt. xx. 30. Jesus represents angels in a parable, Matt. xiii. 39, but they cannot be a parable unto Jesus himself. Now if, with the sage of antiquity, we nevertheless speak of an intervening cause under a personification, then a question arises, whether the modern doctrine may not again have changed the *actual* and *vital* into the *abstract*, and whether or not *vivæ et intelligentes causæ secundæ et virtutes* are to be considered as presiding over mankind.

§ 91. MAN.

Man was created in the likeness,¹ or after the similitude of God, James iii. 9; Gen. i. 27, that is to say, a personal being; but this personality neither implies absolute immortality,² nor absolute freedom, but indicates that man's fundamental destiny is to know Him of whom, and by whom he is, 1 Cor. viii. 6, *ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸν*,—to know God, Acts xvii. 27; John xvii. 3, to love himself and his fellow-creatures in God, and to become blessed in Divine communion with men and angels.³

¹ Even the first Adam is the son of God, Luke iii. 38, and, to a certain extent *μονογενῆς*, but not the only begotten Son of God; he was created after the image, but not the image, the brightness or express image of God, Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 2. Judaic gnosis alone elevates him to absolute, archetypal man, who neither fell, nor could fall, Book of Wisdom x. 1. Upon the point, that "the image" does not refer to what is individual in man, but to man as a whole, Epiphanius has made some pertinent remarks, proving at the same time that such cannot be lost. *C. Haer.* lib. iii. in c. Audian.

² If God alone hath immortality, then man, even before the fall, was not *φύσει* immortal, but *χάριτι τῆς τοῦ λόγου μετουσίας*, as Athanasius teaches. *de Incarn. Tractat.* i. § 5, whilst, at the same time, he harmonizes with the statement in Book of Wisdom ii. 23.

³ Man's original destiny for fellowship is included in the idea of the person, and is acknowledged in the highest and most per-

fect relation to exist in Christian doctrine. See Theremin's *Doctrine of the Divine Kingdom*, 1st and 2d chapter of the 1st book. Compare Marc. Antonin. εἰς εἰ ii. 16. τέλος δὲ λογικῶν ζῶων τοῦ ἐπέσθαι τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας τῆς πρεσβυτάτης λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῷ.

§ 92. BODY AND SOUL.

As the representation or type embodying the idea of personality has been primarily derived from the human body, namely, from the countenance; so the body is not opposed to the fundamental destiny of man in himself (Book of Wisdom vi. 15,) but is conducive and serviceable to the same. Spirit and body, or soul and body,¹ constitute an originally good unity, which God has created and endowed with his holy and wise determinations, Gen. ii. 7; 1 Cor. vi. 19; xii. 24. True similitude or personality, indeed, does not absolutely require corporeal existence; but since personality is to be considered both as a natural gift and as a destination, so the soul requires a temporal and earthly dwelling-place, and an organic bond of union with the world, in which, and on which, it may manifest itself as a personal Being, or Divine resemblance.

¹ Upon the whole, Theodoret's remark holds good, *Dial.* ii. p. 79, tom. iv. ἡ δὲ θεία γραφή μίαν ὀιδεν ὀύ δύο ψυχᾶς.—that what appertains to the spirit and to the soul, in the region of morals, may be distinguished, admits of no doubt, as appears from 1 Cor. ii. 14. But it may be asked whether, in consequence of this practical consideration, we can refer back to the physical or real distinction between spirit and soul, and how such distinction, according to 1 Thess. v. 23, and Hebrews iv. 12, where it appears full of significance, is to be defined. It is not perhaps sufficient to remember the mere contrast *facultates superiores et inferiores*, for the question equally turns on the unity of being, where it is to be sought, and whether the soul be rather the adjective of the spirit, a faculty or power of the spirit; or, on the other hand, whether the soul of man be spiritual, and have spirit. The soul is the unity of the spirit and body, the individual life and finiteness of the spirit. The soul alone presents to us a conception of the individual, with his disposition for spirituality and true personality. It is the *ego*

comprehended in its universal primary self-consciousness, in its general determinableness. But precisely as a human, not as an animal soul is it spiritual, rational, and capable of self-determination, and was created and destined for the purpose of entering and being absorbed into the innate consciousness of dependence on God, and of its freedom in God on every occasion of sensuous self-excitation. *ψυχικοί, πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες*, Jude 19, cannot therefore be understood absolutely, but only in the sense in which we speak of irrational and unspiritual men; because spirit and reason appear as powers existing in them, yet inoperative. The human, consequently the spiritual soul, must thus become what it is, must pass out of its mere natural *egoism* into actual self-hood and personality, it must become spirituous *κατ' ἀλήθειαν*, and thus spiritual, or achieve the *formal*. Thus I am and live, yet not I, but God, the truth, liveth in me. If the soul achieve, on the other hand, the opposite *formal*, and does not elevate itself into the sphere of spiritual self-consciousness, but continues in the sensuous; or, by means of that self-consciousness, places itself as an individual and egoistic being under the form of a false divinity, it thus represents more and more the mere psychological man, who, as such, is no better than a carnal one.

² 2 Cor. v. 1. *ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν δικία του σκήνους*. It is not an expression of sorrow for man's corporeality as such, when the Apostle exclaims, Rom. vii. 24, *τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*, but for his corporeal existence, in so far as that had been a cause and an occasion of fleshly opposition to the law of God. The carnal condition, however, in its rejected state, is that cause and occasion, and even corporeality in itself has been so mistaken and condemned, as occurs in some measure in the Book of Wisdom, ix. 15, *φθαρτον γαρ σῶμα βαρυνει ψυχὴν και βριθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφροντίδα*.

§ 93. EARTHLY DESTINATION.

Although man by reason of his nature already lives for a higher and a heavenly destiny, through the power of which he is enabled even here to have "his conversation in heaven," and as a pilgrim to seek his true paternal city; still earthly destinies are appointed for him by God, which relate to his fundamental

destiny, (whether in the way of image or type¹) explained in § 91, and require either to be viewed more in the nature of objects and blessings, or as natural means for attaining the highest good. In marriage and home, state and church, science and art, these destinations refer to such a preservation and consummation of society, that thereby for the most part the right of every human being to govern his circumstances, and to perform his duty towards God, is fully attained.

¹ A representation uniting the archetypal and the earthly typical occurs, for instance, in the following passages:—*πᾶσα πατριὰ ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς*, Ephes. iii. 15, *πατρις*, Heb. xi. 14, *πόλις*, verse 16.

§ 94. THE GOOD (*ἀγαθόν*.)

None of the preceding destinations can be considered as a mere illusion of instinct, but for every instinct implanted by God in human nature there is a correlative true good, which the inexhaustible riches of God prepares in order that it may be an inducement to supplication, or that it may serve to elicit human spontaneity when directed to that good, and thus constitute a means of his tasting the goodness of God, and in its place complete the fellowship of being. Gen. i. 28, 30, ii. 8, 15, 16; Ps. xxxiv. 9; James i. 17. *πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ κ. λ.* Luke xi. 5–13, *πᾶς γὰρ, ὁ αἰτῶν λαμβάνει.* 1 Tim. iv. 4, *οὐδὲν ἀπόβλητον, μετὰ εὐχαριστίας λαμβανόμενον.*

REMARK. With God and through God there is fulness of joy; this is declared in the Old Testament (Ps. xvi. 11, xxxvi. 9; Isa. lv. 1–3), by imagery the most suitable and expressive of enjoyment. And whilst Jesus, with divine importunity, invites man to partake in his rest and refreshment, Matt. xi. 28, whilst he offers a full sufficiency, John x. 11; and promises that he will for ever appease both hunger and thirst, John iv. 13, vi. 35, He at the same time attests, *first*, the Divine aim of human need in general; and *secondly*, in a mediate manner, He declares that those sensuous requirements, employed by him as images,

are conformable to the object for which they were originally implanted.

§ 95. WANTS AND INSTINCTS.

Even these destinations do not subsist apart from that definiteness of human nature by means of which man meets them in a mode independent of all will and attribution, namely, through the necessity of his original want and instinct. And that man has been especially created with a desire and in reference to a want is apparent, not only from the simple characteristic of his original condition, which, according to Gen. ii., is altogether accounted receptive and necessitous; but it also appears from this, that in a state of degeneracy or of bias there is universally recognised, and remains, to a certain extent, partly that which is natural and blameless in the excitation of the sensuous instinct for preservation and enjoyment, and partly a higher desire. 1 Cor. vi. 13; Mark vii. 15; 1 Tim. iv. 3; Rom. vii. 18, 23, viii. 22.¹

¹ Compare De Wette *Chr. Sittenlehre* i. § 9–14. Σάρξ, θέλημα σαρκός, επιθυμία, לֵב, רֵעַד &c., as often as they are used to express a propensity, convey at the same time a moral and indifferent signification applicable to the natural.

§ 96. ORDER OF GOODS AND INSTINCTS.

To the unity and multiplicity of man's destiny there corresponds an original order of goods and instincts. This harmony does not merely consist in the aims and requirements for preservation being placed before those of enjoyment, Luke xi. 23; 1 Tim. vi. 8., in the goods of domestic and civil society being pre-appointed for the advantages of refined culture, or in honour and liberty, being raised above opulence, but it chiefly consists in this, that the whole of the lower life and good, con-

sidered as simply mediate, and, to a certain extent, foreign to man, Luke xvi. 12, is subordinate to the “one thing needful,” x. 42; or that, what belongs to the earthly or individual life (*βίος*, 1 John ii. 16; Luke xxi. 34), is placed under that which is suited to his true life (*ζωή*). “Man does not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God,” Mat. iv. 4. “To every thing there is a season,” Eccl. iii. 1—9, and universally, through the subordination of things, every thing becomes lawfully ours; so that apart from this subordination, whatever is useful, beneficial, and right, is changed into the opposite, 1 Cor. iii. 21—23, x. 23.

§ 97. FLESH AND SPIRIT.

Two kinds of desire in human nature, which, without violating the ordinary form of speech, we may denominate those of the flesh and of the spirit, are not in themselves opposed to each other; for even though the sensuous desire be necessarily that which is earliest excited, still the supersensuous has unconditional claims upon the will; but the capacity for the moral development and progress of man, consists in this, that these desires separate and contend under the influence of individual excitement. Hence the higher life of a finite moral creature becomes so much the more perfect in proportion as it embodies the excitations of consciousness in time, and limits and governs them.

REMARK. The antagonism between the higher and lower vital impulse as represented, in a similar manner, in Gal. v. 17, and in Rom. vii. 22, 23, is a derived, and not an original one, in its kind. Doubtless, however, their original distinction, and merely possible opposition, is expressed in these passages referred to, by the contrast of the inner man, and of the law in his members, or in that of the spirit and the flesh.

§ 98. FREEDOM AND CONSCIENCE.

The relation of a personal being to his destiny, or to Divine

order, can never be perfected by a mere activity of our instinct, however excited; for between action and impulse there intervene thought and will, partly modifying action, partly conditioning the greater or lesser excitation of instinct. Innate freedom, which is a necessary element in man's personality, consists in this, namely, that man is not compelled to execute the requirements of reason by the author of reason, and that he has the power of thinking, willing, and acting, in opposition to the demands of desire. Hence the fact of conscience, or the revelation of Divine righteousness in the human mind, is a pledge that man's freedom is no mere semblance or hidden natural necessity,¹ Rom. ii. 15.

¹ It has often been asserted that before the fall man had no conscience, and that it consists in a necessary modification of his moral consciousness, which could only be realized after the fall. Doubtless, conscience, in one sense, must be distinguished from conscience in another, as the usual formulæ *antecedens*, *concomitans*, &c. imply; and conscience, wherein a condemning or approving prerogative is manifested, is distinct from that conscience wherein *justitia legislativa* is consummated; *conscientia legis*, *συνείδησις τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ θεοῦ*, moral conscience in general, is as necessarily united with the existence of man as such, and with his development in sin, as it is with his development for obedience, or for repentance and conversion. When the woman remembered, Gen. iii. 2, 3, that God had *said* and forbidden, she did not sin thereby, she had not as yet sinned, but she manifests that she had a conscience.

REMARK 1. Although freedom in the New Testament, regarded strictly as a gift of redemption, and considered as a contrast of slavish propensity to mere external independence, John viii. 36, or that of the present oppressed condition of the world, Rom. viii. 21, or that of compulsion by law and opinion, 1 Cor. vii. 23, Gal. v. 13, is maintained, recommended, and hoped. Still the gospel, in general the Word of God, is the strongest testimony of the original freedom in which, and for which, man was created, a testimony which continually recurs, partly in the alternations of prophecy, Deut. xxx. 15, and in the Divine precepts in general, partly in the perpetual imputations of sinfulness and sin, and partly in the continual requirement, "Repent ye, and

believe the gospel," Mark i. 15. One of the strongest expressions occurs in Matthew xi. 12, "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force."

REMARK 2. At all times the explanations of what is understood by freedom are either distinguished more in regard to the power of choosing between the good and the bad, or in respect of the power of self-determination, independent of motives grounded on the senses. Schelling and Kant. The above explanation, which although it seems to be removed from the idea of freedom as represented in the New Testament, yet endeavours to do justice to both, whilst it indicates with the former character a more negative freedom, and with the latter a positive one.

§ 99. RIGHT AND LAW.

The will, that necessarily thinks, in the development of the personal life destined for social action, is that channel through which Divine legislation enters, and where the wisdom and majesty of God are revealed in the pre-existing conscience. The higher instinct of life refers, in all its claims, to the existence and truth of those relations between personal beings, founded by God; and whilst it is reflected upon a knowledge of the same, there arises in man a natural knowledge of law, Rom. ii. 14; and in conformity with which he acknowledges, "God hath said," Gen. iii. 3. An image of the inviolable relations and orders of the Divine kingdom impressed on our consciousness, is presented anew from without in various ways to the sinner, should the impression be more or less obliterated through sin. In the inviolableness of that relation consists justice, or the abstract of right¹ and duty;² and the law speaks thereon in particular commands, (*ἐντολή*, Rom. vii. 7–9, *δόγμα*, Ephes. ii. 15), and prohibitions.

¹ In the following passages the statutes of the Lord are regarded as an object of the spirit's internal joy, and as an efflux of Divine wisdom and grace, Ps. xix. 8, 9, cxi. 3, cxix. Compare Rom. vii. 12, 22, *συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ*.

§ 100. GOOD AND BAD.

These rights and laws considered as the object of the highest satisfaction, or in their perfect conformity to truth and love, constitute the good,¹ in contrast to the bad. That mode of human life is good in the same degree as it is related through faith and obedience to the truth of Divine order, as revealed in the law, or to the Divine will; hence it not only endeavours to become just to the actual good (*ἀγαθόν*), but also strives to promote possible good, and whatsoever is included in a disposition for the same, Mich. vi. 8. The bad, consequently, is that which, in imagination and effort, in action and permission, perverts, denies, and mistakes, as far as it can, Divine order; and while it assumes circumscribed existence for its motive, it progresses from indolent self-love to the love of unbelief and to unreal freedom of disobedience.

¹ טוב, Micah vi. 8; Genesis ii. 17. τὸ καλόν, Rom. vii. 18, 21. τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τελειον, Rom. xii. 2; Ephes. v. 10.

§ 101. VIRTUE.¹

The image in which man was created has been placed under temporal limits and trial, in order that it may be built up into a free and blessed likeness, (Eph. iv. 24), under Divine guidance, by wisdom and righteousness in love; and in reference to internal and external opposition, be perfected by temperance and perseverance.²

¹ The abstract idea of virtue has not indeed sprung from the religion of the Old Testament, for the latter derives its moral life pre-eminently from Divine communication and grace, or considers it in an especial manner as consisting in obedience, righteousness, and fulfilment of the Divine commands. Hence the words *ἀρετή* and *ἀρεταί* are used in a very subordinate sense,

and with the special meaning, “power, vigour,” 1 Pet. ii. 9; 2 Pet. i. 3; Phil. iv. 8; 2 Pet. i. 5. In the two latter passages it has a peculiar moral signification in reference to its fitness for effecting Divine order.

² Compare Schleiermacher on the scientific treatment of the idea of virtue, in *Abhandl. der Philos. Cl. der Königl. Preuss. Akad. der Wiss.*, 1818–19. Berlin, 1820.

§ 102. CONCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE CREATURE.

Doubtless the trial of faith and obedience, Gen. ii. 17, together with all its possible consequences, formed a part of the divine education of Adam, or was required, in order to develop his natural personality, just as much as the institution of his relation to the other creatures, and to his social condition was needed; but he might, even without the fall, and by means of an innocent antagonism of flesh and spirit,¹ have advanced by an endless gradation towards perfection.²

¹ In reply to objections made to this view, I would observe, that primeval man presents a contrast of flesh and spirit, and that, apart from sin, there is an antagonism of this kind. I am well aware that Scripture does not IMMEDIATELY instruct us concerning this antagonism, but either does not permit human nature to be altogether understood, as it was, according to Scripture, constituted and created by God, and says nothing of its capacity for development in sin or obedience; or else, through the contrast of flesh and spirit, become moral, and which is not a guiltless one, a natural contrast must be seen to shine, which undoubtedly was designed to unfold itself in the purest harmony. This antagonism, however, is nothing more than the combined possibility of sin and obedience. It cannot, in the slightest degree, be regarded either as the commencement or as the germ of sin; although in the present day, many even of our best Dogmatists ascribe sin unto the original Adam, in a quiescent sense; just as the apostle, before an impression from the law was received, does *ἀμαρτία νεκρά*, Rom. vii. 8; or as Bellarmin explained the fall, and the sinfulness reigning thereby, only by an original contrast between reason and sensuousness, just as if carnal desire

had been created as such, and was only restrained by grace. Compare Schmid, in his strictures on Usteri *Tüb. Zeitschr.*, 1830, 4, p. 167–72.

² The last assertion is only intended to guard against the admission of the fall being equally from the will of God and a necessity, as the creation of man to a personal existence was. The admission of such a view is founded on the theory, that the glorious power and grace of God could only be fully revealed in redemption from death, and by the destruction of sin, consequently could only be displayed in the existence and actual being of evil, with which is united the hypothesis, that the actual is that which is effectuated, arranged, and necessary. Meanwhile the dogmatic assertion, that the good requires the bad for its glorification, is not less exceptionable than the ethical maxim, Let evil be done, that good may arise; or ἐπιμενοῦμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονασῇ, Rom. vi. 1. And what is the hidden meaning of those who support the former tenet; but, on the one hand, to maintain the naturalness and dynamic originality of the bad, and on the other hand, either to complete the natural process of universal restoration, or to realize the terrors of a God who requires a being capable of sin and fallen, in order to exercise on both these states His mercy and His wrath, and thus to effectuate His twofold absolute decree? These views, taken together, are irreconcilable with Holy Scripture; but if we assume the possibility of Adam's progression to perfection, apart from sin and the fall, and yet at the same time maintain that redemption is not a mere restoration, we are not by any means inconsistent. For to that infinite progress of Adam would have appertained the essential condition, that by obedience he might have become free, and thus, even as God is, acquainted with good and evil. Now since this condition was not attached to Adam, either before or after the fall, the child of God possesses, as appears from redemption, a something, which Adam, as a mere natural, although sinless son of God, did not possess.

PART THE SECOND.

OF THE BAD.

§ 103. THE GOOD AND THE BAD.

THE doctrine of salvation is more closely related to the degenerated condition of the world, which has become a second nature,¹ and to the bad,² than it is to original good, or to the natural right conduct of the creature towards God. The bad became possible with the creation of personality, without, however being necessary, but it has become so very real that the Heavenly Adam must needs come into the world to destroy the works of the devil, Rom. v. 14, 1 Cor. xv. 46, that is to say, sin and death, 1 John iii. 8, Heb. ii. 14, and to renew the communion of the creation with the Creator.

¹ 1 John v. 19, *καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὅλος ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται*. Compare Gal. i. 4; Rom. iii. 19, *καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ Θεῷ*. Ephes. ii. 3, *καὶ ἡμεν τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς*. Rom. vii. 24, *τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*.

² *עָרָב*, τὸ πονηρόν, τὸ κακόν, Rom. vii. 21. *malum* is not *ἀναρχον*, nor *ἀγέννητον*, not even *γέννητον*, but is that which enters into the thoughts through the self-determinableness of the will, and is subsequently imparted to the material world by Divine permission. Thus Basil ὁμιλ. *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτίος τῶν κακῶν ὁ Θεός*. Every language in which the history and philosophy of revelation is discussed, contains as intelligible traces of the unity as of the distinction between bad and evil. Life, considered as deranging, perverting, and limiting its own unity, constitutes the bad, and that which is actually deranged, perverted, and limited,

when experienced, is evil. Disturbance is the unity of both. Wherefore the bad is an affliction, because man in himself, or primeval man, commits it only in a state of unfreedom, and that only against himself; and since God's ordinance is and continues inviolable, man only injures himself by such commission. The bad, regarded as being unnatural and perverse, or as guilt and condemnation, and thus, at the same time, an internal punishment, is the greatest and in some measure, the only evil; for every other, in which there exists a counteraction against the bad, that is to say, against its principle, is already a proportionate good. Ὁ πονηρὸς is one who prepares for himself and others πονόυς—ἐαυτοῦς περιέπειραν ὀδύνας πολλάς, 1 Tim. vi. 10. It is evident, how, in consequence of the causative relation between bad and evil, the evil also is bad. For evil is not only blameable as a violation of the original and natural, but as a threatening, dreaded, odious thing, provokes to untolerated or cowardly sin of every kind, or to a reaction analogous to itself, in so far as it is no longer merely feared but felt and experienced. Distress, anguish, death, beget crime, and hold, as it were, the sinner in bondage. This is Daniel Whitby's fundamental idea, supported by Heb. ii. 15; Book of Wisdom ii. 1, 19; when, in his *Treatise de imputatione divina peccati Adami posteris ejus in reatum*, (published by Semler, together with *Pelagii Ep. ad Demetriadem*, Halle, 1775), he contends that mortality and perishableness inherited from Adam is rather the cause than the consequence of our sinfulness. All of which is an argument for the doctrine of sin and death suitable to the idea of ponerology.

REMARK. Christian ponerology is divided into two leading sections, that of sin or the bad participating in guilt, and that of death or the bad which has participated in the same. Sin and death are here understood in an extensive sense, as in Gen. ii. 17, Rom. vii. Compare my *Treatise üb. den Menschenmörder von Anfang*, *Berl. Zeitschr. f. Theol.* iii. 1822. Pp. 54, 55.

SECTION THE FIRST.

OF SIN.

§ 104. TRIAL AND TEMPTATION.

The same limitation (by means of which God, who tempts none to sin, James i. 13, tries man for good),¹ becomes a means of temptation. Man does not stand the trial;² but, on the contrary, suffers himself to be seduced, and that by God's permission.

¹ A trial for good sometimes occurs through *πειρασμός* and *πειράζειν*, 1 Peter iv. 12; Heb. iv. 15; Book of Wisdom iii. 5. It must have been so much the more necessary for the first Adam, since even the second required it for his consummation, and must needs undergo experiences in a state of obedience, Heb. v. 8.

² This is not a postulatam, but an experience or knowledge.

§ 105. SEDUCTION AND SIN.

The effectuating cause of man's permitting himself to be seduced by a lie, and by opposition to God, (which in some way previously existed,) does not consist either in prohibition, nor in a Divine economy for developing his freedom, nor in the sensuousness, finiteness, or limitedness of his nature. It does not lie in a prohibition to be spiritual, holy, just, and good, Rom. vii. 12, 14, for that, as a Divine communication and influence, is primarily incumbent upon him. Nor does it lie in the original economy instituted by God in order to vouchsafe unto man a transition out of a childish into a child-like state; for the experience that man has principally become independent in a sinful way, and has escaped from a state of mere determinableness, is no proof that he should necessarily have commenced his freedom by sin, but only proves that God, permitting it,

allowed him thus to be, and to continue determined unto true freedom. When God says, Adam has become like one of us, the context evidently shows, that Adam, in the sense of this declaration, had attained this likeness unto God by unrighteous means, and in an unlawful way had acquired a knowledge of good and evil. Human nature was just as far from being predestined to be a sinful one, by means of its sensuous excitability, or of being predetermined to sin. Sensuousness is neither to be considered as the origin and occasion, nor, as it were, the necessary accompaniment of the entire developed life of sin, nor the cause of sin; for sensible excitation never stands alone. Things were named and ordered for man by God's word. He was permitted to enjoy in one sense, yet not in another, and thus ought to have desired and enjoyed in harmony with order. Finally, the limitation or succession of intuition, idea, desire, memory, and movement of the will, or the possibility of erring, cannot be directly accused of sin. For error, were it indeed not willed, could only (if it generated actual deflections¹) produce innocent sins. Sin, in representation, can thus only be a lie; in desire, only lust. The homogeneous principle of falsehood and lust is egoism, which is only in its origin and causality inexplicable, and yet explains everything. Through this egoism arises a false passivity and activity, that is, an inert shrinking back from the aim and law revealed by God, and a proud impatience² in the enjoyment of blessings and of self. The fruit hereof is sin, that is, the perversion of Divine order which allows the personal being to become guilty, and through which he revolts from God, falls out with himself and his neighbour, and commits an unrighteousness³ which must be atoned for.

¹ The Hebrew, Greek, and Latin words signifying sin nearly all relate to the fundamental idea of a deviation from the path and object, to the idea of violated order and a straying from the aim. But in the German, the word sin (*sünde*) indicates the necessity of satisfaction.

² At first the woman remembers the Divine prohibition, Gen. iii. 2, 3, then forgets it, only looking at and given up to desire for the enjoyment of what was to make one wise, ver. 6. Melanch-

thon by M. Chemnitz, in locc. p. 339, Hæserunt vagantes extra ordinem in objectis contra mandatum Dei, et Evæ voluntas avertens se a voce Dei et vagata extra ordinem hæsit in pomo. This violent haste, of which we have spoken above, or *impatientia*, is, according to Tertullian *de patientia*, the cause of sin, and does not essentially differ from *superbia*, to which Augustin was wont to ascribe all guilt. It might be more critically maintained with Basil, already referred to, that man had, from a certain superabundance in heavenly enjoyment, cast his eyes upon inferior pleasure, and thus committed ἀναχώρησις ἀπό Θεοῦ. But to this haughty impatience we must combine that indolent shrinking back, above alluded to, if we desire to give an accurate account of the origin of human sin, so far as that is generally possible.

³ 1 John iii. 4, ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία.

§ 106. PROPENSITY OR BIAS.

Sin occurs in humanity not otherwise than by causing either a sinful propensity, and with that a fall of the whole human condition, or it is induced by the previous existence of this bias. Sin has not entered into the world as a mere example, but as an active commencement full of important consequences, Rom. v. 12. Wherefore, that sin by which, primarily, the natural institutes of the Divine kingdom were frustrated, cannot be entirely compared with any succeeding actual sin, even should a similar principle be discovered in it. Nevertheless, we still have in an actual sin, the more completely the entire spiritual life co-operates in its commission, instead of stifling it in the germ, a similar fall; inasmuch as actual sin is accompanied by a bias, and becomes a principle of action, under a certain aspect, and a lowering of the spiritual life; provided, on the contrary, it does not perchance induce an elevation of this very spiritual life into a higher stage than was the previous state of child-like innocence; which, however, must first be realised by an especial suffering of self-will, and consequently through an especial influence of grace. If we correctly imagine the con-

dition of man before the primal sin as that of a pure *determinableness* provided with all means of Divine guidance and culture; and if this state, by a false development of freedom in sin, becomes one of impure *determination*, then the latter can only consist in a constant shrinking of the will and thought from the commands of God, or in an unbelieving inclination and in a continual precipitancy of the individual appetite for sensual enjoyment, or in some particular lust, consequently can only consist in a permanent derangement of the original relation between flesh and spirit, soul and spirit, that is, in continued sin; a condition, therefore, which, when primarily viewed as a state of unfreedom, and one incapacitated for truth and good, and consequently to be comprehended as a passion, yet possesses an apparent freedom, and generates from itself an activity or effort, which, as being egoistic and selfish, is also godless, and positively bad. Nevertheless, original nature is not abrogated by such corruption. The idea of disease rather includes the persistent reaction of nature, or of the original unity of the vital powers and vital functions, but not the sufficiency of nature for remedying the evil. Now, according as man, by means of his universal activity of thought and will, enters into the intent and will of reason as antagonistical to the flesh, or passively resigns himself to the will of the flesh, either ameliorations or deteriorations become possible; but distinct volitions do not change the constituted will of nature, nor the relations of the vital instinct in general.

REMARK 1. The Mosaic Hamartigeny (Doctrine of Sin, an expression used by Prudentius) we regard as true history, but not as actual. The fall of David or Peter may be described as actual, that of Adam we could learn only as to its truth, through the word of God.

REMARK 2. Particular opinions concerning the condition of the Adamic race which are met with in Scripture (for example in Genesis viii. 21, vi. 5, and in some measure also in vi. 3) harmonize with the above notion of propensity or continued sin; but chiefly and immediately *ἀμαρτία* (Rom. vii.) does so, which chapter in-

cludes the essential characteristic of the above condition. That *ἀμαρτία* here signifies something beyond actual sin or sensuality, appears from the following considerations:—1. It existed before the law gave the sentence of death, but in the form of *δύναμις*. 2. It generates from itself *ἐπιθυμία*. 3. It reveals itself as BAD, and is developed as such. 4. It gives rise to the entire carnal condition: compare *σάρξ*, Gal. v. 16, 17; John iii. 6. Nothing can be more inconsiderate than to maintain that sin is at all times nothing more than an isolated act, and that the word *ἀμαρτία* can only properly signify this. In every case doubtless an action is presumed, but not merely the act that is apparent in the error, for it must be allowed that only what is thought and willed can be called sin. Now, is such human action to be referred to the elective faculty, as to its own peculiar ground? Is action, viewed as thought and will, nothing more than an isolated and unconnected thing? No, it is accompanied with emotions, inclinations, and tendencies, or other actions, partly as its antecedent, partly as its consequent. Thus action occurs in a continuous form: hence, if the conditions and internal dispositions of man are to be understood, the question necessarily turns upon sin regarded in its origin, foundation, and nature, in contrast with uncontinued and isolated error. If action and reaction, the former regarded as bad, the latter as good, exist contemporaneously; if there be an objective sin, if Cain shall rule over sin “lying at the door,” if we commit evil “that we would not,” if there be “a sin which is unto death,” one which is not imputed, &c., in that case we must abandon that contracted external and superficial idea of sin, of the act of the will, which Pelagianism invented and even Platonism prescribed. If Scripture be an undeniable witness of the law of sin, of naturally evil propensities and of indwelling sin, still one resorts to other assistance. The name of sin, it is said, is in Holy Scripture transferred to sensuality, and since the priority of sensuous excitation is precisely the ground of all human peccability, in so far as the latter has a natural foundation, such a transference is a just one. Granting sensuousness to be the realization of all the developments of self-consciousness, and that it precedes whilst rational activity follows, still the latter is contemporaneously excited in every complete element of self-consciousness; and if in consciousness thus determined, not sensuousness but reason takes precedence, in that case it must be granted that sin had already entered into or

previously existed in man. If sensuousness had absolute priority in original man, that would give the idea of continued sin, and thus, in this case, sin would appear to be not only inborn but innate. And here there is a point where the extremes of Pelagianism and Manichæism pass into each other. In short, the existence of continued sin in the Pauline doctrine does not amount to a metaphorical expression. Touching the antagonistic representation of a twofold tendency or double principle of generic change of the human state, Adam and Christ, Rom. v., it has been well remarked, that the point of analogy lies in the dominion of death, or the power of life pervading the human race, and that death and life are universally represented as undeserved and unmerited, or as only operative through one for many; but the question is here far from turning on sin as communicated by Adam, and as a generic corruption, on sin as a defect of the species, or, indeed, on the non-existence of the same in general, and perchance merely turns on the actual sin of the individual subjects of death. Death has been, to a certain extent, regarded as merely something peculiar, as a SEPARABLE since it reigned over those who have experienced it, less as a personal punishment than an affliction, not as the first man incurred it, from a sin of commission, through a first sin, by transgressing a definite law. Precisely as life is a SEPARABLE of righteousness, in so far as all those who have not been obedient, as was Christ, obtain it only in fellowship with Him, and as a gift of grace. Finally, sin remains an INSEPARABLE of death in all who have not overcome it; for, in the first place, death has entered into the world no otherwise than as *δι' ἁμαρτίας*, and only exists thus in the world; and all have sinned, although not exactly like Adam, against positive law, consequently sin has reigned in and over them, and if not as a first act, if not as a commencing act, or as that of one person, (in which case there would not be a fellowship of death and sin, and consequently none of life and righteousness), then is sin to be regarded, apart from act and prior to it, as a second nature, as a passive power existing in all, and which has developed itself as such in actual sin. The existence of continued sin and of a bias in Adamic fellowship is, consequently, what is presupposed or included in this doctrinal connexion, which chiefly refers to the dominion of death, and the communication of life, or to Adam and Christ. For some admirable and profound inquiries on this subject, see Steudel, *Über*

Sünde und Gnade, Tüb. Zeitschr. für Theologie, 1832, i. p. 125. G. C. Kern, *über die Lehre von der Sünde*. In the same work, 1833, ii. p. 57. Christoph. Benjam. Klaiber, *Neuetestam. Lehre von der Sünde und Erlösung*, Stuttg. 1836; and Schmid, *Exegett. Bemerkungen über Röm. v. 12*, Tüb. Zeitschr. 1830, iv., against which the works of Bretschneider, *Grundlehren des Pietismus*, &c. 1833, and David Schulz, *Schriftmässige Beurtheilung der Lehre von der Erbsünde*, "A supplement to his Christian Doctrine of Faith," Leipzig, 1834, scarcely deserve to be mentioned. For more vigorous and profound researches we refer to the works of Jul. Müller, *Die Lehre von der Sünde*, 1839; and W. Vatke, *Die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und zur göttlichen Gnade*, 1841, works which, although repulsive in theory and method, have nevertheless co-operated in the removal of many prejudices.

§ 107. SIN AS A GENERIC DEFECT.

In the Old Testament, a voice of ardent desire for a complete new birth bespeaks, together with the promise of the people's Divine renewal, (Ezekiel xi. 19, xxxvi. 25, 26; Psalm li. 12), a consciousness incited by the word of God, of man's moral incapacity, which has become a natural condition, and also indicates a universal state of sin. Although in the Old Testament a retrospective view of the fall¹ is rarely taken, yet, what is founded in the Old Testament with reference to law and promise infallibly proves that the realization of the law cannot result from the mere preservation of the people in their calling and moral nature, and that the fulfilment of the promise can only be realized by a Divine freedom from sin, and by a new creation of the heart. Contemporaneously with the feeling of justification and experience of an entirely new life of faith in Christ, there arises, in the clearest manner, a knowledge that all who are comprehended in the unity בְּרֵאֲדָם have sinned, Romans i.—iii. v. 12, and also that the sinful development of each individual refers back to the corruption of the race, in which he is as much included, with regard to suffering and ex-

perience, as he is in associated guilt, (Rom. vii. 9, 10; compare verse 18 and v. 13, 18); and, moreover, that the actual, as well as original sins of all posterity are originally connected with the fall of Adam. Romans v. 12, 13.

¹ Perhaps the Hebrew term in Hosea vi. 7, if not **כְּאָדָם** here as in Job xxxi. 33; Psalm lxxxii. 7, may be translated, “like men.” Yet in all these passages the question under discussion may be compared with Genesis, chap. iii. The absence of the article can scarcely be said to decide the question. We may venture, however, to say that the historical and universal view are mutually blended. In the prophetic passage I have relinquished the conjecture **כְּאָדָם**.

REMARK. It is only the supposition of all antiquity that moral dispositions and tendencies are not only implanted by education and imitation, but also by generation. Thus, too, the supposition of Holy Scripture, not immediate doctrine, is that Adam’s fall has naturally communicated itself to his posterity; for the passages *τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς*, Eph. ii. 3, or *το γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σάρξ ἐστίν*, John iii. 6, do not immediately assert this. But the natural or carnal being and existence is only primarily to be regarded as the negation of the higher Divine life, or as the yet nonexistence of a state and capacity only conferred by redemption; so that both modern views might be compatible, of which the one considers sensuousness as being primarily excited to a principle of sin, whilst the other supposes the germ of sin, self-love, to have existed in the original Adam. On the other hand, in consequence of this mode of expression, it is impossible to imagine actual sin and sinful habits (*vitia acquisita, peccata actualia*) in universal man, considered as unrenovated. Sin has already been stated to be natural, innate, necessary, and objective; for how could the question otherwise turn on “the law of sin in the members,” and on “the body of this death,” (carnal corruption)? Rom. vii. 23 24. But as sin only entered (*εἰσῆλθε*) the *κόσμος*, which in itself was un sinful, it only enters into the individual existing at the time, and does not constitute his substance; and so little so, that sin must rather endure the contradiction of the reason, and of the internal man. Rom. vii. 18, 23. The ego and indwelling sin are distinct and separable. It is true that sin is a nature, but then a second nature, a state of degeneration. Sin is incomprehensible, if only conceived to be as if

προαιρετικόν, and an act of the individual, or simply as a habit. It is affirmed, sin is in the will; but the will itself is primarily imparted and natural, and is the inbeing of the ego determinating itself, together with the earlier or stronger instincts. This bias of the ego, to passivity, only becoming active in sensuous passivity, would be, as a mere something imparted, only a bare suffering; *ταλαίπωρος*, Rom. vii. 24, and although objectively condemnable, would yet not constitute guilt, or even, (as was maintained against the reformers on the subject of concupiscentia) might constitute a necessary mediation of the free spirit, and become something good, so that the idea of sin alluded to would be inapplicable. A man, who from the first should appear merely objective in sin, not admitting and appropriating, even in thought, what the perverted will of nature desires, but rather as a thinking subject standing in a state of reaction, might rather be called an innocent sufferer, or even a victor. Or a person so created and constituted, who at the very moment when he feels an instinctive bias, and is in danger of falling into sin, and being sustained and strengthened by an act of grace, and defended by a *donum supernaturale* to contend, at all times, against and to subdue this bias would, in spite of this propensity and generic sin, be and remain in a state of innocence. In such a condition did Bellarmin conceive Adam to be before the fall, and in like manner did the author of the Book of Wisdom regard the first man. For wisdom (Book of Wisdom x. 1, 2,) had preserved "the first formed" from individual sin (*παραπατώματος ἰδίου*), though not from sin based on sensuous existence as such, but yet from sin having the assent of the will; the latter being first imputed to Eve. But such an Adam is a fiction. Or, if man is conscious, (the more he is placed by Divine preservations and inducements in a state of reaction against his bias), that generic sin has become personal, he knows, as Augustin remarks, *non inviti tales sumus*. The universality of this assent is no more capable of explanation than is the first sin. Its possibility can alone be explained.

REMARK 2. The idea of original sin, if understood in the sense of Romans vii. 8, involves no contradiction. That the individual dispositions of the soul are propagated by generation, will scarcely be disputed. Why not then generic dispositions also? Hence we cannot but maintain the doctrine of derivation, together with that of creation.

§ 108. SIN AND THE LAW.¹

The order of things as perverted by sin dwelling in the flesh, (since the former continues to be in itself indestructible,) never ceases to oppose sinful man. Not only is man sustained in his moral nature, but is, at the same time, stimulated and rendered the subject of fear, shame, and punishment, by external nature reciprocating with the internal, so that he continues, in some way, accessible to Divine legislation, which accompanies and pursues him on all occasions. Now the law, under whatever form and kind it may speak and operate, is, in principle, good and Divine, (see § 105,) and is grounded in love; yea more, in grace, which supposes sin to exist in relation with the kingdom of God; but primarily it corresponds only to the righteousness of God's holy love, and in reference to passible or actual evil, upholds the inviolableness, the objective necessity of the Divine will, without emancipating the natural will of man from his bias, and rendering him truly free, Rom. viii. 3. It exercises over the sinner, in its highest activity, a critical power, but not a mediatorial, reconciling, or animating one. The law is not sin, Rom. vii. 7, but it first renders the sin of the carnal tendency, which was dead and unconscious, actual, conscious sin, Rom. iv. 15; v. 14, and represents it as universally sinful; that is to say, as worthy of death, Rom. vii. 7; and whilst it begets a knowledge of sin, Rom. iii. 20, at the same time effecting a more active or passive satisfaction in good, Rom. vii. 22, it can create a longing for redemption, and testify of its future realization, Rom. iii. 21. But all these operations do not include an abrogation of a bias, or an expiation for sin, or the deliverance of the will, but rather admit the possibility of the law becoming the occasioning cause of still more violent lusts, of still more abundant transgression, and of still more arrogant opposition and ungodliness.

¹The omission in our Manual alluded to by Dr Schmid of Tübingen, in his very valuable *Programme de notionne legis in Theo-*

logia Christianorum morali rite constituenda, 1832, p. 8, namely, in regard to the relation between law and sin, has been hitherto, though only partially developed, included under the head of "Degrees of Sin." We have, however, on the present occasion, at his suggestion, brought the subject forward in a more prominent manner.

REMARK 1. The apostle Paul carefully guards himself against every kind of Gnostic separation of the law from the principle of the spirit and love; and how much more so does he, against the most precise philosophy of sin, or against the assertion of those, who, whilst regardless of system, and prior to Carpocrates and Epiphanes, or the anti-tacticians, represented or taught the νόμος to be the same as ἀμαρτία, Rom. vii. 7, and that law, limitation, distinction and property, are the only, original, and operative causes of sin! According to this monstrous gnosis, sin could only be expiated by sin, and thus become the way to righteousness and freedom. According to Paul, the law developes sin, only in so far as the former applies it to the conscience, and inasmuch as it ever renders the existing internal conflict, which it is unable to remove, more perceptible and decided. The law is weakened in its operations upon what is good in the will through the flesh, and since it cannot repair this defect either by curse, wrath, or threat, it only stimulates the more the carnal disposition.

REMARK 2. The law, considered as that which regulates and is regulative of the Divine emancipation of the finite will, consists, in reference to its mode of manifestation and operation, of many and varied degrees of perfection. Whether written or personally delivered, it may be reduced back to spirit and religious morality; however mutable, it has an immutable basis; but under whatever form of completeness, it ever claims human life for the service of God, is ever opposed to carnal man, and carnal man to it. Law and the flesh, however, are not perhaps less but more opposed, according as the former, regarded in its pith and essence (τὰ βαρύτερα τοῦ νόμου, Matt. xxiii. 23,) or even in its personal manifestation, is valid. It may indeed be said, the more burdensome the law the lighter it is, because in its highest degree it must be approved by the internal man, and obtain the assent of the reasonable conscience; and just as Jesus assures us, that his yoke is easy, and John represents the commandments of the love of God as not grievous, 1 John v. 3, even because these commands, as the injunctions of love, are established at once, being free from all ar-

bitrariness or partial necessity. In like manner, it appears, (particularly since an enfranchising power is imparted to the truth, John viii. 32,) as if rational legislation, or even more developed and unfolded law, (for example, in the sermon on the mount,) should obtain a more ready obedience than any statutory, and, so to speak, arbitrary law. Therefore, a mere legal revelation might suffice for the redemption, (or rather for the preservation) of humanity. Truly to know the Divine and the good, is to venerate and love the same; whoever sees God and the Redeemer, sinneth not, 1 John iii. 6, and the reverse is true, 3 John 11. But this entire view presupposes the ideal man, the *status integritatis*, or man who is born again. The physical or carnal man contends, in the performance of what is easy, external, and even of what is supplemental or untrue, against the truth, the depth, and the greatness contained in the law. Compare Matth. xxiii. He does not recognise the law as it ought to be recognised, if it is to be considered as exercising an enfranchising power, or he does not desire to perceive it in its entire truth. Hence, in so far as the *Logos* is only the *nomos* (according to an ancient fragment,) or in so far as the Redeemer is the living righteousness of the heavenly kingdom, the absolute fulfilment of the law, the standard of man's life,—as such he is as yet unable to redeem sinners from sin; in this dignified character he will especially excite against himself sinners and sin, call forth their *ἀντιλογία*, Heb. xii. 3, experience the replies of unbelief, Luke xviii. 8, and “for judgment” will have come into the world, John iii. 19, ix. 39; and as those only who were always enabled, in some honest fear of the Lord, to understand as much of the law as they perceived, and did their best to fulfil the same, and rendered themselves both objectively and subjectively thoroughly intimate with the true legality of life, although under many demerits and defects, it was only such who attained to a more perfect knowledge of sin, and to a more humble aspiration after redemption. The example of Christ first operates in a vitalizing manner, although it be more than this; even the Stoic doctrine of rational *autonomy*, (granting that it does not serve for a hypocritical pretext, as it does with those immoral saints mentioned by Lucian,) is of a kind that renders the example easy, and which strives against the more difficult one of *theonomy*.

§ 109. DEGREES OF SIN.

If human evil oppose Divine law, though in some degree it be restrained by it, in that case evil will proportionably increase. Sin will ascend not only in degrees which lead from desire to act, but will also advance in these gradations which conduct from a state of blind delusion up to one of actual denial, from a condition of imperfection up to vice, yea even from a state of bondage to that of insensibility.

§ 110. LUST AND PASSION.

The excitations of propensity, or lusts, James i. 15, are aberrations or perversions of that natural instinct which was directed to the preservation and increase of life and activity. This perversion or aberration assails more or less every natural instinct, and is as perceptible in timid aversions as in vain desires, as much in animal as in devilish appetite. Lusts ascend to passion and surpass themselves, not merely on account of an impetuosity proportionate to temperament, but also when they have attained an extraordinary ascendancy by reason of gratification.

§ 111. SINS OF COMMISSION AND THEIR DEGREE OF
IMPUTATION.

If lust "which wars against the soul," 1 Peter ii. 11, be already sin, Exodus xx. 17; Matt. v. 28, then must the act be regarded as augmenting its degree, and this because between the act and lust lies the whole difficulty of maintaining the evil will in opposition to reason and conscience. Hence, the more difficult it is, according to external and internal circumstances, to conceive and retain a sinful resolution, so much the more is the act neither error nor lapse, but a crime.

§ 112. VICE.

The repetition of actual sin produces only a fault or an imperfection, so long as sin does not reach to the extent of becoming permanent maxim, sentiment, and character. Where this occurs, vice, or actual blasphemy against God, predominates. But wherever vice prevails, there, in mutual combination, reign excess, selfishness, godlessness, and demoniacal wisdom.

REMARK 1. The term *excess* is here to be understood in a wide sense; in general, it is love of the world, and “of the things that are in the world,” 1 John ii. 15, or a worldly disposition, Phil. iii. 19. Its manifoldness in analogy with the three temptations directed against the Messiah, or according to 1 John ii. 16, consists in disordered propensities for enjoyment, possession, distinction, and power, or in sensuality, Luke xvi. 19; Phil. iii. 19, (whose god is their belly,) covetousness, 1 Tim. vi. 9; Matt. vi. 24, (service of mammon,) and ambition, Matt. iv. 5, 6; or lust of power, Matt. iv. 8. The internal resemblance between covetousness and sensuality, is the reason why both vices are often conjointly reprobated, 1 Thess. iv. 3—7; 1 Cor. vi. 7—9. Since in each of these vices some one particular earthly good, or earthly good in general, is the highest object aimed after, so vice, by intervening worldly policy, furnishes, (though but a phantasm,) still a shadow of wisdom, which allows all things to remain as they are, or taking advantage of all things, makes a virtue of necessity, Luke xvi. 8, 9.

REMARK 2. To a certain extent there is united with the excess of each vice, the Cain-like evil of hatred and envy, or else that evil egoism which injures and commits injustice on every side. Vice is throughout *ἀδικία* and *ἀνομία*. In its relation to knowledge it is partly folly, foolishness, Mark vii. 22, Rom. i. 28, partly devilish wisdom, James iii. 15. It is most simply characterized as *ἀσέβεια*, Rom. i. 18; and as godlessness may not amount to absolute unbelief, so vice manifests itself also under the forms of superstition and little faith.

§ 113. DEGREES OF VICE.

The state of servitude, John viii. 34, Romans vi. 16, &c. in which the sinfully developed life is often interrupted by vigorous, although not victorious revolts of the conscience, is one that is to be distinguished from that higher stage of vice where the latter exhibits its strength, partly in shamelessness, and partly in hypocrisy, and sometimes by reciprocating both. And from thence again there is an approximation to that extreme degree of obduracy, where not only the Divine law of preservation, and the feeling of fear and shame ever become more inoperative, but the influences of the law and Gospel also ever prove more fruitless, and where the most immediate acts of enmity towards God (blasphemy against the Holy Ghost and sin unto death,) are rendered more possible.

REMARK. For examples of cowardly vice, comprehended in its progress, we may refer to Ahab, 1 Kings xxi., and to Herod Antipas, Mark vi.; of shameless vice to Herodias and Jezebel; of want of faith, to the Book of Wisdom, cap. ii.; for instances of falsehood and hypocrisy, to Herod the Great and the Pharisees, according to Matt. xxiii.; of security and fearlessness, Matt. xxvii. 25; and for a universal example of gradation of vice, to Judas Iscariot.

§ 114. THE JUST AND THE UNJUST.

It partly arises from the distinction in the degrees of human sinfulness, partly from the gradation of the Divine economy of grace, and especially in the Divine preservation of the moral nature, that after the fall the opposite of the just and unjust, of the devout and godless occurs,¹ concerning which not only do the Scriptures everywhere afford immediate evidences, but in the history of the descendants of Seth and Cain present a primeval type.

¹ Certainly not in the sense in which Pelagius conceived it necessary to regard Abel, Enoch, Noah, &c. as just, when he wrote, according to Augustin, *de Natura et Gratia*, c. 36, 37, (*cf. Pelag. Ep. ad Demetriadem*, ed. Seml. p. 22, sqq.) peccavit Eva, Scriptura hoc prodidit; Adam quoque deliquit, eadem Scriptura non tacuit. Sed et Cain peccasse ipsa æque Scriptura testata est. Quorum non modo peccata, verum etiam peccatorum indicat qualitatem. Quodsi et Abel peccasset, et hoc sine dubio Scriptura dixisset; sed non dixit, ergo nec ille peccavit, quia etiam justum ostendit.—On which point he is without difficulty reduced by Augustin *ad absurdum*. The most recent opposers of the church doctrine of original sin, as well in respect to its exegetical as its dogmatical aspect, proceed far too rapidly when they consider the doctrine and history of the Old Testament as controverting the notion of the innate sinfulness or corruption of human nature. Were it the case that moral beauty in heathenism, what is noble in natural man, what is lovely in child-like simplicity, and, above all, what is holy and pious in the leaders and mediators of the old covenant, was only required to become perceptible; or were it the fact that any one demand of law upon human will, or any admonition for the government of sin directed to Adam's posterity, were already sufficient to contravene the doctrine of the corruption of human nature, in that case, indeed, the fathers of the church, the Reformers, and Christians of all times, with whom this doctrine passed current as most plain and undeniable, could have read the Old Testament with but little attention, and must have regarded life and history apart from all sense of truth. In that case, the refutation of their error would be so obvious, that nothing but depraved hearts or dull heads could continue to retain it. For what avails the more than Augustinian and Lutheran learning of the theologians of the nineteenth century, if they are so acute as to perceive in human nature, as described in the Book of Job, in the Psalms and Prophets, purity and capacity for true good, and yet not perceive innate sinfulness? Or if they infer, when God says to Cain, "thou shalt rule over sin," that, therefore, Cain was by nature free from a sinful tendency; that when God said to Abraham, "walk before me, and be thou perfect," therefore Abraham possessed in his own strength the power of being so; or if they inferred, because Enoch "walked with God," that therefore he was not born in sin. Such inferences, on the con-

trary, rather exhibit doctrinal oversights which any ordinary catechumen could easily correct; and how should the learned theologian of the nineteenth century, indeed, understand the Old Testament, if he so vastly mistakes the New, as to consider the exhortation to Christians who are born again of the Spirit, "let not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal body," Rom. vi. 12, to be a clear and intelligible evidence against the doctrine of original sin? The faults which Augustin commits in his exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, for example, *de spiritu et litera*, are not unknown to us; but when compared with the doctrine alluded to, such errors may be considered innocuous. Beyond a doubt, every idea of ἀμαρτία, as laid down in Romans vii., must be rejected, which neither, on its own account, admits of farther deterioration, nor an ameliorating reaction, nor a possible connecting point for Divine grace. But the church idea is very far from depriving us of this possibility, if we will only conceive it, not as has been done by the Council of Trent, merely from the shreds and patches of reformed and symbolical representation, but will comprehend it in its essence. The church has never maintained a non-existence of rational and conscious activity, (whilst admitting the universality of corruption,) or an inability for a varied opposition to the commands of the moral law, or an incapacity for directly receiving and proving those operations of God which sustain and excite our moral nature. She has never denied the opposite of virtue and vice among the heathen, far less the contrast between unbelieving resistance and susceptible acceptance in reference to revelation. Precisely as Paul's conception of the Adamic inclination which pervades unrenewed man, did not prevent him from perceiving heathens who do the works of the law φύσει, or patriarchs and saints of the Old Testament who pleased God by their trust and obedience; so has the church, (in the region of the world and its prince, in that of the Adamic development and preponderating power of the flesh) not been hindered from recognising a good distinct from moral phenomena, and that proportionate good which she designates *justitia rationis*, &c. These moral phenomena do not by any means cancel the church's universal tenet. The church, indeed, attributes to the righteous, under the Old Testament, the righteousness of faith, that is to say, the course of life renewed by Divine grace, and does so in conformity with Scripture. She concedes that the philosophers of Greece (*Augsburg Confession*, 20,) have been

most ardent in the pursuit of virtue, but nothing which an *autonomic* reaction against sin took from the flesh, nor what Themistocles, Aristides, Socrates, or whoever they may have been, or whatever they did, is with her equivalent to the fruit of the Holy Spirit in communion with a redeeming God. Virtue, which, in its brightest manifestations is essentially Egoistic, which is destitute of humility in love, which only arises from faith, she does not on that account contemn; she does not place it on a par with vice which springs from the same soil of natural humanity, but still regarding it in its darker side, and not less so the holiness of true Christians in their unsubdued defilement, (only viewing the latter in another aspect,) she considers this virtue as the strongest proof of innate sinfulness. If, however, the doctrine of the church in any respect exceeds its polemical direction, in that case it can be rectified only by its own spirit and under the supposition of such a fundamental doctrine in Scripture; without which it could not indeed be a testimony for redemption in Christ, and could not be adjusted from the standing-point of Stoical and Pelagian philosophy. Now this will lead to a procedure such as we find, for example, in Steudel's *Glaubenslehre*, or in his Treatise, *über Sünde und Gnade. Tüb. Zeitschr. 1832*, with which Schulz's treatise is designed to agree, both in sense and spirit.

§ 115. THE WORLD.

On the other hand, that which is merely relatively just proves itself to be subject to deterioration and decay, and neither the natural preservation and care which is shared by the good in the domestic and civic state, in science and art, nor the especial guidance of God in law and promise prevents vanity and falsehood from obtaining, to a vast extent, a preponderating dominion, and does not hinder humanity from becoming, what, in an objectionable sense, is called the world, yet not without a reservation of a certain noble part.

REMARK. The bad in humanity may be contemplated in a threefold mode, and revelation also is distinguished from other religious systems of the ancient world by its adhering to no particular mode, but each one teaching and duly conditionat-

ing the other through the doctrine of the good and of salvation. According to one mode, the bad may be regarded as an endowment and an inheritance of human nature, as an inevitable consequence of the personality of a sensuous being, leaving behind much that is good or perchance (especially in later times) but little. Here the bad, for the most part, appears as weakness, as limitation, as the NOT-YET-BEING of the good, and whilst this view (upon the whole the Grecian one) endeavours to maintain itself, partly by a diminishing and palliating representation of actual evil, and sometimes by contending against sensuality and by exciting to the use of reason, it is by a Scriptural recognition of Adamic evil, on the one hand confirmed and on the other confuted. According to the other mode of viewing the subject, good and bad men are distinguished according as they have become such, either by means of an original moral difference of race, or through the decision of free-will. In the one case, the existence of Adamic evil, in the other, Divine origination and a capacity for communion with God is entirely overlooked or denied. What is necessary and true in these doctrines of a Zoroaster or Manes, (which are strengthened more or less by the renovation of the one or extinction of the other), is confirmed in Holy Scripture by what is indicated concerning Cainitic evil, 1 John iii. 8, 12–15; John viii. 44. Compare Augustin, *de Civ. Dei*, xv. 8. The untrue spontaneously separates itself, partly by a reference to Adamic evil, partly by a regard to the constituted economy of salvation. Finally, a third view especially directs itself to a consideration of social evil in so far as it is not an original state of nature, but an acquired one of the world. There is, according to a mode of expression in the Nazarine Codex and other oriental doctrines, various states of life, that is, periods of human existence, each worse than the other; and where this doctrine concurs with the Mosaic records, as it does in the spurious writings of Clement, (*Cotel.* p. 676), and elsewhere, the commencement of evil civilization is regarded as contemporaneous with the descent of angels, (sons of God, Genesis vi.), to the daughters of men, which evil state reached its highest point in heathenism. Unquestionably Genesis vi. contains a peculiar hamartigeny (S. 4, Esr. 3, 10, Et factum est in unoquoque eorum—namely, of those sinners who perished in the flood—sicut Adæ MORI sic his DILUVIUM), perhaps the limitation of a new development of evil in humanity, by means of which the contrast, hith-

erto maintained between the better and worse part of man, tended to the disadvantage of the former, and this on the occurrence of sensuous excitement; and now the whole race, as a type of all succeeding ages, became incapable of corresponding to the design of God laid down for man. Compare AUGUSTIN *de Civ. D.* 15, 22, 23,—*facta est permixtio (Sethitarum cum filiabus Cain) et iniquitate participata quædam utriusque confusio civitatis*,—and the view entertained by Epiphanius of the descendants of Seth. That view, also, is a correct one, which, from every form of civilization resting upon the mere excitation and co-operation of the natural powers of the Adamic race, expects, upon the whole, an intenser degree of deterioration rather than an amelioration. Civilization can only refine egoism, but cannot eradicate it. Still it is by no means the distinguishing principle of world-sin; and the world lying in wickedness, concerning which John speaks, would not even be such, if its evil course did not find a constant susceptibility in the breast of man. In short, even this view of the bad regarded in its social and civil aspect, required those closer determinations which it receives from the Divine word.

§ 116. PRINCE OF THIS WORLD.

The history of the human race, from its commencement, presents to our observation an incomprehensible transition from good to bad, from bad to worse; together with the recognition of these evil wonders, there arises, by degrees, in those who view things according to the word of God and through the medium of revelation, the idea of a being who has fallen from his creator—God, and who, according to his natural relations, ranks higher than humanity, and who is related to all human sin as its primeval and seductive originator, 1 John iii. 8, John viii. 44; to all the ancient and modern developments of the people of God, as an adversary,¹ an envier, an accuser, and a tempter. Gen. iii., compare Rev. xii. 9: (*ὁ δράκων ὁ μέγας*) Matt. iv. 1, xiii. 39, John xiv. 30; who stands in relation to the Redeemer as a conquered enemy, John xii. 31, Rev. xii. 9; and to the redeemed as an enemy absolutely vincible and condemned, 1 Peter v. 8, 9, James iv.

7; who nevertheless continues to rage and to persecute upon earth, Rev. ii. 10, iii. 9, and is finally related to universal heathenism and the world, as well as to apostate Judaism, as a patron, prince, and father, John viii. 44, xiv. 30 (*ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου*) Ephes. ii. 2, vi. 11, 12, who, together with all that is anti-christian shall be annihilated or delivered up to eternal punishment, Rev. xx. 10. Although this view, in our present stage of knowledge,² is incomplete, and has not been fully brought out, even in Scripture,³ still, it appears to us, from the independence and energy with which Christ and the apostles make use of it, to be one that is necessary, in assisting us, partly on the one hand, to exclude the bad from having a divine origination and endless duration, and on the other hand firmly to fix our attention on the central point of its objective existence, as distinguished from that which is natural and sensuous; and farther, this view enables us to estimate all those sinful excitations, acts, and tendencies necessarily conspiring to one and the same anti-christianism, and at the same time assists us manfully to contend against it in its decided weakness.

¹ This embodies the fundamental idea of Satan. Even the Egyptian devil (Typhon) is designated by names signifying one who hinders, a violator, &c. According to Manetho, Typhon is Bebaion, Bebon, also Seth. The first name, according to Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.* § 47), should be considered equivalent to *κάδεξις*, *κωλυσις*; the latter the same author translates *τὸ καταβιαζόμενον, τὸ καταδυναστεύον*. Compare Acts of the Apostles x. 38, *πάντας τοὺς καταδυναστευομένους ὑπο τοῦ διαβόλου*. Perhaps this bad Seth is related to the Hebrew *רש*, ruler, idol, *רש*, violence, *רש* corrupted.

² Knowledge of the good always commences from above, and necessarily proceeds from the absolute good. The bad is not a condition of the good, is neither finite nor created, contingent nor necessary. But, however these different cases may be settled, still, as Clemens remarks in his 19th Homily, the question must necessarily turn upon *πονηρος*,—*εἰπεῖν γὰρ αὐτόν μὴ εἶναι οὐ δυνάμεθα*. The bad is an experience and cognition. Hence our knowledge of it must necessarily commence with relative and subjective evil. Hence it follows, that we can only conceive ab-

solute evil in its essence under the supposition of its deficiency either in absolute malignity or true existence. Here the remark of Thomas Aquinas applies, *S. Th.* part i. qu. 49, art. 7, patet, non esse unum primum principium malorum sicut est unum primum principium bonorum; primo, quia primum principium bonorum est per essentiam bonum, nihil autem potest esse per suam essentiam malum. Sic (in ente) semper remanente bono non potest esse aliquid integre et perfecte malum. The biblical, and especially the practical representation loses nothing by this. It is enough that there is a deceiver and adversary, who, in comparison with bad men, is the absolutely bad, and whose temporal and perishable dominion we, by our sins, maintain and strengthen. Philosophy, indeed, is as unable to explain the reality of Satan as the reality of man's fall. Those who conceive the bad as an element in the development of the good, may even place the highest development of the bad under that of the kingdom of God, and in this way obtain a *construction* of Satan or of evil beyond man, and external to him. God can alone reveal himself by subduing the most absolute contrast between His holy power and love, which might even extend to a conversion of the devil; but upon that point Scripture is silent. Whatever popular and illustrative philosophy adduces against the idea of Satan, whether it refer to the impossibility of an evil will existing in so high an intelligence, or to the inadmissibility of such a power and agency in the region of Divine providence and sovereignty, all is already decided, partly by the analogy of bad, corrupt men, who, in their kind, are subject to the internal dominion of the prince of this world, and which government is, *nolens volens*, subject to God, and who in their way also combine spiritual folly with penetrating sagacity; and is partly decided by a more correct apprehension of the biblical doctrine of Angels.

³ It is precisely those passages which record a superhuman fall, 2 Pet. ii. 4, Jude 6, that deviate from Satan's history, and moreover are only found in the subordinate writings of the canon. But whether the early appearance of Satan in the service of the Lord, or among the angels or the sons of God, denote a later change in his relation to Deity, or a mere development of his representation, is not decided, at least by the only positive assertions that he continues not in the truth, and was a liar, a murderer, and a sinner from the beginning. In the remark of Baumgarten-Crusius, *Bib. Theol.* § 40, "It is impossible to ex-

hibit, from the New Testament, a settled and complete view, or even to lay down a doctrinal system on this subject: for even, in accordance with the New Testament, we are not authorised to treat the matter otherwise than as a form of doctrine, or as an image derived from the time and people,"—we concur only in his first, but not in his second position.

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF DEATH.

§ 117. SIN AND DEATH.

The fruit and wages of sin is death, Rom. vi. 23, James i. 15, and only by sin has death entered into the world, Rom. v. 12. Now, although in this sequence of death upon sin the separation of the soul from the body, once for all, is what must chiefly be understood therein, still death, in its connection with the above tenet, and in accordance with the indisputable language of Scripture, has a much more extensive signification. It comprehends the entire fulness of corruption,¹ which may or must be suffered by a sinful, sensuous, and rational being, according to a Divine decree. It comprehends not only death, but also all that is mortal and perishable, whose occasioning cause is sin, Ps. xc. 7; and not only the last judgments, in which the world passes away from the sinner, but also every banishment from life in the other world; yea, not only external evil, which is to be endured in connection with the whole world, but also that internal condemnation and moral restraint of life, by means of which every lapse into sin is one unto death, and every advance into sin becomes a new death. There are, as Augustin says, many kinds of death,² all of which causatively depend on sin. Hence death, in general, is the positive expression of evil which is consequent upon the bad; but this either in such a way that even death, as the limitation of sin,

or as a just punishment from God,—who separates sin and life,—has a good cause; or, inasmuch as Christ died, and the death of believers is a sleep, and their repentance a death unto life and the resurrection, it does not proceed from its causative relation to sin, and continues to be the last enemy of man, 1 Cor. xv. 26; a ban of servitude, under which the devil holds men as sinners, Heb. ii. 14, and which can only be entirely removed by a perfect cessation of sin.

¹ It is impossible that the Divine threat of death, Genesis ii. 17, iii. 3, can be absolutely identical in its import with the sentence, “unto dust shalt thou return,” iii. 19,—but the serpent is correct in the sense of asserting that those who enjoy do not immediately die, but become, in a corporal sense, mortal; but the serpent lies in reference to the Divine threat, for sinners are actually on the road to death and destruction from that moment, and a separation takes place between them and life. Although corporal death, especially when sudden, is the climax of temporal punishment, and is of all tokens the most admonitory, yet it indicates something beyond itself in the language of Revelation. Romans vii. 10, “and I died; and the commandment which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death.” Ephesians ii. 1, “And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins.”

² *De civ. Dei* xiii. 12, and with reference to the expression “thou shalt surely die,” in the Divine threat, see Philo. *Allegg.* lib. i. fin., δηλών ου' τὸν κοινὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν αἰδιον καὶ κατ' ἐξοχὴν θάνατον, ὃς ἐστ ψυχῆς ἐντυμβευομένης παθεσι καὶ κακίαις ἀπάσαις; and although this explanation turns in a one-sided manner upon the moral view, according to Philo's mode, yet with more point Athanasius takes the same view, *De incarn.* ed. Patav. tom. i. p. i. p. 40, τὸ δὲ θανάτῳ ἀποθανέισθε τί ἂν ἄλλο εἶη ἢ οὐ μόνον ἀποθνήσκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ θανάτου φθορᾷ διαμένειν. And cap. v. οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι—εἰς τα τῆς φθορᾶς ἐπιστραφέντες. κ. λ.

§ 118. GUILT AND CONDEMNATION.

The next fruit of sin, or the most immediate reaction of violated law upon him who violates it, is guilt, or the conscious

imprisonment of¹ our life under a law which demands satisfaction, Romans vii. 10, v. 16. Doubtless, guilt, considered as the first among the effects of Divine justice, (all of which are related to the separation of the good from the bad, and the re-separation of sin from life), is not of evil, but the more it is felt to be free, is even good, and the commencement of godly sorrow, 2 Cor. vii. 10, of repentance and conversion, Luke xv. 21, xviii. 13. Even shame and dread, feelings which seized the first sinners, Genesis iii. 7, 8, were to be regarded as the counteractions of the Divine image against sin, and as the natural intimations of a capacity for redemption.² But as an anticipative and merely natural and necessary repentance, Divine accusation, which is felt, is, at the same time, a passive enmity of the heart against God, and must, unless eradicated, draw after it new sins on the one hand, Genesis iv. 5–7; Matt. xxvi. 25, and despair on the other, Genesis iv. 13; Matthew xxvii. 3–5. Now there are, as prefigured in the immediate consequences of Adam's and Cain's sin, various degrees of evil consciousness, but, in a certain measure, all men, according as they partake of the universal life of sin, are the children of wrath, Ephes. ii. 3, and are accounted unrighteous before God, Romans v. 19.³

¹ This idea, together with its representation, is expressed by the term, ἔνοχος, Matthew v. 22; James ii. 10, and ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ, Rom. iii. 19. Differently is DEBITUM, ὑστέρημα, ὀφειλημα as CULPA. The former only expresses an action not yet completed, an obligation as yet good and pure; the latter, on the other hand, a perverted evil obligation arising out of violated duty. Still the first representation passes into the other, just as conscious sins of omission are sins, James iv. 17.

² Ackermann, *Das Christliche im Plato, &c.* p. 247, "It is precisely upon his feelings of guilt that his only hope and the possibility of his restoration depends," &c.

³ The connection between the guilty evil and other kinds of evil, and between the entire corruption of man, is evidenced by this, that the wicked adversary, (Zechariah iii. 1), as expressed in the names Satan, διάβολος, ἀντικείμενος, κατήγορος, unites the character of an accuser with the disposition of a seducer and tempter.

§ 119. PUNISHMENT AND JUSTICE.

The *internal* penal condition of the sinner and sinful world is, by the will of God, confirmed and maintained by an *external* one, Gen. iii. 16–19; iv. 11, 12; vi. 13. For together with this threefold development of sin, as recorded in primitive history, there is also unfolded, in a threefold manner, the penal justice of God, and this by particular and characteristic marks. But the measure of suffering must never be taken as a standard for estimating personal guilt or innocence, John ix. 1–3; Luke xiii. 1–5. With reference to their occasion through sin, and as ordained testimonies against sin, all temporal afflictions are Divine punishments; but with respect to their ultimate aim for exciting a higher life, and for kindling aversion to sin and worldly-mindedness, and for inciting revolt against sin, they become benefits of Divine probation and chastisement, Psalm xxxiv. 19–22, 2 Cor. xii. 7, Heb. xii. 5–12, Rev. iii. 19, and bring with them especial opportunities and occasions for manifesting the word of God in Christ, John ix. 3.

§ 120. SIN AS PUNISHMENT.

If God, on the other hand, effects such a connexion of the internal and external life as leads to reactions of conscience after the fall of man took place, and which are sustained by external institutes for judicial inquiry and punishment, but, at the same time, admits a proportional incapacity to return to a higher stage of life, and begets a natural incitation to continue in the sinful one, then it follows that each succeeding sin immediately becomes a punishment to its predecessor. For a striving after absolute self, and for agreement with self, is innate in the rational creature; whereby he enters into the direct consequence and self-maintenance of sin. By virtue of a Divine law man is compelled to retract sin either by regret, re-

penitance, and conversion, from its very beginning and principle, or else to persevere in its course for his own punishment. The state of servitude in sin, John viii. 34, that of insensibility for good, Ephes. ii. 1, 5, of spiritual blindness, Ephes. iv. 18, Romans i. 24, 28, and of spiritual incapacity for comprehending the word of God, Mark iv. 12, Acts of the Apostles xxviii. 26, John viii. 43, 47, is in an especial manner to be regarded as punishment.

REMARK. By no kind of Divine punishment, temporarily inflicted, is the sinner excluded from the reach of the grace and mercy of God. For the same wisdom and love of God, which chastises by the punishment of conscience, and by afflictions, constrains man, whilst allowing sin to follow upon sin, to complete conversion, and whilst impeding a false, or half, ill-timed conversion, Mark iv. 12, still more necessitates him to a true one.

§ 121. DEATH.

Although the existence of the soul and its life with the body is not one and the same in the original and pure state of man, still that which is necessary, violent, uncertain, and painful in its becoming entirely unclothed, once for all, (2 Cor. v. 3, 4,) together with all the evils of disease and age, transitoriness and the burden of time, Psalm xc., must be regarded as a mark of a natural state of punishment, Genesis iii. 19,¹) in which we have been placed on account of sin, though, at the same time, with a distinct regard to our salvation.²

¹ In a general sense, the body is the medium for the self-developing life of the spiritual soul, and, in this point of view, is not a hindering, encumbering, and restraining, but an innate, and consequently a permanent exigency. Hence the ancient Jewish philosophical notion concerning the longing of souls for their vesture, a longing not to be explained, according to Plato, as if it were a decadence and sensuality, or as a punishment, but as a love for developing consciousness in existence and action; and hence the philosophic idea of unhappy and impure spirits, who, by reason of

their nakedness, have become restless and impassioned, and struggle after embodiment and individuality. On the other hand, the second view, viz. that the body is the just encumbrance of the spirit, can only be admitted in so far as the soul, by the abuse of its spirituality, and its own sensual perceptions, is imprisoned in sin, 2 Cor. v. 4, ὄντες ἐν τῷ σκῆνει στενάζομεν βαρούμενοι. But even in this state we long, as the apostle immediately adds, rather “to be clothed upon,” than to be unclothed; so that unclothing death is of evil. There was neither βάρος nor “unclothing” for original man, although he was of the earth. Hence we may assume, however it may be, that corporeality, which in itself is perishable, gradually or by paroxysms, as it has been said, shall be glorified and perfected. The death to which Adam was subjected, must at all events have been of a different kind, or the mortality of which he partook must at least have been different from that death to which he was condemned by Divine judgment. From the words of Paul, ἵνα καταποθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς, we look to a promised change or transformation of man’s original earthly condition, since it is declared “unto dust shalt thou return.” The author of *Apost. Constit.* does not therefore directly contradict himself, when he says, on the one hand, φυσικὴ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς ὁδός, επεισακτος δὲ ἡ τοῦ θανάτου, 7, 1, and likewise 7, 18, ὁδός θανάτου επεισαγωγὴ τῶν πονηρῶν, and, on the other, that there are diverse kinds of death, a κατὰ γνώμην Θεοῦ, ἀνὲξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἀλλοτρίου. In the primeval world, says the Book of Wisdom i. 13, ii. 23, death was only possible, “for God made not death;” through the envy of the devil death became an objective power and entered into the world. Original principles in themselves are free from mortality—σωτήριοι αἱ γενέσεις. It is only sinners who have, as it were, invited, incited, and impertuned death. However dark these doctrines are, still it is certain that the question does not merely concern spiritual death, but turns on the bias of evil for non-being, and the desire to frustrate and violate all existence, and thus relates to the introduction of corporeal death. Against these modern expositors of the New Testament, who concede (only in its subjective relation,) that death, which was ordained and natural in the primeval world, is unnatural, and as such is a punishment for sin and its consequences, Krabb defends, and we believe correctly, its objective bearing. See his *Doctrine of Sin and Death*, Hamb. 1836, pp. 195–203.

² As a dissolution (ἀναλυσίς, 2 Tim. iv. 6,) of the entirely tem-

poral and penal state, and as the termination of sinful development in this world, death itself may be regarded as a beneficial deliverance, Rom. vi. 7, and if viewed as a passage to judgment, Heb. ix. 27, how much more is it a benefit in another point of view, Phil. i. 21; nevertheless the dead are doubtless the blessed, and death, in short, a justifying and sanctifying deliverer, and is, on the one hand, rather the medium of a crisis and of chastisement, of a consummation and redemption; and, on the other, an evil from which man shall be delivered, John vi. 47, 51; viii. 51.

§ 122. DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL.

But if the soul, being dependent on its Creator, does not possess absolute immortality, 1 Tim. vi. 16, compare Ecclesiast. xii. 7, this at least is certain, that it has been created and constituted to participate in eternal life, and if it must lose its true self-life in proportion as it is deserted by truth, love, and blessedness, it follows that as sin increases, the soul faces destruction in hell or its death; Matt. x. 28; Rev. xx. 15.

§ 123. CONCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DEATH.

Combined with the consciousness of salvation in Christ, there is, at the same time, a well-grounded assumption that the whole national and earthly life of man, without the preserving salt which is imparted to it by Christianity, would be in a state of continual dissolution, and under the dominion of the devil, and entirely resigned to the power of death.¹

¹ According to Hebrews ii. 14, death is the power of the devil, not merely in so far as he kills by means of seduction, but also inasmuch as he imprisons in sin, through the fear of death, those sinners who already deserve it. Otherwise I am unable to interpret the sentence *ἐνοχον εἶναι δουλείας*, words, which, as Bleek has shown, have a connective relation. According to Romans v. 14, 17, death reigns over the race of Adam on account of sin. But

since dying is not free but of necessity, and under which, those even are comprehended who are no longer living under the dominion of the prince of this world and of sin, so death is an independent power, a last enemy, 1 Cor. xv. 26, 55, and one with Hades, or if distinct, yet will be, immediately after the devil, (Rev. xx. 10,) cast into the second death, or lake of fire, (verse 14.) A relation which is mythologically represented in the so-called gospel of Nicodemus.

PART THE THIRD.

OF SALVATION.

§ 124. CAUSE.

THE original cause of our salvation¹ in Christ, is not Jesus of Nazareth, in his human manifestation and ministry, but the eternal philanthropy of God, John iii. 16, 1 John iv. 9, Titus iii. 4, which sent the Only Begotten, and hath given him up and “made us accepted in the Beloved,” Ephes. i. 4, 6. God is Saviour, Tit. iii. 4. And, again, the Divine good-will toward men, Luke ii. 14, is realized through that which is repeatedly expressed concerning the revealed Christ, Matt. iii. 17; for neither the totality of sinful men, nor Abraham, nor David, who proved a blessing to the typical people, Isaiah lv. 3, nor human works and merits in general, Titus iii. 5, have so pleased God as to redeem the world.

¹ Σωτηρία σώζειν, λύτρωσις, and ἀπολύτρωσις, it is true, sometimes especially signify a full and final redemption of certain godly members, as well as the whole people, 1 Cor. i. 30, Ephes. i. 14, 2 Tim. iv. 18, or they especially signify redemption from the guilt of sin, Heb. ix. 12, Ephes. i. 7, or in other passages, as in Acts iv. 12, Luke ii. 38, Heb. ii. 10, they signify generally a Divine liberation of the chosen people from their unsuitable condition, or their elevation into that state whereunto they were called; and the idea of a miraculous Divine act exceeding all expectation and understanding, (1 Cor. ii. 9,) so entirely belongs to that of redemption, that the Septuagint at once translates **הוֹשִׁיעַ**,

Jeremiah xxxi. 22, *σωτηρία*. The words *χάρις*, *εἰρήνη*, *ζωή*, *αἰώνιος*, all apply either to a certain part of salvation, or to the whole.

§ 125. COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION.

Redemption does not commence with the appearance of Jesus upon earth, or with the fulfilment of prophecies which point to the personal Redeemer, inasmuch as the entire Divine pre-administration and preservation of the world must have been perfectly conformable to the everlasting decree of salvation “before the world,” 1 Cor. ii. 7, Ephes. i. 4; iii. 9, 11. For even the manner in which God punished the first sin, Genesis iii., besides the law of preservation, and the decree of Divine forbearance, Genesis viii. 21, 22, together with the founding of civil life (cap. ix.); but particularly the calling of Abraham, upon his faith, and the founding a promise, Romans iv., Gal. iii. 16, the separation of Israel by a legal pedagogy, Gal. iii. 23, Romans vii. 4, the overlooking and tolerance of sin, Romans iii. 25, the manifold address of God to the fathers by the prophets, Heb. i. 1; the scattering of the Jews among the heathen, and the preservation of the mother country under various dynasties, up to the period of John’s testimony; the birth and finished work of the Lord, and up to the founding of the first Christian community, all are facts of a preparative redemption, and effects of a Divine decree of salvation. But this decree was first fully realized in the world when the Son of God came, Gal. iv. 4; was perfected by his death and resurrection; and was manifested through the Holy Spirit, in the hearts of the first believers for the forming of a church. This state of things, however, only indicates the founding of salvation, and many of its developments, but leaves the Christian still to hope for Christ.¹

¹ Accordingly, the exposition of the Christian scheme of salvation consists in the four following doctrines, namely, The founding salvation upon the person of Christ; The appropriation

of salvation through the grace of the Holy Spirit; fellowship in salvation; and finally, the completion of the same.

SECTION THE FIRST.

SALVATION FOUNDED ON THE PERSON OF THE REDEEMER.

§ 126. THE MESSIAH.

Jesus is the Christ, 1 John ii. 22, Jesus of Nazareth; born of Mary, in the city of David, Luke ii. 11; who came out of Galilee unto Jordan, and of whom John the Baptist bore witness, John i. 6, 19; “who went about doing good,” and preaching peace; who was anointed by God with the Holy Ghost and with power, Acts x. 38; crucified under Pontius Pilate, and raised again the third day; seen after his resurrection forty days, Acts i. 3, 1 Cor. xv. 6, “of those who had been with him,” and, after his visible removal from the earth, was publicly proclaimed at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost; this Jesus is the veritable descendant of David,¹ the Son of God manifested in the flesh; the holy servant of God, Acts iii. 13, iv. 27, 30; the Saviour (σωτήρ, Luke ii. 11); the Messiah, or Christ and Lord, Acts ii. 36, of whom all the prophets bear witness; who did not come for the carnal deliverance of Israel according to the flesh, but, according to prophecy, for the gathering together of the spiritual Israel, and for the redemption of the world.

¹ Romans i. 3, τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ, κατὰ σάρκα κ. λ. an apostolical passage which has been totally disregarded by Strauss, in his *Leben Jesu Krit. Bearb.*, i. p. 126, and cannot be forthwith dismissed with the remark, p. 128.—Son of David is equivalent to Messiah; compare 2 Tim. ii. 8.

§ 127. SUBMISSION AND SELF-ABASEMENT.

This true Christ came into the world by virtue of a Divine submission of the Son of God, conjointly with that of a self-renunciation and self-abasement, John iii. 16; Phil. ii. 6;¹ Gal. iv. 4; 2 Cor. viii. 9. But not after the manner in which every human appearance upon earth is related to primitive human nature as an abasement; but God gave his only begotten Son, or his own Son, as a reconciling manifestation of humanity in union with Divinity. For since He came, not to judge but to reconcile, it behoved him to come deprived of the majesty which he had with the Father, John xvii. 5, and which was his own; or he was bound to appear in no other condition than in one of servitude, and to manifest his glory in a human, legal, and suffering state of obedience, and to be glorified by the Father. Hence the abasement of the Son of God is not a merely moral one, but is, at the same time, conditional, and included in his incarnation; and this in such a way, that in the moral act of his obedience, even unto his death on the cross, that same free act of mercy is ever humanly repeated; through which obedience he was especially, in a divine manner, offered up.

¹ For a good exposition of this passage by Stein, see *Theoll. Stud. und Krit.* 1837, p. 127. ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων may be farther elucidated by πλούσιος ὢν, 2 Cor. viii. 9, and ἑαυτον ἐκένωσε, μορφὴν δούλου λαβὼν by ἐπτώχευσε. There is in the life of the Redeemer no commencing point for a morally free renunciation of the unconditional enjoyment and use of his glory, which was not the commencement of his existence in the actual form of a servant; consequently, upon the whole, the doctrine of the New Testament will be found to indicate that the incarnation is included in the condition of self-abasement. If we desire, however, to mark the distinct stages of this humiliation, (perhaps upon the grounds of Phil. ii.), they may be stated as follows: 1st, His entrance into the σαρξ ἁμαρτίας united with the possibility of his glory being mistaken; 2d, His being reckoned among the transgressors, Luke xxii. 37.

§ 128. HUMANITY.

Meanwhile, if Christ has, on the one hand, not humbled himself for the illusion of his glory, but rather for manifestation, yet for a saving revelation of the same, then, on the other hand, his human existence itself is neither an illusion nor a mere semblance (1 John iv. 1–3, 2 John 7), but veritable human nature. True, in reference to his corporeality, because he was born and died,¹ hungered and thirsted, suffered want and pain;² not less true in regard to spirit and mind, for he increased in wisdom, and was subject to the alternations of pleasure and displeasure, joy and grief; was tempted, Heb. iv. 15; Matth. iv. 1;³ struggled, and became obedient, Heb. v. 8; Phil. ii. 7–8; Luke xxii. 44. It behoved him to become man in order to be Mediator, 1 Tim. ii. 5, and ransom man from death, Heb. ii. 14, 17, because all the redeeming acts upon which salvation was to be grounded, depended upon his participating in human nature; and because the condition of salvation in the redeemed themselves could only be a brotherhood with the first born, and must consist in being conformed to his image, Rom. viii. 29.

¹ The expression *γεύεσθαι θανάτου*, Heb. ii. 9, does not, probably, relate to any view that impairs the truth of Christ's death, but is to be taken (as in Mark ix. 1) as *πειῖραν λαβεῖν θανάτου*, or simply for *θανεῖν*. In like manner, *ὑπνώσας*, found in the Sibylline oracles, cannot be considered as expressing merely apparent death.

² Differing on this point, like others, and confounding the sinful *πάθος* with pure natural instinct and necessities, Clemens of Alex. remarks, *Strom.* vi. p. 276, *ἔφαγε γὰρ οὐ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δυνάμει συνεχόμενον ἅγια· ἀλλ' ὡς μὴ τοὺς συνόντας ἄλλως περὶ αὐτοῦ φρονεῖν ὑπεισελθοί· ὡσπερ ἀμελεῖ ὑστερον δοκῆσει τινὲς οὐτὸν πεφανερωῦσθαι ὑπελαβόν· οὐτὸς δὲ ἀπαξοπλῶς ἀπαθῆς ἦν, εἰς ὃν οὐδὲν παρεισδύεται κίνημα παθητικόν, οὔτε ἡδονή οὔτε λύπη κ.λ.* It appears also that the opinion entertained by Daub, (*Jud. Isch.* ii.) on the relation of the idea of duty to Christ and to love, in his excellent treatise, *Gesetz und Evangelium*, does not entirely accord with the biblical doctrine of the *ὑπακοή* of Christ.

³ The historical foundation of the evangelical narrative of the

temptation of Jesus becomes so much the more secure, when we compare the relation of the summary sketch given by Mark i. 13, with the developed one contained in the two other synoptical gospels. The same Spirit which John saw descend upon Jesus, led him into the wilderness, that he might be tempted of the devil. (On the Spirit, in this point of view, see § 131.) The consciousness of being the Redeemer, the promised one, has, up to this point, attained its full development; and now, with reference to the precise mode of Messianic action and suffering, his consciousness must be more fully determinated. His desire for glory, for unencumbered deliverance and happiness, for his manifestation to all people, and to be acknowledged as without offence, is just as possible and actual in him, as his aversion to the opposite. Earthly Messianic dignity was not, therefore, in all who cherished it, a carnal and secular one. Still less was there in the representation of Christ aught that was untrue or sinful; but into every element of its realization he saw the prince of this world enter, and in each element of that desire and this aversion he perceived how the flesh, the world, and Satan threatened to intermingle. Here this susceptible life ever shut itself against, and separated itself from, evil and false divinity. The incomparable distinction between the spiritual, the carnal, and secular course of the Messiah, entered into his consciousness, and his humiliating, lingering, unparalleled Divine way of suffering disclosed itself. In no other mode could the Redeemer be tempted; and in this way he must needs be tempted. The human finite consciousness of which he thus partook had its echoes, Luke xii. 50, John xii. 27; but they did not destroy the assurance which certified to that consciousness (John xiv. 30) that the coming Prince of this world “had nothing in him.”

§ 129. WITHOUT SIN.

As the human condition was ordained upon sin entering into the world, so, for the same reason, the Son of God partook of the human condition, (Romans viii. 3, *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*).¹ But this fellowship with humanity suffering on account of sin, was in him purely one of suffering, never one of sin. He had no spontaneous experience of sin, 2 Cor. v. 21,

nor was he ever under the bias of sin, 1 John ii. 5; and although in suffering he surpassed all men, yet with more perfect truth than the prophet or than Zion, he silently appropriates the reality of the Lamentation (i. 12); and although he was, as far as possible, enticed in every way to participate in fellowship with world-sin, yet did he, on the one hand, for the first and only time in history, most perfectly satisfy all the moral claims on humanity which God ever raised either by the gift of reason or by his Word; and, on the other hand, for the first time, confirmed them; whilst he was a living and pure model of that conduct which is pleasing to God, 1 Pet. ii. 21, and developed himself, “yet without sin,”² Heb. iv. 15, inasmuch as he was born without any evil propensity.³

¹ These passages, as well as others, 2 Cor. v. 21, ἀμαρτίαν ἐποίησε Gal. iii. 13, γενόμενος—κατάρρα Heb. iv. 15, συμπαθεῖσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις compare v. 2, 7, vii. 27, ix. 28, ἐκ δευτέρου χωρὶς ἀμαρτίας,—are misunderstood if they should lead to the conclusion that the Redeemer, as man and as High Priest, appropriated sinfulness and was personally conscious of it. Either, as Ullman remarks, ὁμοίωμα, Rom. viii. 3, relates to σάρξ, but not to ἀμαρτίας: God sent his Son, so that he resembled man who was a sinner; or, according to Tertullian *de carne Christi*, 16: Ergo, inquis, si nostram induit, peccatrix fuit caro Christi. Noli constringere explicabilem sensum: and previously; quod ipsa, non peccatrix, caro Christi ejus fuit par, cujus erat peccatum; genere, non vitio Adæ: quando hinc itiam confirmamus, eam fuisse carnem in Christo, cujus natura est in homine peccatrix. But as to the other passages, the Epistle to the Hebrews, indeed, ascribes to the High Priest of the New Testament ἀσθενεία in the form of being tempted and of παθεῖν, whereby He alone was capable of sympathy; but not in the form of ἀμαρτία, which might have necessitated him to sacrifice περὶ ἰδίας ἀμαρτίας. Nay, according to Hebrews vii. 28, He was exempt from all the ἀσθενεία of the legal High Priest. But had he been made sin, became curse, and at first appeared not without sin but with it, still everything testifies, (inasmuch as this freedom from sin is directly affirmed), its manifestation only, in his suffering on the cross proportioned to sin.

² In the truth of His sinlessness is included the truth of His

thinking faculty, or His freedom from the imperfections of error, misconception, want of faith, and superstition. See particularly Ullman on the sinlessness of Jesus, 4th section, entitled *Inferences in relation to the teaching and work of Jesus*. The finiteness and development of His human perception is not abrogated by the Logos having been incarnated in Him. His Divine knowledge was only active and efficient in Him and by Him, in conformity with His human nature. As omniscience, His knowledge is to be understood as being in part only potential and in part teleological. It was necessary that there should be something He did not know, Matthew xxiv. 36, οὐδεις οἶδεν; Mark xiii. 32, οὐδὲ ὁ υἱὸς, εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ; compare Acts i. 7. The sect of the Agnœtæ might correctly teach, that not knowing, especially when conscious of it, is not ignorance.

³ The Redeemer himself was the most competent witness of His own sinlessness and specific originality, inasmuch as He, (who was before all saints and nobles, whether connected with or apart from testamentary religion, and who was the most incontestable and undeniable image of Divine truth and purity), never in any way concealed His humanity, weakness, and dependence; yet never confessed to being sinful and in need of redemption, or either of them. His coming to baptism cannot possibly be construed into a confession of sin; for the united accounts which guarantee the fact, testify, at the same time, that baptism in His case did not signify a transition out of a sinful state into a pure and sinless one, but that of a concealed Messianic life into a public one,—see § 131. If in any one degree He had participated in carnal propensity, and thus in actual sin, without perceiving and acknowledging it, then, on the one hand, He would morally and intellectually have been far inferior to many prophets, psalmists, and Greek and Roman sages, before whom the Divine Law or *ideal* of humanity floated with such majestic fulness, that they must have rejected its moral being and becoming; and, on the other hand, He must again (insomuch as He claimed to be the only begotten, the Mediator, the way, the truth, and the life, because truth and faithfulness are the bond and condition of all) He must, we say, rather have been a mendacious or fanatical deceiver of men, and not “God with us,” not a Nathanael of Nathanaels. Compare my sermon entitled *Persönl. Werth geltend zu machen ist Sache der Demuth*, in the collection published, 1838, p. 38.

§ 130. HOLY BIRTH.

But the exception of Jesus Christ from sin can only be regarded as complete and adequate to redeem from sin when such exception is original. Although Christ himself, and the apostles only indirectly, in their public teaching maintain the supernatural¹ holy origin of His humanity, namely, when asserting that He “came from the Father into the world,” passed out of a Divine state into a human one, and that “the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in Him bodily,”—yet, from the inmost centre of this testimony, (and especially from faith in the Saviour as the only begotten, and as being archetypal,) there emanates an especial authority for the original Christian narratives directly affirming His miraculous conception; admitting even that we ought not to concede to these narrations an historical character and value equal to that accorded to the facts of the public life of Jesus. The original sinlessness of the second Adam is consequently distinct in kind from that of the first; for, besides His supernatural generation, the sinlessness of Christ is conditioned by his union with the Divine nature.

¹ The supernatural birth of Jesus is defended by Origen, *c. Cels.* lib. i. c. 9, partly on the grounds of its innocence or moral supernaturalness; partly on the analogies of nature, and especially on that of the origin of the human race. On the other hand, the natural view (although in a different way from Cerinthus, Theodoret. *Hær. fab. comp.* lib. v. c. 11) appears combined with the supernatural one as laid down by Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*, ii. p. 73, who, moreover, expressly remarks, p. 74, “it would be fruitless to deprive those narrations of their literal and historical character merely because a generation apart from male co-operation is inadmissible; for, under any circumstances, we must still allow a supernatural generation.” But this theologian is in error when he maintains, (according to Strauss, in the work referred to above, in a manner so conclusive that the subject is exhausted), that “the same reason which renders a merely natural generation insufficient, renders a partial abrogation of the same also insufficient.” Be

the historical value of the narrative in question what it may, the sense is this: the Redeemer was begotten without any communication of a sinful nature, not because He may have received it *quantitatively* only from the woman, but because He may have received it apart from the co-operation of the egoistic sexual instinct, only by means of the maternal sensibility and creative spirit. Schleiermacher supposes the generation to have been supernatural, yet not one out of nature, but in it. At all events, the natural activity or passivity of the genitor, according to this view, must be regarded as changed, restrained, or animated, if the creative act of God intervene therein; and it is only in the Biblical narrative that this *qualitative* peculiar generation seeks and finds its representation, and without such representation it would neither have been discerned, nor conceived, nor taught in the church. The tendency of the narrative, correctly understood, does not by any means lead to the mystical dogma of the sinlessness of our Lord's mother.

² Krabb avows his opposition to this tenet in his *Lehre von der Sünde und vom Tode, &c.*, p. 234, seq. But in this he overlooks, *1st*, That the question only turns on the original sinlessness of Christ; *2dly*, That the indeterminate possibility not to sin, as it was peculiar to the first Adam, is something quite distinct from the determinate freedom of the second Adam to do the Divine will, and that the Godhead of Christ, if it shall not be separated from His humanity, as is done by the Nestorians, includes a free necessity for His holy and pure human development. The question cannot here be concerning physical necessity which is not free. The exclusive *poterat non peccare* suffices only to indicate the first Adam.

§ 131. THE ANOINTING WITH THE HOLY SPIRIT.

If in a certain region of the most ancient Judaizing Christianity the entire perfection of the true Messiah and the peculiar union of Jesus with the Divine nature was derived from an inspiration unparalleled in its kind and degree, yet were there not wanting motives for this either in the prophetic or evangelical testament. Whatever had always qualified those who were especially called to co-operate either by speech or action

towards the preservation and cultivation of the people of God, was a proportional communion of the Divine Spirit, see § 84, p. 189. There was a certain *διαδοχή* of the prophetic Spirit, 2 Kings ii. 9, 15. The unity in this sequence was the Spirit of the Messiah itself, 1 Peter i. 2. Or if *Χριστοῦ*, in this passage, shall only be taken objectively, still the great prophet and king who completed the entire series, must possess Divine perfection, and equipment in a higher,—in the highest degree, Isaiah xi. 1. Herein consisted his anointing, Acts x. 38, *ὡς ἔχρισεν αὐτον ὁ θεὸς πνεύματι ἀγρίῳ καὶ δυνάμει*. And, in fact, prior to the time that John the Baptist saw the Spirit descend and remain upon Him, Jesus performed no Messianic act, and did not reveal his glory in the work of salvation; and therein John recognised in that fact that He was the Son of God to whom the Spirit was “not given by measure,” because He also should baptize with the Spirit, John i. 33, iii. 34. Immediately upon this it is recorded by the other Evangelists, that He was led by the Spirit into the wilderness, there to undergo the Messianic probation. But this especial anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit and with power, in no way contradicts His generation and birth by the Holy Spirit, far less that He was the Only Begotten, the Son of God, and that the Logos became man in Him; as if the one made the other superfluous, and as if such a birth left no susceptibility nor necessity for such a consecration of the Spirit. The determinateness which the human nature of Jesus had already received at birth through union with the Godhead,² did not exclude its own peculiar development. But this development itself, (up to the point when his consciousness of being the Redeemer entirely realized itself in those contacts which His spiritual life received partly from the word of God, and partly from the sinful world), this development, we say, was of another kind than it appears from this point; a view, according to which, doubtless, the period when Jesus was baptized, and the entire separation of His public and concealed, His quiescent and active Messianic life would appear to be necessary.

¹ Compare my *Theol. Studien*, 1 15–25 and 139.

² Faith in the Divine humanity of the Redeemer has certainly been preserved from any essential disfigurement by the totality of the ancient oecumenical formulæ, and through their explanation and justification contained, for example, in the *Dialogues* and *Syllogisms* of Theodoret. The church, by her setting aside the Monophysitic doctrine, preserved the truth of the Nestorian view, and by her rejection of the Nestorian tendency allowed the truth contained in Cyril's doctrine. The ethical significance and efficacy of Christian supernaturalism was admitted by Nestorius, and with perfect justice; whilst, however, he admitted the mere union between the Logos and man, and neglected their mutualinterpenetration and oneness, he appeared almost to place Jesus only under the sustaining influence of the Logos; and thus what corresponded to such a doctrine could easily acquire on the side of anthropology, a Pelagian tendency. Hence the contradiction became requisite. On the other hand, the absolute supernaturalism of Eutyches and the Monophysites, regarded merely as an astonishing marvel, is deprived of all ethical operation, of all human mediation, and must, consequently, be adjusted in the same way as has been done by Leo and Theodoret. Nevertheless a certain Monophysitic view has popularly prevailed even in the Western Church, which is still recognised among Roman Catholic Christians, *i. e.* they term Jesus at once, the Gracious God, the Gracious Lord God;—hence, in this point of view, we need not be surprised that Christ's mediating efficacy recedes, and is ascribed to other names and beings, as, for example, to the Virgin; nor need we marvel that the church considered as supernatural humanity between Christ and the natural man, negotiates, and inclusively with Him, effects divinely human mediations. But even apart from this, the church theory of John of Damascus assumes the Lutheran doctrine of a communication of qualities in its most developed form, and to such an extent, that the human is absorbed by the Divine, or partially occupies its place. In return, the reformed doctrine and the *κένωσις* promulged by the Giessen theologians only offer a significant protest, in order to afford human development ample space. Until the time of Schleiermacher, who on this point has given the question an important turn, it is undeniable that the ethico-psychological explanations have been too much neglected for the sake of the physico-logical ones. The two analogies of glowing iron, and of the unity of the human person in the soul and body

which had been already used by Theodoret, and are at all times applicable, are scarcely able to explain anything whatsoever. We must therefore betake ourselves to the region of freedom and reason. We must not previously take into consideration the oneness of the soul and body, and only admit that the human spirit enters into direct union with the logos. The earliest catholic divines, Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, even Athanasius and the two Gregories, were on this right track before the dispute arose concerning the two natures. The idea of theanthropy was explained by them through the idea of man abstractedly viewed, and particularly with reference to his destiny. The Logos always appertained to man; θεοποίησις was man's destiny; his entire humanity was spiritually nurtured by the logos, it expected its incarnation, and through the same was included again with God the Father. Although but little regarded, Origen especially renders the unity of the human soul of Jesus with the logos conceivable (as one existing before the incarnation) and through it, the possible embodiment, that is, the Son of Man as *ἀνθρωποφιλία*, *ἀνθρώπιος*, in short, the God-man; whilst, at the same time, he makes use, analogically, of the passage 1 Cor. vi. 17; "He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit." *De Princ.* ii. 6, 3; compare Dorner's *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, &c., Stuttg. 1839, pp. 53–81. There is a natural divinity belonging to the human spirit, apart from which we cannot conceive the ungodliness and unhappiness of fallen man. The Divinity of the second Adam, through whose fellowship and promise we shall all be made partakers of the Divine nature, 2 Peter i. 4, is indeed something quite distinct; but if the capacity for Divinity in humanity did not pertain to the idea of humanity, it would be impossible to comprehend what the latter either is or could be. The true Christian, the child of God, lives in God and God in him; whoever cleaves to the Lord is one spirit with him; here the Divine and human nature is again united; but then the union is one effected through Christ, and yet, as such, is incomplete. The language of the Christian is, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." This is a true and valid analogy of the personal unity of the Redeemer's divine and human nature. The distinction between the Divine will revealing itself in human life, and the human will allowing itself to be Divinely determined is in him continually annulled by this immutable tendency of the one will and the other. In Jesus

there is not the mere sinlessness of the first Adam as was his nature before the fall, but it is the predetermined (foreordained, 1 Peter i. 20), sinlessness of the only begotten, in whom the Father will reveal himself, as redeeming, in the Son. He attains a consciousness partly of his species, partly of his individuality, no otherwise than by becoming objectively conscious of his species as a sinful one, and becoming aware of the distinction between his species, as the Son of Man, and that of the children of Adam. This self-consciousness is the continual operation of the logos, incarnated in him, the effect of his peculiar origin, his proceeding from the Father. Hence a holy development of the life of Jesus is absolutely necessary, yet it is not one of compulsion, nor a necessity which merely leaves a semblance of human freedom in obedience. Those who are conscious of being incited by the Spirit of God unto a good work, and in any given instance to be incapable of sinning, are at the same time conscious of the fullest freedom. When Jesus says ἐμὲ δεῖ ἐργάζεσθαι, John ix. 4, he is in a condition of the most perfect freedom. If the personal Divine humanity of the Redeemer excludes the possibility of sin, still it does not exclude the participation of the Divine in the finite, and in a successive series of conditions. The Redeemer affirms both, “We testify that we do know, and which we have seen,” and at the same time, “The Son knows not the day.” He confesses both, that “All power in heaven and earth is given unto me,” and that “The Father is greater than I.” For the consciousness of God in Christ’s self-consciousness (although it is not only a consciousness of God, but is at the same time a Divine consciousness) is acquainted with His power, glory and wisdom, in such a manner that it is at the same time acquainted with its gracious self-limitation, or with its limitation to revelations and demonstrations in the humanity of existence. It is indeed the Godhead of his consciousness which effects and represents the infallibility and sufficiency of his utterances and actions; but then it is the Godhead condescending, reconciling, and become human, and, at the same time, as such, effecting the limits of its mode of manifestation and operation. For a fuller explanation of this subject, see Sartorius’s defence of the Lutheran doctrine of the reciprocal communication of the attributes of the two natures in Christ, in *den Dorpater Beiträgen zu den Theoll. Wissench.* 1 vol. pp. 306—84, and Dorner on the historical development of Christo-

logy, particularly in modern times, *Tüb. Zeitschr. f. Theol.*, 1835, 4. Compare his *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ from the earliest times, &c.*, Stuttg. 1839, p. 176, where a critical estimate is given of the view taken by Sartorius.

§ 132. WORK OF THE REDEEMER.

As the personal being and state of the Redeemer was indispensable for his saving work, it could only attain its object in union with this work as a basis for the salvation of the world. With regard to salvation as founded upon the person of the Redeemer, it may be considered in a twofold point of view. In the first place, the Redeemer grounds salvation on all those preparatives for his elevation to the Father and for the mission of the second Paraclete, or through every thing appertaining to his work and destiny, which belong to his *πολιτεία*, (in the old ecclesiastical sense of that word). Meanwhile, his ministry, after his departure to the Father, ceases not to be the fundamental one for the salvation of individuals, and of mankind at large; and strictly speaking, the doctrines of the grace of the Holy Spirit, of the church, and of the final doom, are at the same time those of the Saviour, and of his saving activity, continuing in varied relations up to that period, indicated in 1 Cor. xv. 28. That is to say, he continues in his state of glory, his prophetic and sacerdotal ministry, although in a different manner; just as he exercised in a servile state his regal office, although in a particular manner. Now the question turns especially on the founding of salvation (*œconomia originans*), in the first sense, or in relation to His work considered as absolutely finished. John iv. 34; xvii. 4. This work is nothing else than his self-manifestation and development in a sinful world, and so far, it cannot be considered otherwise, than as operating upon and influencing the latter; or we should fully denote by this that he hath done the will of his heavenly Father, John iv. 34; or that he has reconciled the world; or, again, that he bears witness of the truth, John xviii. 37, for the one ever in-

cludes the other. But the fundamental work of the Saviour may be especially conceived under three distinct points of view, as testimony, reconciliation, and a preparatory formation of a church.¹ And to this threefold division, the unexceptionable classification grounded on Scripture, of His ministry, into the prophetic, priestly, and regal, corresponds.²

¹ The life of Jesus probably does not admit of being divided chronologically, according to these functions; just as if His reconciling or propitiating ministry had first commenced with his spiritual conflict, in the garden of Olives, or were to be restricted to his literal suffering in death. As far as his being “delivered up,” John iii. 16, Romans viii. 32; His becoming poor for our sake, 2 Cor. viii. 9; His being *γενόμενος ὑπὸ νόμον*, Gal. iv. 4, reach, to the same extent, does the reconciliation of his testifying and typifying life also reach. Death is the culminating point of his entire ministry, and this in such a manner, that his resurrection (which is to be regarded as a free return, and as his work and will), must ever be taken into account. The distinction of legal and passive obedience, or of active and passive performance, was to be approved, in so far as it resisted the limiting of Christ’s mediatorial ministry to the facts of his historical passion; but this distinction led directly into error, when it was at the same time desirous of becoming one of a twofold imputation, and of a double redemption. Besides, the contrast of action and passion is on the one hand, in its phenomenon and time, engaged in a continual transition of the one into the other. His confession, “I am He,” forms his reproach and death, &c.; and, on the other hand, the contrast is internally dissolved. The process of the life of Jesus, is such a self-manifestation, or self-development in humanity, needing salvation, by means of which the new divine common life incorporates itself more and more with the old Adamic one, and at the same time, assumes the latter more and more into itself. The former is predominantly an action, the latter a passion, and both are sinless; both reconcile and both redeem. But as long as this process remains incomplete, the Saviour himself, as such, is “not perfected,” Hebrews ii. 10, *διὰ παθημάτων τελειῶσαι*. And since he cannot completely effect redemption in each relation before his glorification in death, but rather can only thereby continue to attest his existence, and appropriate

to himself humanity, and to humanity himself, so beyond a doubt, death is the aim of his life. From this consummation, he primarily draws all men unto himself, John xii. 32; and the deepest humiliation will be his exaltation, in which all who believe in him, derive from him eternal life, John iii. 15. Hence, in that period when he awakens faith predominantly by word and deed, he declares the inadequacy of this mode of operation, and the necessity of his completion, Luke xii. 50. The joint operation of Christ, thus perfected, is the redemption of the old life of man in the creation of a new one.

Redemption is a reanimation, which, inasmuch as it cannot be magical, must be effected by illumination; but before illumination can operate spiritually by animating, it must operate by mortifying the flesh, and it effects the one in and through the other. Vivification itself is justification and sanctification, which ideas include, together with the positive one of purity and power of love, the negative of exculpation and expiation. For a correct view and lucid analysis of the work of redemption, see Klaiber in *der Neutest. Lehre von der Sünde und Erlösung*. p. 495—99.

² The prepossession chiefly emanating from the school of Ernesti, as if this threefold view were an arbitrary selection of Biblical and figurative signs of Christ's ministry, has been weakened by several writers, but chiefly, and in the most instructive manner by Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* ii. § 102, p. 122. Wherever the most perfect realization of the idea of an office occurs, but by no means where a mere analogy of the office exists, there nothing should be expressed by a trope. The acknowledged essential functions for maintaining the old covenant, were the three above named, and this in such a manner, that the mission of the prophets, which was always openly maintained, was added to the two other offices, which offices, strictly speaking, were both in existence before the time of Saul, and this mission was appended as a third, completing, mediating, progressing, and purifying office; whilst the office of teaching in the New Testament is the primary and fundamental one. The Biblical theology of the Old Testament will indicate, *first*, How far all the actual possessors of these dignities, (which probably existed up to the time of Nehemiah,) were from attaining that perfection with which each of them should be exercised at a future time for the salvation of the people, according to the individual earlier or later promises.

Second, It will point out how a certain union of several or all of these dignities in one and the same person, was realized at every extraordinary period of any new dispensation; and, *thirdly*, How, in consequence, the structure of the new covenant was able to maintain its relation to the old, merely through a prophetic and everlasting king, who, at the same time, should be “a priest after the order of Melchisedec.” To a certain extent, in an usurping manner, and with an essential disfigurement of each individual dignity, this triplicity had already appeared in personal union. Josephus, whilst commending the good fortune of Johannes Hyrcanus, remarks, *De Bello Jud.* lib. i. c. 2, p. 81, ed. Lips. Τρία γοῦν τὰ κρατιστεύοντα μόνος εἶχε, τὴν τε ἀρχὴν, τοῦ ἔθνους, καὶ ἀρχιερωσύνην, καὶ προφητείαν· ὡμίλει γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ δαιμονιον, ὡς μηδὲν τῶν μελλόντων ἀγνοεῖν. κ. λ. Compare also Philo, *De Vita Mosis*, who represents the dignity of Moses under the same threefold point of view.

§ 133. TESTIMONY OF THE TRUTH.

The saving efficacy of Christ is, in the *first* place, one that testifies and reveals; wherefore, on certain occasion, he states his whole vocation to be, that of bearing witness to the truth, John xviii. 37, and ascribes entire salvation to the emancipating power of the truth proceeding from him, John viii. 32. This is life eternal, to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent, John xvii. 3; and those no longer sin, and they become “whole,” who have seen and acknowledge him to be the true Saviour, 1 John iii. 6. At all events, the first consideration is the fundamental relations of the eternal kingdom, which being darkened or denied in the world, are brought near, typified and evidenced in a new and perfect way to believing perception, through him who holds those relations in his hand, and constitutes their living centre. The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth come by Jesus Christ, John i. 17. This “Declarer” of Divine things, verse 18, distinguishes himself as such, in a manifold point of view, from all who, either contemporaneously, or preceding or succeeding him, teach the word of God. Once he had no heavenly kingdom to teach, which, as

a mere idea, or as a promise, could claim the moral powers of his auditors; but in teaching this kingdom, he at the same time represents it in its relation to God and to man, bearing witness through himself and his work, (Matth. xii. 23; xi. 5,) that the hour of the world's redemption is coming, and now is, John v. 25, *ἔρχεται ὥρα, καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν κ. λ.*; for it is evident that throughout all his general doctrines concerning the kingdom of God, (as they are contained in the sermon on the mount, and parables,) he only incites humility and ardent desire, but he does not require the immediate consummation of this heavenly order, and thus it is so much the more natural, that he constitutes himself the surety and mediator for entrance into the kingdom, and the essential object of his testimony and of the faith, which he requires; and all he teaches concerning redemption is only true and certain as connected with himself. From the purport of this testimony, it is evident, that it consists not in word alone, but in action and suffering also, and that between both a peculiar connection subsists, which he partly makes known by avowing that he does not hinder, by any imperfection, the formation of faith, John viii. 46; and partly through the assurance that he would, at a future time, draw all men unto himself by his consummation on the cross, John xii. 32. If this saving testimony be fulfilled in his death, John xvii. 4, he still continues it through the glory which he had with the Father, (verse 5, *δοξασόν με,*) and through his resurrection from the dead up to the period when the Paraclete was to come to testify of him, John xv. 27. In this connection between the doctrine and the person of Jesus, it is at the same time established, that, like a prophet, he is related as a teacher to the masters in Israel existing in his time, and among whom he suffered himself to be numbered; an authority which, beyond a doubt, he also openly claimed under peculiar relations, John ii. 15, just as it was ascribed unto him by the earliest believers, Luke xxiv. 19, *ἀνὴρ προφήτης, δυνατὸς ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ ἐναντίον τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ παντὸς τοῦ λαοῦ.* But he is distinguished from the prophets, as the finisher of prophecy in the founding of the new covenant; and from the

apostles and teachers of the New Testament, from evangelists and prophets, by the originality of his doctrine, and by the dependence in which he places all those, not permitting them to lay any other foundation, nor even to perfect it, 1 Cor. iii. 11, Gal. i. 7.

§ 134. RECONCILIATION.

The saving efficacy of Christ consists, in the *second* place, in the reconciliation of the world; for reconciliation is not the whole but a mean for the Divine redemption of humanity. The Divine decree in Christ includes the reanimation of the world dead in sin. And as we die in Adam, we shall live in Christ, 1 John iv. 9; an essential destiny or change ever belongs to man specifically, and whatever shall be effected in, and for fellowship, must emanate from a personal mediating commencement, which possesses in itself a new common life and common nature, and appropriates and manifests the same. By preparative means it was made known that such a second Adam, new covenant, and Messiah was to come. That new common life was disclosed in the Old Testament, and to a certain extent appropriated; especially in that sphere where it was to be manifest, both in individual personality and reality. Now when such common life actually appears, it has pre-eminently to become known and perceived as such. This occurs not through mere self-testimony in teaching, nor by merely asserting the identity of that which has arrived, and that which is expected, but, as we have already intimated, through the combined impression of truth and grace, of Divine fellowship, holiness and blessedness, which impression the entire personal phenomenon attests, and whereby the latter places the susceptible circumstance in salutary dependence. If, however, at any period this agency of the Redeemer shall be, according to its extent and duration, imperishable and shall increase; then must it reach its *intensive* consummation, even with the most susceptible novice in faith, in conformity to the temporal, local, or general circumstances of

man. Added to this, that the testimony of truth, that the personal testimony of man's translation out of death into life, a transition imparted and necessary, does not only not yield to obstacles, but even prospers under them, and through them, up to its imperishable effect. That wherefrom the Redeemer shall liberate, namely, sin and death, the world, the flesh, and the devil, is at the same time a something which will maintain itself as free, good, and just, and is opposed to the salutary affection of human life through the manifestation of the Divine life.¹ The claims of the flesh demand a corporeal Redeemer, and one connected with the world, and contend along with the externality of the law and the promise against the truth of a spiritual Redeemer; so that the whole Adamic life, as contrasted with the Redeemer, is yet included under unbelief, and with more or less consciousness of falsehood and sin, remains captive under its sentence of death. Thus, the entire process of redemption or reanimation still continues restrained; sin is not yet perceived, nay, has not yet reached its consummation; far less has guilt been pardoned and grace fully appeared. In all truth and love the Redeemer continues in contrast with the Adamic life, not only from his own testimony that he is the Redeemer, but also in powerful manifestation, without in any respect allowing the sin of unbelief to return, or permitting himself to be enticed into it; but then without interrupting the development and self-destroying process of world sin by any act of visible glory and premature judicature. He continues to reveal himself unrestrictedly to human life in the individualism of his holy love, and to live in the same; which action precisely constitutes his bitter passion and death; and what he suffers in such action, and acts in such suffering, appropriating and reserving himself for a sinful world, constitutes the substance of his reconciling, and at the same time expiating ministry, into which his testifying and typifying one passes. For he has not only, in order to begin this ministry, made himself participative of human finiteness and limitation, and emptied himself of his glory, but at the same time, in order to continue and complete it has

partaken of world sin, in his innocent suffering of death and ignominy.

¹Romans v. 6–10, ἔτι ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν, ἀσεβῶν, ἀμαρτωλῶν, ἐχθρῶν, —Χριστὸς ἀπέθανε. This enmity to the light, or even this insusceptibility for spiritual salvation, which is to be subdued by divine love as reconciling grace, was not only in the narrow historical circle of the Redeemer's operations, (although in very different degrees and kinds,) a something universal, (for all even the most susceptible were to some extent unbelieving, had little faith, and were offended in him, Luke xxii. 31 seq.) but even the world in general consists of such ἐχθροίς—who, in their guilt, or passive enmity to God and his truth, require a reconciling appropriation of the Redeemer. All sinners as such, entertain the necessity, that the witness of the truth should die, Luke xviii. 8. In all men, before they can receive life from Christ, sin must first be convicted of falsehood, ransomed as guilt, and put to death as enmity. Sin must be ended, exhausted, and annihilated for all in the Redeemer. Hence a mere testifying and typifying ministry does not by any means correspond to man's need of redemption. The Socinian view limits the redeeming agency of Christ to teaching and example; but essential and important as may be the connection between doctrine and type, for grounding salvation, still it can neither directly reconcile, nor be acknowledged and apprehended in its truth by unreconciled hearts; or, in so far as it is recognised, it judges and punishes rather than heals, and before it is able to improve and sanctify, it must pardon. Type as such is even to sinners a something strange. Should it be entirely for us, and not just as much against us, we must recognise it in the light of a common life bestowed upon us, as the commencement of our new life, as a pledge of our pardon, and this too in such a manner that its unattainableness only the more attracts us into its fellowship. But this first takes place when it is consummated in a reconciling manner. The Redeemer undoubtedly presents distinct examples, John xiii. 15, unto those who are or shall be reconciled and sanctified through him, and is their living precept and example, 1 Peter ii. 21; but it is not by this means that he reconciles, at least, his example would have been still more effectual for reconciliation, in the Socinian sense, if he had had to reconcile himself, and had been himself a sinful and fallible man, as Camillus

Renatus, whose views assimilate to those of Socinus, is said to have inconsiderately taught, quod Christus habuerit carnem peccati et concupiscentiam et ob id sit dictus maledictus peccator, &c., vid. *Illgen. symbb. ad vitam et doct.* Laclü Socini illustrandam, I. p. 49.—In this case, the example of Christ would have been an imperfect good, or universal sinfulness would not have been objectionable, and universal reconciliation would have been unnecessary, and yet a something possible or actual. But if, on the contrary, Christ is *impeccabilis*, whilst sinful humanity requires to be reconciled through a Mediator, his example as such is not a reconciling one, because, even in a formal point of view, he who is originally exempted from sin, cannot be unto those who are not so a valid example in their behalf, and for their encouragement. Even in another point of view, reconciliation is not to be regarded solely as a part of the instructive ministry of Jesus. Undoubtedly the Lord testifies that he had to suffer, in order to reconcile, and claims our faith for this assurance, Mark x. 45, John vi. 51. Criticism cannot show that the doctrine of reconciliation only occurs in the discourses of Jesus retrospectively, nor can exegesis remove the representation of the reconciling passion from those passages which relate to it, a representation which, in general, was not foreign to the period. See the prayer of the dying Eleasar, iv. Macc. or *περι αυτοκρατορος λογισμοῦ*, § 6, in *Josephi Opp.* t. v. Lips. p. 265. But the real act and event of Christ's passion, is not the mere sealing of these decisions, nor as such, only a reference to the reconcilableness of God to man, but it primarily proves itself to be the reconciling consummation for testifying the truth and the life of Jesus as a mediating and common life of humanity.

§ 135. CONTINUATION.

The ultimate ground of this consummation of the Redeemer, is that same mediatorial God, who from the beginning, offered up His Son. It is His will, His decree to bring back the alienated world in Christ, and to reconcile it unto himself;¹ consequently to pardon its sins. God does not become reconciled, but reconciles the world unto himself by Christ, 2 Cor. v. 18—21. Ephes. ii. 16. Col. i. 22. Rom. v. 10, 11. The Re-

deemer apprehends both from the condition of the world, as well as from Scripture, the will of the Father who spared him not, whilst under such circumstances, his consciousness of the mode of his Messianic procedure and destiny is developed; and he receives that will into his own under the innocent resistance of his pure human nature. This constitutes his obedience, Rom. v. 19; Phil. ii. 8; Hebrews v. 8. In this way, the world indeed appears to be reconciled, and graciously pardoned through Christ, yet not for the sake of Christ; that is to say, in this mode of manifestation and of testimony; or in such a way, that the condescension of the Son of God to the world, (continuing up to his death, and glorified in his resurrection, notwithstanding the sinful opposition of that world,) admits of pardon being rather included and presupposed than effected. For the gracious will of God is directly revealed in the consent and avowal of Jesus to suffer and to die, and by the efficacious fellowship in which he places believers with the glorified one. But however much of evangelic truth is contained in this view, it neither constitutes the whole, nor is it independent. Scripture not only teaches a reconciliation of the world, (*καταλλαγὴ*, *reconciliation*), but also expiation for the sins of the whole world, (*ἰλασμος*, *expiatio*, 1 John ii. 2); it refers the act and will of God immediately to the passion and death of Jesus, 2 Cor. v. 21. The Redeemer gives himself as a ransom for many, and the experience that he appeared at his death in the character of a transgressor, Gal. iii. 13, corresponds to the type of the Messiah, that is, to the vicarious passion of the only chosen servant of God, Isaiah liii. compare John i. 29, 1 Peter i. 19, ii. 22; and answers to the perfect sin-offering once required, Hebrews ix. 11; Romans iii. 25, by virtue of which a godly people could only then become truly the servants of God, and have access unto him. The Redeemer, since he had not to suffer death for himself, and for his own sake, as being absolutely innocent, has suffered and overcome death for others, *περὶ ὑπερ*, and consequently, in their stead *ὑπερ ἀντὶ ἀντιλυτρον*, so that he is the end of all condemnation or

pardon, which otherwise could only have been legal. From these representations, it is clear that Christ, by virtue of his vicarious obedience and passion, and through their sufficiency, is our righteousness or our justification.

¹ With reference to the meaning of the word *καταλλάσσειν*, compare 1 Cor. vii. 11, and Döderlein *Instit. Theol. Chr.* ii. 326, seq. Whether and how the words reconciliation and expiation are originally related to each other, is here unimportant. It is sufficient that in harmony with undoubted usage, their signification is just as distinguishable as the signification of *reconciliatio* and *expiatio*. The former act can be realized merely through revelation, and the interpretation of its sense; the latter can only take place through a work of suffering.

§ 136. CONCLUSION.

The ideas of this substitution, imputation, and satisfaction, are not, however, to be formed according to the view of a relation which, as regards the Redeemer, is to be considered as one that is foreign and past. The Reconciler is not representative, and does not make sufficient satisfaction as an individual for individuals separately. He does not suffer in experimental reality, what, according to abstract necessity, we might have to suffer, as if he were actually a sinner, which in fact he is not; he does not surrender himself to a twofold work, first, of righteousness, and then of the grace of God, as if the one were a something which approximated towards the other and against it; rather must such Antinomian views disappear in the truth of reconciliation, instead of being introduced into the Divine or human nature and into the person of the God-man. Since scripture acknowledges in God only one and no other ultimate ground of Christ's passion, than that love in which He sent his Son into the world, so, from this ground alone can every Divine compulsion of the Saviour's consenting to die for the reconciliation of the world be understood. That love, denying all origi-

nal will, favour, indifference, or enmity, possesses as such in all its communications, even the most perfect, a defence against evil and a negation against sin, that is to say, it is a holy and righteous love; for righteousness by which the bad is ever separated from the good, justice in its higher development of legislation revealed, and sin judged, and the sinner punished, is not without love, but exists in it and springs from it. Accordingly the world's need of redemption requires such a deliverance, by means of which it is not only reanimated in its capacity by God and for God—but is also put to death in its sinful and carnal character, and is not pardoned without having the same removed, and without receiving power to punish itself, and to enter into life through the death of repentance.

This is a power nowhere bestowed upon the world, according to the flesh and under the law, nor granted during the mere toleration of a more or less unacknowledged unrighteousness. Consequently the world requires fellowship with a mediator, a powerful example for this purpose, who, in the unalterable holy love of his imparting effort receives death for the sin of the world's unbelief, in order to give life unto it in the glory of his conquest over death, and who, by bestowing life upon the world, kills the flesh and the law which condemns. Whilst the world's unrighteousness transgresses against the holy and righteous One, it exhausts itself, and He endures it in the glory of his innocence in order to punish it through his spirit in us. Thus, while the world is sentenced, its sin is forgiven and in its punishment is reconciled. Only in a twofold, reciprocal, passive, and active fellowship, between the world and the Redeemer, is it true that he offered himself up to God, and suffered death instead of the world. It is only as the power and possibility of our actual purification that his obedience unto death becomes a ransom for many; only in the power of his spiritual sympathy for the world's corruption, and of his striving efforts for its salvation, does the Redeemer internally suffer the punishment of its sins. Transferred to him, this punishment assumes another aspect, and the complete contradiction between his

merit and destiny, which does not allow, even in his undergoing death, that he should participate in sin, is solved by redounding unto his glory, and being reiterated in us for our salvation.

Thus Christ becomes our righteousness, and the exclusive principle of all individual justification. As God, in consequence of Adam's sin, permitted death, as a punishment, to reign over those who had not sinned like Adam, on account of that fellowship to which the whole race was destined; so, in consequence of the perfect obedience of Christ, many—nay, all, who have not died nor risen again, like Christ, participate in justification unto life. Thus, neither the one, (inasmuch as all have sinned unto death, Rom. v. 12,) nor the other, (since there is an obedience of faith, which includes a dying and rising again with Christ, Rom. vi.) is excluded, apart from which individual reconciliation is unattainable.

REMARK 1. The idea of "ransom," "payment," if we desire to carry it out in all its bearings, as represented in Christ's suffering death, is again annulled by other ideas. For no compact exists between the Redeemer and death, or between the Redeemer and the devil; since the latter rather is deprived of his power and prey, by the former, or Christ is opposed to the enemy in his own right, &c. However, from the time of Origen the question concerning the devil's right of possession in matters of redemption was agitated by the Greek and Latin fathers; by the former up to the period of John of Damascus, and by the latter to that of Abelard. Yet St Bernard was enraged against Abelard for contending against such right. A transition soon took place in accordance with Anselm's view, with reference to Divine right and Godhead, both demanding and paying ransom. The idea of ransom as such, never regards right, but actual conditions; it refers to a sacrifice necessitated by love, to an actual deliverance, and especially to what is substitutory and vicarious.

REMARK 2. The idea of sacrifice in the Old Testament, as being a fellowship with God accomplished through resignation and self-renunciation, is primarily applicable, in its universality, to Jesus and his death. He sanctifies himself that thereby his disciples may be sanctified, John xvii. 19. The act of his suffering obedience is a consecration to God, whereby his life partakes of a

perfectly human character in order to effect the sanctification of the community. Here the condition preceding the sacrifice is only to be considered as a yet non-existence of holiness and purity. Those who are sanctified by this sacrifice are now capacitated to exercise the functions of priests, and to offer themselves up and all they possess, Phil. ii. 17, iv. 18, Romans xii. 1, 1 Peter ii. 5. In a special relation, Christ is a sacrifice for the preservation and renewal of the covenant, a passover, Matt. xxvi. 28, 1 Cor. v. 7, because in the communion of his death, blood, and body, there exists a foundation, preservation, and renewal of communion with God. Here are references to sin, and its pardon, and reconciliation; *εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν*, Matth. xxvi. 28, Heb. ix. 22, *καὶ χωρὶς ἁματεκχυσίας οὐ γίνεται ἄφεσις*, because the whole sacrifice must not only be a pledge for the future, and for obligation, but must also terminate the past, a past pertaining to a committed breach of a covenant not yet expiated. But the relation of the death of Jesus to an expiatory sacrifice, and to the great sacrifice of reconciliation is especially admitted, 2 Cor. v. 21, Romans iii. 25, Heb. viii. 9, 10, 1 Peter ii. 24. This idea has God himself for its leading feature, as revealing and presenting the means and mode of a reconciliation of the sinner, which is expressed in 2 Cor. v. 21, and particularly in Romans iii. 25, by the term *προέθετο*. It is God who renders it possible for the sinner and the sinful people under the theocracy to reacquire a capacity for serving him and for fellowship with him; the same God who exhibits Christ as the expiatory sacrifice, *ἁμαρτίαν*, and as the ground and means of reconciling all who have incurred guilt. This ground is symbolized in the Old Testament. Its elements, however, diverge in the symbolism as follows: sacrifice and priest, High Priest and the Holy of Holies, purity of the sacrifice, and death, blood. The actual expiation which God founds and presents, is the not sparing his Son, who, in fact, is the only innocent being; His not sparing the Redeemer who surrendered himself to God and suffered death for his people, as a pledge for their sanctification. The act of Christ's holy passion operating and assuring a spiritual conjunction of the people in death and newness of life, is itself, again, an operation and manifestation of holy love or of the righteousness of God, and effects the pardon of sin by a retrospective causation; that is to say, the pardon of sin, which, not merely as tolerated but as forgiven, and in forgiveness rendered destructible, and destroyed and transferred, as a mere suf-

fering, to the just about to be glorified, a sin which, being no longer imputed to the faithful in Christ, corresponds to the *δικαιοσύνη* of God. See particularly Klaiber's work already referred to, on the nature of sacrifice in the Old and New Testament, although he appears to go too far in his opposition to the theory of satisfaction and punishment, and to make the distinction between expiatory and other sacrifices too subjective and internal.

REMARK 3. *ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης*, Rom. iii. 25, 26, has been the chief cause of introducing the idea of *justitia retributiva* into the doctrine of reconciliation; and indeed according to some, the justice of God is apparent in this, that He abolishes the unrighteousness of men together with their original sin by the grace they receive in Christ; whilst others, indeed the majority, perceive in this, that God does not forgive the people their sins without satisfaction and a fulfilment of the law which shall be both passive and active. But such ideas of justice have already been set aside by our doctrine of the Divine attributes.

§ 137. FOUNDATION OF THE KINGDOM.

How limited soever may be the exercise of regal power in the depressed condition experienced by the Redeemer, a power by whose means he purifies unto himself a peculiar people (Tit. ii. 14), and mutually unites those individual members who depend upon him,¹ still such power is not absent. Jesus so decidedly avows the true royalty existing in his person, that it becomes an ostensible occasion for the world to condemn and put him to death, John xix. 19. In the fulness of his power, he calls whom he will, John i. 44, xv. 16. He confers personal promises, Matt. xvi. 19. He decrees, by commands full of promises, an external communion of believers and worshippers, Matt. xviii. 18–20. He ordains for this communion federal signs as pledges, Matt. xxvi. 25, xxviii. 18. He sends and equips chosen persons to invite men to believe, Luke ix. 2, John xx. 21, and he commands his disciples to remain together awaiting the promises of the Father, Luke xxiv. 49. That this mode of action on his part belongs to redemption ap-

pears partly from this, that it required in all its results the whole of Christ's peculiar virtue and glory, and partly because it was necessary for his entire success, and was a certain condition also pertaining to the office of Prophet and High Priest.

¹ See Schleiermacher, *Glaubensl.* ii. p. 269. "For a preliminary understanding on this point, it must be remembered, that in Judaism the actual government, the preservation, renewal, and improvement of the community, was incumbent on the king; but the priests administered the immediate and more internal relation of the people and of individuals to God;" and p. 271, "on the other hand, however, should we exclude the regal office; in that case the other two conjointly, whilst they alone could unite each redeemed one to the Redeemer, would only produce an unsatisfactory (and more closely regarded) an unchristian separation." P. 302. "The regal office is not to be considered as only commencing after Christ's ascension; but as he himself says—not that he will become a king, but that he is one. And thus he exercised his regal authority even during his abode on earth; by legislating for his kingdom, and by the direct power which he had over the minds of men.

§ 138. EXALTATION.

The Redeemer himself, who appropriated in this world that threefold dignity and official ministry, required a certain kind of justification, namely, that kind which he obtains by his resurrection, Rom. i. 4, Acts iii. 15, 26, iv. 10; by his exaltation to the right hand of God, Heb. x. 12; and by the communication of the Spirit, 1 Tim. iii. 16, *εδικαιωθη εν πνεύματι—επιστευθη εν κόσμω*. In fact it is our justification; for without his resurrection our faith is vain, and we are yet in our sins, 1 Cor. xv. 17. But expiation by death only becomes perfect reconciliation in his resurrection, Rom. iv. 25; or, according to Heb. vii. 25, x. 12, in his exaltation added to the express enunciation made by the Father (*λόγος τῆς καταλλαγῆς*), 2 Cor. v. 19. Thus is the Redeemer first made

perfect through suffering, Heb. ii. 10, and then through glorification, for which he prayed the Father, John xvii. 5. His actual exaltation, of which he gave a visible sign, Luke xxiv. 51, Mark xvi. 19, Acts i. 9, and which is testified by the general knowledge and belief of the apostles, John xx. 17, Ephes. iv. 9, Col. iii. 1-3, 1 Tim. iii. 16, ἀναλήφθη ἐν δόξῃ, Acts iii. 21, is, in the first place, to be viewed in the light of a miraculous departure from the world, corresponding to his miraculous birth, John xvi. 28, and in the second place is to be considered partly as a negative and partly as an affirmative condition for perfecting his disciples for their apostleship, and for a holy community; finally, the Lord's exaltation is to be regarded as that reward, Phil. ii. 9, Isaiah liii. 10, 12, and consummation, by which he brings into perfect operation, and sustains therein, salvation grounded in a threefold manner, namely, the testimony of truth, reconciliation, and formation of the community; and this he does not only in relation to time and space, Matt. xxviii. 20, Ephes. iv. 11, 16, John xvii. 22, 1 John ii. 1, 2, but also victoriously leads his people to a higher external and internal completion, 1 Cor. xv. 27, 28.

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF THE APPROPRIATION OF SALVATION.

§ 139. GRACE AND THE HOLY SPIRIT.

The perfect mediator of the new covenant, Heb. ix. 15, first imparts to the souls of men the gift of eternal redemption through the Holy Spirit who receives all "of His," John xvi. 13, 14. For obtaining salvation is one thing (εὐρεσις λυτρώσεως, Heb. ix. 12), imparting it to individuals is another; salvation prepared differs from salvation appropriated (τὰ χάρισθέντα ἡμῖν, 1 Cor. ii. 12; μέτοχοι, Heb. iii. 1, vi. 4); the grace

of our Lord Jesus Christ is distinct from the grace of the Holy Spirit. Through the former the whole world is reconciled (*κατὰ δύναμιν*) 1 John ii. 1, 2; through the latter an ever-increasing number of individuals is reconciled unto God, *κατ' ἐνέργειαν*, 2 Cor. v. 20, *δεόμεθα ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ, καταλλάγητε τῷ Θεῷ*. See above § 26, § 81, and § 84, on the second and third necessary causality of salvation.

REMARK. Grace is termed the Divine causality of salvation, first as contrasted with law, reward, and merit, Rom. iii. 23, iv. 4; Tit. ii. 11, iii. 7; and secondly, in contrast with nature and individual ability, 1 Cor. xv. 10; Ephes. i. 8. The operation of the Spirit of grace (Heb. x. 29) is described for example in Ephes. iii. 16, 19.

§ 140. ORDER OF SALVATION.

As the founding of salvation on the person of the Redeemer does not proceed magically, but, whilst availing itself primarily of doctrine and testimony, in harmony with that fundamental relation of man which includes freedom, so the appropriation of salvation, in like manner, must first operate by inciting or calling forth man's free susceptibility. This mediation of grace operating by the word, the church, and sacraments, does not exclude the necessity of an immediate work of God on the human heart; and the commencement of a new birth through the Spirit, when such has actually taken place, does not impede a constant carrying on of that work up to a point which is never reached in the present condition of humanity. To this threefold relation correspond the three leading doctrines, namely, the calling sinners by the gospel, the new birth through the Spirit, and the sanctification of human life.

REMARK. The scholasticism of the middle ages was unable rightly to represent the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation, because it had in view rather the ecclesiastical course of

the Christian life, as it should develop itself in the elements of the sacrament, than the order of salvation. Meanwhile it contemplated chiefly preparing and justifying grace, and then baptism, and repentance after baptism. The latter distinction loses its significance in Protestantism, because every reconversion of a relapsed man essentially resembles the first. The positive divinity of the Reformation at first only regarded the article of justification by faith, and developed it according to circumstances, or rather only more fully unfolded the idea of faith, as regards spirit, repentance, works, and love. At a later period, the Reformed doctrine entered upon the distinction of *gratia preparans* and *convertans*, as well as of *sanctificans*, *conservans*, *glorificans*, or even *regeneratio*, *renovatio*, &c.

The mysticism of the middle ages had the individualizing of salvation less in view than the extinction of individualism, or than the stages of *unio*; and Protestants have erroneously reckoned this *unio mystica* as an especial, final point, which it cannot be, since the true mystical union with God is already included in regeneration and sanctification. Equally erroneous is it if an especial *τελείωσις* (according to a false interpretation of an expression in the Hebrews) be made the conclusion. The school of Ernesti has not been more successful in criticising the customary order, than the division of Christ's office; for the leading distinction, *justificatio* and *sanctificatio*, *vocatio* and *regeneratio*, is obvious, in Biblical language. Two series, the objective and subjective, (*ἀκοή, πιστις*), as proposed by De Wette, cannot be carried out, and do not assist in solving the problem. Schleiermacher established a correct arrangement, although it had been introduced by an older division; *gratia præcurrens*, *operans*, *co-operans*, &c. The arrangement must be especially psychological, yet not in such a manner that the relation of feeling, understanding, and will, be made fundamental, as done by Hollaz and Ammon, in which case nothing more remains for sanctification; but the arrangement must be such, that the conditions of the soul, or the spiritual life, with reference to mediation, principle, and development, be taken into account. We may refer this threefold division—calling, justification, sanctification—to Christ, as Prophet, Priest, and King.

A. On Calling.

§ 141. ELECTION.

Divine calling is not only to be considered as a universal publication of reconciliation, founded on Christ, and as a preaching of grace, and an invitation to the banquet of spiritual life in general, (as it is shared by the whole world in successive distinct ages, according to nations and their destinies, Prov. ix. 1, seq., Luke xiv. 17, Matt. xi. 28, Mark xvi. 15, Tit. ii. 11, 1 Tim. iii. 16; but it is to be viewed as an influence operating upon our knowledge, heart, and will, in its especial application unto individuals. Divine calling is related in a twofold manner to election. It appears in justification, as the consequence of election, Rom. viii. 29, or is coincident with election and justification, in such a manner that a contrast between called and chosen does not exist. Moreover, it brings to light obduracy or unsusceptibility, as well as the non-existent and the undetermined, 1 Pet. ii. 8. For although God “will have all men to be saved,” 1 Tim. ii. 4, and has created no personal being for damnation,¹ still the wisdom of Divine grace, even in those who for a long period, or for ever oppose it, attains by such its holy purposes, Rom. ix. 17, 22, xi. 33. The gradual entrance of men into fellowship with Christ, is in harmony with the plan of calling and election adopted by God, which deviates as much from our opinion and expectation, (*ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοὶ οὐτοῦ*, Rom. xi. 33), as it does in excluding the claims of merit and works, ix. 11. *ἵνα ἡ κατ’ ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις τοῦ Θεοῦ μὲνη, οὐκ ἔξ ἔργων, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος.* Ever will the first be last, and the last first. According to His own choice, God allows individuals to attain hearing, faith, and knowledge, Rom. x. 14, through the gospel, which is adapted indeed to all classes and races of men without distinction, (*οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ διαστολὴ ἰουδαίου τε καὶ ἑλλήνος*, Rom. x. 12.) But those who do not obey that gospel, whose

sound has gone out unto all the earth, and whose call is sufficiently clear and constant, x. 16–21, have been previously hardened and rejected of God, in order that through their holding back, the mercy of a calling and electing God may be the more glorified, in the uncalled and the “far off,” and that zeal be called forth and maintained in all, Rom. xi. 8, 24. Nevertheless, the validity of any original call suffers no disparagement by an early or late reception of individuals; for God, who is rich over all, Rom. x. 12, desires not to gain the life of one by the death of another, Rom. xi. 25–32.

¹ Nowhere in Holy Scripture is there any mention of an eternal decree of damnation “before the world began,” nor of a divine creation for unhappiness, not even when *σκεύη ὀργῆς κατηρητισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν*, are alluded to in Rom. ix. 22, in whom the wrath and power of God were to be shown. This passage is evidently copied from the Book of Wisdom, xi. 20, *Ἐἰ γὰρ ἐχθροὺς παίδων σου καὶ ὀφείλομενος θανάτῳ (σκεύη, ὀργῆς κατηρητισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν) μετὰ τῆς τοσούτης ἐτιμώσεως προσοχῆς καὶ δεήσεως (μακροθυμίας,) δοὺς χρόνους καὶ τόπον δι’ ὧν ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς κακίας· μετὰ ποσῆς ἀκριβείας ἐκρίνας τοὺς υἱοὺς σου, κ. λ.* Both in St Paul’s epistle, as well as in the Book of Wisdom, the subject turns on Pharaoh as an example of God’s mercy and long-suffering towards those who were to fall under His judgment. The question refers to the worth and destiny of men, in so far as they are apparent and complete in this life. There are men in history, as we are reminded by St Paul, who are destined to have the Divine judgment manifested in them. They are vessels of wrath and dishonour; but even towards such God has shown His patience. Whence alone it is evident that their existence was not designed for His wrath to be manifested in them. In direct unison with similar reflections, the Book of Wisdom has such passages as the following, (xii.) :—“But thou sparest the Canaanites, for they were men; for thou lovest all things that are, so that they may believe that Thy judgment is not unright; (*τὸν μὴ ὀφείλοντα κολασθῆναι καταδικασαί*), thinking it not agreeable with thy power to condemn him that hath not deserved to be punished, not that thou wast unable to bring the ungodly under the hand of the righteous in battle to destroy them; for it (the Canaanites) was a cursed seed from the beginning; neither didst thou from fear of any man give them pardon for those things wherein they sinned

For who shall say, What hast thou done? or who can stand against thee for to be revenged for the unrighteous men?" Up to this fragmentary point of the question, and indeed with the appropriation of all its elements, the apostle advanced; and although he compared God, when variously destinating different men, to the potter, in allusion to the prophetic passage, nevertheless he only concluded by asserting, that against God, who is affected by no law or duty—against Him no law and no complaint can be made; apart from the consideration, that the comparison of the potter and the clay, in all the passages of the Old Testament, only speaks of that for which the will of God constitutes man or a people within their historical epoch and earthly destiny. St Paul certainly reduces the designed destiny into the causative; but whilst, as in Rom. iii. 3–8, he contends against the immoral inferences drawn from the destination of liars and the unrighteous, he teaches at the same time that God's ultimate aim and final cause in the unrighteous can only be relative; the apostle here takes his stand upon apologetico-polemical grounds. The question was, whether the universal calling of the heathen and Jews corresponded to the particularism of the Old Testament, and how the particular calling of the Jews agrees with the Divine word. In the former relation this may be admitted; there is neither a right of descent nor of works and merit opposed to the freedom of grace, as may be seen from the words and history of the Old Testament; and in the latter relation this may hold, that whether few or many disbelieve, so far is this from contradicting the power and wisdom of God, that it rather tends to the glorification of free grace, for salvation, since it is purely of grace, even in its imputation through the Divine favour of illumination, awakening and conversion must especially appear as an act of grace. Hence it comes to pass, that the extensive limitation of election advances the protensive and intensive progress of God's work on humanity. Now in such connexion the following considerations may be especially noticed; some were ordained unto eternal life, Acts xiii. 48; some were appointed to take offence, 1 Pet. ii. 8; but, in the first place, we must accompany this with another view, that the apostle assumes merely temporal obduracy and rejection, and in order to explain the not being called, requires the case of those who have not heard and have not obeyed. We need only refer to the explanation of the same phenomenon given by Jesus, John v. and vi.,

in order to perceive how those who cannot, and shall not believe, do not exclude those who will not believe. Jesus undoubtedly teaches the attraction of the Father; and only comes to him whom the Father has given unto him. The Jews could neither believe, nor understand, nor comprehend the Word, because they are not of the truth. No unsusceptible, no unrighteous one, shall believe; God will not subdue his opposition. That unbelief is a Divine punishment of a previous guilty condition, Christ expressly asserts, John v. 40, "Ye will not come to me." In like manner, Chrysostom and Melancthon have taught, on good ground: Deus trahit, sed trahit volentem. In connexion with all this, Scripture teaches nothing concerning a decision before the world began—of an eternal decree, consequently all declarations of the love of God to the world, John iii. 16, of a propitiation for the sins of the whole world, 1 John ii. 2, and such like, retain their full power, and resist those elaborate attempts which have been made to particularise generality or universality. On the other hand, it is from that point which relates to the Paraclete whence Christians, in their temporal state and weakness, will refer to God's purpose, and his predetermination to call, justify, and glorify, Rom. viii. 29, 30. As the Redeemer affirms no one can deprive him of those whom the Father hath given unto him; so this comforting remembrance is afforded to Christians enfeebled by tribulation, to those who feel themselves placed by persecutions, by the delay in the final consummation, and by the decrease of their first love in a state of wavering and apprehension, although time will not (like whatsoever else that is temporal), cause their Christianity to disappear, and deprive them of their inheritance: if ye be only justified, then are ye also glorified and sanctified; for inasmuch as ye have obtained the righteousness of Christ, so far is it from being a mere temporal phenomenon, that it is rather the realization of God's innermost decree, which is fulfilled in such as he has called, ordained, and foreknown; compare Joh. Pet. Lange, *Doctrine of the Holy Scripture on the Free and Universal Grace of God*. Elberfeld, 1831.

§ 142. CALLING THROUGH THE GOSPEL.

Calling, in its operation on the heart, or on the unity of the conception and will, is both illumination¹ and awakening, Eph.

v. 14, but in either case it is effected by the Divine Word. No one can attain unto fellowship in salvation who has not been called by the word, nor apart from the inclination of the Father to the Son; for even that seizing with violence of which the Lord speaks, Matth. xi. 12, presupposes the day of John and Christ, or their calling.² Faith cometh by hearing, Rom. x. 17. Now although the entire government of the world is so regulated by a Redeeming God, that it supports the call of the gospel by accompanying or preparing, and upholds the especial destiny of individuals in particular, Luke xiii. 1—8, yet, apart from the ministry of the gospel, and external to it, there is no independent calling; so that God, where his word remains altogether inoperative, will not beget the result of salvation by any other means, Luke xvi. 31.

¹ Calling has for its object undivided spiritual life, whose changes are at all times mediated by cognition, and not less so has it conversion; and every act of sanctifying grace must again be one of illumination, to which act (inasmuch as every essential renewal of life is conditioned by a new cognition), the previous call by the gospel corresponds. Christ is the light of the world, John ix. 5, xii. 36, who of God is made unto us wisdom, 1 Cor. i. 30: the immediate chastening office of the Holy Spirit, John xvi. 8; compare iii. 19, 20. The condition of illumination through existing circumstances, Eph. v. 14, a passage apparently derived from Isaiah lx. 1. The illumination co-existing with regeneration and justification, 1 Cor. ii. 15; 2 Cor. iv. 6; Eph. iii. 18; iv. 13. Partly in the same passages, partly in James i. 5, 6; Phil. iii. 15, the illumination which operates associated with sanctification.

² This suffering violence of the kingdom of God, and this seizing it with violence upon the part of those who do violence is the reverse of that time when it was only prophesied, longed, and hoped for. Primarily, the question only turns on a preference of the commencing epoch, and on the standing-point of the New Testament. The appearance of violence and conquest is a necessary one. Compare Luke ix. 62; without such act no one enters into the kingdom of God. The improperly used expression sufficiently explains and justifies itself through other representations of holi-

ness in worldliness, as in Luke xvi. 8, and the question is not deficient in connexion,—by the doers of violence being worthy of praise. Hence, since the appearance of Schweizr's learned disquisition on the passage, *Theoll. Stud. u. Kritick.* 1836, i. p. 90, "Whether in this passage of Matth. xi. 12, praise or blame be implied?" We do not exclude the view given above and at p. 207.

§ 143. FAITH AND UNBELIEF.

Divine calling, as distinguished from election (Matth. xx. 16), or from conversion and sanctification (Luke xiv. 16—23), is primarily related to the contrast of believers and unbelievers. Some who hear the word do not understand, Matth. xiii. 19, (they could not, indeed, as they are, understand, v. 13, compare § 120, Remark,) or they do not keep the word, v. 21, or mix it up with the wisdom of the flesh and the world, v. 22, are disobedient to the gospel in general, Rom. x. 16, since it is unto them foolishness or an offence, 1 Cor. i. 24. Christ comes to his own wherever he proclaims himself to man as truth and grace; but not all who are his by virtue of their human nature, or by virtue of his incarnation and passion for them, and his sovereignty, receive him on their parts, John i. 11. Since, to a certain extent, the whole world sins against him rather through unbelief, Rom. xi. 30, 32, those continue in unbelief who do not permit the light of grace to fall upon them, because it reproves their sin, and will not allow themselves to be redeemed, reconciled, and "gathered," Luke xiii. 34, whilst they prefer the freedom of unrighteousness to the servitude of righteousness. These unbelievers (*ὑποὶ ἀπειθείας*, Eph. v. 6; Acts xxviii. 24), are to be distinguished from those who are simply not believers and not Christians, (*ἀπιστοί*, 1 Cor. vii. 13.) Now, if unbelief be an essential want of relation of human spontaneity to the economy of salvation, which requires faith to such a degree that it even calls itself faith, Gal. iii. 23, then a strong point of opposition to grace is conceivable, and becomes the object of admonition, Matt. xii.

31, to which the unwillingness of unbelief passes from the merely passive character of indolence and cowardice into one of the most hateful duplicity, and is no longer opposed to the mediations of truth and grace in the Son of Man, or in the gospel, but becomes an unreconciled and irreconcilable blasphemer against the immediateness of the Holy Spirit.¹

¹ In the legislation of antiquity, both positive and philosophical, a distinction is made between expiable and inexpiable offences. *Cic. de legg.* i. 14, scelerum in homines atque impietatum nulla expiatio est, *Plato de legg.* x. fin. A crime of a treasonable character, *i. e.* such as assails, and, as far as it can, destroys the foundations of the entire Theocratic policy, does not, according to the Mosaic legislation, admit of being either pardoned or expiated; or rather it must be rooted out of the people by the punishment of death. Blasphemy against the Divine name is preeminently a transgression of this kind. Now, if in accordance with the dispensation of the New Testament there be aught that is inexpiable and unpardonable, blasphemy against God is its natural symbol in the Old Testament; and it does not admit of a doubt that Jesus, (according to Matthew xii. 31; Mark iii. 28; Luke xii. 10), in this aspect, warns against the sin of blasphemy with a distinction of its various kinds; and it appears particularly from St Mark, that the Redeemer was desirous of more strictly defining the Mosaic law, (Levit. xxiv.), or associating himself with its correct interpretation. The law inflicts, first, קַפְּלֵי אֱלֹהִים (*i. e.* for any kind of blasphemy against divinity), only punishment in general, (וּבְשָׂא הַטָּאֵר); on the other hand, direct blasphemy of שֵׁמוֹ was punished by death. This distinction of punishable and unpardonable blasphemy (κακολογία, 1 Sam. iii. 13, Septuagint) the Redeemer, according to Mark, applies, in the first place, in such a way, that He represents pardonable blasphemy as less punishable than blasphemy against Elohim, and then, according to Matthew, He represents it as blasphemy against the Divine Ambassador, in this case, against the Son of Man; and, in both instances, the unpardonable blasphemy against the name, against Jehovah, as blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. Olshausen, in his commentary on Matthew xii. is not quite correct in his endeavours to establish a threefold stage of the sin blasphemy, namely, against the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The

question rather turns on blasphemy in general (against Elohim) than on that against the Father; neither is he altogether correct in assuming, that every blasphemy has God for its object; for the Jewish interpretation of the law regarded the derision and contempt even of magistrates, judges, and of every human mediator of Divine authority, as proportionate blasphemy; and the same is certainly to be understood of the words of the evangelist Mark, *αἱ βλασφημίαι, ὅσας ἂν βλασφημησωσιν*. But the point to be considered is, how there can be in the New Covenant an unpardonable offence, and in what sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is to be understood. According to Delbrück, (*Christenthum, Betrachtungen und untersuchungen, &c.*, part iii. 1827), the New Testament contradicts itself by affirming the universal pardon of sin, and yet asserting that there is a sin which is unpardonable: upon this point he has been answered in *Theoll. Stud. u. Krit.* 1828, p. 649, sq. For does the New Testament subject the reception of forgiveness of sins to no condition? Does the grace of God in Christ constrain the sinner to become righteous and blessed? May there not be also an unbelieving tendency of the mind which cannot be forgiven, because it rejects all pardon, and, so far as it can, extinguishes every relation of man unto God? Were it possible for the New Testament to have refrained from admonitory hints touching such aggressive refractoriness against grace? In point of fact there are not a few such hints, whether they relate to the offensive character of unbelief in the Gospel, or to the final apostacy in relapse and its accompanying phenomena, Matthew vi. 23, John viii. 24, Hebrews vi. 4, x. 26, 2 Peter ii. 10, 21, 22, 1 John v. 16, Revelation xxii. 11. Thus, properly speaking, the question is only, whether and how that which appears to be conceivable merely as a bias and a constant, unsubdued tendency, is also to be conceived as being an isolated act of sin. That Jesus often affirms, as, for example, in Matthew v. 22, 39, 40, something of acts and of sensuous operations, which clearly can only be understood of modes of disposition and conduct corresponding to such acts, is, for the most part, admitted, provided He shall not be regarded as a second Moses, and altogether distinct and inconceivable. SAYING is (according to a universal, yet an especially eastern, manner of representation) the symbol of the disposition and continued action; indeed the evangelist declares, Mark iii. 30, by the words, “they SAID, He hath an unclean spirit,” that an act of speech had elicited this

judgment of Jesus. However, it does not follow that what had been the occasion of the censure was at the same time its perfectly developed object. At all events, Rheinhard's interpretation is altogether inadmissible, according to which the Jewish cotemporaries who opposed Jesus were, by their referring His curing demoniacs to the devil, accused of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. The judgment of Jesus manifestly includes much more than this, and it appears, on the other hand, to be capable only of a relative application to the Pharisees of that period,—in so far as, in a certain sense, scoffing at the Spirit was as yet impossible, because Christ “was not yet glorified,” John vii. 39, “The Holy Ghost was not yet given.” Whether (according to Ammon, *Handb. der Sittenl.* i. 1823, p. xxi. and 425) the Pharisees can actually be accused of the crime in question, or, as Olshausen, Tholuck, and others maintain, the charge brought against them in this respect is to be considered in the light of a warning, or, according to C. Ludw. Nitzsch (*de peccato homini cavendo quamquam in hominem non cadente*, Viteb. 1802) can only be a warning in general, or an accusation of a particular tendency,—to form a judgment on this point, presupposes a more accurate idea of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For some excellent contributions towards a correct definition of this idea, see *Theoll. Stud. und Krit.* 1833, 4; J. W. Grashof, *üb d. Blasph. des h. Geistes*, 1834, 3; Gurlitt, *Bemerkk. zu der Abh. des Hrn. Grashof, &c.* 1836, 2; Tholuck, *on the nature of the sin against the Holy Ghost*. Blasphemy is the matured expression of hateful contempt and denial of the Personal object, in this case, God. Now, the object is to be expressly distinguished [in so far as it has only affected the subject in a mediate and yet imperfect manner] through and in the Messiah, [who is more or less recognised, but, at the same time, easily mistaken], and to this extent is to be distinguished, in a perfect and altogether unmediate manner, in the Holy Spirit, even in the Spirit of grace, Hebrews x. A certain godlessness and want of conscience constitutes the sin in every case; but the revelation of God's holy love, as grace, is offered to the sinner in the appearance of Christ, in order to excite repentance and faith. Thus man sins anew against God when he does not come to the light, lest his works be punished: and yet this does not amount to blasphemy against the Son of Man. But disbelief in Him is aggravated when the sinner, ceasing from mere inert passivity, proceeds to active enmity, and advances even

to the accusation : Thou art a misguided spirit, a fanatic, a rebel. The extreme case does not yet appear, inasmuch, for example, as the carnal Christologist or Jewish teacher of doctrine, in his erroneous view of the mode in which the kingdom and the Son of God were to be manifested, can bring the ancient law of God to contend against the new law, and the temporal promise against the spiritual; and the emotions inevitably excited in those whose sin was exposed to light, might, as well as the entire ancient law, stand in the way of a full illumination of the conscience. Meanwhile there was an undoubted necessity for warning man against this extreme case. The desperate contest had commenced with their better convictions. An inclination opposing God and conscience had sprung up out of passive neutrality, and at least the objective, historical power of redeeming revelation for the individual is previously supposed, apart from actual operation. Together with blasphemy against the Son of man, there is at least that partial suppression of man's spiritual and moral subjectivity, without which there can be no connecting point for grace and salvation. The Divine Spirit in general is already blasphemed, namely that Spirit who mediates by legal culture, and through our indelible rationality; and hence it is clear how De Wette (*on the sin against the Holy Ghost*, 1819) and Ammon, mentioned above, who, previous to the publication of the works alluded to, endeavoured feelingly to render the severe earnestness of our Lord's warning, which is so applicable to our times and life, intelligible); it is evident how they discovered the sin against the Holy Ghost, in the insolent revolt of self-will against religious consciousness, or in the suppression of the holy idea of God. But there exists no exegetical right for placing the Holy Spirit, and Spirit and conscience in general or religious consciousness, on an equality. The latter may and can acquire a new definiteness through the Divine truth of the grace of Christ becoming subjective. The Divine potentiality of this subjective state is the Holy Spirit; and, as in its work it completes the operation of God's grace, considered as condescending to destroy sin, so must man's beginning not only to grieve, to repel, and to withdraw himself from it, but also to blaspheme it,—be considered as the consummation of the refusal of grace and the unpardonable sin. A sin which can only be unpardonable, because there is combined withal a condition which no longer allows any commencement or progress of repentance,

from the manner in which the alone Holy One hath been pleased to regulate and destinate the world and human nature. How shall this entire incapacity for repentance, and the element *in concreto* inviting it, be comprehended? For in its entire incomprehensibility, warning also appears to lose its power. So much is certain, that the most perfect knowledge of the good ever carries with it the will to love, and neither admits of hatred nor difference, John xvii. 3; 1 John iii. 6. On the other hand, the sin under discussion, as it appears, can only enter where all the light of truth which could come to an individual, (Hebrews x. 26, *μετὰ τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας*,) together with the accompanying good feelings and emotions, have been rendered inoperative by means of the opposing will; so that, according to the view of the earlier Lutheran divines, he only who was in a state of illumination and grace, could commit that sin. It may be asked whether this contradiction cannot be accommodated. It must be conceded, a (point which Tholuck has not sufficiently considered in his tendency to differ from Gurlitt,) that there is a Scriptural view of a state of grace which cannot again be lost; for whosoever is born of God is preserved, and those who actually fall away never were, according to 1 John ii. 9, true, regenerate Christians. For if there be a state of impossible *μετάνοια*, how should it not be possible that there should also be an opposite *ἀδύνατον* in those whose newly implanted life is as firmly rooted as it is flourishing? In like manner, it must be conceded, that a certain fulness of experience in Christianity, and of excited love and joy, is presupposed in those, who, according to Hebrews vi. 10, 2 Pet. ii. fall away, so that no room for recovery remains. But should not such a love, degenerated into hatred, rather come under the contingencies of that condition which we ascribe rather unto the awakened than to the regenerated? These awakened—(what have they not tasted of spiritual blessings, what signs of life have they not already given!) whilst they esteem themselves, and are regarded as converted, regenerated, and elected, fall away and suffer relapse, in a moral point of view, and are in extreme danger of transgressing against the truth of the Spirit, which alone wills and works regeneration. Thus, then, the sin of this apostacy is to be viewed as on the verge of a hateful opposition to the Spirit of truth; that point, where heat passes into cold, and where the latter must ever be regarded as that last state of indifference to Good and Bad,

such as Gurlitt endeavours to represent it. However this may be, (for the endlessness of the individual course is yet, in fact, but little understood by our dogmatic ideas concerning awakening and regeneration, however necessary such ideas in themselves may be,) the idea of a final opposition and complete apostasy, or of grace exhausted upon the sinner, remains, just as everlasting punishment and eternal death remains, a necessary hypothesis of Christianity; if neither the holiness of God, nor the possibility of good nor human unconstrainedness shall be denied, nor a mere natural process step into the place of the kingdom of God.

§ 144. STAGES OF FAITH.

Calling in its distinction from election and conversion is, among other things, related to different stages of faith, in which consists every essential harmonious relation of man to the God of salvation, and which belief, indeed, from its commencement, is not a mere passive compulsion or capacity of perception,¹ but is an acknowledgment, consequently a moral acceptance of the Divine word.² That is to say, if the salvation of man be so grounded that the Personal Redeemer comes into the world, and there developes himself into an operative principle of our death unto sin, and holy return unto life; and, farther, that the Redeemer does not impart himself magically or mechanically to the life of each individual sinner, but is imparted by means of testimony; and if there be a prevenient reconciliation of the whole world,—in that case the reception of salvation or beatification can be nothing else than faith in the name of the Lord, and particularly in the blood of Jesus. This belief, as the condition of all Divine favour and blessedness, is alike the same in Abraham or David as in Peter, since it ever includes a living veneration for the God of grace, as well as for the God of truth, and whilst ever renouncing self from a peculiar sense of power, worth, and right, at the same time consists in its entrance into every attested and accorded mediation of God,

and not only refers back to that original confidence in God's invisible nature and works, for which, and with which, man was created, but also generates from itself every confidence, every faith and consolation, as opposed to misfortune and trial in the hour of need and of death.³ Hence there are no valid grounds for distinguishing between universal and especial faith, between the faith of revelation and justification, or faith in the doctrine and the person of the Redeemer. For the former does not exist apart in the actual life of faith, or has nothing to do with the appropriation of salvation. On the other hand, faith, viewed as a self-restraining principle in man, is quite distinct from regarding it as the gift of the Holy Spirit; and faith in the awakened, differs from faith in the converted. Both distinctions pass into and modify each other. For, although faith, on the one hand, inasmuch as it is a command (Mark i. 15) and a praise, must also be a work and an obedience of man; so that all truth may revolve round this point of the co-operative doctrine of the freedom of the will,—yet is it effected by the grace of the calling God in all its degrees, and in so far as it yet precedes the announcement of the gospel, is effected, induced, and called forth by the equally natural grace of the sustaining God; and yet all this occurs in a mediate way, and so, that with every advance of faith, there is a gradation of human spontaneity, or free susceptibility. Every believer has, therefore, been awakened unto believing, and yet only in proportion does he approach near to salvation, or partake in it, as he is awakened or prepared for it. Hence we receive, through a something which we either are or do, the gift of the Holy Spirit; whether it be called repentance or faith, Acts ii. 38, Gal. iii. 14; but the entire blessed confidence in the Redeemer which is thus imparted to us, or faith as the actual principle of a new, holy and blessed life, is a grace immediately bestowed on us, which entirely excludes all co-operation and every merit, as well as all reference to the fact that we have believed, and do believe.

¹ Perhaps it is only in James ii. 19, that *πίστις* occurs in a religious and yet morally indifferent sense. In Romans also, xiv.

23, it has the unusual signification of a moral conviction, of an evident consciousness of duty before God.

² Faith is itself an *ἔργον*, and especially a work of man which God wills, and which is well-pleasing to Him.

³ Πιστις is, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, particularly in chap. xi. an especial aspect of sanctifying faith, that is to say, a confidence in the finisher of our salvation, in the Redeemer who keeps his word. The author exhorts, in general, to *ὑπομονη, παρρησία τῆς ἐλπίδος*, for fear of a possible apostacy. The general statements in verses 1 and 6, declare that the renunciation of the visible and the present, is the fundamental condition of all fellowship with God, and of all life pleasing unto him. The question is not of justification in the sense of *ἐυαρεστῆσαι*, verse 6, but the exhortation to confidence in the accomplishment of salvation, refers farther back than to the necessity of our being justified from sin through our confidence, namely, (upon the occasion of the example alluded to,) it refers to the necessity of *πιστις* for all that is good. A similar special view of sanctifying faith, *i.e.*, a victorious confidence in the power and assistance of the redeeming God, our Lord sought to perfect in his disciples by word and deed, Mark xi. 23; because the state of revealed salvation at that time especially indicated this point of culture, and because the belief that our prayers and our confidence will procure for us infallible aid, can as well be a preparatory exercise for the real belief of salvation, as it can be a direction to, and a development of the same.

B. Of Regeneration.

§ 145. CALLING AND REGENERATION.

The end of the Redeemer's ministry, regarded as merely calling, is the commencement of a new tendency in the life of man, his new birth or creation, John iii. 5, 2 Cor. v. 17, James i. 18, and by means of this new commencement, he enters into fellowship, as a living member, (Phil. iii. 10, Romans vi. 5; vii. 4; viii. 29,) with him who has become a new life-spring to the whole human race. Man's regeneration, or the Divine transformation of his spiritual life, in its origin, is the unity of the sinner's justification and conversion.

REMARK. Regeneration is related to the totality and unity of self-consciousness. The latter is, in one point of view, more intuitive, in another, more active, *i. e.*, idea and will. Through justification the representing self-consciousness is renewed, and becomes a mode of contemplating God and self; our relation to God in self-perception is quite a distinct thing. Through conversion the will is changed. But as the complete idea, regeneration, considered as vitalizing according to the Spirit, at the same time finishes or excludes something, namely, the carnal life, so the like holds with the special ideas, justification and conversion; inasmuch as both deny, and both affirm, something. Justification, in a negative aspect, is the pardon of sin, in a positive one, it is the adoption and appropriation of an eternal inheritance; conversion, in a negative sense, is a renunciation, repentance, godly sorrow, a dying, and hence, mortification; in a positive sense, it is a resurrection unto righteousness, faith, and love, and hence, vivification.

§ 146. JUSTIFICATION.

Upon this boundary line of conditions man is delivered partly from the dominion of the guilt of sin, and partly from the power of sin itself. The former is justification or the appropriated reconciliation of the world, Romans iii. 28, viii. 30, Phil. iii. 9, and is indeed distinct from conversion and sanctification, as an act of judgment, yet at the same time is a communicating act, and as such is to be perceived in our peace of conscience, Romans v. 1, in the spirit of adoption, viii. 15, in intercessory prayer which we enjoy from this spirit, viii. 26, 27, and is experienced also in our open access unto God, Heb. x. 22, as well as in the consciousness of our being “co-heirs” with Christ, Romans viii. 17, and participating in his glory, ver. 30. Hence divine justification is the perfect abolition of a penal state (*κατάκριμα*) or a justification of life (*δικαίωσις ζωῆς*) Romans, v. 17, 18.

REMARK. The idea of justification is not only expressed by the

term *δικαιοῦν* but also by *καθαρίζειν* 1 John i. 7—9, *καθαρίζειν τὴν συνείδησιν*, Heb. ix. 14, *τελειῶσαι κατὰ συνείδησιν*, ver. 9, &c. The same passages treat on justification in its necessary unity with conversion. Upon the whole, the question turns more on justification when it relates to the divine production of regeneration, and more upon conversion when it refers to human change. It is self-evident that God justifies no one, without at the same time converting and sanctifying him. The individualizing of redemption is a unity which is partly expressed in the idea of regeneration, and partly in that of faith. But it by no means follows that the justifying act should be an especial primary element of the whole idea. I enjoy the peace of pardon and reconciliation in the certainty that my life is united to that of Christ, and in the certainty of my belief that he died and rose again for me. This application of Christ to myself is indeed only true in that belief which, together with a change of mind, includes also a new will.

§ 147. JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

Even the divine institution of justification itself some times bears the name of faith, (Gal. iii. 23, 24, Romans iv. 14,) which latter term shows that the reconciliation of the world is not appropriated to us in proportion to our remaining innocence or to our future earnestly desired improvement; nor is it appropriated by a mere consecration of the church, nor by a barren admission of the truth by the mind, but only by faith in Christ, which faith centres its life in a personal confidence on the conciliating power of his death, and certainly can only justify in proportion as it opens the mind and life to the converting and sanctifying ministry of the Redeemer. For the worst of all the divisions of Christ, namely, into him who reconciles and into him who sanctifies, is not in the slightest degree founded on the fact that union must precede fellowship, birth precede life, and thus faith be anterior to all imitation. Those who conceive justifying faith to be only good intention, to be the greatest moral exertion for which, as such, the pardon of sin is granted, misunderstand the meaning of the gospel not less than those

who would infer a co-operation of love for justification, or an exclusively justifying power of love, from the preference they have for moral disposition rather than knowledge, or from their higher estimation of love, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 2, 13, than of faith. The former are so far correct in explaining faith in Christ as the truest and highest moral religious effort, which faith is, as it were, the central point of the sinner, called by grace, the first difficult commencement of all good; only they overlook that faith is so principally either in a negative mode or in one of self-renunciation, and that it has the mediatorship of Christ for its indispensable object.¹ But the latter mistake, in that we have not first loved, and could not first love, 1 John iv. 10; that in general we neither acquire nor deserve pardon, for in that case it would be the result of love, but we receive it, as it must be the work of faith; they mistake in that the mediated gift—love, as a participation in the Divine nature, may certainly be in itself greater than the mediating gift, and than faith, since God neither believes nor hopes, but loves. And, moreover, they mistake, in that, faith, in which a certain element of love, namely, truth, humility, desire, and self-denial cannot be wanting, still maintains the entire dignity of the new birth. Still less is the exclusively justifying power of faith annulled by the combined operation of good works with faith (*συνήργει* James ii. 22). For Scripture, or the one apostolical spirit, only corrects an abuse which crept into the doctrine of grace and faith by means of this development of a living basis as the opposite of cause and effect. Faith, as a living basis, includes its consequences, that is, love and its works, and excludes these only in so far as they could afford a first or second independent basis of subjective salvation. This is the doctrine of the Apostle Paul, a doctrine altogether free from the supposition of there being a dead faith, which is yet a faith. But in so far as faith, regarded as a mere abstract empty basis, is separated from and renounces works in degenerated Christians and doctrines, so works which are the living consequences of faith, become of importance for reanimating this dead basis, and thus arises and

exists the doctrine of St James, which indeed still retains what is bad and defective of its motive, namely, of the motive through a corrupt misuse of the promise; since it is impossible that good works should be added to mere belief in order to co-operate with the latter: Thus James only explains in this way the idea of the Pauline faith, much in the same way as abstract faith is explained in Romans x. 10, namely, that a living and confessing faith is divided into a justifying faith, and a sanctifying confession “with the mouth.”

¹ Luther to Agricola, 31st August 1527. *Mundus et ratio non capit, quam sit cognitio ardua, Christum esse justitiam nostram: ita operum opinio nobis incorporata agnataque et innaturata est.*—The truth of this assertion has again and again been proved since the period of the reformation, and associated anew with evangelical theology. But however often it has been necessary to repair and illustrate the Protestant method of teaching, in so much that Calixtus, willingly omitted *sola fide*, Swedenborg allowed that a change of mind, and a reformation of life precede justification and justifying faith, (Dr J. F. J. Tafel, *Vergl. Dartsell. der Lehrgegensätze der katholiken und Protestanten, &c., zugl. die erste Darstellung und Begründung der Unterscheidungslehren Swedenborg's*, Tubing. 1835, p. 278, seq.) and farther, Tittmann, *de summis principiis confessionis Augustanæ*, Lips. 1830, denied the forensic idea of justification, only discovering therein a new possibility of a state of grace and holiness; and Schleiermacher represented all separation of God's justifying and converting efficacy as inadmissible: still the essence of our evangelical church-doctrine is nevertheless competent to defend itself against the objections raised by Möhler and Tafel, and all such like objections. It is necessary to recognise the genetic in regeneration, namely, that its primary element is justification, although apart from the other, i. e. conversion, it can neither be preserved nor perfected. The sinner as such, is in active and passive enmity against God, and the one is strengthened through the other. Sin considered as action, and tendency, involves banishment from God; this is universally conceded; but not sufficiently so the other view, namely, that a feeling of banishment and guilt must first be removed, and the will of him who is called must first enter into the reconciliation offered in

Christ, if it shall become a new will of love, and if the commencement of this righteousness shall take place. *Remissio peccatorum fide recepta fit reconciliatio, reconciliatio regenerat, sanctificat peccatorem.* The uncalled and unenlightened sinner neither discerns the holiness nor love, neither the righteousness nor the grace of God, or at least, not so as to admit of this knowledge changing his life. The called and enlightened sinner discerns in God, as seeking and accepting the world through Christ, his pardoning judge, and his spiritually-punishing reconciler. Now, if he acknowledges him, and with his whole heart accepts the offer of holiest grace—(however much the flesh strive against it, because it rather shuns the subjection to, and obligation of, the new covenant, and persists in sin appeased by its own expiation or by none, and enjoys the semblance of righteousness and freedom rather than accept a restoration at once so humiliating and annihilating)—if he believes, he is justified, Rom. iii. 28, “his faith is counted for righteousness,” iv. 5. For the consciousness of adoption, and the power of love and of a new obedience, is bestowed on the same faith, in the Holy Spirit. The same faith stirs and changes the whole heart and life. It is not alone, *i. e.*, it is not a mere idea and admission of the truth, it is not without repentance, love, patience, and hope, but it alone justifies, as the constant fulfilment and completion of the righteousness which is yet lacking; so that even after conversion, and in sanctification, that which justifies ever continues to be faith, and faith only. Such is the Protestant doctrine. Does it then desire that the believer should only be accounted as justified, whilst in fact he is unrighteous, or not righteous? Undoubtedly; but only in so far (as it comes to pass without merit on his part, without satisfaction from him, and purely of grace) that he is received into the fellowship of Christ, the just one and the justifier. Every pardon and forgiveness of sin is a justifying righteousness, and a righteous justification. But then faith is a righteousness also, namely, *κατὰ χάριν*, in and according to the relations of the new covenant; yea, is the only true righteousness of which man is capable. Only the being in Christ, and possessing him, constitutes the righteousness which is valid before God. But how are we in him, and how do we possess him, if not by going out of self, renouncing self-glory, and by receiving and accepting him, ergo—by faith? This faith is the foundation and commencement of all our righteousness; all love and sincerity return back

to this principle, and is completed in it. *Imputative* righteousness, or righteousness from grace by faith, is not merely *putative*. The exception adduced by Swedenborg is very unimportant, namely, that faith itself even is a gift of grace, and, consequently, the question arises how faith is appropriated, and whether it may occur through a previous conversion. But, on the other hand, with equal justice we might reply,—conversion is a gift of God, and thus we could never attain to the idea of an appropriation of salvation. Faith is the gift of God in a very different sense from that of forgiveness of sins; and this faith, according to many expressions and passages in Holy Scripture, is the sum and substance of entire saving subjectivity, and hence is not necessarily a *CONSEQUENS* or *CONNATUM* of repentance, but is as much the reality of repentance as is love. The instance adduced by Möhler, namely, that the justifying faith of Protestants only justifies in humility and confidence, and does so in love, and that therefore love justifies, is not less erroneous, however subtle the instance may be; for it is not the love which the believer possesses, but the love he desires to have; it is his hungering after true love which makes him a believer, and consequently it is faith.—Compare my *Protestantischen Theses*, Nr. 69—73—.

§ 148. REPENTANCE AND FAITH.

Reconciling fellowship with the Lord cannot exist apart from a perfect change of mind, or conversion. In the fellowship of his death, Rom. vi. 5, vii. 4; Phil. iii. 10; Col. ii. 11, we die to that of sin (*τῷ σώματι τῆς ἀμαρτίας*) in continued repentance, 2 Cor. vii. 10; Romans viii. 13, or persevering penance, which is not directed to particular faults or defects, nor to merely moral imperfection. Through the fellowship of his life we live unto righteousness, Rom. vi. 4, 5, 13, in a decided longing after the perfection of Christ. The two elements in conversion are reciprocally generated, and preserve their mutual connexion. For repentance unto holiness is distinguished from despair, in that it allows us continually to feel the grace and victory of Christ in the spiritual punishment of sin, and either derives the power of repentance

itself from faith in reconciliation, or, at all events, brings no sorrow for past and present sin which may not be changed into joy in the Lord, and confidence of victory. Moreover, such penitence differs from mere sentimental or even worldly repentance, in that it demands and requires perfect confidence in justification, in order to prevent despair; and that, as a strengthening principle, it strives, on every new excitation, after the holiness of the Lord. In his heroic assiduity to acknowledge and confess his sin in its fullest amount (1 John i. 9), and timely to perceive and to repent of returning sin (ii. 1, 2), and, on the other hand, in his freedom from vain wishes in regard to undoing what has been done, and a timely return to his former innocence, consequently in the power of faith, the penitent man is to be recognised in all this, as much as in the feeling that the world is crucified unto him, and in the state of mind which according to Isa. xxxviii. 16, although not quite according to the text, is expressed in the ordinary translation. Again, faith on its part, as an apprehension of Christ, Phil. iii. 9—12, ever derives from the knowledge that repentance is necessary, a new renunciation of all glory (*καυχησις*) and consequently a reinforcement of justifying confidence (Rom. vii. 25); and whilst developing itself unto thankfulness and love, it must generate from itself by shame and repentance all the feelings and works of penitence. From this relation it follows that each particular act, repentance and faith, may be predicated of entire conversion, although the development of the latter into a twofold form (*e. g.* putting off and on, going out and in, turning from and towards), continues as thoroughly grounded on Scripture as it is on the nature of things, Mark i. 15; Luke xxiv. 47; Acts xx. 21, xxvi. 18.

REMARK 1. It follows from the above, principally, that we cannot altogether admit, as was usually done at the period of the Reformation, that penitence is derived from the terror of conscience produced by the preaching of the law, even in the correction which the *formula concordiae* had given to the usual derivation.

That penitence effected by the law, as such, whether of the Old or New Testament, is only but a preliminary one, and is not the repentance of regeneration and conversion. The latter springs from the same preaching of the cross and of grace from whence faith comes; and by the correctional office of the same Holy Spirit, which is a spirit of faith and grace.

REMARK 2. We have to consider faith under a threefold relation, as the reception of salvation. It is, in the first place, the good in the varied relation of those to whom the gospel is announced, and thus, in contrast with unbelief, is good conduct towards grace in the Divine word. In the second place, in contrast with all *καὶ χησις*, which consoles itself with works, it is the reception of Divine pardon for sin through Christ, and as such, is the mediate gift of calling grace, whilst the peace of God, and the purified conscience, are immediate gifts of the Holy Spirit. Finally, in the third place, it is the reception of a higher vital power, and the principle of the new life itself, in so far as the latter cannot be imparted unto us otherwise than through communion with Christ.

§ 149. EPOCH.

The regenerated know they are so, but they know it in faith, and just as little in an empirical manner as a man is in a condition to perceive perfectly, at every distinct moment of his consciousness, the content of his personal being; and that this lofty point, whence man passes from a state of calling and awakening into the condition of conversion, by means of a spiritual conflict once occurring and bordering on despair, and to which conflict a blissful feeling of victory succeeds,—that such a point is an epoch in the consciousness, or arrests the attention, is indeed possible, but must in general be so much the less required, as this demand would carry with it a palpable and moral disadvantage; on the other hand, it can in no case be assumed that the posterity of Christian parents,¹ in the enjoyment of a Christian school and a church, should leave the bare necessity of improvement and perfection, and be exempt from the requirement of a conversion, combined with internal struggles

and change of mind. So far as the latter is an act of the human will (Luke xiii. 3, 34; James iv. 7—10), it may indeed be treated as a temporal concern, be delayed, refused, or altogether denied, and this procrastination is nothing else than the sin of sins, and absolute folly,² since the mere necessity acknowledged for the future and end includes a perfect retraction of this acknowledgment. But it must be assumed that a true conversion is never too late (Luke xxiii. 43), when, in a spiritual sense, its most decided *moments* do not occur at the end of life, but in some intermediate period.

¹ The words of the apostle, 1 Cor. vii. 14, ἐπεὶ ἄρα τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν ἀνάδαρτα ἐστί, νῦν δὲ ἄγια ἐστίν, cannot here furnish any proof. Compare de Wette, *Theoll. Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, p. 669, where the correct interpretation is given.

² Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille
Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

§ 150. FINAL PERSEVERANCE.

Under a confirming and converting power, as well as under election, 2 Peter i. 10, the truth of conversion or sanctification, correctly speaking, can alone be understood.¹ For in the full sense of the word, a second conversion is inadmissible; but a fall from a state of grace is either a proof that actual conversion had not taken place, or that it was partial, or only an apparent one. Instances of the first kind occur in Matth. xiii. 21, Luke xi. 25, 26. But even the apostolical warnings against falling away from fellowship with Christ, as an irremediable step, Heb. vi. 4,² 1 John v. 16, in part suppose only a conceivable case, and in part do not exclude the imperfection of a state in salvation which could be lost and relinquished.

¹ 1 John v. 18, ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν.

² Many who had attained Christianity, bore traces of a spiritual life, and yet fell away; and whilst the apostles contemplated such occurrences, they only thought on the irreparable loss of the

means of grace provided by the gospel, or on the improbability (which they extended to *ἀδυνατόν*, such as occurs elsewhere,) that whoever had lost or trifled away their awakened condition could regain it, or, that whoever had experienced in vain the power of salvation could be at all blessed. The contrast of the two Protestant views in reference to the possibility of a falling from a state of grace, has, in a practical point of view, no real consistency. For even the most stringent dogmatic teaching of the Reformers,—*Can. Dortr.* cap. v. art. 11, 12,—warns in a manner, against losses, and that for those who undergo them through their own fault, scarcely any thing remains but an abstract state of election, or at least no consciousness of peace; and, on the other hand, even the Lutherans would fain unite a recovery from the deepest fall of those who stood earlier under grace only to this earlier condition.

§ 151. TEST OF CONVERSION.

The real signs and sureties which never fail to accompany a true awakening and conversion, consist in the union of a sincere confession of sin,¹ Luke xv. 21, with a putting off of the actual life of that particular unrighteousness in which sin rules primarily, and especially over individual life, John viii. 11, Ephes. iv. 28; v. 3. and consists also in a union of conduct admitting of possible restoration in reference to violated justice and laws, with a willing reception of the severe duties of patience and sacrifice, Luke xv. 19, *ποιήσόν με ὡς ἓνα τῶν μισθίων σου*, Luke xviii. 2.

¹ Not only is there, according to circumstances, often no other consummation of a change of mind through any act possible than a cry for pardon and confession; but there is also in all true penitence a powerful impulse towards confession, which, besides its going up before God, is also desirous of being poured into the bosom of pious friendship. See Tertullian *De Pœnit.* c. 9, 10, and Luther's *Pred. Sonnt. reminiscere*, v. J. 1522, on confession.

C. Of Sanctification.

§ 152. CONVERSION AND SANCTIFICATION.

The conversion of a sinner only changes in itself the direction of his life. The more genuine it is, the more necessarily does it advance in holiness and renewal of man; and the more unremittingly holiness progresses, so much the more genuine and deep is regeneration.¹ The will of sin does not exist, indeed, in that tendency of heart and development of life which is given with regeneration by the Spirit, 1 John iii. 6–9, but it does not follow that the regenerated in general have not sinned, or could not sin. Rather there remains in them a struggle of the flesh against the spirit until their deliverance out of a temporal and mundane condition takes place, and they can the more and more develop, up to this point, the new disposition of their life, only in reference to sin still existing and still prevailing, yet nevertheless decreasing; (Romans vi. 12, 14,) wherefore a convertible state and daily repentance, pardon and repeated supplication for forgiveness of sin, (1 John ii. 1, 2; v. 16,) are not contradictory; and the fact that the regenerated man cannot be touched by the wicked one, 1 John v. 18, does not exempt him from combating with the invisible Prince of this world, Ephes. vi. 12. It is just the gradual separation of the external and internal life from fellowship with sin, in union with the progressive culture of all vital activity for the service of God which gives the idea of sanctifying grace.² The question here too turns on the operation of grace; for although the positive essence of a sanctified life is love; consequently is a true and new spontaneity distinguishable from susceptibility in faith; yet is it to be distinguished, on its part again, from all amendments and good works, based on self-will and individual life, in that it merely reposes on the fellowship of the Redeemer, and is the energy of faith, (Gal. v. 6.)

¹ Regeneration is not to be considered as if it were a self-evident principle of holiness; nor is sanctification to be regarded as a thing possible, independently of a previous and original appropriation of salvation, or as if perchance, it strove only after this object. But the relation may be illustrated by the parable of the seed of corn; for not only does the latter come up and thrive, stalk and blade, but strikes deep into the soil, and both directions of increase and growth conditionate each other. It is only in proportion as the roots deepen and strengthen that the entire growth thrives, and the upward growth reacts on the roots. Or we may select as an illustration the psychological and ethical truth of the maxim strengthened by a free application. A new birth can be a true one proportioned to the depth of individual life. Now, the same individual generally progresses in experience; for example, the boy advancing to the experience of the youth, and the youth to that of the man, and life upon the whole becoming deeper and fuller. If the principle of the new life in Christ does not at the same time deepen, if regeneration does not become truer and stronger, then there arises a danger of spiritual decay.

² The sanctified or saints are indeed sometimes denominated, especially with reference to faith and justification the members of Christ, or else in this relation, Heb. ii. 11; x. 10; xiii. 12. And this only because there is one faith, one spirit, one Lord, who effects forgiveness and purification from sin, or imparts the entire capacity for the service of God. In conformity with the Pauline doctrine and language, which expressly distinguishes *δικαίωσις* and *ἀγιασμός*, 1 Cor. i. 30, (although not so in vi. 11,) and in general, in accordance with Scripture, John xvii. 17, 1 Thess. v. 23; iv. 4, 8, 1 John iii. 3 *πᾶς—ἀγνίζει ἑαυτὸν, καθὼς ἐκεῖνος ἀγνός ἐστιν*—sanctification especially refers to the new formation of Divine life, or to the improvement and purification of the Christian walk in particular.

§ 153. THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

Existence and life in Christ, in so far as it is separated from world life unto the service of God, is a holy life, Romans xii. 1, 2, 2 Cor. vi. 16, a spiritual one, Romans viii. 5, 10, because it is solely derived from faith, and according to the command of the spiritual law, does not develope itself unto carnal desire; it is

heavenly also, Phil. iii. 20, Col. iii. 1, 3, partly in the same relation, and partly because it is in particular blessed in hope. We endeavour to comprehend the peculiarity of this Christian life; *first*, In the law of the Spirit which it uniformly follows; and, *secondly*, In the discipline by which it is preserved; and, *thirdly*, In the fruits of the Spirit wherein it subsists.

a. Of the Law of the Spirit.

§ 154. THE DEEPEST MOTIVE.

Christian life is governed by a new, not a literal law, Romans vii. 6, by a law of freedom, James i. 25, not of carnal desire, Gal. v. 13, by the law of the Spirit, Romans viii. 1, 11. This law is love, or the perfect self-motion of man created “after God;” it is the perfection of personal being. But since love, neither as knowledge nor obedience, neither as gratitude nor imitation of God, nor as love of God or of man, neither as the love of neighbour nor of self, attains in us an actual and independent existence; admitting that the Spirit of Him who died and rose again for us, kindles and preserves this love in us, still the love of Christ, both active and passive, (2 Cor. v. 14,) or gratitude towards the Redeeming God, Romans v. 5; xii. 1, Ephes. v. 20, 1 John iii. 1, is the most universal motive of Christian action and suffering, from which every thing else is developed. And since the love of God in Christ necessarily includes holy self-love, 1 Cor. vi. 15–20, as well as love of our neighbours, 1 John iv. 20, and universal as well as especial brotherly love, 2 Peter i. 7, so in like manner it necessarily excludes love of self and the world, 1 John ii. 15, and this in such a way, that in each development of the Christian disposition, the element of world-renunciation must appear, a renunciation which is in harmony with joyful hope on the Lord, and consists not merely in a higher or lower esteem of possessions, but also in a disinclination for everything

which cherishes sin and death, without permitting itself to be pervaded by eternal life and redeeming love.

§ 155. EXCLUSIVE DUTY.

It is in perfect accordance with this statement of Christian motive that the Christian life ascends to the sublime of filial duty, whose typical expression is found in the words of Jesus, “wist ye not that I must be about my Father’s business?” Luke ii. 49; or unto adoration of God in spirit and in truth, i.e., unto a veneration of the heavenly Father, which, in reference to local contrast, to that of time, to that of the external and internal and of relative persons, of fortune and misfortune, nay even of righteousness and sin, is and continues to be undivided. John iv. 23, 24.¹

¹ The Christian never has to pray where he may not have at the same time to return thanks and praise; and *vice versa*, he never has to return thanks where he has not also to pray; and this holds both in relation to the earthly and corporeal, and to the heavenly and spiritual. Even the consciousness of sin ought to lead to prayer, and not only the consciousness of redemption, but also that of growth in improvement should equally prompt us to thankfulness and supplication. The type of this disposition is our Lord’s prayer. Now although life passes from a state of contemplation and supplication into one of action, yet both conditions are subject to the duty of worshipping in spirit and in truth, just as they are subject to filial duty or to that of fearing and loving God above all things, and consequently of confiding in Him alone. Worship—adoration (*προσκυνήσις* differs in some degree from *προσευχή*), includes the following elements:—in itself and substantially it possesses the form of realized feeling, which is especially developed in prayer (praise, thanks, supplication), but chiefly through faith and obedience it becomes a disposition, ever establishing a new reception of revelation and entrance into the will of God. This love of God, however, with reference to the possibility of the bad and the existence of evil, possesses the element of the fear of the Lord in the first view, and the element of confidence in the second.

§ 156. WILL OF THE LORD.

Although the love of Christ is a law unto itself, still the regenerated man stands in need, partly of chastisement and partly of guidance which can ensure him only objective precept. For if he be not yet perfect in love, and consequently not so in truth, then must he seek for whatever may be the universal will and pleasure of God, in the pattern of Christ's life and his holy church, or in the word of God. Ephes. v. 17, Rom. xii. 2.

REMARK. The law of God, (*ὁ νόμος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Rom. vii. 22, 25.) The purpose inherent in existence, Divine justice, and its word, can never have been abrogated, nor can ever be so. Even grace and faith have only appeared in order to confirm and strengthen law, Rom. iii. 31, Matt. v. 15, seq. The law both in doctrine and letter (*παλαιότης γράμματος*, Rom. vii. 6) has entirely yielded, either as a shadow to substance, or as a body to spirit, or, as a condemning law has yielded to reconciliation through the blood of Christ, Ephes. ii. 15. The law fundamentally can be altogether divine, and in its aim of accomplishing the distinction between pure and impure, through the entire use of what is natural, it can be the eternal will; in its concrete and particular designs it becomes temporal, especially as it was designed to inure and draw a people who were carnal and sinful, and to tame the human will chiefly through the Divine; and since it was required to be local and popular, it becomes contingent, and, to a certain extent, transient. Hence, in the Book of the Law we find a subordination of designs. Some laws were spoken by the Lord, other were given by Moses, &c., wherein many other classifications are connected which had become usual among Jews and Christians, in order to facilitate their application at a later period. Hence, on the one hand, among those who contended against the spirit of the law, there was an interpretation which reduces its external and physical content into a generally moral one (the Alexandrians, Philo); and, on the other hand, there was an admission that the law had been interpolated by the ancients, or that it even contained falsehood or some material for the *οἱ πολλοί*; hence the Pauline doctrine on childlike,

elementary, secular institutions, Gal. iv. 3, Col. ii. 8. For the ancient law had in these institutions a connecting link in natural religion and in the ethics and government of the world generally before Christ; hence Paul's treatment of the law of meats, of days and of times, of circumcision, Gal. vi. 15, iv. 10; Rom. xiv. 14, 1 Cor. viii. 8. Hence the entire apostolical emancipation of Christians from circumcision, Acts xv. Still the doctrinal law is allowed to be used in Christianity, 1 Tim. i. 8, ὕδαμεν δε, ὅτι καλὸς ὁ νόμος, εἴαν τις αὐτῷ νομίμως χρῆται (compare *Test. Nephthalim* § 8, ed. Grab. p. 217), εἰδὼς τοῦτο, ὅτι δικαίω νόμος οὐ κείται, κ. λ. And besides all this, the sanctified stand in need both of a divine undivided word which shall not only instruct but improve, and of a divine command. But since it is needful in Christ to pass over the limited conclusion of individual moral commands and ideas, by searching and questioning the Divine will, so the will of God affords a much fuller legislation than all written law hitherto either laid down or capable of being so. Since the dogmatic knowledge of faith has a free and ample capacity for being developed in biblical gnosis (for in Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, Col. ii. 3); so has also the ethical knowledge of faith a similar capacity (for it cannot, as individual knowledge, be separated from that which is general.) Phil. i. 9, Col. i. 9, 10. Indeed not any kind of apostolical determinations can be equalised because they are individual, temporal, or local, (compare C. L. Nitsch, *de judicandis morum præceptis in N. T. a communi omnium hominum ac temporum usu alienis*, *Viteb. Comm.* xi.) but must be reduced back to their principles, and then brought into analogical application: Canon Law, Acts xv. oath, vesture, covering the head, marriage, divorce, &c. But just as little can Christian ethics admit of being casuistically supported, or reach their ultimate aim by insulating the idea of duty. The material of human life possesses, in all its unity and invariableness, a something which is yet mutable, and the will of love is ever desirous of revealing itself more perfectly.

§ 157. WISDOM AND PRUDENCE.

In regard to a readiness to recognise the good and perfect will of the Lord in all things, and to incorporate it with his own, the

Christian is wise, and supplicates for wisdom from above, Eph. v. 15, 16, James i. 5, iii. 15. With reference to the necessity and power of apprehending and maintaining external circumstances and relations, in the sense of wisdom, there is Christian prudence, Matthew x. 16, 17.

§ 158. SIMPLICITY.¹

Both the above qualities are not only combined with simplicity, but rest upon it. Christ disarms the tempter by the most simple repetition of the Divine commands and promises. For the constant tendency of the mind to the one thing needful, and a steady walk in truth, capacitates man for easily seeing into and fulfilling the subordination of things and events.

¹ 2 Cor. i. 12, ἡ γὰρ καύχησις ἡμῶν αὕτη ἐστὶ, τὸ μαρτύριον τῆς συνειδήσεως ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἐν ἀπλοτητι καὶ ἐλιγκρινείᾳ Θεοῦ (οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ σαρκικῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν χάριτι Θεοῦ) ἀνεστράφημεν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κ. λ. Matt. vi. 22, Prov. x. 9. Compare *Herm. Past. init. mdd.* and *Test. Beniam*, § 6, τοῦ δε Βελαῖαρ πᾶν ἔργον διπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ἀπλότητα.

b. Of Spiritual Discipline and Exercise.

§ 159. SPIRITUAL POVERTY.

Sanctification must produce a particular line of conduct which is directly related to sin, (which is constantly being excited anew,) and to the necessity for preserving the desired mode of life, and perfecting it unto preservation. The sum and substance of the energy required and suited for this purpose, we term spiritual discipline.¹ For since redeeming grace cannot reanimate without chastening us, so that we may deny the world and ungodliness, (Tit. ii. 12, παιδεύουσα ἡμᾶς), then must we, if we are to be sanctified by grace, accept even this office of discipline from it, in order to bring it to bear upon the rude and uncultivated part of our

life. And the humility (spiritual poverty, Matthew v. 3) which rendered our hearts susceptible of faith and the call unto repentance, shall abide in us, not only as a real wall of separation between our former and present condition, but be operative also as a spontaneous preserver of the state of salvation. The especial members and instruments of this discipline are vigilance and prayer, abstinence and labour, and the regimen proportioned to their united action.² The more these are realised apart from an abiding sanctification, so much the more are justification itself, merit, what is pleasing to God, or even the seal of perfection, wont to be sought for in them in a manner as vain as it is obstructive, Isaiah lvi. Matthew vi. 1–17, xxiii. 23, Gal. iv. 9–11, v. 3, 4, Col. ii. 16. A sound Christian self-education is to be recognised by its maintaining, on the one hand, its corporal exertions in due connection with its spiritual ones, and in not seeking to turn the pain and toil of repentance upon the flesh; and, on the other hand, in avoiding to make evil distinctions between lesser and greater commandments, in preserving itself from a violation of the natural and universally valid order of goods and impulses, and, finally, by rather voluntarily submitting to, than shunning, that general and special discipline reserved by the providence of our Lord, 2 Cor. xii. 7–9, Heb. xii. 5–7.

¹ Basilius, Proverbs i. 2, 3. "Ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία (בְּיָדָה) ἀγωγή τίς ὠφέλιμος τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπιπόνως πολλάκις τῶν ἀπὸ κακίας κηλίδων αὐτὴν ἐκκαθαίρουσα κ. λ. When Clemens of Alexandria, *Strom.* iv. p. 230, teaches that sins before baptism (regeneration) were forgiven, which, when committed after that event, must be removed by a purifying discipline, such a view must be received with at least great caution, or it is in direct opposition to 1 John ii. 1, 2, (*Book of Wisdom* xv. 2, 3). He ought rather to have taught that the regenerated man is first capable of receiving discipline from God, and under Divine guidance of chastising himself. In other respects, the ideas τιμωρία, κόλασις, and παιδεία, in various passages have been extremely well distinguished and explained by him.

² This has generally been denominated by the term ἀσκησις. This expression, borrowed from the preparation for the public

games, (Casaubon, *Exercit. 2, ad Baron. Ann. sect. xiii.*), was applied even before Christianity to the so-called philosophical life (*βίος κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν*), that is, to its separation from the common enjoyment of life. Since many particular observances with regard to vesture, food, and other restraints from secular usage, passed over from the philosophers, particularly the Stoics—*philosophia per abusum* in *GENUS QUODDAM VITÆ PROFESSORIUM* verti cœpta circa tempora Epicteti, *Baco a verulam Augm. sect. vii. p. 355*—to the Christians (Tertull. *de pallio*) and hence the names also, *ἀσκησις*, *φιλοσοφία*, &c. To represent Christian life under images derived from the gymnasium, the classical passage, 1 Cor. ix. 24, seq., added to all this an especial inducement. Meanwhile, Christians forgot, as well that they were all priests, as that, in the midst of their domestic and civic life, they ought all to be disciplinarians. Even in the old Catholic ritual (Apost. Constitutions) under this title such characters appear, who, in an especial manner, represent the universal Christian calling to spiritual discipline and exercise, and therefore rejoice in ecclesiastical dignity. Such a manifestation always exhibits a double character, that is, a better and a worse aspect. The better one is this, that spiritualism (Tertull. *adv. Psychicos*) pervading a community, elicits a moral reaction, which, in order to testify itself so much the more efficaciously against offences, formally and externally endeavours to represent itself; and that, in general also, in times of public tranquillity, when martyrs, in a strict sense, are no more, it desires to expose to the light the power of Christianity to overcome the world. The bad aspect, as respects this manifestation, consists in this, that extraordinary profession of Christianity is desirous of separating itself from the common, and assuming the superiority, and that discipline entirely forgets its character as a means, and seeks to be great not only in trifles but even in untruth. Such were the so-called Christian stoics, ridiculed and despised by Lucian, and such those Pharisees whom Christ condemned as straining at gnats and swallowing camels, Matthew xxiii. 23, 24.

§ 160. WATCHFULNESS.

Spiritual discipline, as a precaution against sin¹ nigh at hand, assiduously strives after the circumspection and presence of the Spirit, which is represented under the image of watch-

ing, Matt. xxvi. 41,² Ephes. vi. 18, Col. iv. 2, and by the perception as well of external as of internal circumstances, should be in a condition partly to anticipate the temptations of the flesh, the devil, and the world, and partly, in connection with prayer, to resist them. On the one hand, this watching presupposes another condition, or an awakening from sleep, Ephes. v. 14, Rom. xiii. 12, Isa. lx. 1; on the other hand, it fortifies itself, simply by remembering the speedy termination of this state of probation, Matt. xxiv. 42, xxv. 1; 1 Cor. xvi. 13, 1 Thess. v. 1–8. In the doctrine of spiritual discipline, watchfulness is to be opposed rather unto an excessive desire for dissipation and false spiritual security, Luke xi. 25, than to carnal security.

¹ The kind and amount of all individual discipline is determined by the idiosyncrasy of the individual; and this is alone cognisable through upright self-examination. Hence entire moral circumspection, in its earnestness, depends on our insight into our own inner nature, and on the truth which we observe towards ourselves. Ephes. v. 13, τὰ δὲ πάντα ἐλεγχόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς φανεροῦνται, 1 John i. 6. All watchfulness and prayer, all abstinence, labour, and regimen, preserve their tendency, their object, and their intention only in truth, when thou acknowledgest the sin that most easily besets thee, or strivest to perceive it.—

² What our Lord chiefly demands or denounces, here, indeed, refers to corporeal watchfulness. He requires, in His general exhortation, Matt. xxvi. 41, the universal prevalence of Christian watchfulness. However important may be temperance in corporeal sleep for the sustenance of body and soul, still the defective and corrupt discipline of the earlier periods of Christianity cast itself upon night watching; and Hieronymus may not have been so very just towards *Vigilantius*, when he treated him on account of his judgment on *Vigils*, as a *Dormitantius*.

§ 161. PRAYER.

A true moral presence of the Spirit cannot be conceived apart from a walk in the presence of God, and all strengthen-

ing and equipment is a becoming “strong in the Lord,” Ephes. vi. 10, whose panoply, ver. 11–18, cannot be put on nor worn without prayer, ver. 18. And hence it is that both these requirements, watching and prayer, are almost on all occasions united. Unceasing prayer, 1 Thess. v. 17, 18, Col. iv. 2, Rom. xii. 12, does not exclude that ascent and descent of feeling which is combined with human nature and its constitution, nor preclude the absolute inwardness or passivity of life in itself. But whilst the characteristic mark of life is prayer, the thinking and acting life may and ought to direct itself outwardly from this basis, if only all natural motives brought from without, as well as all especial excitations of the Spirit for particular prayer be indeed perceived. These motives are found under two states of feeling, James v. 13, in every commencing and concluding period of life, and in the relations of the communion in which God hath placed us. But these excitations, which in the highest degree conditionate the fruitfulness and the hearing of prayer, Rom. viii. 26, are not entirely dependent on external causes, and so much the less so, since the state of the Christian can in no instant be conceived as having no want. The aid of the Holy Spirit and of the name of Jesus in supplicatory prayer, produces, the more it is accorded, the requisite subordination of benefits and petitions, or the wisdom of supplication; and to the misuse of the doctrine of what is called deprecatory prayer, the undeterminableness of the Divine will cannot be so well opposed by the human will, or by the immutability of things, as can rather, in part, the conditioning power of prayer through the communion of Christ, and in part the danger and contradiction which exists therein of receiving, in the results of urgent and emphatic prayer, the rewards of confidence and corrections for mistrust. Here essentially and primarily belongs every supplicatory prayer formed after the sixth petition of the Lord’s prayer, and that one which, according to the model of our Lord in the garden, enters with resignation into the more or less revealed decree of the proving God.

§ 162. ABSTINENCE.

Spiritual discipline develops itself in action, *σωφροσύνη*, *σωφρόνως ζῆν*, Tit. ii. 12), and caution primarily does so in a negative manner, that is to say, by a restraining from the fullness of sensuous and worldly enjoyment, which restraint is as intentional as it is unassuming, and even abstaining from what is lawful, 1 Cor. x. 23, as much and as often as it serves to destroy the attraction of what is inadmissible, and to strengthen and protect spiritual freedom, 1 Cor. ix. 24–27. The inducements granted to Christians for determining both these kinds and proportions of abstinence, lie partly in individual qualities, partly in temporal circumstances, (*διὰ τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν ἀναγκὴν*, 1 Cor. vii. 26), and partly in the particular vocation, (1 Cor. ix.)

REMARK 1. Salutory abstinence not only refers to the subduing the flesh in a more limited sense, but also to the relation of silence to speaking, solitude to society, and repose to labour. For some admirable therapeutic and instructive doctrines on this subject, see Basil's *Homily* on the words *πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ*, κ. λ.

REMARK 2. Fasting stands for a universal symbol of precautionary abstemiousness. Nevertheless, it has not been placed in a just light by the ancients; for example, in *Past. Herm.*, simil. v., even when they prescribe it in the first place in its wide signification, *νηστεία ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ*, and then in its narrow one of restriction as to food. Even as a means of saving for the poor, especially when it appears combined with liberality, (as in the parable of the Shepherd) as an *opus supererogationis*, it does not retain its peculiar right. Basil, in his two *Homilies*, *περὶ νηστείας*, has viewed the subject in a better light, and has made some admirable remarks against the revels of the Carnival. In fasting, we should consider sincerity, joy, and freedom. Matt. vi. 16, 18, and at the same time that which is necessary, Mark ii. 20, 1 Cor. x. 7, Rom. xiii. 14. See my sermon *Unrechtes Fasten und rechtes*, (Pred. 1833, p. 75.)

§ 163. CHOICE OF SOCIETY.

Although the Christian cannot and ought not to forsake the world, 1 Cor. v. 10, in order to escape all the vexatious influences of society, or to protect himself from the leaven of the Pharisees and of Herod, Mark viii. 15, but rather is placed and disposed by God, in such a circle of social life, that he may partly share its ameliorating and preserving salt, and partly receive warning against individual sin in the suffering of vice; yet spiritual caution summons him, in so far as proximity and distance is a matter of freedom, to shun one society, 1 Cor. xv. 33, and to seek another. He avoids the one, not merely because he is in danger, involuntarily, of being strongly influenced by the sins of others, but also because much that is evil in him only awaits the authority of foreign example to become strengthened. Every one needs, (however far advanced he may be), in one aspect or another, an example that may put him to shame; and although the most admirable could only be for each other blind leaders of the blind, if, when giving and receiving, they did not refer directly to the only Master, still a voluntary humility towards those who are wiser and better, Psalms cxli. 5, and a susceptibility for the personal mediations of Christ's example, consequently a Christian choice of intercourse, pertains to the entire course of that prudent walk upon which the present discussion turns.

§ 164. REGULATION OF LIFE.

And all this combination is held together by the salutary self-restraint of order, and the love of it. For not only is sin, in general, actual disorder, and life, according to the law of the Spirit, nothing else than a continued achievement of pleasing order, but there is also a division of time and strength for which the Christian is assiduously desirous—a division relative

to the existence of sin to be contended against and requisite, in this point of view, for the prosperity of the soul. An ill regulated kingdom, daily walk, or property, can neither be overlooked nor controlled. But a life that ever proceeds anew from devotion, and reposes thereon—which consumes the superabundant powers of the soul, by the intervention of service and assiduity—a life which is adapted to a gentler transition, from seriousness to recreation, from pleasure to pain—such a walk leaves no room on the one hand for immediate sin, for impassioned over occupation, or for indolence pregnant with sin, (2 Thess. iii. 6), but rather finds room for what is unavoidably out of the usual course, and is to a certain extent identical with the light of watchfulness and self-knowledge, with the enjoyment of prayer, with the power of abstinence and edifying intercourse.

c. Of the Fruit of the Spirit.

§ 165. RIGHTEOUSNESS.

If, in fact, this entire prudential contest against yet existing sin be a fruit of the Spirit, still the Christian dialect especially indicates under the latter the fulfilment of the Divine commands in love, Gal. v. 22, the accomplishment of the eternal Divine order itself, or the righteousness fitted for the kingdom of heaven, which exceeds and is more genuine than that of the Pharisees, Matth. v. 20. In Christ or in His fellowship is truth, (*ἀληθεία*, Ephes. iv. 21), effectual renewal of life in all its aspects, v. 23, imitation of God, v. 1, and, in reference to the soul, by which the whole body of action is moved and more or less pervaded, there is perfectness, Col. iii. 14, 15.

§ 166. EARTHLY AND HEAVENLY VOCATION.

This perfectness is especially related to the compass of all the natural, necessary, and plastic relations in which human life participates. For neither by the crucifying power of repentance (Gal. v. 24; Col. iii. 5), nor by renunciations combined with spiritual discipline, can the earthly human destiny (recognised above, § 93) be changed or abrogated in any one point. But the work of the Spirit and the mind of pure love extends thus far, that every original disposition and each necessity is led to a pure development, and becomes an earthly vessel of heavenly good, and a means of manifold joy in the Lord, and of varied and associated exultation and reciprocal service in love. Thus, although we ought to acquire, to purchase, to possess, and enjoy everything temporal with reserve, 1 Cor. vii. 29–31, still we ought to shun indifference, and not reject and despise anything which is grounded on the will of the Creator and Preserver, and which merit our thanks, Col. ii. 16, 18; 1 Tim. iv. 1–6. Every kind of acquisition and vocation upon earth is related to our heavenly calling, if it exclude usury, and includes service and admits of Divine blessing. The Christian life is, of all modes of life, the most domestic, the most civic,¹ the most devoted to art, the most inclined to science, and pre-eminently the most humane.²

¹ *Tertull. Apol. c. 42*, “We are not gymnosophists nor hermits.” *Meminimus nos gratiam debere Deo—nullum fructum operum ejus repudiamus. Itaque non sine foro, non sine macello, non sine officinis—cohabitamus vestrum hoc sæculum. Navigamus, militamus, rusticamur, et mercatus miscemus.*

² *Idem ib. c. 39*, *Fratres etiam vestri sumus, jure naturæ matris unius, etsi vos parum homines quia mali fratres.*

§ 167. HEART AND WALK.

None of these relations, and, in general, no motive for moral

progression, can merely lead to this, namely, that thought or mind, that action and speech, can preserve a Christian state; but the fruits of the Spirit always primarily attest themselves in the completion of the internal temple, in the destroyed lusts of the flesh, and in the awakened thoughts of love (*ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν*, Ephes. iv. 23). A pure heart proves its soundness in every way, Matth. vii. 16, 23. Neither good works nor good words can be so, unless they arise from a pure source. Nevertheless, all who live in the Spirit walk also spiritually, Gal. v. 25; and the good tree will be known by the fruits of the tongue, James iii. 10, as well as by the fruits of action, James ii. 16. It is goodness only, pressing on to confirmation up to the last, which makes the perfect man, James iii. 2.¹

¹ Compare my sermon *uber den Werth der guten Worte im Christenthume* (Samml. 1819).

REMARK. The indivisible unity of the speaking, acting, and thinking man must be presupposed, if such moral precepts as those which substitute one for the other, (as in Matth. v. 39, compare ver. 22–25,) are to be correctly understood.

§ 168. FIDELITY IN GREAT AND SMALL THINGS.

This Christian perfection proves itself and is tested only by the entire sacrifice of self, or in great hazards and self-denial, 1 John iii. 16; John xv. 13; Matth. xix. 21; but the internal value of these actions consists in and is coincident with that same love, 1 Cor. xiii. 3, which, in the sum total of common and obscure performances of duty, proves itself to be faithful. Common virtue,¹ if it be but virtue, is as great as uncommon virtue; and persevering self-denial, in daily recurring service, demands, in certain point of view, a greater measure of strength of love than any single sacrifice which Christian heroism can offer,² Luke xvi. 10.

¹ For example, a real desire to oblige, a genuine complaisance;

the former chiefly in dissimilar and bounden relations, the latter in free and equal ones, is a great proof of subdued self-love. In like manner, the administration of property, carried on in the spirit of a true community of goods and with the entire effort of inventive wisdom and love, or genuine chastity and moderation in the marriage state, and especially submission to one another, 1 Pet. v. 5; Ephes. v. 21; will, in proportion to their strength, require a much larger expenditure of spiritual power, and possess a much higher value, than all monastic vows.

² See Fenelon's work, by M. Claudius, vol. i. p. 136. On fidelity in small things "trifling occurrences are unforeseen; they recur every moment; they incessantly conflict with our pride, our indolence, our prejudice, our sudden anger, our fretfulness, and our contests; they disturb and interrupt in every possible way our wills. If we wish to be faithful, nature has no time to pause, and she must expire with all her inclinations. It is with piety as with the administration of temporal goods; if we do not exercise a rigid superintendence, we are ruined more by small expenditure than by great items."

§ 169. FRUIT OF INNOCENCE AND VIRTUE.

Each member of the contrasts exhibited in § 167 and 168, includes both Christian innocence and Christian virtue. For it is one and the same love which shuns evil and does good, fears the Lord and imitates him; and we owe unto God, and for His sake unto all men this entire love, Romans xiii. 8. Nevertheless, it appertains to the truth of moral action in every feature, that above all I neither offend nor despise whatever is, in God's sight, finished good (§ 100), in order to be able afterwards to cherish and promote the good included in the disposition; and, in conformity with this, the correct doctrine concerning the rectitude which is in Christ, demands that the unity of innocent conduct shall form the basis upon which the unity of a virtuous life is to be raised; although the vital doctrine, just as actual life, is unable to refrain from uniting the prohibitory contents of each particular article immediately with the precep-

tive one; as, for example, in the interpretation and application of the Decalogue. In Romans xiii. 9, 10, for example, the contents of the second table of the law are comprehended positively, but in James ii. 11, Matth. v. 22, principally, only negatively.

REMARK. The classification of Christian ethics from an early period has been so much the more readily deduced from the Decalogue, as the latter truly Divine record itself is not a mere decade of propositions, but is bipartite, and each of the two divisions may be again subdivided; so that, upon the whole, this record invites to a genetic development of the Divine precepts. In point of fact, it was unnecessary, for the setting forth of the moral law of the New Testament, to add to the Decalogue (as has been done, for example, in the *Constitut. Apost.* vii. 2,) the command to love one's neighbour, and, for this purpose, to separate the second; but, according to the Lutheran method of exposition, everything, namely, 1. The remaining content of the first table; 2. The entire second table; 3. Every prohibition of action; 4. The prohibition of lust, may be deduced from the first commandment; or the sum of the law and the prophets, the love of God and our neighbour (in which latter is included self-love), may be referred to the superscription or sign of the spiritual interpretation. How were it possible that an element of Christian morality could be exhibited, which would not admit of union with any direct or indirect commandment in the Decalogue? The doctrine of the fundamental cause of moral action is enunciated in the first commandment; the succeeding commands unite disposition with word and deed and practice. The command to honour parents includes all the relative duties; the doctrine of duties, virtue, and possessions is most intimately united in subsequent points, and in the latter command spiritual discipline still retains its position, and ascetic subjects find their relation to the first table. But the subject has been carried even beyond this. David Chyträus, *Regulæ Vitæ, virtutum descriptiones methodicæ, recens recognitæ*, Viteb. 1576, exhibits twelve *utilitates decalogi*, of which only two enter upon especial moral doctrine; *est regula vitæ piorum*, and *est norma vitæ hominum in externis actionibus, ut mores honeste regantur*. Others give to the Decalogue dogmatic powers, for example, to confirm even the resurrection, or philosophical, artistical, and political effects. On the subject of instructive and dogmatic power

of teaching, see some excellent remarks in Calvin's *Institut.* ii. 8, 1. sqq. And this Reformer has, at the same time, whilst glancing in his wonted manner at the spiritual interpretation of the ten commandments, partly considered, with his usual vigour, the justice and necessity of a synecdochical explanation of the same, as he terms it, and partly weighed the just proportion and limits of such an interpretation. See the above work, § 7–12. The Decalogue, however, is but little fitted for a theological, *i. e.* a scientific representation of Christian rectitude, although it is of incalculable importance and value for homiletical and catechetical instruction in morals. The numerical arrangement, and the inequality of the propositions previously blended therewith, oppose all direct admission of the whole into a scientific adjustment; and in the same degree as we welcome such a popular system of doctrine as that of Seiler, which, under the representation of the first article of our faith, founds the Decalogue immediately on the development of ethics, to the same extent must the much more important work of Chyträus appear constrained, on which is constructed, from that point of view, a complete Christian doctrine of virtue.

REMARK 2. The omission of the second commandment, namely, the prohibition of images, as it occurs in the tradition of the middle ages connected with Augustin, and in Luther's Catechism, admits indeed of being explained in the same way as the subsequent division of the prohibition against lust; but in the present day, since we have attained a just knowledge of the subject, the omission admits of being no longer justified (see Geffken *Ueber d. verschiedne Eintheilung des Dekalogs und den Einfluss derselben auf den Cultus*, Hamburg 1838. The entire blessing associated with the fundamental constitution of the Old Testament is based upon the prohibition of images. For if Jehovah (with the exception of אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים), could have been worshipped under any one image, the very idea of God as the principle of all true religion, and the entire development depending thereon, would have been lost. Kant (*Krit. d. Urtheilskr.* p. 123), termed the prohibition of images the most sublime in the whole Judaical code, and explained the religious enthusiasm of the Jews as flowing from it. We need not apprehend that this prohibition will lose its importance in reference to our circumstances, because our idolatrous inclinations have

long been subdued. Apart from the fact, that the word of God shall yet for long be proclaimed, by preaching and the catechism, ere the last idol shall disappear from the earth, so there exist even now general heathen tendencies just as there are Jewish; and Paganism again so lately commended, may lead to many results which we scarcely anticipate. Then, again, even in this prohibition, there is nothing to oppose the distinction between coarser and more refined errors. Even the soul itself conceives false and forbidden images of God the Lord and his attributes. The application of the prohibition to that of the image of Christ is altogether erroneous, and still more perverted is the condemnation of images in general, or the adornment of churches with pictorial representations of biblical persons and events. It is only the state of the sixteenth century, and the peculiar views of Zuinglius (for Calvin and Bucer, not to mention Luther, who approved of pictures, were, in this instance, free from exaggeration,) that render comprehensible what was held and done during this puristic tendency. See Gruneisen's *Rec. ub. d. Geffken'sche Schrift Theoll. stud. ii. Krit.* 1840-4. Every Christian technologist must reject, as well in the name of religion as of art, the representation of the Trinity under human forms.

REMARK 3. It has been objected to our delineation of duties, that it does not recognise our duty towards God, nor does justice to the distinction between our duty to God, ourselves, and our neighbours. To this we reply, 1. That the division which is missed is a deduction, and, so far, is not a division, because it does not consist of co-ordinate members. 2. As a deduction, this division has not only been taken into account, § 154, but has also been perfected by the usually neglected relations to the love of Christ and renunciation of the world. 3. That we teach duty towards God is abundantly evident from § 155, or from our doctrine on exclusive duty. But if we desire to understand duties towards God in the pleural, without understanding thereby the totality of duties, in that case they likewise belong to the general doctrine of the law of the Spirit, and not to the doctrine of the fruits of the Spirit. 4. The theology of duties ought and must reduce back the opposite of duty to self and our neighbour, to its unity or to our duty towards man, that is, towards the Divine image. See §§ 170 and 178; and thus it becomes possible, that in a general system of Christian doctrine (where it happens that the simplest divisions are adopted), the duties

we owe to ourselves and our neighbour (at least in the doctrine of the innocence of the Christian life), are inseparable, and are represented intimately united, that is, according to their individual relations to the immediate and mediate benefits belonging to personal being, especially when in the doctrine of ethics as hitherto treated, their identity has not been rendered sufficiently apparent. This is precisely what is defective in the usual doctrines, for example, on falsehood, fornication, calumny, &c., especially since they do not adequately recognise the coincidence and parity of self-injury with the injury of our neighbour.

a. The Innocence of the Christian Life.

§ 170. GENERAL IDEA.

Every thing, by which the Divine image suffers contempt or injury in any one of its rights, or any one of its original relations, is opposed to the innocence of the Christian life (1 Cor. xiii. 4—6), and whether the injury effects the personality of ourselves or others, makes no difference. Contempt is even an injury, Matt. v. 22; hatred is murder, 1 John iii. 15; and all injuries and contempt are identical in this respect, that none of any kind can be mere self-injury, and none the mere injury of our neighbour alone. God's kingdom, man, the image of God, is injured by every sin, and by every sin is the whole law transgressed, James ii. 10.¹ Nevertheless, we have afforded ourselves no room to develop this unity, which should remain inviolate, up to a due manifoldness, and therefore none to the deceptive effort of limiting the commandment of love in its application; and contempt, for example, of corporeal right and weal is not to be justified, or, on the contrary, through a false holy esteem for such, is the spiritual element to be so sacrificed. For, from the doctrine laid down in § 89—99, concerning human nature and its destiny, it follows incontestibly that an injury done to man in his temporal property, in his external freedom, or in his honour, is not guiltless in reference to the personality itself.

¹ A sophistical trifling with smaller and greater sins, with minor transgressions which may not be sin, is perhaps what is reproved in Hosea xii. 8—9. On the other hand, 1 John iii. 4, *πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖ.*

§ 171. ESTEEM OF IMMEDIATE PERSONALITY.

Christian life bears itself innocently towards the being and well-being of the soul, with a disregard of all other life. In so much as the soul is not exposed to arbitrary murder, the Christian is not withheld from avoiding as a capital crime even the mere attempt to injure his felicity, and is not prevented from finding in all sin a share therein, and in all passion and vices a germ of this offence. Accordingly, there exists a peculiar Christian aversion for all works in which an approach to the sin of hatred and despair is exhibited, or which approximate to the murder of the soul, and consequently an aversion to cursing and execration, James iii. 9; Matt. v. 22; to scandal¹ and seduction, Matt. xviii. 6; to contempt of personal persuasion in proselytizing, Matt. xxiii. 14, 15; to shutting up the kingdom of heaven against men; to any wicked attempt to keep the mind in darkness,—a bigoted and unjust detention of the truth of grace, Matt. xxiii. 13; an abhorrence of falsifying the gospel, Gal. i. 9; for every species of idolatry, or for denying the fellowship of God in fornication, 1 Cor. vi. 12, 20,² in avarice, 1 Tim. vi. 9, and every other vice.

¹ To put a stumbling-block in the way, *σκανδάλιζεν*, Matt. xvii. 6; Rom. xiv. 21, (the sensible part of the representation is to be understood from Lev. xix. 14) denotes an actual guilty allure-ment unto evil, or one intentionally excited. The opposite to this occurs in Rom. xv. 1, *βαστάζειν τὰ ἀσθενήματα τῶν ἀδυνάτων—ἀρέσκειν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ πλησίον πρὸς οἰκοδομήν.* Now every exemplification of evil, every sin is, as an example as it were, a certain incentive to the next succeeding, at least under certain circumstances and relations. For social evil reacts phenomenally, as hateful and offending, on individual evil; so that the good is called upon to abide as such (through the evil which directs itself

in its outbursts), and does not yield to internal evil. Thus the precise idea of scandal is realized only in proportion as there arises a condition of dependence and natural succession, as the relation of education, in which the force of example is perverted to the seduction of innocence, or to the depression of moral interest. Moreover, from such definite relations of life the arbitrary and impassioned treatment of one's neighbour effects a violent excitation of pleasure or pain, so that it should not redound to him as sin, and be as a stumbling-block. Under all circumstances, and in all relations, an action or admission becomes offence, when it represents any connection between good and evil, and thus exhibits the equal value of both, as well as the seeming freedom of evil, and the apparent success of the unjust, and either aids in relaxing the bonds of aversion and shame, or destroys faith in the operation of the existing means of grace and virtue. If most offences arise from ignorance and neglect, still they are more or less intentional and satanic. The guilt of those who take offence may be as great as that of those who give it. If absolute innocence and edification, if a perfect motive and incentive to good (enfeebling all other social offences, as well as constituting the basis of all edification, Matt. xi. 29; John xiii. 15; 1 Peter ii. 21; 1 John iii. 6, 7), if Christ "is set for the fall of many," Luke ii. 34; Matt. xiii. 57; Isa. viii. 14; 1 Pet. ii. 17, then are those who receive offence just only those who give it, or they receive it as a punishment, because they will not suffer themselves to be sanctified and edified.

² The argument used by the apostle, 1 Cor. vi. 18, against fornication would not have had its due weight, if, as sinning against his own body, it were not to be understood as being injurious to his personality. The sensualist rejects the conditions of exclusive connubial love, of spiritual fellowship, esteem, confidence, and mutual resignation, under which alone exists nothing degrading in the corporeal fulfilment of sexual destiny. The sensualist converts the entire personality into a means of gratification. Gluttony and inebriety are essentially allied excesses, being the desecration of the Divine temple, the members of Christ.

§ 172. ESTEEM FOR THE INTERCOURSE OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH.

Christian intercourse, Col. iii. 9, Eph. iv. 25, not only renounces falsehood, in so far as it is injurious, and is a contingent means of evil intentions, but because it directly violates that which is true, or breaks the original bond of personal being, “for we are members one of another.” Here the holiness of our faculty of utterance, and the sanctity of truth, declares itself to be an inviolable common good. And as the so-called lie of necessity and duty never can be consummated without a certain feeling of shame, no case can arise or be imagined where an affectionate forbearance, or any kind of sympathy in obedience to duty could not prove itself far more truly and nobly in another way than by falsehood. The falsehood of necessity and service when consummated is ever, under favourable circumstances, still a sign either of wisdom, which is defective in love and confidence, or of a love which is deficient in wisdom. Hence the apology of meekness may be offered, but never the lofty idea of duty and service.¹

¹ The austere aspect of ethics has been strongly enforced by Böhme, *Ueber die Moralität der Nothlüge*. Newstadt, 1828. Compare also Kierkegaard, *De Notione atque turpitudine mendacii*. Goettingae, 1829. With regard to the toleration of falsehood (*falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi*) considered as self-defence or expediency, many great and moral contemporaries, such as Basil and Chrysostom, Augustin and Jerome, Calvin and Luther, Kant and Jacobi, have held very opposite opinions. It depends upon our idea of what is sin in falsehood, and of what constitutes the basis of duty in truthful utterance. To be true in expression subjectively and objectively, is not merely a duty for the sake of result and effect, but is a direct obligation; hence, truth both in duty towards ourself and our neighbour is identical, and if impulsive motives are contained in the idea of what is useful or injurious, still personality, which is universally interested in the divine and rational object of our faculty for expression, remains the determining motive. Play, war, jest, imitative

and other illusory arts, acknowledge their delusions, and thereby cancel the same, or they degenerate into falsehood, and are then so far sins. The duty of truthfulness cannot be limited to the idea of rational truth, as that which should surrender the reality of expression. For even temporal reality claims in its divine condition and suitability, a pure and true apprehension and transmission. We are certainly not bound by absolute duty to give utterance to our sentiments, nor to exhibit the full content of our consciousness. Silence is not falsehood, although there is often added the explanation, that we desire to be silent, and thus confess that we know that silence is not lying. There is not only in the region of art and science, but also in practical life, a wisdom of allegory and typology which calculates on our susceptibility and capacity for comprehending the true and the actual, but which is free from falsehood. If the maintenance of our corporeal life were unconditioned duty, and if in this relation the saying, “necessity is law,” or “necessity knows no law,” were a truly moral one, in that case the idea of a lie of necessity would be justifiable. As an exception from the rule, as a suspension of the fundamental maxim, a lie of necessity is also a sin of necessity, and consequently is sin. A lie of necessity must thus pass into one of duty, if it is to be defended; and now the idea of personal self-preservation contends with this falsehood, which may be said to be duty towards our neighbour, and the ministry of love. No concrete case can be pointed out where those who lie or falsify from affection could not have acted more wisely and affectionately without such falsehood. The disproportion between the frequent minimum of action in speech, and the maximum of conjectural consequence, between the mere idea of action and the perception of a terrible reality, renders the practical difficulty here so great that a secondary effect ever blends itself with the *moral*. We ought much rather confess that we are liars and sinners from imprudence in love, and from uncharitableness in complaisance, than exempt ourselves from striving after the perfect man of whom James speaks, James iii. 2.

§ 173. REGARD FOR LIFE.

Since corporeal life, the primary condition of all the personal manifestation and development of human nature, is a creation

of God, which, even in man's sinful condition, can lose nothing of its original goodness and holiness, Genesis ix. 6, consequently the commandment "thou shalt not kill," Exod. xx. 13, xxi. 12, Romans xiii. 9, is universally valid, without any exception. But murder, as Calvin remarks,¹ is only the strongest characteristic of all sins of lust and wrath imputable to man's moral insensibility, the characteristic of all impassioned life in its swiftness and fulness, of all the negligence of the health, to which a disregard for the chief temporal gift of God is fundamental. And suicide, which is declared to be a crime in the Scripture, though but mediately, yet with sufficient distinctness, is so much the more irreconcilable with Christian innocence, since it is as much a Christian duty to hazard and sacrifice life in the service of God and man, Luke xvii. 33, John x. 12, xii. 25,² as it is to endure it and render it fruitful for the kingdom of God, Phil. i. 22, 24.

¹ *Institutt. Rel. Chr.* ii. 8, sect. 10,—Cur autem Deus velut dimidiis præceptis, per synecochas significarit magis quid vellet quam expresserit, cum aliæ quoque soleant rationes reddi, hæc mihi imprimis placet: quia peccatorum fœditatem (nisi ubi palpabilis est) diluere et speciosis prætextibus inducere semper caro molitur, quod erat in unoquoque transgressionis genere deterrimum et scelestissimum, exemplaris loco proposuit, cujus ad auditum sensus quoque exhorresceret, quo majorem peccati cujuslibet detestationem animis nostris imprimeret.

² See my sermon, *The Sacredness of Self-preservation, a Christian exhortation against duelling*, Bonn, 1835.

REMARK 1. That the legal punishment of death is to be conceived as murder is as irrational as it is unchristian, and there is no trace of such idea to be found in Scripture records. On the contrary, the consciousness of the Divine lawfulness of punishment, by taking away life, is clearly expressed in Matt. xxvi. 52, Romans xiii. 4. Here we find, in part, an indication of what is Divine in the state as an *ἐκδίκησις*, as an *ἀποκάλυψις ὀργῆς*,—and the symbol of the sword notifies the *jus necis*,—and, in part, we refer to the ancient law of Noah and Moses. This again refers back to the dark and blended phenomenon of right and wrong in the avenging of blood. Cain expresses his dread because he feels

himself left to the avengement of blood; God's voice assures him this should not be, but that a sevenfold vengeance should attend on him. Now, when the haughty violator and bearer of the sword, Lamech, relies on the prohibition of vengeance for blood, then arises the necessity for the law of Noah, according to which the mere right of the strong or the prudent, the law of contingency and individual power in regard to human life is altogether abrogated, and to it is opposed the absolute injustice of murder, and the absolute justice of its public expiation. This justice puts the murderer to death. The first prohibition against avengement of blood adduced no reason for its enactment; the prohibition of murder does so: man is God's image, the ground of personality. But is this ground for the punishment of death itself assailed? Does this punishment commit the same crime which it punishes? By no means; with as much reason might legal confiscation or imprisonment be called theft and plunder. Human laws may, perchance, in themselves, include principles of vengeance, cruelty, and injustice, or Divine laws may be perverted in their principle, so that capital punishment may assume the character of murder. But law, in the necessity of its existence and operation, does not foster any kind of passion or arbitrary will, but punishes both the one and the other with the reactions of violated and yet inviolable justice, of which it is a manifestation. Law, punishment, and state, have indeed proceeded from the source of Divine love, but, primarily, as phenomena and effects of right and justice. Sinful humanity, as such, (according to Genesis viii. 21), shall indeed be tolerated and preserved, but then only in so far as it does not resign the human character, but allows the state in general, and indeed primarily admits the abolition of arbitrary will in reference to personal existence. Thus we understand the connection of the ninth chapter of Genesis with the preceding one. The legal and state covenant with God, in all its manifestations, more or less complete, may at least be said to exist as a *παιδαγωγία εἰς χρίστον*. That is to say, the state, as a Divine institution, is the possibility of public care for the immediate institutions of the Spirit, of religion, and science; but only so inasmuch as it is essentially something beyond this, namely, the annihilation of despotism and injustice, or the representative of personal right against sinful individualism. The state is consequently not merely a theoretical manifestation of abstract natural justice and moral

law, but is the practical act and exercise of actual justice. The real necessity of right is given with the state, whilst the latter cannot produce the former considered as free, but only promote it. Thus the question is not simply, how far the state can prevent actual transgression, but it must annihilate actual sin in its injustice, which it can neither prevent nor undo; it must purify itself from the transgressor, or ransom and expiate guilt; in a word, it must punish. Punishment does not desire a mere temporal indemnity, which is not always possible, nor does it seek mere security through indemnification, or by deterring from crime, nor does it aim at improving the guilty, which by itself it could not accomplish, but it desires to be the actual manifestation of violated and yet inviolable law. All those subordinated or derived objects of punishment can only be attained and promoted by realizing abstract right, and by rendering valid the consciousness of eternal justice. Thus the ultimate aim of punishment is ever an object of love; and whilst the most recent speculation regards it in such a point of view, it reconciles the contradiction between Kant's view of the aim of recompense and Fichte's opinion of the object of improvement. Christianity, with its principle of reconciliation, when adopted into the state, authorises the latter still further to punish, and even to punish intentional murder by death, because it more and more perceives that justice is love, and suffering by law is freedom, and that punishment is reconciliation; just as it ever exempts penal institutions from the charge of cruelty and an unjust waste of life for the sake of exciting terror. The principle of pardoning sin, whilst the sin itself is permitted to exist, is contrary to Christianity. The idea of punishment is that of law restored in the identity of endured denial. Premeditated murder must either remain unpunished or be punished only with death. If corporeal self-preservation were an altogether unconditioned good, and the absolute right of personality, in that case there would be no natural law for the punishment of death; if the temporal prolongation of life were the exclusive and adequate means of conversion, there would exist no Christian right for such a punishment; but neither of these conditions exist. Reformation cannot reach the murderer who does not acknowledge that he is guilty of death, and who does not surrender himself up to the Divine decree of punishment. If he do not recognise this, still the decree exists; the law of God is notwithstanding fulfilled in him, and Divine mercy is not bound with the transgressor

to the temporal limits of existence. Even a violent death is, to a certain extent, to be regarded as freeing and purifying. This view, directed against the author of *das Votum der kirche gegen die Todesstrafe*, and against Schleiermacher, Grohmann, and others, agrees in the main with Daub's treatise on the punishment of death, (Daub's *Beurtheilung der Hypothesen in Betreff der Willensfreiheit, &c.*, herausgeg. von Dr J. G. Kröger, Altona, 1834, p. 218).

§ 174. ESTEEM FOR SEX.

Man's destiny for society appears in the sphere of his mediate personality, and especially in the natural distinction of sex. Man and woman may be said to complete spiritually and bodily their associate life, Genesis ii. 18, 21–25, Matth. xix. 4, and the natural preservation of the species may be described as being under the influence of inclination and devoted love. The only way of preserving our innocence against whatever is suggestive of sexual impulse and sexual relation, is consequently that connubial condition of life which exists in marriage, and out of it, as well as in virginity and widowhood; and universally consists in shame, or the innate defence of personality against the destructive egoism of sexual impulse in thought, word, or deed, being rightly perceived; in subjecting all sexual gratification to the conditions of lawful marriage; and in maintaining marriage in the abstract, as well by those who reject, as by those who enter into that state, inviolate in all its rights and destinies. Impurity and incest,¹ fornication and adultery, are consequently as much opposed to Christian life, Ephes. v. 3, 1 Thess. iv. 4, 1 Cor. v. 1, Heb. xiii. 4, as is a state of virginity and celibacy, which either assumes that condition to be more pleasing to God, or adopts it from mere arbitrary will of independence, 1 Tim. ii. 15; iv. 3.

¹ The substantial ground of prohibited marriage (Leviticus xviii. and xx.) between blood-relations has been clearly indicated by the legislator himself. Those who, by virtue of consanguinity

possess, and have to cherish peculiar natural endowments of disinterested love, and particular kinds of feeling shared by man in general, cannot gain, but must only lose such a possession by the marriage union. Connubial love can neither destroy nor derange that whereto it refers, and which it desires to reproduce and propagate. Thus, the *horror naturalis* is not only to be honoured, but admits of being understood, and we must diligently strive after this understanding, partly because of the sophistry of the carnal mind, which appeals to the example of the Persians, Egyptians, and Athenians, and partly on account of the modifications to which the prohibition of marriage within certain affinities is subjected, in reference to its wider extension, according to local and temporal circumstances.

§ 175. RESPECT FOR FREEDOM.

The Christian calling to the service of the Lord, and to freedom in love, confirms man's original claim to a participation in common external freedom, as well as agrees with all the restrictions of that service; and those restrictions which arise in domestic and civil fellowship are, on that very account, true expansions and defences of each individual right. Accordingly, every performance and furtherance of adoration to man, all plunder or sale of person and talent, all subjugation and sedition, will separate itself from Christian life as being unholy; and this will operate to such an extent that the legal condition where the Christian calling fails, is, on the one hand, summoned forth, and, on the other, is partly loved, and partly completed by love, Ephes. vi. 8, 9, Gal. iii. 28, Philem. 17, 1 Cor. vii. 20–24.

§ 176. RESPECT FOR A GOOD NAME.

The duty of living to the honour of God in Christ, 1 Cor. vi. 20, 1 Peter iv. 11, and of sharing the ignominy of our Lord, Matth. x. 33, 1 Cor. iv. 13, eradicates from the mind where

it exists, all carnal and secular ambition, by the same powers which sharpen the mind towards personal worth, and strengthen esteem for a good name. The same feeling which, in regard to our Lord, makes the Christian ashamed of his fortune and his deserts, of his state and rank, compels him, when, remembering his scarcely overcome self-contempt, to concede, even to the most reprobate fellow-creature, the glorified image of reconciled humanity, and to restore unto him, as far as he can, the merited loss of the world's esteem, in so far as it can conduce to consolation derived from the feeling of reconciliation, Luke vii. 37–50, John viii. 10, 11, 2 Cor. ii. 10, 11. And the same feeling which compels the Christian to seek the glory of the Lord alone, urges him to acknowledge without envy every man's worth, merit, and office; enables him to contemplate the same in its true signification, Romans xii. 3, 1 Cor. xii. 22, and renders easy the payment of that reverence, rightly and proportionably, which is due unto all men, 1 Peter ii. 17, and this feeling, too, compels the Christian to recognise (2 Cor. v. 11), and yet soberly to estimate (1 Cor. iv. 3) the advantage of being manifested in the conscience of his brethren, and of standing well in their esteem; and, finally, it obliges him so much the more conscientiously and affectionately to aid in securing to every man against calumny and treachery that moral honour, which, being free and uncertain, is exposed to danger, and this so much the more, as it furnishes the foundation, not only of temporal well-being, but also the basis of activity for the kingdom of God in this world, and is an important aid for self-government and preservation of the soul.

§ 177. RESPECT FOR PROPERTY.

Our natural equality in poverty and wealth, 1 Tim. vi. 7, no more abolishes, than does our spiritual equality, man's earthly destiny for inheriting and acquiring property, and for administering it, as accountable unto God, and according to his will. For

even the community of goods in the church at Jerusalem was and could only be only in part valid at the commencement, and in part was a mark and sign of that spirit in which unequal possession ought to be regarded and treated in all times and places of the Christian's common life, Acts ii. 44, Luke xvi. 9. God's irrevocable ordinations always reproduce inequality wherever it may have been artificially removed, and this, manifestly, as well for the building up of man in righteousness, as for the glorification of Christ in giving and receiving, Acts xx. 35, 2 Cor. ix. 7, and for discipline in indigence and wealth; so that all actual and legal continuance of property maintains the authority of a providential and Divine arrangement, even granting that many a man in the midst of all his opulence, (which he neither knows how to manage with secular nor Divine prudence,) should be punished in a particular manner. In connection with this latter truth, not only the incapacity of the prodigal, but also of the avaricious, for respecting property, has been already indicated.¹ Since they, indeed, do not comprehend in what consists the right of the enjoyment of God and the brethren, and, in truth, with equal lust, turn God into gratification, or the means of it; thus, their respect for worldly goods breaks out into a real contempt and violation of property. For the self-injury of the avaricious and the spendthrift cannot be conceived apart from a coarser or more subtle form of the sin of theft; and the force of the Divine commandment, "thou shalt not steal," must, according to Ephes. iv. 28, 1 Cor. vi. 8, 2 Thess. iii. 6–12, operate to this extent,—that the Christian must be purified from all habits and works of the parasite, the beggar, or the sluggard, as well as from the sins of carelessness, embezzlement, and fraud.

¹ Hamann to Jacobi (1785), "The time to collect and to scatter belongs to the secrets of God, and perhaps to the call of each individual. The worst of it is, that in squandering, avarice is inevitable, and thus one has to contend against two enemies."

β. *A Virtuous Life.*

§ 178. GENERAL IDEA.

The positive aspect of righteousness for the kingdom of heaven, consists in this, that the Christian, partly in the entireness of his developed life, and partly in his works, ever more perfectly imitates the love of Christ, and by that means, in opposition to indolent self-will, contributes his share for the realization of the kingdom of heaven, or of the good appointed by the Creator and Redeemer. Innocence consists more in the preservation, and virtue more in the perfecting, of every thing that possesses conditioned or unconditioned value for the typical being. Hence, in this place, the question no longer turns on self-preservation, but on culture; and, with reference to our neighbour, no longer hinges on justice (*justitia*), but on equity, or upon affectionate deportment in relation to possible or actual conflict, and on goodness or affectionate conduct in reference to indigent humanity.¹

¹ See, in reference to this arrangement, Sailer's *Moral*, ii. p. 179, and Herbart *Einl. in die philos. Wiss.*—Auscg. ii. p. 90.

§ 179. CULTURE.

(*Self-love as self-perfection.*)

In order to become a more and more perfect copy and instrument for the love of the Lord, the sanctified man labours, in his inmost life, not only for his daily resuscitation, but also to this end, that his entire mode of life shall be in conformity with his general and particular earthly calling, (1 Tim. i. 18, iv. 12–16, vi. 11; 2 Tim. i. 6, ii. 3, 22, iv. 5,) edifying or exciting to improvement, Romans xv. 2, Heb. x. 24, and therefore that it may become pure and symmetrical. For Christian

culture no natural disposition is indifferent, Phil. iv. 8, 9, whether it be a particular talent, or one common to man in general. But it is only by the subordination of the objects of culture that the evil arising from the miseducation of the whole can be averted.

§ 180. EQUITY.

(Love of our neighbour in regard to strife.)

Cultivated love places the Christian in a condition not only of doing good, but also of enduring evil, prospectively and retrospectively, and of overcoming evil with good, Romans xii. 21. The saying, "there must need be divisions," is erroneously founded upon Luke xii. 51, and similar passages, as if the question does not here turn on inevitable results rather than on moral obligation. Emulation in what is good, and an irreconcilable contest with our invisible enemy, Ephes. vi. 12, 2 Cor. vi. 15, must inevitably exist, because every other form of division, on the basis of enmity previously slain by virtue of Christ's death, and on the ground of existing reconciliation, must be, on the one hand, averted, and, on the other, carried on in a reconcilable spirit. The general virtue which relates to strife may be called a peace-making disposition, as in Matth. v. 9, or living peaceably with all men, as in Romans xii. 18, inasmuch as both requirements are always understood. In the first place, it is necessary that we have for our aim a good understanding derived from love, and not from desire, and hence that we persist in attending to the "things" of others as though they were our own, Phil. ii. 4, 5, and forego our own wishes, in so far as that may conduce, not to the strengthening of wickedness, but the softening our adversary by shame, Romans xii. 20. Thus we do not prejudice the holiness of that which supplies the ground of all unity and pardon, but only ourselves. In the second place, it is necessary that we, being dead unto hatred and revenge, as unto that which is absolutely contrary to God

and belongs to the devil, and separating wrath from sin, Ephes. iv. 26, know how to contend with the weapons of truth and love, by the restraint of divine peace, and this never without mistrust of ourselves, and never without confidence in our adversary, together with an infinite readiness to forgive, Matt. xviii. 22.

§ 181. GOODNESS.

(Love of our neighbour in need.)

Since we are indebted to communion with our Redeemer for a new consciousness, which essentially consists in a sympathy with the redeemed and redeemable brethren, we, according to the example of Christ, Matth. xxv. 42, 46, make all the real necessities of our fellow-creatures (not excepting those that are corporeal) our own, through love. This is that true philanthropy (2 Pet. i. 7) which, distinguished from brotherly kindness, expansively and truly sympathises with the poor and sick, the hungry and naked, the deserted or persecuted, the imprisoned and condemned, whether they be guilty or innocent, and even feels for the dead in relation to their corporeal and spiritual remains; so that philanthropy does not mistake what is required by the rich, the free, and the healthy, and equally observes all these necessities in their spiritual meaning and existence.

§ 182. CONTINUATION.

This philanthropy, in so far as it springs from faith, is never an inert sentimentalism, 1 John iii. 18, James ii. 16, not even when, from want of counsel and means, it seeks and accomplishes, in the consolation of the Divine word, and in intercession, the only succour, James v. 13, 18. The service of good words even sometimes includes a purer and greater amount of love than the ministry of good works. He ever approximates

the nearest to philanthropy, who, being the most grievously restrained in its sphere of action through suffering, is farthest repelled from the boundary line of that common progress which belongs to human destiny. As for what remains, the closer relations of nature, of convention, of friendship, and of calling, determine how strength, time, and means are to be apportioned. Compare Luke x. 36, seq. with Gal. vi. 10. For the unworthiness of an indigent being does not decide the measure, but the kind of sympathy which love shall devote to him. The essence of true philanthropy is anticipative and disinterested, Matth. v. 46. If we consider its operations, it ascends from general attention to what belongs to another, and from a sincere officiousness in trifles, not only unto a charitableness that endures and spares, but also up to hazarding all we possess for the sake of preserving our neighbour, 1 John iii. 16. Hence philanthropy is not only just, and plunders not, in order to give, but it is also wise and great in limiting and determining benefits, Mark vii. 27, Acts iii. 6. The first limitation is drawn by the subordination of individual corporeal necessities, one to another; the second, by the subordination of the corporeal to the spiritual; and the third, by a just attention to any preponderance of bounden duty that may exist.

§ 183. CONCLUSION.

Although every act of beneficence becomes an evil one, as soon as it is only sown to the flesh, or is done at the expense of spiritual well-being, still there is a fulness of good actions and services which are immediately directed towards the suffering soul, towards spiritual disease or necessity. The Christian, in all his relations, is called upon to be solicitous for souls, and is as much bound to give instruction as to receive it, 1 Thess. iv. 18, v. 11, 14; Col. iii. 16; Ephes. iv. 16. That is to say, the love of Christ constrains him to instruct, to chasten, to grieve (2 Cor. vii. 8, seq.) his neighbour; to encourage and

console him; it even constrains him so to lift up and to receive any deeply-fallen fellow-creature as to reanimate his feeling of honour and safety, Luke vii. 37, chapter xv.; John viii. 11. The Christian, moreover, is constrained to bear the infirmity of weak consciences, Romans xiv. 15, Matthew xii. 20, and universally to exhibit, by self-control and sanctification, by prudence and fidelity, such works as tend to the glory of his heavenly Father, Matth. v. 14, 16, 1 Pet. iii. 1, and are pleasing to his neighbour “for his good to edification,” Romans xv. 2. Christian zeal, in particular, as regards instructing and converting others, will not alone be recognised by its exempting us from the shame of the gospel, which is accounted foolishness or an offence, Romans i. 16, and by its imparting to us courage to give an answer unto those who demand a reason “of the hope that is in us,” 1 Pet. iii. 15; but it will also be distinguished by our exercising it not less in behalf of our nearest connexions than for strangers; in our ranking essential points above subordinate ones, 1 Tim. vi. 3, 4, 20; in honouring personal capacity for persuasion and faith, (because it is continually involved in error mixed with truth;) in seeking to transfer ourselves into the place and course of thought of those who are in error, 1 Cor. ix. 20; in not exposing the truth, by passionate or importunate expressions, to an aversion and hatred that tramples on it, Matthew vii. 6; and, above all, Christian zeal will be recognised by its not acting as if we were able or willing, by our own strength, or by the measure of grace dwelling in us, alone to guide any conviction and any conversion promptly unto faith.

§ 184. PUBLIC SPIRIT.

Whatsoever is in accordance with duty and virtue, as respects the love of our neighbour, is repeated in the relation of the Christian to society; whilst it is required that he reduce his sanctified sympathy from the central point of natural brotherly love (*φιλαδελφία*, Heb. xiii. 1, 2 Pet. i. 7, John xiii. 34), not

only into the natural fellowship of home, but also be in a condition to extend it unto a genuine popular love and cosmopolitanism (*ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων*, 1 Tim. ii. 1), susceptible of every excitation appertaining thereto. For attachment to home and fatherland is assuredly not diminished by Christian culture, but elevated to prudential perseverance, and maintained by moderation and fidelity. But even whilst such attachment renounces the passionate and selfish element of particularism, it becomes, at the same time, justly and freely participative in all the peculiar gifts and necessities which nature and grace may have implanted or called forth in the condition of our neighbours, of the community, and of nations. In this participation the unity of manifoldness exists, and by virtue of a due subordination, either the more noble, or the more contiguous, or the more general in reference to social objects and goods, decide our determinations. Although the maxim appears very heathenish, according to which Caiaphas (John xi. 49–52) (who, besides his saying more than he meant) decides the relation between a citizen and that which is most expedient for the people; still the public mind of Christians especially manifests itself, not only in the choice of calling, but also in its entire view; not only in laborious culture for the duties of one's calling, but also in its administration being full of sacrifice; not only in dying but living for one's calling; not only in rare performances or endurances for a common object, but also in daily conduct, full of circumspection in reference to the commonwealth, and its individual parts.

REMARK. Hitherto Christian life has not been considered in the relation of Christian to Christian as such, nor even in the relations of the duties of earthly condition, as they are usually determined by nature and grace; a consideration which the existence of the Christian church, and the recognition of its constitution presupposes.

SECTION THE THIRD.

ON FELLOWSHIP IN SALVATION.

§ 185. COMMUNITY OF SALVATION.

Precisely as human destiny (§ 91) was originally designed for fellowship, in like manner can redemption only be participated in as a common one; and although the Christian stands to his heavenly Father in that peculiar and immediate relation in which he is placed by the Son in the Holy Spirit, yet the spirit is a common one, by means of which the Christian is at the same time peculiarly connected with the entire body of the Lord. Compare John xiv. 23, with John xvii. 21, 22, Ephes. iv. 4, 1 Cor. xii. 4, 13. This combination or union does not depend upon a mere identity of condition or internal determinateness, nor in a mere identity of custom and creed, but consists equally in an effective reciprocity, and is compatible with a boundless variety of gifts and degrees of Christian culture, Ephes. iv. 7–16, 1 Cor. xii.

§ 186. CHURCH.

This fellowship of men called and sanctified by Christ, in so far as it is united with the community of a typical people as its spiritual development and realization, is called the church of God, (עֵדָה) 1 Cor. i. 2, the summoned popular assembly of God in this world; and in reference to its common actions in the presence of the Lord, as well as to its continuous structure, is denominated the Church.¹ In one point of view, it is an abiding testimony, Tit. ii. 14; and, in another, a continual means for the redemptive ministry of our exalted Redeemer; and no one can be in and live in Christ, unless he be guided in some

way by the vital ministry of the church, and at the same time be led to take an active share in it, and for it.

¹ The church is the Lord's house, and τὸ κυριακὸν has copied the name of the Basilicæ, ἀνάκτορον, ἀνάκειον, as the heathen temples were called. In the 13th Canon Concil. Neocæs. τὸ κυριακὸν τῆς πόλεως, is termed the town church. Likewise הַיְהוּדָה in Amos viii. 3, signifies both temple and palace, and corresponds to the term Basilica. Ecclesia is called by the Greeks a popular assembly, in contradistinction to the assembly of the senate (σύγκλητος); the Alexandrians used the term, as well as συναγωγή, for translating קהל, קהלה; the Christians, however, have ever preferred the expression Ecclesia, to that of synagogue, (James ii. 2, Heb. x. 25); first for the sake of distinction, and then because it had been especially used by the apostle to the Gentiles.

§ 187. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CHURCH.

The church is essentially, and before anything else, the congregation of the sanctified, and to this extent is itself an object of faith, Ephes. i. 22, Heb. xii. 22, not only because its invisible head, together with the congregation of the perfected, belong to it, but also because, in reference to its personal continuance, and the actual ministry and culture of its members, it lives a hidden life, which its open life can never altogether be equal or correspond to.

REMARK. A religious community corresponds to its idea only in proportion as it inwardly possesses its definite character and spirit, and does not assume a mere externality, or exercise itself in a mere representative spirit. If it be objected,—that positive religion must always first be exhibited to its people and exercised from without; and that absolutely positive, or true, revealed religion (which is not mediated by natural religiousness,) must be so before all others, consequently, that the Christian church may pre-eminently be regarded as one that hears, teaches, confesses, and celebrates sacraments, and for these objects is to be conceived as ecclesiastically organized, and consequently as an external and

visible assembly; to this we reply, that the revelation and institution of the old covenant must assuredly precede that of the new; but the latter is not like the former, a legal one,—is not perchance the only general law of God touching worship, morals, and domestic life. The New Testament is the theocracy of the spirit, and has, when possessing a hierarchy and aristocracy, essentially a spiritual clergy. This internal theocracy is principally mediated from without by the historical Christ and the word. That which is mediating, however, is not worship and law, but doctrine, gospel, and life; the internal theocracy is produced not by legislation, but by Divine instruction; consequently, the medium itself is spiritual, enfranchising, awakening, not determining by sense and by the exercise of violence. Hence it is, that the church, during the sermon on the mount, or on the occasion of Christ's call and invitation, had not in effect as yet appeared, but first on the day of Pentecost, after our Lord's departure and glorification, entered into full existence and reality. The apostolical and Christian consciousness must first be fully perfected before the church of Christ can exist. In this first moment of its existence, it is, and is preliminarily before aught else, a congregation of the sanctified, of believers. Compare my *Protestantische Beantwortung der Symbolik Möhlers*, Hamb. 1835, p. 192, 217, and my *Protestant Theses*, Numbers 34–42.

§ 188. UNITY AND PLURALITY.

However, the church of the Lord is not absolutely internal and invisible, nor absolutely true, only in its invisibility. But together with its active life, there is necessarily associated in a twofold point of view, a capacity for being external. In the *first* place, in so far as an inclination to utterance and confession, which is innate to faith, necessarily produces, for the reciprocal influence of Christians, external mediations; and, *secondly*, in so far as its communion, as such, desires to influence the world, and, consequently, must exhibit itself, 2 Cor. iv. 13, Romans x. 7–15. For this externality of his church, the Lord himself has not only provided, but at the same time founded, in commands which have a promise, Matth. xviii. 15, 20. For if it

be admitted that the continued preaching of the gospel, and common prayer, that the celebration of baptism and the Supper of the Lord, and that the exercise of brotherly discipline and the office of the keys, are partly our Lord's institutions, and partly the fundamental and sustaining functions of the church, in that case He is not only the founder of the kingdom of God, but is also the founder of the church. But none of these acts of fellowship has He commanded otherwise than on the assumption of an already existing spirit of faith and love; none has He commanded as a new liturgical legislator; none in such a way, as that, in general, that determinateness of congregational life constituting his church, should only be elicited, any where, or at any time, by the exercise of all these acts; just as if faith (precisely as it must be derived from the word of God,) could only (combined with the whole ecclesiastical union and relations as existing in organized societies,) be realized in the latter, and primarily constitute the true church. Rather is the church that has become external, unlike in many respects to that which is internal. For the latter is necessarily at all times one (*ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ, σῶμα Χριστοῦ*), the former only so by means of the latter, otherwise it is a plurality, (*πᾶσαι αἱ ἐκκλησίαι τῶν ἁγίων*), a plurality, whose individual members are able, and to a certain extent are bound to strive after external union, but in not attaining, or in having lost that union, from temporal or local circumstances, yet lose nothing of the essential characters of the church of Christ. The conditions, stages, and kinds of ecclesiasticism are equally unlike in both relations. Many maintain a high dignity in the true church, which is one, and are subordinate to all the distinguished offices in the church of Ephesus or Thessalonica, in connection with which their residence may place them; others scarcely find in the porches of the one true church a place, yet occupy a high position in the Christian communion which exists in plurality, or mere artificial unity. Notwithstanding this, however, the different churches cannot altogether disavow their connection with the one church, and with each other, and must acknowledge

it in proportion as they refer to the original appearance of Christianity, and build upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Ephes. ii. 20, and hold fast the institutions of Christ.

REMARK 1. It is not unimportant, that modern theology, the supernaturalistic as well as the rationalistic, has to a great extent renounced the development of the idea of the Church of Christ, which was traced in all the symbolical books of the Protestants. Even Reinhard, Döderlein, and Storr, commence with the whole body of confessors, and afterwards mention the distinction between the general and particular, true and false, and visible and invisible church. How have they reached this point? If the church, as a united body of confessors, shall have a place in a system of doctrine and morals, it presupposes that all who confess the name of Christ with any measure of truth and freedom, must be supposed to be in some conceivable fellowship of the Lord, and be regarded in some way or other His members. Otherwise this so-called historical idea of the church is worthless as regards faith; rather does this idea begin to destroy faith, as soon as it conjectures that Christianity must first be a confession, in order to become afterwards faith and love, or that Christianity is only fellowship, in so far as it is confession, worship, and social arrangement. All this is absolute extravagance, and not derived from Biblical and Protestant doctrine, and most injurious in its consequences. If we admit, on the other hand, into the idea “collective body of confessors,” that equally indicated religious and moral interest, then does the latter only maintain its hold by an indifferentism, or its better ground by the idea of a communion of saints (believers) being already acknowledged, and thereby finding an internal point of relation for all the phenomena of Christianity. On the other hand, many maintain that the *congregatio sanctorum*, in the sense of Melancthon, Luther, and all the Reformers, namely, *societas vere credentium*, (for which they incline to put *vere emendatorum*), *societas ejusdem evangelii et ejusdem spiritus s, qui corda eorum renovat, sanctificat et gubernat*, is a philosophical conception, or an idea of the church. This conception, is of all others the most real which can be given, and, fortunately, theology, which has lately been termed mystical, has reinstated it in its original imprescriptible right. See Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre* ii. and Marheineke, *die Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik*. Augs. i. p. 455, “according to its absolute

idea the church is the fellowship of those who are sanctified through faith. We are in the church only in proportion as we are sanctified. The impure and unbelieving are not members of the church, (or at least are but *membra mortua*).—Apart from this idea of the church it is impossible rightly to attain definite conceptions of it, for the latter only specify what is realised more or less, in the life of man by the idea, and represent not so much the ultimate aim of all our efforts, as the separate attainable elements and conditions of life in the church, or relations of the world to it." N. B. Marheineke's view of an *idea* is altogether different from that of Wegscheider.

REMARK 2. The objection offered by Protestant dogmatists, as, for example, by Döderlein and Ammon, in common sometimes with Roman Catholic teachers, to the idea of an invisible church of Christ, arises from their comprehending the contrast between the internal and external absolutely, and not as it should be, relatively. Just as every genuine Christian gives testimonies and outward expressions of true Christianity, and blends them with all his relations; in like manner, an internally sanctified congregation cannot remain unwitnessed, either in morals (*mores Christiani*) or in custom (*mos Christianus*); it must ever publicly declare its belief and preach to the world, even as it must ever strive after the union of its members in the world, yea, it is the only vital and invariable cause of all that is visible in the church; but it never happens that, in connection with its expression and manifestation, it must not be accurately distinguished from the visible church. The invisible church can never entirely acknowledge the same expansion or limitation, never altogether recognise the same members, stages, vital functions, and laws, which are peculiar to the visible. The relative invisibility of the church of Christ is laid down in Luther's *Catech. maj.* art. 3, *credo in terris esse quandam sanctorum congregatiunculam et communionem, ex mere sanctis hominibus coactam, sub uno capite Christo, per Spiritum S. convocatam, in una fide, eodem sensu et sententia, multiplicibus donis exornatam, in amore tamen unanimem et per omnia concordem, sine sectis et schismatibus.* On the relative invisibility and visibility, Melancthon remarks, *Apol.* art. iv., *Ecclesia est—PRINCIPALITER societas fidei et Spiritus sancti in cordebus, quæ tamen habet externas notas, ut agnosci possit, videlicet puram, evangelii doctrinam et administrationem sacramentorum consentaneam evangelio Christi.* The observation

of the same divine, *Loci*, 1543, p. 339, in reference to the idea of an absolutely invisible, unmanifested church, is not opposed to this view: nec aliam fingamus ecclesiam invisibilem et mutam hominum, in hac vita tamen viventium: sed oculi et mens coetum vocatorum, i. e. profitentium Evangelium Dei intueantur, et sciamus oportere inter homines publice sonare evangelii vocem. Although Calvin discusses the idea more surely, and fully indicates the unity as well as the difference of the ecclesia visibilis and invisibilis, *Institt.* iv. i. § 7. Compare also Joh. Gerhard, *Aphor.* xix. de eccl. 7, 8, Proinde distinctio illa (in eccl. vis. et invis.) non introducit duas veluti distinctas ecclesias s. diversos coetus, sed coetum vocatorum κατ' ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον ὑπολήψεως τρόπον, videlicet ἐξωθεν καὶ ἑσωθεν considerat. It cannot be said that Protestant confession is self-contradictory, because the church finds it especially or PRINCIPALITER in believers, and yet preserves itself from every view entertained by Donatists or Novatians. The Divine act of the appropriation of salvation is a single one, which is developed in calling through the Gospel, or in the preventive grace developed to the grace that justifies and converts; the single result of this one act is the one fellowship of the faithful; but it is to be remembered that this act is to be distinguished in its elements, and that it is possible that the κληστοι are not yet ἐκλεκτοι, although they may become so. The historical and visible church admits, however, of distinctions also which are held together by the unity of the word and the period of grace. The real church itself, which, so long as it is historical, is only relatively perfect, comprises within itself its possible members, whilst it refers to the future, which separates the impossible, Matthew xiii. 24–30, 47–50.

§ 189. THE TRUE CHURCH.

It follows from the above, that, with the outwardness of the church there is always united a certain untruthfulness; for it is only by the word and the Spirit of God that the church is preserved absolutely true. But if exposition and continued preaching belong to manifestation in every case, then all the remaining fallibility and partiality even of regenerated preachers par-

ticipate in that, and the infallibility of the developed life of doctrine is preserved only through the gift of *διάκρισις* and trial of the spirits, 1 John iv. 1, 1 Cor. xiv. 29, 1 Thess. v. 21, a gift which ever abides with faith. The gift of the Spirit of truth itself is farther conditioned by the gift of the Spirit of love; and if it be conceded that ordinary teachers, as such, are not the more faithful or genuine Christians in every point of view, then they cannot be the especial possessors of the Spirit of truth, since Christ, as wisdom and love, cannot be disunited. Now if it happen that any existing congregation of saints be an organ of Christ's calling ministry, and supposing that such knew perfectly how to preserve and distinguish the condition of the Catechumenists; still the called, dependent, (Ephes. iv. 12, 13), relapsing, and erring, in order not to relinquish their necessary tendency towards sanctification, must be admitted into their own circle; and from the inability of every existing church government to judge the heart, it must even cherish and tolerate hypocrites, and suffer from the vicious, 1 Cor. v. 2 Cor. ii. Faction, offence, and corruptions, consequently partial falsifications of the church, are in their connection with the world relatively necessary and useful, Matt. xiii. 25, 29, xviii. 7, 1 Cor. xi. 19. Nevertheless, the one, true, living Christian Church remains, by virtue of God's Word and Christ's authority, for all time in this world, in order to be augmented from time to time, Romans xi.; except that it possesses in its external condition those attributes only in proportion as it is purified by suffering, 1 Peter iv. 17,¹ and is restored to its historical and spiritual original by reformations. Even under the evil circumstance of its contending against renovation, the truth, from which it can never be entirely emancipated, may still continue operatively implanted in it, through the opposition in which it stands with itself.

¹ Melancthon, *Loci*, p. 498. *Plerumque ecclesia est cœtus exiguus veræ doctrinæ professionem retinens et sustinens varias et ingentes ærumnas, communes et peculiare.*

§ 190. PREACHING.

As a fundamental and vital function of the church, our Lord established the preaching of repentance and forgiveness in his name, Luke xxiv. 47, Matt. xxviii. 19, Mark xvi. 15, Romans x. 14, 15, and founded the office of preaching in its living perpetuity to the end of time, Mark xiii. 10, and this in all its manifold gifts and ordinations, Ephes. iv. 11, 1 Cor. xii. 28. The ordinary or exclusive office of teaching, in so far as it rests withal upon human calling proceeding from the congregation in connection with the world, is to be regarded as an advantageous institution, for which the apostles themselves made the necessary arrangements, 1 Tim. iii., Tit. i. 5. Only the ministry of the word, apart from which there is no church, and neither foundation nor preservation of its common life, cannot be absolutely and under all circumstances bound to this order; partly because the Charisma, (the gift of testimony and teaching), and the conscious mission of the Lord, may by possibility reach to a witness, who in his place or time might not be in a condition to obtain that laying on of hands which he would seek, and partly because an arbitrary and partial refusal of approbation may occur in proportion as the gospel might by possibility be persecuted and oppressed by an erring, or even unbelieving administration.

REMARK. If we consider the condition of “a regular call” (*Augsburg Confession*) valid in the sense of the evangelical idea of the church, then the order which opposes the fanaticism and confusion of a Münzer and the Anabaptists is equally to be protected and guarded against the claims of the legal priesthood and the Divine office of mediation. If order, which is innate to common life, since a universal necessity for it remains, has elevated itself, by the reflection of wise men, up to an institution, still the latter is but human, historical, and moveable; and through the same gift of wisdom, which co-operates for it, must its real substance be reduced back to the original living order, and thus may be renewed, expanded, and determinated. Where

the contrary occurs, authority ever becomes usurpation, and the end is sacrificed to the means. The Lord imparts gifts, awakens, tries, calls, and sends. He who is called, moreover, approves himself to the congregation, is recognised in his gifts and capacity for being called by the congregation, who exercise their judgment, and a belief in his Divine vocation is consummated and sealed, by the laying on of hands and by prayer. The called knows himself, and is known, in the origin of his testimony from the word of God, from his apostleship; and since he could not be a Christian without desiring fellowship, and fulfilling its duties as a member, so he can as little be called a genuine successor, if he do not desire to honour the subsisting and preceding ministry of the word, and place and maintain himself as a witness in union with the collective body of testimony. This is the Divine order in the human. On the other hand, if we seek the first and last, the absolute criterion of what is divine in the vocation, merely in the fact of Episcopal or other established forms of anointing, ordination, &c., then is the gospel perverted into a mere legal, dead, and mechanical system.

§ 191. PLEDGES AS SIGNS OF A COVENANT.

If no one can be called into the fellowship of the Lord, and partakes of His Spirit, otherwise than through the power of the Divine word, then every one requires for his confirmation and preservation in this internal fellowship an external one of mutual influence and recognition in the Lord. This external fellowship itself, however, universally requires, for each and all, those seals and pledges,¹ through whose acceptance and attainment, partly its union with the Lord, partly its distinction from secular and natural fellowship, and consequently a certain limitation of what is prepared and incorporated, is effected. Hence our Lord has instituted baptism and the Eucharist² not merely symbolical acts, (yet not magical ones),³ but such as change, by virtue of his compact and institution, wherever they are performed in his name, and the more their administration

agrees with his institution,—man's internal relation to him; and in proportion to the personal and common faith with which these acts are repeated, they impart communicatively the fellowship of his glorified life, and in general amply confirm the duty of reciprocal brotherly love and Christian relationship.

¹ The idea of *pignus*, as distinguished from *signum*, is just that in which the various Protestant Confessions are enabled to unite their doctrines of the sacrament. See on this point Luther's *Catech. Maj.* p. 555, ed. Rechenb. Ideo ad sacramentum accedimus, ut ejusmodi thesaurum ibi accipiamus, per quem et in quo peccatorum remissionem consequamur. Quare hoc? Ideo, quod verba illa extant et haec dant nobis. Siquidem propterea a Christo jubeor edere et bibere, ut meum sit mihi que utilitatem adferat, *veluti certum pignus et arrhabo, imo potius res ipsa*, quam pro peccatis meis morti et omnibus malis ille opposuit et oppignoravit. If this be commonly assumed, then, is that which is common more than a distinction originating from peculiar modes of thinking, of which one prefers the mystical identity of the spiritual and corporeal of what is received, and another the mystical simultaneousness of the same twofold act. Other definitions not agreeing with the above are to be mutually relinquished, because they rest upon an arbitrary and assumed exegesis. The definition of the *Declaratio Thorunensis*, v. 7, bordering upon the evangelical union, concurs with the Lutheran exposition: Patet, nos nequaquam signa nuda, inania, inefficacia aut tantum notas externæ professionis statuere, cum præter *mysticam* ex instituto *significationem*, certam etiam divinarum promissionum *obsignationem*, simulque veram et infallibilem rerum promissarum, modo ipsis convenienti et proprio, *exhibitionem* fide viva acceptandam statuamus.

² It has been justly remarked by Chrysostom on John xix. 34 (upon an incidental occasion of the ἐξῆλθε ὕδωρ καὶ αἷμα) ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων (baptism and the Lord's Supper) ἡ ἐκκλησία συνέστηκε καὶ ἴσασιν οἱ μυσταγωγούμενοι δι' ὕδατος μὲν ἀναγεννωμένοι, δὲ αἵματος δὲ καὶ σαρκὸς τρεφόμενοι. In the *first* place, the duality of the sacrament is firmly grounded upon Holy Scriptures, particularly on the typological passages in 1 Cor. x. 1—5, καὶ πάντες εἰς τὸν Μωυσῆν ἐβαπτίσαντο ἐν τῇ νεφέλῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ καὶ πάντες το αὐτὸ βρῶμα πνευματικὸν ἔφαγον, καὶ πάντες το αὐτὸ πόμα πνευματικὸν ἔπιον—; and, in the *second* place, it is based upon the idea or the nature of the subject; for

if the sacrament be a sign and pledge, a sign and means of appropriating that higher life which is derived from Christ, then it is only the two elements of the birth and preservation of this spiritual life that admit of being distinguished and compared. See my *Protest. Beantw. d. Symbol. v. Möhler*, p. 182, and *Protestant. Thesis*, No. 85.

³ With reference to the idea of symbolical and allegorical acts, and then on either superstitious or mystical ones originating therefrom, see my treatise on the text and sense of the words used by our Lord in instituting the Eucharist, “*uber den Text und Sinn der heiligen Einsetzungs-Worte*,” &c. in Rosenmüller Tzschirner's *Analecten*, &c., vol. iv. st. 2, p. 187—90.

§ 192. BAPTISM.

As a pledge and seal that man may be received into the fellowship of the new life in Christ, our Lord, in conformity with natural and prophetic symbolism (Ezek. xxxvi. 25, Zech. xiii. 1), instituted baptism, which even by his express word, John iii. 5, Mark xvi. 16, by the apostolical practice, Acts ii. 38, viii. 15, 16, and by other incidental allusions, Ephes. iv. 5, v. 26, Tit. iii. 5, is declared to be an external surety of regeneration by the Spirit. Grace does not require baptism in order to justify men, but man, as associated with the church on earth, needs the fellowship of Christ's institutions. Baptism, by being erroneously or prematurely administered, is not thereby rendered fruitless, but it is a contempt for what pertains to its internal and external completion; and where it is only administered without intentional abuse, and in conformity with the real institution, and the will of the Christian community, it affords a valid proof that the baptized, and congregation, are mutually related in the Lord, and that the former hath entered into the sphere of Christ's redeeming ministry.¹

¹ If the more ancient Dogmatists (compare Gerhard, in the work already referred to, xvii. §§ 14, 15) maintained the sacramental identity of the baptism of John and that of Christians,

nevertheless Biblical theology can show, from Acts xix. 3–5, John i. 33, &c., a distinction, which allows to the former all the consequence to which it is entitled. On the other hand, it belongs to that doctrine of faith which is historically complete to defend infant baptism, partly from the analogies of Mark x. 14, 1 Cor. vii. 14, and by the facts of nature and experience, and partly to concede its defectiveness and need of completion. See Schleiermacher, *Glaubensl.*, ii. § 150, p. 540–545. The assertion, that the children of Christian parents, as such, may possess adoption, as far exceeds the limits of truth, as its opponents do, when they, as for example Gerhard, maintain the proposition, that in baptismo et per baptismum Spiritus S. fidem accendit in infantibus—quamvis vero non possimus intelligere, quomodo comparata sit illa infantum fides: tamen non debemus propterea Spiritus S. operationem negare. Without doing the latter, we may nevertheless refuse our assent to the doctrine of *fides infantum*. Infant baptism, performed according to God's word, by a believing church, clerically, and in the presence of sponsors and parents, is a divine fact, in and on the child's life, an act by and in which he shall believe, after attaining, through the word, a knowledge of baptism. Baptism, in its connection with the fact of the church and the word of reconciliation in Christ crucified and raised, is a seal of that common grace especially appropriated to the child, a seal of his especial calling and ordination unto eternal life, which as much awakens and strengthens faith as he will be sustained by faith, and confirmed by the baptism of the Spirit and its fruits. Compare *Confess. Anglic.*, art. 17, March 6, Colloq. Lips. "They are received and adopted into grace according to God's order." *Ecclesiæ inseruntur; promissiones—iis obsignantur; fides confirmatur.* These are the only just determinations, and which are at the same time sufficient for confirming infant baptism; on this depends our understanding, partly the mutual relations between the two means of grace, and partly the mutual relation of the two sacraments in the spirit of the letter and the gospel, in conformity with human nature and experience. Under the first relation, we may venture to concede to Baptists more than the most recent and gifted apologist of infant baptism has thought it right to do, (Martensen, *d. Chr. Taufe. und die Baptistische Frage*, 1843); or rather we may be said to take less from them. There may be Baptists, and among ourselves many who sympathize in

their views, who endure such a state of subjectivity as to forget the appropriating act of Christ, and merely regard the psychological antecedents which are elicited by the doctrine. Baptism itself is unaffected by this charge. Martensen appears to think only of the doctrine, or only of the letter in baptism; but the question turns on *verbum Dei*. Does not this, if it awaken faith, operate as the power of Christ, as a spiritual means of grace? Or does the Holy Spirit in the word effect only all pertaining to *gratia præcurrens*, and develope exclusively by the sacrament what pertains to *gratia convertens*? And must the sacrament then, according to the doctrine of the Baptists, be a mere external superaddition, can it not be the conclusion of the internal operation of grace? Upon the whole, Martensen concedes too much to the Baptists. Moreover, no view taken of *μαθητεύειν*, Matth. xxviii., affords any grounds for asserting that the New Testament recognises those only to be baptised who have given living signs of their faith. The evangelical standing-point which excludes a magical or mere legal appropriation of salvation, requires that the sacrament should be, not only a *signum*, a *verbum visibile*, but also *pignus*, a *pignus fidei et promissionis fidei acceptæ*, and an *exhibitio*, in fact, that which essentially co-operates with the word. We do not find in the apostolical history of baptism, that he who had not received baptism by water, could not be baptised and regenerated by the Holy Spirit; nor that baptism should be indifferent to him who believes the word and is justified by faith; nor finally can we gather from apostolic history that baptism may not be administered to him whose regeneration and conversion are yet incapable of being recognised. In this latter point of view, the Baptists have manifestly the apostolical history against them; to say nothing of the fact that regeneration itself is a fact incapable of being empirically and infallibly recognised. Compare Martensen, p. 26. Under that supposition baptism would necessarily be postponed to an indefinite period. The case stands thus, that the church may have reason to believe the Divine election and calling of the person to be baptised, and may perceive no obstacle either in the mind of the candidate or his personal relations, and that this may be the commencement of his reception by Christ and the church's influence upon him. The church is not merely the invariable product of operations connected with the means of grace, but is also the constant mediatrix of those means to

men. She is not indeed mistress of the communications of Christ, but she is the servant and administratrix of the Divine mysteries. According to her idea, she perceives in natural birth both the commencement of a sinful development and the need of a redemption—which is exclusively bestowed in Christ. Moreover, in harmony with her views, she equally recognises the individualization of salvation to be a gift and act of the Lord, and that election and calling must precede justification and sanctification. The church, indeed, is not at liberty, in the case of the adult, whose personality is already developed, and without a reference to his susceptibility or unwillingness, to refuse his desire, or to compel if he declines the ecclesiastical act of appropriation; neither is she at liberty to question, in the case of the infant born within the circle of Christian life, its call to the kingdom of God; for what *κλησίς κατ' ἐκλογὴν* is for an adult heathen, is in this case an historical and providential ordination in the Christian circle of nations and families; and St Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 14 (compare De Wette *Theol. St. u. Kr.* 1830, 3 p. 669), appears throughout as a witness for the testamentary existence of a child under those circumstances, to whom, as among the Jews, a like *πρῶτον* is given before the heathen according to Rom. i. 16, ix. 4. Now the church is able to complete this relation by conferring the sacrament, and irrespective of the undeveloped age; since human nature in itself is susceptible of the implantation of the Divine life; since no period in developed life can be indicated as the absolute commencement of the necessity and susceptibility for salvation; and since the promise is expressly given that even childhood may be brought and appropriated to the Saviour; Mark x. 14, there are no grounds for fearing that the Church's act of faith in baptizing, as connected with that appropriation of salvation, which must be mediated through antecedent acts of consciousness, and through conscious relation to the church may not be serviceable to the future operation of the Spirit on the baptized, and not obstructive. On the other hand, the church is not at liberty to confer baptism where such cannot as yet be the commencement and surety of a development in its sphere, and which stands in no living relation to the means of grace in the word. In a region not yet christianized, missionary baptism can only desire to operate; and missionaries are justified in delaying and being most circumspect in introducing infant baptism. Where a foun-

dation is laid, upon which no development or superstructure can be expected, and must consequently be surrendered a prey to desolation and profanation, it is far better that it should not be laid at all. Baptism ought only to be conferred in connection with all other means of grace, and thus only as a basis for confirmation and communion. Where this is the case, it remains, at all events, a fact which shall be farther verified and completed according to its internal value and tenor, and thus, as a problem to be realised, cannot be too soon performed. Even before the Christian era there were two classes; some sought to postpone, as long as possible, consecration into the mysteries, inasmuch as, when once received, it excluded from any voluntary enjoyment of the world; and in so far as such consecration imparted the gift of immortality, others desired to appropriate it as early as possible, and this even in childhood. Christian practice fluctuated between both these views in the early ages of the church. At last infant baptism prevailed by virtue of an internal right; for if once there exist a universal capacity for, and need of redemption, and if the treasure of salvation can only be personally appropriated by means, then, wherever possible, must its use be claimed for all human life called to salvation, and not being in opposition thereto, and this in proportion to its applicability; and thus baptism is claimed for infants, not less but rather the more earnestly, inasmuch as it cannot be preached unto them. A contradiction between the future walk and baptism is possible, even when it is only conferred on the instructed. Baptism may become a dead letter to the unbelieving; but it is peculiar to Christ, not only to prevent with his grace, but also to be and to continue faithful, when the baptized is unfaithful, and to preserve that whereunto repentance can return. Wherefore the church has no power absolutely to excommunicate a baptized person. Baptism, in a season of emergency, when the life of a child is in danger, cannot be refused on the plea of the former only having a concern for that life which may be said to endure and to be developed in the earthly temporal church. Baptism corresponds to faith in the unity of the church of Christ here and hereafter. Nevertheless those who abstain from or considerably limit baptism, are not on that account to be suspected of contemning the sacrament or denying the exclusiveness of salvation in Christ. Compare Rütenik on the baptism of necessity, "über die sogen. Nothtaufe," *Theoll. Stud. u. Kr.* 1836, 2 p. 417. There

are granted unto the church in general sacraments, means of grace which it is bound to preserve uncorrupted in their unity; but to carry out the order of their administration and application with reference to time and circumstances, is left to those who, in general, exercise the order of administration.

§ 193. THE LORD'S SUPPER.

The Eucharist was instituted by Christ, 1 Cor. xi. 23, x. 16, as a pledge and seal that a member of the church subsists and increases in living fellowship with the Lord. For like as he declares, (John vi. 51), that partaking of his flesh and blood, or the fellowship of his personal life, (which assuredly is not confined to the external celebration of the sacrament), is the condition of our share in eternal life, and as he has also intimated how he alone becomes, through the finished work of his reconciling death, the appropriate object of enjoyment and the perfect means of life; so has he instituted a mystical act, which shall not only adumbrate but typically warrant and mediate such participation and such fellowship, and which, according to the exposition of the apostle, 1 Cor. xi. 26, ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ is designed to be perpetuated until "He come," and in a peculiar manner to presentiate unto us our crucified and raised Lord. Hence all believers, according as they can come to the sacrament with desires purified by self-examination, have to unite themselves afresh from time to time with the heavenly life of their head in the common participation of the blessed bread and wine with a grateful acknowledgment of His death.¹

¹ Luther, *Catech. maj.* p. 556, JURE OPTIMO CIBUS ANIMÆ (sacramentum altaris) DICITUR, NOVUM HOMINEM ALENS ET FORTIFICANS. Per baptismum enim initio regeneramur, verum nihilominus antiqua cutis carnis et sanguinis adhæret homini. Jam hic multa sunt impedimenta et impugnationes, quibus cum a mundo tum a diabolo acerrime infestamur, ita ut non raro defessi viribus deficiamus ac nonnunquam etiam in peccatorum sordes prolabamur. Ideo hoc sacramentum tanquam pro quotidiano

alimento nobis datum est, ut hujus esu fides iterum vires suas repararet.—Etenim nova vita ita instituenda est, ut assidue crescat.—Verum huic contra multæ passiones exhauriendæ sunt.—Ad hoc jam datum est solatium, ET HÆC PRÆSENTARIA ANIMI LEVATIO ADORNATA.

§ 194. COMMON PRAYER AND THE LORD'S DAY.

The condition of living and true fellowship which Christians shall have in the Lord, with each other, and with the past and future church, is common prayer in accordance with the word of God,¹ Matthew xviii. 20; compare Acts ii. 42, iv. 24. A community continually offering up thanksgivings and supplications can never cease to intercede for the magistracy, the people, and the world, with which it is connected, 1 Tim. ii. 1. The more a congregation prays in the name of Jesus, the truer it becomes, and as true, is always heard. Individuals ought to submit to all the discipline of the Spirit, and to all external order requisite for their attaining a more and more perfect common prayer, 1 Cor. xiv. Ephes. v. 19. If they are bound to cherish their assemblies, they are equally bound to consecrate them in communion. For although the holy day,² regarded as an element of the Jewish Law, is no longer binding on Christians, Gal. iv. 9, still it is to be viewed as an element of a succession of time, as “The Lord’s Day,” (Revelation i. 10, 1 Cor. xvi. 2), which is grounded on creation and human destiny. On that day (even the day when He rose from the dead) the Lord has procured rest for His people from His enemies, hence it is also a public day, and in order that each individual may discern his share in the change of meditation and action, rest and labour, each is bounden to each and to the community at large.

¹ Calvin, *interim adultero—germanum, cui adjecta est vera pacificationis et ecclesiæ reformandæ ratio*, 1549. “Hoc principium recte teneamus, nos non recte orare nisi præeunte Dei verbo.” The fundamental principles of freedom, truth, communion, order, and solemnity, are developed from the evangeli-

cal idea of congregational divine service. Freedom is equally opposed to mechanical, contingent, and arbitrary divine service. Truth forbids the partial operation of subjective consciousness, so far as the latter tolerates freedom, and reconducts to the objectivity of the canon and creed. Communion opposes the predominance of individualism. Order preserves reciprocity of action, the unity of manifoldness, and development. Finally, solemnity is the co-operation of all these principles, in so far as it is directed to the exhibition of faith, an exhibition which must equally avoid both natural fellowship and secular art. As respects the principle of truth, that is equally applicable, pro and con., the use of repeated or traditional prayer. In the *first* place, it is not opposed to the use of such, because a verbal expression of Christian common faith may be so excellent in its kind, that even the most lively devotion of those who respond in prayer always strives to enter into its spirit and meaning, and therein to exercise itself. In the *second* place, the principle of truth is in favour of such form of prayer, because the expression of a common feeling must ever be sought in traditional words; notwithstanding this, however, it is opposed to the literal, legal, and exclusive use of a formulary, because the living appropriation of such can only take place under the condition of an immediate productive power being present, and having room and incitement to testify itself in the congregation.

² As the week, like the month, year, and day, affords a natural division of time, so the law of the seventh day is to the like extent grounded on creation, as soon as we admit that it is man's destiny not only to live through, but also to consecrate, every period of natural existence. Hence a day of rest is a natural, divine institution, which is commended to the conscience by such an institution in the old covenant, with reference to a true veneration for, and fellowship with God. If the Sabbath, in the words of our Lord, be made for man, and not man for the Sabbath, and if the Son of Man, who has to represent all the aims and objects of humanity, be also Lord of the Sabbath (Mark ii. 27), then, on the one hand, the appointment of a day of rest, in relation to the extent of the distinction between a time of labour and a time of rest, is left to the consideration of evangelical freedom, and on the other hand is not left to arbitrary will. If it must not comprehend inhuman regulations, as, for example, were those of the Pharisees, nor absolutely deprive the festival of

operative love, nor deprive work of rest, then, for the sake of what is divine in the human festival, or because a day of rest was made for man, it must be strictly preserved for Christians. This law is not abrogated, but rather glorified, by the Sabbath being changed to Sunday. Sunday is the festival of redemption on the day when we celebrate the work of creation. Some Christians in this respect rather aim at the common enjoyment of the means of grace, as, for example, Luther, in his catechetical exposition. Others, again, claim this day as being a period for devotion, and for exclusive attendance on church ordinances, so that both parties, by their subtle tendencies, are mutually opposed as rigorists and spiritualists, or as legalists and free. The balance lies, in the *first* place, in this, that even the more rigid must admit the idea of works of necessity, and the idea of recreation, if they do not desire actually to oppose the explanation of our Lord and the apostles, and admit all days to be Lord's days, and for the service of God; and, *secondly*, in this, that the free-minded are not at liberty to violate the Divine law, which graduates and apports our time in relation to our church and spiritual necessities. Hence the universally valid precept,—to keep the day of rest in such a way that common rest from secular occupation may allow opportunity for common recreation and refreshment, and that each individual should only participate in such occupations, and sensible recreations, external to the church, as may allow them to participate in those dispositions of the soul congenial to the Sunday.

§ 195. OFFICE OF THE KEYS.

In the same proportion as the church abides in a pure gospel and in vital prayer, does it possess not only the right to declare whether a doctrine be conformable to faith, and whether a custom accord with the law of love, Matt. xvi. 19, xviii. 18, but also inherits apostolical authority, to declare unto some the forgiveness of their sins, and to others the reverse, John xx. 23. The church never judges man's internal relation to the Lord, nevertheless, it is at liberty lawfully to speak concerning the conformity of the external relation of its members to Christian fellowship, and this, by warning,

admonition, and all the acts of discipline, which open a way for reunion, and do not cut off admission unto the preaching of the word, and in no way penally affect secular and civil relations, 1 Cor. v. 3—5, 12, 13. Compare 2 Cor. ii. 5—11. A church, which does not act as a church, with respect to the inconsistency between a scandalous walk and the sacramental confession, which, in general, exercises no discipline, and which neither will nor can do so, is, although it may cherish in its communion many living members of Christ, not to be regarded as a church, but even in the promulgation and hearing of the Divine word, only a contingent assembly, Matth. xviii. 16.

§ 196. ECCLESIASTICAL CONSTITUTION.

Every Christian community, in general, which, in any place or time, practises preaching, prayer, and the administration of the sacrament, has always to regulate itself on the supposition of a unity as well as diversity in the visible and invisible church; and in accordance with this twofold point of view, the community is bound to strive after the greatest amount of ecclesiastical union, without denying the original equality of churches; it is bound to allow all especial spiritual talents (1 Cor. xii. 14) without sacrificing to any one in particular the universal gift of the spirit of love which springs from faith; and is equally bound to admit ranks and degrees of office, without, however, placing them on a par with those which are alone cognisable and valid with the Lord, and without detracting aught from the higher authority of the gospel, the apostles, and Christ, Gal. i. 1—10; 1 Cor. vii. 12, iv. 15.

§ 197. ECCLESIASTICISM.

Christianity, in relation to an external and mediated church, cannot be conceived apart from ecclesiastical sentiment and exertion. The general duties of Christian ecclesiasticism con-

sist, *first*, in an internal and external contribution towards founding, sustaining, and perfecting church communion and confession in general, and towards that union in particular by which those who are most intimately allied in natural and civic relationship are the most closely approximated for mutual edification; *secondly*, in a due share in the reformation, union and mission of the church, and cheerful participation in the suffering connected therewith; and, *thirdly*, in a preventive attention to the order and offices of the congregation, as well as subjection to social discipline. The especial duties between catechumens and those who are of age, between the congregation and the elders, and the congregation and teachers, admit, accordingly, and in conformity with the Apostle Paul's pastoral Epistles, of being more fully determined.

§ 198. CHURCH AND KINGDOM OF GOD.

The preparation of the kingdom of God afforded by the Divine preservation of the world, is included in the family, the state, and in general worship, which preparation operated in the Christian church by redemption. Since the highest common good consists in these opposites being fused into the unity of the kingdom of heaven, but which still abide; and since the heavenly kingdom may be regarded as a perfect citizenship, as well as a perfect paternal home, it follows, on the one hand, that the object of the Christian fellowship of faith and life is to purify and to complete natural fellowship by means of a visible church; and, on the other hand, that all natural common life founded by God shall conduce, each in its kind, to the preservation and advancement of the true church. Consequently Christian duties, domestic and civic, are most intimately allied with the Christian duty pertaining to the church.¹

¹ The arguments adduced by Dr Rothe, in his *Commencements of the Christian Church*, (*Anfängen der Christl. Kirche*, &c.) Wittenb. 1837, on "the Relation of the Church to Christianity," is

opposed to the above views, as well as to the evangelical, nay, to every dogmatic idea of the church. According to his view, Christianity, as a religious common life, can only be realised in a Christian state, and as a Christian confederacy. The church, in a Christianised state, according to our author's idea, has already perished, if the Reformation of the sixteenth century is not to be viewed as a wicked apostacy. The church is a necessary and auxiliary institution for Christianising public life, and, as such, participates in an apostolical, and indirectly in a Divine foundation; but regarded in itself it is a temporal form for preserving and diffusing Christianity, a form destined to decline.—We intend on this occasion merely to express our objections, but not offer any formal arguments against the author's views on this subject. The New Testament and the Confession of the Evangelical Church recognise no Christian common life which may not equally be a collective Christian life, or a homogeneous element of the same; no Christian fellowship, which, as such, is not dependent on its head, Jesus Christ, by faith in love; no common life which may not represent itself in the confession of Christ; which may not seek and obtain mutual edification, preservation, sustenance, and advancement upon the same grounds of apostolical and prophetic preaching, and through the same spiritual means; in short, which may not be ecclesiastical, in fact, the church. The church, an assembly of people, a people of God in the new covenant, differs from a similar assembly under the legal covenant of the Old Testament. The church appears at Rome, Ephesus, Corinth, (under the conditions adduced above,) in continuous identity and unity; for everywhere there appears the same dependence on the one Lord, in one Spirit, and on one word; the same relation to human nature, the same war against the Prince of this world, the same tendency to the redeemable and destitute world, consequently the same impulse to represent, sustain, and extend Christian life as a common life in conformity with those local and temporal relations which are grounded on the social constitution naturally existing; and there is everywhere the same desire to secure for preaching and edification their permanent effects, and for separating whatsoever is heterogeneous. The church is neither older nor younger than Christianity. It is the constant product and continued medium of the historically true Messiah's ministry, imparted in the Word and Spirit. It is mere caprice admitting the church only to enter into life where and when it has, in

a manner, disappeared, or is forgotten and denied. This occurs, however, from the very moment it begins to seek, in the multiplicity of its members, its existence in its mode of manifestation, and does not simply add the latter to the former, but ranks before the word an hierurgical sacrament borrowed from heathenism, and elevates ecclesiastical order to the law of God. All the elements of its idea, truth, unity, universality, and holiness, are from thence converted into falsehood. This change has not occurred by virtue of its own principle, and by consequence of circumstances, but by the power of a natural secular principle, opposed to the church, and which has not yet been subdued, a principle partaking of Judaism and Christianity. Christianity has regenerated heathenism to a great extent, and this by ingrafting Judaism upon it. Thus Christianity has become but a third principle, as an apocryphal writing of St Peter expresses it. The impulsive energy of the church, and its power to produce orders, moral systems, and artificial representations, is something quite distinct from its inability to do so without a relapse into legality. True Catholicism, which vitally cherishes Protestantism, can call forth very much that is organised and material, without denying the principle of evangelical freedom, the independence of congregations, or the manifold kinds of Divine service and customs. What Jews were ever greater and truer Catholics? Was it those belonging to the Sanhedrim, who hoped to govern for ever at Jerusalem the twelve tribes after their own manner? or the Alexandrian Jews, who placed the central point of unity in every synagogue, or rather in Moses, who was well understood and acutely expounded, and who believed that the doctrines of the law, by virtue of their truth, must subject all people to Moses, or rather to spiritualization and divination? And farther, it may be asked, whether the idea of unity and universality was realised more by the extension of the Romish liturgy to Siam or Peking, or by the combined operation of evangelical missions to all parts of the world? It will be readily granted that the unity is much greater, and the universality far more perfect, which bears and endures the greatest amount of distinctions. Those external and united efforts which anciently united congregations in political capitals, and always concentrated more and more towards old or modern Rome, constitute, as more particularly appears since the Reformation and the reawakened missionary spirit, but a fragment of the history of the unity and universality of the church of Christ. The

learned author has bestowed abundance of peculiarities upon the Christian state or confederations, and for that purpose endowed the church with a semblance of greatness or poverty of identity. In general it is an error, occasioned indeed by Hegel, to suppose that ecclesiastical history can only be explained from the opposites of state and church, and of religion and science, and from these alone. There must be added a third contrast, strictly a dogmatical one, namely, the church of the Gospel and the church of the law. By this contrast alone does the process of internal life, decay and renovation, self-deception and contradiction of the church with itself, become intelligible. The evangelical church could, (if the world were only the material of nature and realisation, merely a something susceptible of God, were only that concerning which philosophers are alone wont to speak,) from the period of its being first planted, have organised itself far above the model afforded by the synagogue, and exhibited itself far more catholic, without losing or denying its evangelical and catholic character. Hence, the church of the law could not exist if that of the gospel did not constitute its foundation. Phenomena, however, which delay, oppose, and falsify, are not based upon the supposition that Christian fellowship organized itself against the state, but on this, namely, that it disregarded the relation of its order and constitution to its nature, and comprehended itself in its temporal condition as well as in its essence, in its mutability as in its permanence. With regard to state and church, they are not to be so viewed as if they arrogated, borrowed, lent, or forestalled anything in reference to the material of human and popular life. They both possess themselves of this material with a different design, and with a distinct mode of operation, without their being deficient in an indestructible relation. The state itself, as well as the church, must derive all its material from a third principle, from popular life; this latter contains in itself the world, sin, and the flesh; the state is related thereto in a manner quite distinct from that of the Christian church. The state entirely belongs to the concrete morality of the public mind; but still that is not its idea. The state (status) is morality in the form of necessity. The necessity of morality is justice and action. The state, abstractedly viewed, does not produce anything that is free, but has a potency for doing so. Whatever popular life effects as a state, and consequently by means of law and government, is included in this idea.

The state guards and protects the spirit of social freedom, and the enterprises of association; it administers after it has settled and regulated, it levels and adjusts. He who considers this view too contracted must, as yet, have recognised but little of the general order of Divine and human affairs. A Christianised state at least, understands more than any other, the enfranchising principle, and knows that it is not in itself that principle; it comprehends the emancipating condition of the church, through whose continued operation it ever becomes more completely christianised. Ransom is assuredly in the state and through the state, but it is altogether different from that redemption which is in the church and by the church; it is a preliminary, legal, and mediate one, and, being very important, the Christian church originates the state where she finds none, and aids to construct and sustain it. Thus the kingdom of God is not so much the perfected Christian state and the negation of the church, but the complete elevation and intervention of this contrast. We here lay aside the eschatological consideration connected with this subject.—Compare Petersen, *die Lehre von der Kirche*, i. 1842, p. 138, where the distinction and unity of the church and state with reference to all the particular and extreme views which have been propounded up to the time of Vinet are pointed out.

§ 199. CHURCH AND EARTHLY CALLING.

The members of the Christian church abide in their earthly calling, 1 Cor. vii. 20; and in those ancient connexions whereunto they have been appointed by God, under the obligation of so living therein as neither to deny faith nor love, but support, by Christian innocence and virtue, preaching, by faith, 1 Peter ii. 12, iii. 1, 2; and imitate all natural and secular fellowship, from a spirit of Christian union, or copy the archetypes of the kingdom of God.

§ 200. MARRIAGE.

The conjugal state must not only be preserved chaste and faithful, Heb. xiii. 4, 1 Cor. vii. 1–6, compare § 174; and as

opposed to lust and caprice, be held as indissoluble,¹ Matt. xix. 1–9, 1 Cor. vii. 10; but must also strive to embody a common life, which corresponds by love, esteem, and confidence, to deep, heartfelt exclusive affection, Ephes. v. 22, 23; although in relation to exact personality, a perfectly equal honour is due to the wife as to the husband, Gal. iii. 28, 1 Peter iii. 7, *συγκληρονόμοι*, it follows from independent natural relations, 1 Cor. xi. 7, that the husband's love ought to manifest itself especially in kind courtesy and considerate esteem, 1 Peter iii. 7, Ephes. v. 28; and the wife's in obedient confidence and submission, Ephes. v. 24.

¹ The Biblical idea of marriage is that of "one flesh;" the one common life of the man and woman as instituted by God, and designed to realize all the objects included in a distinction of sex, in their purity and subordination, and to preserve them against the power of carnal lust. As in all common life the more perfect regaining of individuality by a surrender of peculiarity, and thus union in God is the most important and most religious form of life, so holiness is incumbent upon marriage, the root of all common life, this most intimate personal union, this especial type of religion and the church; even apart from the object of preserving the species, or of instruction. Resignation in marriage would be opposed to personality were it not reciprocal; if in this reciprocity there was not confidence and a promise of fidelity, if it were not of life-long duration, and if there were any reservation of peculiarity and separation. Hence the Redeemer develops that view given in primeval history, "*εἰς σάρκα μίαν*," to the universally valid proposition; marriage, in the abstract, is indissoluble (Matt. xix. 8, *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*), what God hath joined together let not man put asunder. Every marriage, if it be not in itself null on grounds of fraud or blood relationship, (in which case, even though consummated, it cannot be held as real) —every marriage regarded as a fact of regulated social life, presupposes that divine institution, and constitutes a divine union, even admitting that the married pair had not been united spiritually in God. For, inasmuch as God, in his providential government of the world, has allowed man and woman, (who were or ought to be capable of realizing the true object of marriage), to enter into that form of relationship instituted by him, it be-

comes a divine union which man cannot dissolve. On the other hand, that God may separate by his revealed will, and then by means of man, is not to be denied. Precisely as the prohibition "thou shalt not kill" does not abrogate that other decree "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man לְאָדָם shall his blood be shed."

Marriage, as opposed to human caprice, self-love, desire, or disinclination, is indissoluble, for in its institution and consummation, it is a mutual receiving and surrendering which can only be authorised by fidelity; and hence it follows, *1st*, That a disinclination to continue in the marriage state, and an inclination to dissolve it, must necessarily be connected with sin, even admitting that this sin antedated the origin of the marriage and its voluntary consummation; *2dly*, It follows, that in the Christian ethics of mind and conversation, there is included a will for maintaining the holiness of marriage in opposition to desire and disinclination, for sacrificing unto it sensuous gratification, or for enduring for the sake of marriage, and for using such endurance for its glory, on account of so exalted a human common good, as well as for promoting the personal welfare of the soul. It by no means follows, however, from all this, that the fundamental principle of Christianity pronounces an actual marriage union to be absolutely indissoluble. The question of divorce, if it is to be Scripturally answered, compels us, amongst other admissions, to acknowledge that the New Testament is not a legal codex, which, as such, would at first only aim at the external deportment; rather does it reduce the law back to its ultimate grounds, and unfolds to us its divine principles for every relation of life; it points out their realizing elements here and there in concrete action and sufferance; but by no means is this entirely the case for all times. The material constituting the relation of earthly life is neither absolutely changeable nor unchangeable. It is only the idea, the fundamental principle that is immutable. Christian moral culture is at once free and progressive. We do not say this, as if, in this or that case, an expression of Christ or the apostles existing in the form of moral requirement could, as being purely of local or individual import, become invalid and indifferent as respects our existing moral system. For the principle is embodied in every moral doctrine, and its mode of manifestation retains its proportionate regularity, although it must first be reduced to its principle, and thus sometimes be extended and sometimes narrowed. If we include under this supposition the

entire phenomena, the following results appear to us deducible therefrom. 1. To seek and accomplish a divorce from disinclination to an existing union, and from a desire after another, is so very sinful and unjust, that no mutual agreement, no public approval is competent to extinguish the unchristian nature of such a procedure. Moses, who, on account of the hardness of man's heart, permitted him to put away his wife with a bill of divorcement, has not prohibited, on the plea of adultery, a reunion of both, but only does so in the case of a divorced woman having, in the mean time, taken another husband. Deut. xxiv. 1-4, compare Jer. iii. 1. Moses forbids whatever might approximate to an exchange of wives or community of women. Catholic canonists hold that Moses regarded every marriage of a divorced woman as adulterous. In that case the law would have absolutely warned man against marrying a divorced woman, which is not the case. But, if she whom thou hast put away have become the wife of another, she is unclean unto thee. The Christian fulness of the law extends farther; it condemns as adultery that disinclination in the husband which is consummated in divorce, when it is combined with a desire for another marriage. Mark x. 11, Luke xvi. 18. It advances still farther; for it condemns divorce itself as incurring adultery, unless for the latter crime alone. Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, and 1 Cor. vii. 10, the *λόγος πορνείας* is not once taken into account. 2. Divorce, on the ground of adultery, or *πορνεία*, is not a duty, is not necessary, but permitted. If on this ground it be not necessary, but permitted, then the idea of it is indisputably extended to at least the permission of a separation in all cases where the preservation of personality renders a dissolution of associated life necessary. 3. Separation may become a duty; for to surrender body and soul to the sinful will of another cannot, even within the matrimonial union, be regarded as a duty, but must be held to be inadmissible. The apostle assumes many cases of separation, 1 Cor. vii. 10, in which there may exist a necessary and innocent element of justification, for he says in general—*ἐάν δε και χωρίσθῃ κ. λ.*, and adds, as his own opinion, if your husband will live with you only on condition of your abjuring, denying, and not exercising your faith, you are not bound unto him, but if otherwise, abide with him. 4. Every separated person must refrain from marrying again as long as the spouse lives unmarried, and a moral and just reunion be yet possible. 5. If a Christian possi-

bility yet exist, under the injury sustained from adultery, of forgiving the adulterer and continuing in the married state, in that case there is a proportional moral necessity for the innocent party to remain unmarried during the lifetime of the guilty one. 6. Nevertheless there are Christian grounds for permitting and consecrating the second marriage of a separated spouse during the lifetime of the first, supposing even that the separation has not taken place on the ground of adultery in the usual sense. The Divine object of marriage is this, namely, that it is a defence against sexual lust and averts concupiscence and its lawless outbreaks, and reduces inordinate desire into the order of connubial chastity, 1 Cor. vii. 2. The more this consideration, according to age and other circumstances, obtrudes itself, and at the same time the cause of separation has been well grounded, so that it almost amounts to a declaration of the nullity of the marriage, so much the more readily may the church consent to a second marriage. But she must never do so in the case of a person who, in his remaining course of life, gives no evidence of his being penitent and subjected to the discipline of the spirit, nor without paying particular attention to the special care and discipline of the soul. The universal claim of justice extends in all cases not grounded on λόγος πορνείας, only to separation. If the adherents of the mere letter fortify their views by the absolute μενέτω ἄγαμος, they will not only be embarrassed by another literal view, but will also be opposed by the οὐ δεδουλωται, 1 Cor. vii. 15, because it would have been self-evident in the case assumed by St Paul, that the party who had been put away or wickedly deserted, was not bound to continue the external social life. Ultra posse nemo obligatur. When he says, οὐ δεδούλωται, it must be understood as equivalent to δεδεσται, v. 39, ἐλεύθερον εἶναι, ib. and Rom. vii. 2, 3.

§ 201. PARENTS.

Christian parents regard their children as gifts inviolably intrusted to them by the Creator and Redeemer. They purify, through a sense of redemption, their parental feeling from the vanity, on the one hand, always adherent thereto; and, on the other, from the sorrow and weakness peculiar to such feeling,

Mark x. 14. They do not take from parental power, by passionate misuse, the glory of love, Col. iii. 21, Ephes. vi. 4, (ἐξεδίξεν παρόργιζεν),¹ but they unite in education, discipline, Heb. xii. 7, with admonition *νουθεσία*, and conduct them by such to maturity in the Lord, by the law to the gospel, and by the latter to the former. Moreover, the conduct of age towards youth is regulated by the same spirit, as well as that of instructors (fathers, 1 Cor. iv. 15, 1 Tim. v. 1,) towards their scholars.

¹ On this text, see Schleiermacher's *Sermons on the Christian Domestic State*, which comprehend these relations more profoundly, and place them in a clearer light than the great majority of works on ethics.

§ 202. CHILDREN.

Christian children recognise in their parents the absolute and reverend representatives of the creating, sustaining, and governing God, Ephes. vi. 1, Matth. xv. 4, and they never attain to such maturity and independence as to cease to be bound to pay them distinctive service, gratitude, and obedience in the Lord. The command to which they conform has, not in vain, connected with it, before all others, the promise of a blessing. It is not every one who is destined to be a father, mother, brother, sister, or spouse, but even the orphan is not altogether deprived of the natural means of instruction in the higher filial sentiment; and the child at least, though he have not all the circumstances of domestic life around him, is not deprived of an immediate model in the life and conduct of the Redeemer, Luke ii. 49–51, John xix. 26. From the spirit of filial duty, the deportment of youth towards their elders, and of scholars towards their masters, is duly determined.

§ 203. BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

From Christian filial conduct there spontaneously arises an appropriate state of brotherhood, hence, in this point of view, there was no necessity for a distinct command. Christian brethren are by virtue of their common descent, from a parental common life, peculiarly capacitated and called upon to improve each other, and cultivate an interchange of heart free from envy, and a true attachment, devoid of selfishness; and to exhibit universal types of the love of our neighbour, and the higher form of fraternal love, to which they can only attain in proportion to their fellowship with the first-born in the household of God, John xx. 17, Heb. ii. 11–17. For as all the bearings of natural love among relations most intimately experience the power of selfish bias, and may be deformed to the extent of finding place and opportunity for the manifestation of the most unnatural, that is of all Cain-like wickedness, even so is the fraternal relation not only very susceptible of redemption, but stands much in need of it. The duties of fellowship in office and rank are to be recognised in a spirit of brotherly love.

§ 204. HOUSEHOLD UNDER AFFLICTION.

A regardful sympathy, not only from the family itself, but also on the part of neighbours and the congregation, is doubly due to the sick and aged, to widows and orphans.¹ For they are, by a remarkable provision of God, constantly represented as objects of love, James i. 27, Luke vii. 12. On the other hand, they are bound to exhibit thankfulness for the sympathy they enjoy, and to evidence the holiness of their especial state of trial by an edifying walk and willing renunciation, 1 Tim. v. 3–16.

¹ See Dräseke, *in reference to the one thing needful*, in his Sermons, 1812, p. 227, “and she was a widow.”

§ 205. DOMESTIC LIFE.

To Christian domestic life there also pertains a certain common exercise in the word of God, and in prayer, which is an echo to the public one, and a preparation for it likewise. At the same time there is a certain surrender of filial and fraternal sentiment to domestics, and of parental feeling to masters, Philem. 15, &c.

§ 206. FRIENDSHIP.

The inclinations of choice comprehended under the name of friendship are alike distinguished from those of conjugal and from those of brotherly love. They preserve a Christian value, inasmuch as, through the friendship of Christ, John xv. 13, 14, they partly free themselves from sentimentalism and adulation, and partly from the sufferings of sin and mortality, and are proportionally endowed with the gifts of knowledge, of joy, and of fidelity in love. Thus refined and cultivated, they ever more purely exhibit, according as they are divested of earthliness, that whereunto all unions of peculiar love, even those of marriage and brotherhood, are elevated, and in which they shall continue in the resurrection, Matt. xxii. 30.¹

¹ See my sermon on the superiority of the Christian friend over the blood relation.—*Samml.* 1819, p. 231.

§ 207. THE STATE.

The state becomes a new and abundant invitation to mutual holiness and the common exercise of Christianity; an institute of God the Preserver and Governor, which the gospel finds either already considerably formed, or at least, everywhere potential. As the Preserver circumscribes evil in the con-

science, in like manner He wards off destruction from this transient world by means of laws which maintain an equilibrium, Gen. viii. 22; and from the beginning He has provided the social state of man on earth, with means of preservation, Gen. iv. 15; ix. 5, 6. Personal right is reciprocally preserved, in order that all may have the most suitable opportunity for cherishing the whole of the higher or lower earthly destinies of man. All actual phenomena connected with this, all establishments of a legal commonwealth, partake of the character of a Divine institution and authority, and neither conquest nor compact alone, but contemporaneously with these, and by them, Divine necessity conditionates the institution, by which the evil doer is punished and restrained, and the well-doer praised and advanced, Romans xiii. 3, 4; 1 Peter ii. 14, 15. Precisely as the Apostle, Rom. vii. 14, ascribes unto the law, in its deepest ground and origin, the same principle which is revealed in the gospel, so must the Christian be equally as capable, as willing, to recognise the divinity of the state. There exists a three-fold relation of the state to the church of Christ. If the Christian first perceives in that relation the preliminary society of an instituted discipline against sin, then will he not fail to recognise that the compulsive power of political law absolutely requires that higher warrant¹ which is given together with the law of the Spirit as an enfranchising one; and that consequently, the state and church work better together for good, the more their mode of operation and the nearest objects they propose for themselves continue distinct, or the less the state, on its part, attempts what it is unable to effect, and the Church on her part aims at what she should not. According to the second relation, the state appears as the protector and cherisher of those spiritual institutions for which man as such is destined, and deprived of whose efficacy civil honour and happiness, love and patience could not by possibility prosper. If, for instance, church life finds no support for its external development apart from a legal position being assumed in some form or other, and must seek and supplicate for this support, (and this constitutes

the third relation to be taken into account), then is it bound to recognise in civil life a moral power, a more ancient divine alliance, against which it is absolutely bound to offer no obstruction, and in which it must undergo its probation, 1 Peter iv. 15. Even when the state prohibits the confession of Christ as the Son of God and Lord of the world, or commands superstitious usages in which the Christian, on the grounds adduced by Peter, Acts iv. 19; v. 29, cannot concur, he feels himself bound, both before and after transgression, to conduct himself without defiance towards the order of the state,² and under every circumstance to pay with the utmost promptitude in love whatever tribute and service may be legally demanded, Romans xiii. 6, 7; and, for the public good, both to bear and forbear.

¹ The religious necessity of the state eminently appears in the circumstance of its demanding and permitting judicial oaths. In order to reconcile this institution with the express prohibition in Matt. v. 34, James v. 12, (a reconciliation which Chrysostom, Basil, and so many Christians of all ages have held to be impossible, morality, by merely distinguishing a private oath from a public one; a frivolous and gratuitous oath from one that is serious and pious (Augustin, Luther, J. D. Michaelis); a promissory one from a testamentary one, (Grotius); and common Christianity from that which is perfect, (Balsamon, the Scholastics;) Morality—does not adjust all the difficulties of the question, although in each of these points there is a share of truth. The law of the New Testament finds the taking of oaths already sanctioned; it is the necessary phenomenon of the religious and social consciousness in its naturally sinful condition. The law only reduces the phenomenon to a moral and testamentary order. The Israelite is to swear in the name of Jehovah, and not swear falsely, and is bound to keep his oath to the Lord. Under these suppositions the law specifies even the oath, as, for example in Exodus xxii. 10, 11. How does the *πλήρωσις νόμου* in the gospel correspond to this? It passes into *ἀδέτησις*, and does so likewise in respect of the *jus talionis*. Since with the absolute rejection of *talio*, even state law as penal law, nay, the state itself, might be abolished, (an hypothesis totally at variance, however, with Christianity), so it appears in both cases as if the meaning

of the gospel amounted to this, namely, that the state, law, and punishment are only the preliminary, pedagogical phenomena of justice; that the law of freedom is released from those obligations or constraints attached to sinful humanity, and in the kingdom of God there is only a love which tolerates and forgives, and a plain simplicity of expression. Accordingly we might almost say with Balsamon, and with those who concur in his views, that an oath is forbidden to those who are perfect, and only annexed to that common Christianity which stands in need of discipline and is developed along with state discipline. Meanwhile the distinction between perfect and common Christianity destroys the unity and truth of Christian moral law. We ought thus to pass from this view to the second, namely, that the Christian in his free private life must be far above an oath, although in civil life he cannot dispense with it. The church does not recognise oaths, the state only does so. Thus the question ever turns upon this point;—whether the state and the citizen, in so far as they are actuated by Christian principle, should require or take an oath? Christ not only rejects swearing absolutely, whether false or true, but points out the superstition, folly, and sin of doing so. How is this? 1. His censure (Matt. v. and xxiii. 16—22) only relates to the deceit and falsehood of making a distinction between non-obligatory or less-obligatory oaths and those that are binding. 2. It only refers to the universal obligation to give true evidence, the denial of which is implied in swearing. 3. In the passage, *ὅτι οὐ δύνασαι μίαν τρίχα λευκὴν ἢ μέλαιναν ποιῆσαι*, it alludes to the irreligiousness of disposing of ones self for any possible event, or of desiring the Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer of man to destroy or condemn him under some possible circumstance, or of wishing ones self not to be saved under certain contingencies. Every gradation of assurance which, in word or thought, has in itself this irreligious religion, is evil; and if there be no formula of asseveration which, in order to be otherwise useful and forcible, cannot but partake of this evil, then is every form of asseveration to be rejected, and the whole institution of oaths abolished from the foundation of a Christian state. In the first place, however, yea, yea, nay, nay, are by no means to be understood as if every asseveration exceeding the simplest affirmation or denial, or every protestation including an element of religious consciousness, was sinful; the whole letter and spirit of Scripture is, so to speak, opposed to such a mode of explanation. Even

the Redeemer's *ἀμήν*, *ἀμήν*, strictly speaking, would be inadmissible in this view; and still more so, the frequent asseveration of St Paul, for example, in 2 Cor. xi. 31, *ὁ Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ οἶδεν ὃ ὧν εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ὅτι οὐ ψευδομαί κ. λ.* What a solemn and religious obligation upon self to declare the truth! The idea of Christ, however, and the view of the sermon on the mount, do not allow of our desiring that he should have confined his heavenly deportment to such outward and empirical legalism. He is not in general *νομοθέτης*. He does not command any actual behaviour, in order thereby to subject generally man's will to the will of God; but he represents here, as in Matt. v. 22—39, the objectionable or necessary disposition in a concrete form, in the unity of the thinking and speaking, thinking and acting man. Is the command then of Christ, "turn the other cheek," or "give the cloak also," &c., not absolute in every case? Is it not the outspoken word of offence as such that endangers judgment and hell fire? So far an exalted and religious asseveration is not forbidden in the passage referred to. Christianity even allows of swearing in a pure and edifying form, which otherwise it prohibits; for neither is this assumption unchristian, namely, that sinful man (whether in a state of conversion or unconversion) is corruptible, susceptible, and fallible, and never sufficiently mindful of God and his relation unto Him, so as to keep those laws within which his earthly concerns are enclosed by God; nor is this other view unchristian, namely, that fallible, erring, and susceptible man, when brought to a consciousness of God and confirmed by his religion, will speak the truth. Rather is that mistrust, as much as this confidence, grounded in Christianity, and it pertains to the most important rights and duties of a Christian state, to recognise, invoke, and glorify in this way the power of religion. Christianity, (even without referring to Hebrews vi. 16,) can only commend this conduct of the state and of the judge, who, on important occasions of personal right and need of testimony, has recourse to the religious conscience, and demands a sign that the witness believes in God, and is conscious of his relation to the omniscient and just Judge, in order to satisfy under this condition all farther questions. The objection, that in the case where an oath is not taken, therefore the person is neither supposed nor required to speak the truth, is here inapplicable. The duty of an especial divine service, of a fixed confession, by no means annuls the uni-

versal duty of serving and confessing God. It might indeed have been better if the Christian state had abolished the word oath, ὄρκος and the like, together with the whole train of those religious ideas of heathenism connected therewith. The question should and ought to turn on divine testimony, invocation, reverence for the tribunal, the sacred duty of the witness, &c. The formula of an oath of this kind would have far less difficulty; it would depend much more on the whole matter, according to place and time, being adjusted in a purely religious manner, in conformably limiting the requirement and admission, and in considering what Christian ethics and policy might have farther to advise. For one of the most profound discussions on this subject see C. L. Nitzsch. *Pragr. de judicandis morum praeceptis in N. T. a communi omnium hominum ac temporum usu alienis*, Nr. 6 and 7. The pious author of the book, *The Oath, a Religious Treatise*, Barmen, 1830, inasmuch as he has only supposed the idea of an oath, loses sight of its justice in order to represent it absolutely immoral and anti-christian.

² Upon the whole, this was the practice of the Christian at the time when the prohibition of factions had been applied to Christianity. Origen *c. Cels.* 1, however, fortifies the claims of Christians on the state. When 1 Peter ii. 13 desires submission to every ordinance of man ἀνθρώπινη κτίσις διὰ τὸν κύριον, the force of the command does not lie in the ἀνθρώπινη; but in κτίσις, ordinance, regulation. The reference to our Lord, who is soon about to appear and to judge, ought not to prevent the κτίσις being in itself honoured and esteemed; but the ordinance to which human laws relate, and in which they participate, has universally, as such, a share in that reverence due unto whatever is Divine.

§ 208. MAGISTRATE AND SUBJECT.

The relations of subordination existing in office and station redound to the praise of the Lord, when we, as his free men, obey and serve, 1 Cor. vii. 22, and as servants of Christ, command and rule, and when we are equally as far from eye-service, (arising from the restraints of conscience and the fear of God, Ephes. vi. 5, 6), as from imperious desire, (ἀνιέντες τὴν ἀπειλην,) and are mindful of the account we have to render unto God.

It is the duty of the Christian subject, according to 1 Peter ii. 17, to honour the king in the same spirit in which the Apostle calls upon him to be respectful unto all men, to love the brethren and fear God. The Christian cannot pay respect to all men without being ready to show that especial deference, which is due to the possessor of the highest power emanating from God, provided the forms of deference are distinct from expressions of adoration. The Christian cannot honour God without feeling himself bound to pay inviolable obedience to those who are God's representatives, to rulers and parents, even when immediately necessitated by God's command to censure, delay, or change the exercise of his obedience; and he cannot love the brethren without loving the head of their earthly common life, without interesting himself by a free hearty participation in all the necessities, assaults, and responsibilities attached to the station of that fellow-mortal, or fellow-Christian, who is his sovereign. Intercession for our sovereign, in the congregation, can only be true and worthy, in proportion as it proceeds from this disposition, and as it nourishes and produces the same. A Christian sovereign, conformably with the biblical idea of a servant of God, who accepts the office together with all its ruling and pastoral duties, is unimpeded by the dread of opinion and desire to please, humbles himself personally before his position, renounces, according to his own inclination and will, neither the government nor its rights, but, on the other hand, is ready with all his personal power to sacrifice his enjoyments, renown and life for his people, and to preserve and consecrate himself in their behalf.

SECTION THE FOURTH.

ON THE COMPLETION OF SALVATION.

§ 209. BLESSEDNESS IN HOPE.

A Confession of Faith, fellowship, and imitation of the Redeemer, do not exempt us in this world from those sufferings to which we are exposed in this present sinful state; on the contrary, it is the destiny of Christ's members to be purified and proved through affliction, Rev. iii. 19, to be made like unto Christ through undeserved suffering, 1 Peter ii. 21; iii. 17, to be partakers of His reproach, 2 Cor. iv. 8; and to bear the marks of his death as well as of his life. Yet, notwithstanding, because the previous knowledge of perfect life and salvation is assured to every Christian mind inhabited by the Spirit, 2 Cor. iv. 14; Ephes. i. 14; Romans viii. 17—25, there is a blessed hope belonging to Christian life, 1 Peter i. 4; Rom. viii. 24; and consequently the claims on the Christian are of such a nature as to cause him to rejoice always in the Lord, Phil. iv. 4, to account temptations for joy, James i. 2; and in the strength of the Lord to glory in his infirmity, 2 Cor. xii. 9, 10.

§ 210. HOPE.

Christian hope is a feeling determinated through faith in the future completion of Christ's redeeming work, and is consequently distinct from that universal longing of the creature for deliverance from vanity, Rom. viii. 22, and from the general admission that a continued existence after death will be a better life and a compensating eternity.

§ 211. FRUITS OF HOPE.

The life of the Christian by virtue of this hope, is not only

full of expectation, but also of ardent desire, and Christian longing struggles to rise above time and the visible world, Rom. vii. 24; viii. 19. Phil. i. 21, 23. Since Christian hope, however, does not in the least degree assume the nature of passion¹ and enthusiasm, and consequently is most intimately united with present joy in the Lord, or with joy in the work and being of the Lord in the world, Phil. i. 21. 2 Cor. vi. 10, and is equally one with the consciousness of the all-governing wisdom and mercy of God as with profound humility, so does it present unto the Lord in this life, the fruits of faithfulness and patience.

¹ An erroneous reflection on the Christian doctrine concerning the end of the world is desirous, now-a-days, in opposition to this doctrine, to prove that Christians ought with passionate inquietude and weariness to wish themselves out of this present world, if it does not constitute their absolute all. But precisely the reverse is the state of Christian consciousness. Were there no end of the world, and if we only knew of an endless duration of this state of existence, and the present division between the visible and invisible world, then might vexation, weariness, or rather passionate desire for an hereafter, engross the Christian mind. But since there is a consummation of things in which the present passes into the future, and the future into the present, a termination of the world, which, (since we cannot calculate its consummation as we do eclipses or the appearance of comets) is, in its infinite greatness, ever nigh, and hovers around us; and since also in this world a growing work of the Lord is present, which does not at one time lift itself into the infinite and undetermined, and at another destroys itself, but grows to a definite ἀκμῆ, and ripens for the Lord of the harvest; and since, moreover, as individuals, we have to expect a consummation in death, and since, in no relation, as respects the Divine economy, is there haste or delay, so all the disquietude of the Christian vanishes, and the impossibility of compensating the opposite of excessive desire and contentment can never occur. According to that so-called absolute theology, Christian hope would be nothing but a transient *moment* of the spirit restored to itself, whereas it is rather a continuous power of the spirit through faith, which presentiates the Eternal, to have the eternal of the future, or the cessation of faith by sight present.

§ 212. FIDELITY.

Through hope Christian love is faithful in all points; *i. e.*, on the one hand it is ready and resolved to preserve innocence of life unto the end, yea even unto death, 2 Tim. ii. 9–12, Matt. v. 11, 12; Heb. xii. 4, and to avoid all sin, and on the other, is willing and able, notwithstanding the absence of reward and thanks, and in spite of a discouraging world, sometimes flattering sometimes threatening, Heb. x. 32–35; xi., to continue the ministry of good works and edifying example, Phil. i. 20–24; 2 Peter i. 13.

§ 213. PATIENCE.

Both kinds of faithfulness pre-suppose patience, Heb. x. 36, *i. e.*, such an agreement of individual will with the Divine intention of affliction, such a reception of chastisement from God, and such a striving against dejection, as by means of which the more violent feelings of pain are resolved into a filial invocation of the Lord and unite with the approval of whatsoever he doth, Matt. xxvi. 39; xxvii. 46; 2 Cor. xii. 8.

§ 214. HOPE IN CHRIST.

Faith, which is fundamental to all this state of feeling, consists in the certainty afforded by the previous experience of welfare and by the word of God, that redemption, as yet incomplete, shall be brought to completion, partly in Christian individual life, and partly in Christian common life; for Christian hope, or hope in Christ, not only includes the certainty of an infinite perfecting, or a continual approximation of the church on earth to the church in heaven, (in which, however, a distinction and contrast may ever remain,) but also an historical conclusion, by means of which the re-development of sin

and death again, together with the present condition of nature, will be entirely abolished.

§ 215. INDIVIDUAL CONSUMMATION.

The Christian's hope of bliss cannot be extinguished by any delay, or by aught that is incomprehensible in the universal consummation of things. For not only is the personality of every one from whom the world passes away in death, preserved, of which the Holy Spirit gives full assurance, but also all who die in the Lord enter immediately into a closer and freer fellowship with Him,¹ Rev. xiv. 13; Phil. i. 23; Rev. xiv. 1, and are raised in general to a new and more perfect form of being; save that this condition is related to that one, which the end of the world can only realize, as an intermediate state, and even includes a great manifoldness both of place and mode of existence.

¹ The adoption of such a view of an intermediate, though preliminary consummation of individuals, has been rendered somewhat difficult by Julius Müller, (*Theoll. Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, p. 785, sq.) and Wetzel, (the same Journal, 1836, p. 965, sq.) and, on the other hand, much facilitated by John. Pet. Lange, (the same work, "*Biblico-Theological Disquisitions*," i. p. 702,) Fichte (*Idee der Persönlichkeit, &c.*) and Krabbe in the Journal referred to. Meanwhile Müller, although he maintains against Fichte the disembodied existence of departed souls on scriptural grounds, and with special reference to 2 Cor. v. 4, (ἐκδύσασθαι,) fully allows that this state of rest, considered in itself, cannot exclude the εἶναι σὺν Χριστῷ, according to Phil. i. 23. It is impossible, if we regard the plain alternative of the Epistle to the Philippians: either to remain in the flesh, (ἐκδημῆσαι ἀπο τοῦ κυρίου, 2 Cor. v.,) and produce fruit, or depart and be with the Lord ἐκδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν κύριον; or, if we consider Christian consciousness, it is impossible to admit Weizel's doctrine of the suspension of the more perfect fellowship with the Lord until the great day. Schleiermacher has pre-eminently and accurately explained the Christian consciousness of those who live and die in the fellowship of the Redeemer, to this extent, that there occurs no interruption of this relation, no cessation or suspension of this enjoyment, although

there may occur some essential purification and perfecting. Precisely because, says St Paul, Christ is my life, (*i. e.* the real signification, substance, and worth of terrestrial existence,) is death my gain. Now, this gain must absolutely refer to the same object of possession which preeminently imparts to life its real value. Paul would not have been one hair's-breadth nearer to the Lord by death, if, before the great day which restores Christ to Christians then alive on earth, no reunion could take place, and if death were not the way to such. Christ himself promised the apostles individually a *παράληψις*, John xiv. 3. He prepares places for them, he will come again to them, and each shall be where is. Hence if, in order still more to widen the distinction between the present time and the day of judgment, we assume that the hereafter of individuals is no gain, then is it a loss, and we dogmatically teach, to a certain extent, the very solicitude of those whom Paul sought to console, inasmuch as they thought all the manifestation of glory was reserved not only for this present world, but also for those who were then alive. Undoubtedly, the consolation administered to them by the apostle, 1 Thess. iv. 14, 15, *ἀξει τοὺς κοιμηθέντας—σὺν αὐτοῖς—ἡμεῖς—οὐ μὴ φθᾶσωμεν τοὺς κοιμηθέντας*, includes the recognition, that those in the other world (those who are asleep, *νεκροὶ ἐν χριστοῖς*) are not yet perfected; but it does not follow, from any Biblical representation of their condition, whether it be called sleep, death, or rest, that their souls exist only in a state of solitude or unconsciousness, and that they should not be judged, punished, or blessed in proportion to their relation to the Redeemer. Scripture indeed principally, as well as universal consciousness, represent the dead in Christ as resting from labour and affliction, Rev. xiv. 13, 1 Thess. v: 10; but if in this view, not the mere external rest of the grave is represented (Tertullian *de Anima*, c. 58, *dormire est corporum, non animarum*,) but that souls are exempted from anxiety, then the representation *ἀνάπαυσις, σάββατισμὸς*, Heb. iv., extends to the state of decided, perfect blessedness; and, consequently, cannot include the entire and only characteristic of the intermediate state; but leaves a farther positive determination of the same, so much the more so, as the pious, even in this world, were not consumed by a feeling of strife and anguish, but enjoyed peace in the Lord, a knowledge of him, a life and work in him, and a mutual fellowship which must be conceived as partly augment-

ed since their deliverance from anxiety, and which may be imagined in some way as partly realised in some specific locality. Now some, who are as far from denying a gradation in the life of the soul when disembodied, as they are from setting aside the distinct state of good and evil souls, nevertheless believe, that every spiritual existence mediated through corporality, and that all reciprocity between the soul and the world, is contradictory of the idea of an intermediate state. Müller conceives the absolute life of the departed in the same way as Thomas Burnet has done, (*De Statu Mortuorum et Resurrectione liber*. London, 1726, p. 83, sq.), (it would be particularly useful, now that eschatological questions are so frequently discussed, to refer to a work of so much importance to philosophers and theologians, and one so rich in subtle and profound observations.) Burnet is quite correct in maintaining the existence of an intermediate state; but his doctrine concerning the absolutely isolated, expressionless, and naked existence of the soul, is not in accordance with Scripture. How could the souls of those sacrificed for the sake of Jesus, be represented as crying and lamenting, as clad in white raiment, as an assembled host encircling the Lamb,—how could those representations in our Lord's parable of the rich and poor man, or those which afforded consolation to the converted thief, be supposed,—how could God bring with him those who are perfected on the second advent of Jesus,—and apart from all this, how could this absolute being of a created spirit be ever imagined, (which, in order to be with and in nature, must have a local and formal existence in connection therewith,) if Burnet's view could be maintained? It is insufficient to assume, that these passages are poetical, since paradise, at least, the many mansions, *μοναί*, John xiv. 2, especially the ALICUBI of the soul, are representations of dogmatic nature. Doubtless, the subjects of death are, in respect of their earthy corporality, *νεκροί*, beside *ψυχαι*, *πνεύματα*, 1 Peter iii. 19, Heb. xii. 23, Rev. vi. 9, and as such are destined for the final resurrection; but they are only naked simply in reference to the dissolution of their earthly portion, and in respect to the yet non-being of their heavenly new body. If this view be maintained, then Burnet himself even does not reject the supposition of a corporeal medium for the existence of the departed, and at p. 88 of his Treatise, concurs in these physiological considerations, which Fichte has adopted on speculative grounds, and Lange on Biblical ones. Lange is quite right in

thus explained 2 Cor. v. 4; "We are not clothed upon, although we groan to be so, but are first unclothed, although again re clothed." Hence an absolutely bare existence is excluded. It may well be asked, however, whether all that Scripture asserts concerning an intermediate state, can be collectively viewed, and whether all that has been written, on the one hand, concerning the consummation of individuals, and, on the other, on the consummation of all things, admits of being concentrated into one single view, as Lange has attempted to do. But so much is certain, that partly in reference to *κρίσις*, and partly as regards existence and life externally and internally, and in reference to fellowship and activity, no mere quiescence, but only an incompleteness in the intermediate state is admissible. That a judgment follows immediately after death, according to Heb. ix. 27, is certain; but the final judgment is not in consequence set aside. And if the departed merely live in themselves, how can they be affected by the word and preaching, according to 1 Peter iii. 19? Weizel rejects these passages as apocryphal; but upon no tenable grounds. What Lange says concerning St Paul's doctrine of diverse kinds of bodies in the various circles of creation is confirmed in a widely diffused theory of Jewish antiquity, which is fundamental to the 'Αναβατικόν' Ησαΐου. There Christ remains in his descent to earth concealed from the princes and angels of each heaven only by his assuming the peculiar corporeality and vesture of each particular heaven.

§ 216. RETURN OF CHRIST.

The end¹ as regards the time is unknown, Mark xiii. 32—37, 1 Thess. v. 2, *ὡς κλέπτῃς ἐν νυκτί*, and on account of the particular nature of its prognostications,² it is ever either prematurely expected, or too long deferred. The signs consist not only in natural convulsions, but also in moral phenomena. Like as from time immemorial, man's extremity has been God's opportunity,³ the glorious manifestation of Christ will not ensue, until, by some repeated course of anti-messianic domination, the contrast between the church and the world, and the appearance of anti-christian sentiments have reached their climax, 2 Thess. ii. 3. Finally, the preaching of the gospel is closed to faith;

and the announced Redeemer appears in his glory; and this in such a way, that whoever may appear, and whether he have appeared, not the slightest doubt will anywhere exist, Luke xviii. 23, 24, Zechariah xii. 10, Revelation i. 7. But he does not come only to conclude the preaching of the Gospel, but also to close the duration of the world—to transform the world of faith, in which dwelleth righteousness and blessedness, into a world of sight—to awaken the dead—to change the living—to judge the living and the dead, and to conduct the children of God to the inheritance of eternal bliss, 1 Thess. v. 23, 2 Thess. i. and ii, 1 Tim. vi. 14, Hebrews ix. 28, x. 37.

¹ Speculation has been so far from opposing the Christian view of the world's catastrophe, that had there been no doctrine of eschatology, it must have supplied the deficiency. Christianity is neither illustrated, nor is any thing philosophically gained by at once perpetuating the elements of eschatology, and presentiating them as eternal. It is unwillingly admitted, that the spirit is dependent on time and nature, in its essential destinations, and yet it is allowed that this nature and time maintain their uniform unbroken continuity in the world. Individualities and periods of time as they arise are consumed and overcome; nevertheless, the collective being, the individualized existence is never subdued, and the individualizing spirit never ends. There is none other than a logical glorification, a physical one, which we should desire and predict, and as such ought to know and understand is altogether forgotten. But if nature be the medium of history, it must renounce all realities apart from an end and glorification, and can be nothing more than a bare means or opportunity, and negative reflex of the thinking spirit. If corruption *φθορά*, shall be overcome, as an ancient apocryphal tradition teaches, then must this *γένεσις* cease. This was better philosophy than the philosophy of endless history.

² The Apocalyptic prognostic of the New Testament consists of acts, which in some degree, more frequently occur before they become perfect prognoses. So much the more natural is it, that from the time of the Apostles, the end of things should appear to the pious, especially at a period of new developments, much nearer than it is. They do not err in perceiving

the prognoses, although such continue until the end the object of presentiment and faith.

³ Quando duplicantur lateres, venit Moses. Compare Luke xxi. 28. There pervades the Apocalyptic doctrine of the New Testament, a more spiritual and more material representation of the last things; compare, for example, what John says of Antichrist, and of many antichrists, with the much more plastic and definite expectation of the Apostle Paul and of Revelation, and in the same passage, (John v.) the extended with the limited awakening of the dead. Now, if in the general, we are unable to combine an entire view from individual points of the plastic representation, then are we still more justified, yea, even necessitated, by the intervention of the more spiritual doctrine, to distinguish in each of the Evangelical or Apostolical leading views, the symbolical elements from those that are immediately didactic. But the question here does not turn on the symbols of the idea, but on those of fact, just as it does in primeval or elemental history.

§ 217. RESURRECTION.

The mere duration and immortality of the soul, or the bare deliverance from its earthly habitation, does not complete Christian hope; for the consummation of the individual is by no means perfect, so long as the entire creation and church are not consummated with him and he with them. The Christian waits for the redemption of the body, Rom. viii. 23; consequently Christians expect the resurrection of the dead; and Christ's resurrection is an historical pledge, just as the gift of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of glory, is its internal one, 1 Cor. xv. 20, Romans viii. 11; the body, moreover, of those who are raised is not the corrupted nor corruptible one. Nature and body include a great and profound mystery. Nature herself shall be delivered from that vanity and perishableness to which she is subject. The coming forth from the grave is only a type or partial appearance of a glorifying regeneration or transformation of our individual life, in which we become like unto the glorified body of the Redeemer, after bearing, in time,

the image of the earthly Adam, Phil. iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 35–50.

REMARK 1. The article of the Apostles' Creed—*credo resurrectionem carnis*—is assumed by Müller (in the work already referred to) to signify *corporis*, but is defended by Lange. For the ever-becoming and transient material does not participate identically in the resurrection; the body (*σῶμα*) even, is not a mere form without substance, and there are, according to 1 Cor. xv. 39, many kinds of *σαρξ*. In fact, this difference between body and flesh may be reconciled; for in the one case, it is only the bare spiritual existence of man in a future state that is denied, and in the other, the renewed unity of the spiritual and natural essence that is affirmed, and in both cases the conservation and renewal of individuality that is maintained.

REMARK 2. It solely depends on the view taken of the preservation of the individual distinctive character, when the question turns on the identity of the earthly and future body. The image of the seed of corn, the idea of a change of the individual, and of another of the like kind, infers personal identity. But this identity would be without interest or purpose, if a body expressly adapted were not joined to a soul correspondingly modified, for its phenomenal expression; for the principle of individuality is still the soul and not the body. Whatever of irony may be visited on the corporeal form and appearance of man—and nothing connected therewith is either contingent or without intention,—because it belongs to that condition which may be said to develope itself in the antagonism between the flesh and the spirit; still we may admit, in general, that the individual body corresponds to the fundamental dispositions of the soul's individuality, and that the moral formation of character imparts more and more to the body its other free or definite form. Whatever exceeds these two elements is peculiarity, and must be something absolutely perishable. Thus the principle of the body's identity exists in the identity of the soul. Whoever imagines the departed to be bodiless before the resurrection will hardly find, in the mere ashes of the mouldered body, a connecting-point for the identity of the past and future corporeality. The medium of identity ought rather to be sought for in that corporeality in which the departed soul abides, and which, according to the nature of the cosmical sphere to which it

primarily pertains, and according to the elements of its own internal form, is changed to the point where it reaches its final state. If it be asked, under such suppositions, what interest and final cause remain for the principle of a general resurrection corporeally viewed; and if it be demanded, whether the reunion of the separated soul with the earth be not rather a resumption and a frustration of the preceding process; then we answer, that the earth itself even is no longer the former earth; that the collective system of nature is renewed and transformed, and that the perfect body, like to the body of Christ, shall be immortal and spiritual, and absolutely proportioned and serviceable to the spiritual life. In the mystical theology of the Jews, the identity of the earthly and heavenly body is altogether relinquished. The spirit, individualized in the soul, lays aside for ever in death its earthly body, and attains, together with its capacity for renewing its corporeality, an entrance at last into the third heaven, where raiment lies ready for each of the elect. The idea of a heavenly body is realised through the ethical idea of chastity, gentleness, &c. for even the virtuous are by consequence of this doctrine, *imagines Dei acquisitæ*, and in their kind are impressions, bodies, clothing. The white raiment of souls in the Apocalypse is allied to such representations.

§ 218. CONCLUSION.

Unto those who are blessed in hope, the region of this faith discloses itself. Considered as a blessed hope, the resurrection belongs only to the children of God. They have died and are risen here spiritually with Christ, Col. iii. 1—4. Their life is by and with Him, but hidden even as He is hidden. His manifestation will be theirs, Romans viii. 18, 19. After they have followed him in death according to the flesh, he will awaken them from the dead on the day of judgment, that they may reign and live with him and judge the world. And this is the first resurrection, Revelation xx. 6, a resurrection of believers, John vi. 40, of the righteous, Luke xx. 35, 1 Cor. xv. 23, 1 Thess. iv. 17. With reference to the doctrine of Christian hope, the question only turns on this resurrection. In so far as it precedes the general resurrection, it is to be re-

garded as partly the commencement of a renewal of nature, partly as the Sabbath of God's people, or as the most complete and glorious appearance of the church of Christ that can be expected in this world. The general resurrection brings some to life, and others to judgment and shame, Dan. xii. 2, John v. 29,¹ Acts xxiv. 15. The universality of the resurrection can only be the necessary preservation² of all human individuals to the extent of their presentation and public separation before the judgment-seat of Christ, Romans xiv. 10, Revelation xx. 13, 14.

¹ We follow in this passage of the exposition, which at verse 21, in the words ἐγείρειν τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ ζωοποιεῖν, obtains the widest and most indeterminate idea of the divine power for quickening the dead, which, at verse 25, principally finds the spiritual, and at verses 28, 29, the corporeal awakening of the dead. See Lücke's *Commentar. u. Excurs.*

² Undoubtedly, one form of life and judgment is to be distinguished from another. Those who are raised unto life are publicly judged, and their personal and actual worth definitively determined, Rev. xx. 13, and the active relation of those brought to judgment does not annul every passive relation; yet even they rise to judgment, to receive their sentence, and enter anew into a full individual existence.

§ 219. FINAL JUDGMENT.

The separation of good and evil, which the word of God, or which even progressive history and government effect, does not correspond alone to the Divine decree and to the consummation of the redeemed. Indeed, there is a condition that immediately occurs, after death, to every human being, of a judicial and retributive character, Heb. ix. 27; Luke xvi. 22. But inasmuch as there is no want of allusions to the fact, that departed believers have not yet, through death alone, become partakers of perfect blessedness, Heb. xi. 39, 40, so are there traces of a capacity, in another state of existence, for comprehending salvation, 1 Peter iii. 19, and for a change and puri-

fication of mind, 1 Peter iv. 5, 6.¹ Finally, in the general resurrection a perfect judgment and discovery of each individual's personal worth and personal relation to the Divine alliance between nature and grace, will appear, Matt. xxv. 32; 1 Cor. iv. 5; Romans ii. 6. Unto the Son of Man is committed this judgment in the full power of God, John v. 22, 27, so that those who were the earlier perfected, in proportion as their righteousness has been manifested with the existence of the true church in all consciences, shall co-operate and take a part in the judgment, 1 Cor. vi. 2, compare Luke xxii. 30. At the last judgment all the children of God shall be revealed and delivered from all communion with the unholy,² Matt. xiii. 39-42; xxv. 33. The idea of eternal damnation and punishment, Mark ix. 44; Matt. xxv. 41-46, is in so far a necessary one, inasmuch as there cannot be in eternity any forced holiness of the personal being, or any blessed unholiness, Romans ii. 8, 9. On the other hand, there is no foundation for assuming that the truth of God's word and the kingdom of God itself, need the existence of beings everlastingly condemned, or that God should maintain the existence of a personal being in eternity, in order to deprive him of the possibility of eternal holiness and blessedness.³

¹ The passages in 1 Peter iii. 19, iv. 6, as testimonies of the apostolic doctrine of Christ's preaching in Hades, have hitherto resisted all sophistical interpretations, and have not been weakened, even by Weizel's strange and hasty remarks, (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1836, p. 927, sq.) This learned writer admits the sense of the words as far as the fact is concerned; but, because he will not admit that, in any case, a development of condition can take place in Hades, far less any change and conversion, so this representation appears to him as in part only filling up a blank in the Redeemer's existence, and in part as only completing the idea of the universality of the judgment of Christ exercised over the living and the dead. But, independently of this, preaching only three days, and only transitorily, and he might have confidently added, doing so without an object, would have been without effect, and devoid of meaning. It is easy to conceive how the passage

thus viewed appears to this writer as Apocryphal. But by inferring that the whole of the first Epistle of Peter is of a later date and of apocryphal origin, he betrays how easily dogmatic prejudices corrupt criticism and exegesis. It is just the lofty, genuinely apostolical, and canonical character of the epistle, that assures us that its purport cannot be to maintain so thoughtless a doctrine, and a fact so objectless and ineffective as the *descensus ad inferos* is, according to Weizel's view. Dogma has not produced any mere logical inference, nor preserved one throughout Christian antiquity, if aught thereby be understood as indifferent for the idea itself; for not merely the truth of the day of judgment is reflected therein. The effect and signification of salvation, and the knowledge of the Saviour, extends beyond the present existence of the human race, in its quickening and sanctifying power, because the universality of grace shall be glorified and adjusted with the unrighteousness of temporal relations. The question does not here turn on the partial universality of judgment, but on the entire relation of individuals to the Redeemer. The judgment of our ancestors was not morally more possible and just by the mere notice of Christ, if such could not have become in some way or other operative. Even the word in the second passage (1 Peter iv. 6.) *κρίθῶσι*, is so far from being the leading idea, that it rather serves only as a medium for *ζῶσι*, and Steiger very correctly remarks, that the sense may be, *ἵνα κριθέντες μὲν σαρκί—ζῶσι*. The era of heathenism, of sin and sensuality, is passed away, as the apostle teaches; it has lasted long enough,—let no one prolong it. Both Christ and the Gospel exhibit, even to the ancient world, a converting aim and effect, so that the dead, although judged in the flesh, in conformity with human condition and destiny, and punished with death, still shall live, in proportion to the work of divine grace, according to the Spirit. Compare Rom. viii. 10, *τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην*. This is the apostolical view—that for those who were unable in this world to know Christ in his truth and grace, there exists a knowledge of the Redeemer in the other state of existence, which is never objectless and inoperative; but is either judicial or quickening. It is strange that it should be wished to contract this operation within the short period of three days. The notion, however, of an intermediate state, does not annul the idea of conversion in the other world, for, inasmuch as it presupposes a life in this world, but does not amount

to a full certainty of death and life, of rejection or blessedness on that account, is it a middle state.

² This is the reason why the judgment itself, which partially or possibly excludes from life or blessedness, belongs nevertheless to the doctrine of hope in Christ. It does not contradict the idea of representing eschatology as the completion of salvation; for as Christians we should know nothing of the last things unless they redounded to the glory of the Redeemer and his church. The standing point of natural philosophy, which perchance admits a conflagration of the world, or something resembling it, or the standing point of the natural postulate of a heaven and hell, is not that of the Christian, or is so at least subordinately. The possibility of evil is permitted for the sake of good; but if it be not absolutely annihilated in its reality by the grace of redemption, yet is it relatively so, and thus redounds to the glory of grace. If there be an eternity of punishment, then must it even belong to the consummation of salvation. The redeemed indeed cannot desire the condemnation of any one; but they may long for the judgment as being a manifestation, a final decision, a cessation from all dominion of evil, and as being the abolition of all mixed and impure conditions.

³ The question is, whether the second death be only, as it were, a parallel representation of the state of eternal punishment, or a definitive feature of that state, and thus be equivalent to the absolute annihilation of the individual. Scripture, in general, does not in every case mean by death, non-being, or a negation of being, but more frequently non-being in being; for death in sin, the being dead through the fall, does not negative individual existence. Accordingly the second death may be that spiritual death, which excludes the destiny and capacity for spiritual reanimation, without annulling existence; and when St John in the Revelation says that the lake of fire and brimstone is the second death, it appears that a permanent condition is indicated, otherwise the point in question relates to the unextinguishable fire. On the other hand, the idea of annihilation becomes more prominent when we consider that even death and Hades, (which shall absolutely be no more), are cast into the lake of fire. Moreover, the second death, as such, does not as a total spiritual death refer to a partial one of this kind, but is related as a death of the soul to the first corporeal death, and thus to the opposite of being and non-being in general. The idea of an ab-

solite immortality of the human soul, as of a purely simple entity, has of late been too closely investigated to admit of its opposing by itself alone such an interpretation of the second death. The finite, created spirit amounts to this; its immortality is a gift derived from the grace of God; its absolute individual existence is the continual operation of a sustaining Godhead. God alone hath immortality; if he withdraws his spirit-breath from the soul, it ceases to be, and the dissolution of its powers would effect a death similar to that which occurs to the body. Those who never receive the Holy Spirit, that earnest of immortal personality, might, for the same reason, lose their rational spirit, the spirit in general (νοῦς πνεῦμα) which has already lapsed into passivity through the fall, and thus lose the consciousness of God; and what would then remain to human substantiality as such, after having endured the loss of the soul? But again, it may be asked, how human nature can be conceived as regards the distinction and unity of soul and spirit. Is the human soul actually nothing more than an exalted animal individuality, or an exalted principle of organic life to either of which the spirit (νοῦς) is added as a *donum superadditum*? Or can the human soul as will and conception, or as consciousness of self and the world, in relation to God-consciousness and what is rational, be considered as only a completing form, so that the separableness of the spirit and soul constituted from the very beginning the idea of man? By no means. The human soul as such, is an individualized spirit, which not only substantively inheres in the soul, but as the self-determinating ego possesses its own determinateness and destiny. The soul is a natural personality which, even in its degeneracy into selfish peculiarity, does not lose its natural destination to be spirit. Thus viewed, the soul was created ἐπ' ἀφθαρσίᾳ, *Book of Wisdom*, ii. 23; and the possibility of its falling away from God, which at the same time implies the possibility of its spirituality and of its partaking of a divine nature, does not annul when realized, its destiny and its idea. In ente non deficit bonum; the bad never absolutely and of necessity belongs to the soul, and the latter is relatively immortal although it be dead in sin. Now, if we disregard the representation of the second death, Holy Scripture does not authorize us by any other view to conceive the human soul as absolutely annihilable; for the Redeemer opposes to man's fear of death, not the fear of being killed by God; and to his fear of corporeal death not

the fear of absolute death, Matt. x. 28, Luke xii. 4, 5, not ἀποκτεῖναι, but ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν, ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν γέενναν is the περισσότερον that God has the power to do. But if ἀπώλεια, φθορὰ should be explained by θάνατος δεύτερος, and not the latter by the former, then it is remarkable that even Weisse, who on several occasions, and again in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835. *On the philosophical meaning of Christian Eschatology*, p. 271, seq. maintains the cessation of life and the annihilation of the psychological not of the regenerated man; a representation of eternal (second) death, which does not relate to this mortal soul, but to the evil *pneumata*. It cannot be biblically maintained that man was despiritualized by the fall, and that death is natural to this individual so deprived of spirit, for the psychological man is and remains, by virtue of his original nature, at the same time a pneumatical one; the psychological man is not the characteristic mark of a natural but of an ethical species, of a direction of the mind and will; and because we all die in Adam the idea of annihilation does not follow, and because we have been created in him εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, it does not exclude the spirituality of nature; and thus the spirit which seals unto us the resurrection and ζωὴ αἰωνίος is quite different from πνεῦμα—νοῦς. But the idea of an evil πνεῦμα, as assumed by Weisse, would be, in reference to the last judgment, the idea of eternal punishment, and a justification of the doctrine of eternal damnation. And thus again, we have attained to an incomprehensible idea, as regards its purpose. It is self-evident that Lessing's idea of eternal condemnation and punishment, as an infallible consequence and endless retribution of evil conduct, is theologically untenable. For the eternal consequence of their sins exist, even among the blessed, not, however, as punishment and condemnation, but as a feeling of grace and thankfulness, and Scripture does not denote with condemnation and blessedness the plus and minus of one and the same condition, but rather the contrast of an absolutely different condition. Meanwhile, it cannot stand in connection with this dualism without something farther. Scripture teaches the eternal condemnation of human individuals, because such is a necessary hypothesis, inasmuch as grace, being neither compulsory, magical, nor mechanical, allows of man's final resistance; perseverance in opposition to unbelief is possible, consequently, if there be a final judgment there must be, *de futuro*, and on this hypothesis, an eternal condemnation. Absolutely and *in concreto* the devil alone, that

incomprehensible and inconceivable individuality, and those who are his, are eternally damned. Neither are post-diluvian sinners nor persons otherwise historical, absolutely or eternally condemned before hand and by name. But Scripture does not distinguish between hypothesis and thesis, and eternal damnation, as thetical and hypothetical fact must, in both cases, be realized in thought. How is this possible? How can the bad as well as the good be eternal? The Divine preservation of a being perverted in wickedness exists, only, as it appears, in so far as such can pass into redemption; otherwise redemption would be incongruous with preservation. If Christocracy altogether ceases, if it passes entirely over into the absolute power of God, then no evil spontaneity can remain, no being exist in whom an unredeemed antithesis could adhere. Thus, eternal damnation is either only an hypothesis, and as such the unconditionated necessity of universal conversion, or absolute non-being, or inconceivable being in non-being, or an individual being with absolutely passive and exclusive consciousness of redemption and the kingdom of God, and equally bereaved of every good as of every evil activity, a ruin which is at the same time a triumphal monument of holy and true love. In each of these cases it is apparent, how the apostle who so boldly and resolutely preached eternal condemnation, yet admits his extreme doctrine of eschatology, to look and pass beyond this contrast, 1 Cor. xv. In so far as in this point mysterious doctrines are held by the church, they do not relate to the contrast of philosophical and popular knowledge in particular, but partly concern the contrast of different stages of Christian knowledge, partly that of the converted and unconverted. For the latter as such, who have resisted conversion, and remain unconverted, there is in nowise any hope of conversion and sanctification in the other world.

§ 220. RESTORATION OF ALL THINGS.

Together with the return of the Lord, the awakening of the just to life, and the consummation of salvation in general, there is associated a change of the entire condition of the world, or a renewal of the heavens and the earth, 2 Peter iii. 10—13, Revelation xxi. 1—14, by means of which death and sin to-

gether with all their elements and operations are exterminated, 1 Cor. xv. 26,¹ Revelation xx. 14. But with this restoration of all things, Acts iii. 21, the moral restoration of all free beings, and consequently of the devil, or an imaginable anti-christ, is so much the less to be assumed as a general article of faith, as in that case the history of the kingdom of God would be changed into a natural process.²

¹ "God all in all" is not a Pantheistic idea, nor a so called Theopantism. See page 40. The goal of history is not the dismissal of particular species and individuals, nor the return to universality; for in that case God would only be All, not all in all. Individuality, (created good in its kind, to which as such, determination for freedom and spontaneity is innate,) shall not be in itself removed, but it shall be abolished in its peculiarity, and elevated to a personality in God—to a personality which is a true and perfect fellowship, and an indwelling of God.

² The thesis of Divine universal grace, after placing its antithesis in the spontaneity of man, struggles after the synthesis of the freedom and blessedness of God's children in their entire kingdom. On account of the antithesis, and since the element of will is the condition of free development, eternal damnation, or the second death, continues to be a necessary hypothesis. But the originality of the thesis just as necessarily opposes an hypothesis of universal salvableness. No dogmatism could be endured in time and history, that would elevate either the one or other hypothesis to an absolute proposition. Compare Martensen, *die Christl. Taufe u. die baptistische Frage* iii. *die Prädestination*, p. 36, sq. All Scripture and all Christian dogmatic history warrant this relation of the subject.

§ 221. ETERNAL JOY.

The eternal joy into which the blessed enter, (Matth. xxv. 34,) is partly distinct from that foretaste of the hope of blessedness which they enjoy in this life, and partly different from that anticipated joy, in which, immediately after this life, they rest from their labours without losing their conscious con-

nexion with the world, Revelation xiv. 13. Anticipated joy is only of that kind (redemption from the body of this death leaving an incompleteness), alluded to in Heb. xi. 40, Rev. v. 10, 11, which will be abolished through the final judgment and the renewal of the world. What eternal joy may be in itself, surpasses every idea we can form of it, and every immediate representation given to us in the Apocalypse, 1 Cor. ii. 9,¹ Ps. cxxvi. 1. But it must resemble its own foretaste, or the joy of spiritual life on earth,²) and consequently, while excluding all the evil of sin,³ it will be a progress in the contemplative and operative, in the susceptible and spontaneous fellowship of Christ, that will float before us in hope,—a progress in fellowship which at the same time is a communion with God and a contemplative reciprocity with angels and the elect, including every beatific recognition and re-union; and whilst this eternal joy fulfils the universal and fundamental design of typical being, (§ 91) it secures in the utmost truth to each, his individuality, and yet in such a mode, that he shall dwell in God and hold communion with Him.

¹ “In this passage,” (Knapp strikingly remarks, *On Christian Faith*, ii. p. 589,) “properly speaking, the question, according to verse 7 and 8, turns on the Christian doctrine which hitherto was unknown, and not of human invention. But the whole passage tends to this—that God decreed this extraordinary condition through Christ, in order that we may be led to unutterable felicity.”

² Local representations, *e. g.* heaven, many mansions in my father’s house, everlasting habitations, city of God, &c., have their corresponding reality. Those topographical systems, indeed, which occur in pseudo inscriptions, among the Cabalists, Christian neo-Platonists, Scholastics, and in Oberlin, and others, are perfectly gratuitous, and destitute alike of either a scriptural or spiritual foundation. But even the entire denial of locality, or the translation of it into a spiritual condition (Morus), into Being in God, in heaven (Pfaff), is inadmissible. Gerhard, Baumgarten, and others, insist, on just grounds, on an *alicubi*, for there must be a new, a second nature and world adapted to spirit-

ual life, but, nevertheless, a nature and world which the saints shall possess as the material and local medium of their spiritual life.

³ Schleiermacher considers eternal bliss as merely the goal and limit. To others, and indeed according to 1 Cor. xv. 28, it appears a non-being. In the former view, regarded as an idea of exaltation, as well as of limitation, contrasts, and impediments, it may even comprehend evil. J. D. Michaelis and Reinhard concur with the latter view of the subject; whilst from the *μενειν* of faith and hope, according to 1 Cor. xiii. 13, they infer an adverse element which is yet to be overcome. In truth, however, faith and hope (compare 2 Cor. v. 7, 1 Cor. xiii. 12, 1 John iii. 2,) abide only in so far as the believing subject also abides as a contemplating one in dependence on an object hoped for and believed in, or in so far as that which is hoped and believed never passes away from him who believes. He never loses it, and it never loses itself. But love is greater, because it does not, like faith and hope, merely relate to God, but has itself a Divine nature, and is participative of Deity. God neither hopes nor believes, but knows and loves. A fundamental error, however, exists in Schleiermacher's theory, since finality, exaltation, and progress are inseparable from evil. The ancients correctly taught a *status impeccabilis impatibilis beatorum*, Revelation xxi. 4; 2 Peter, iii. 13. The latter is as far from excluding Becoming and Increasing, as Love is from excluding desire, Rest, action and effort, or Intuition Mediation.

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
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